Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 2 – The city of God

While the metaphysical compendiums in Wolffian tradition have usually ended with a look on natural theology, Darjes has left cosmology as the final chapter of his metaphysics. This makes some sort of sense, since he has already emphasised that cosmology is no proper part of metaphysics, since it does not deal with characteristics of all things or of things from one of the highest genera of things – cosmology is about world, which is a certain complex of things, consisting of many kinds of things (in Darjesian philosophy, material bodies and immaterial souls and spirits).

Another oddity is Darjes' inclusion of certain notions from natural law to his discussion. He is particularly interested of the concept of right and possession. Right to something, for Darjes, means that a person has the ability to use that something without hurting other persons or their rights. This seemingly innocuous definition allows Darjes to conclude that in fact God is the primary owner of everything – God surely can control everything that exists, and he cannot really hurt rights of others, since he made all things in the first place.

Darjesian definition has also important consequences for the rights of finite entities. Firstly, he notes that finite entities can really have rights only for complex things, because they have no power to do anything to simple entities. Secondly, since all things already belong to God originally, finite entities can have right to anything, only if God has provided them the right to use things in some manner.

In addition to owning everything, God also governs world. This means that he sets the goals toward which this ”city of God” strives. The main purpose divinity has set for everything, according to Darjes, is the happiness and perfection of all rational beings. Thus, Darjes concludes, all rational beings should strive for their own happiness and perfection and help others to find these also – and definitely not hinder others in their search.

Darjes does not go into particularities of what actions are good for happiness and perfection, but merely notes what tools God uses for guiding rational entities toward their appointed goal. Firstly, God can directly reveal some guidelines. Secondly, God might appoint further rewards and punishments and even a kind of heaven and hell, to provide further incitement for good actions. Despite these rather naive Christian notions, Darjes also supposes that all rational entities will eventually be able to perfect themselves – the purpose of punishments is also just to help personal perfection.

We are now finally finished with Darjesian metaphysics. Next up on the list is a return to the work of Martin Knutzen.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 2 – Goal of creation

All Wolffian metaphysics thus far have concluded with natural theology – study of the infinite entity behind everything else. Although natural theology isn't the end of Darjesian metaphysics, he certainly wasn't able to ignore it completely. He starts by noting that an infinite entity is characterised by being perfect in all senses. Thus, infinite entity must be active and spontaneous. It must also not be dependent on anything, hence, it cannot be a material entity consisting of other entities. In other words, infinite entity must be a spirit, which acts perpetually. If there are infinite entities, Darjes finally notes, there can be only of them.

Now, Darjes notes that some philosophers have denied the existence of any infinite spirit. Such philosophers can be called atheists, since they deny the existence of God, which would be infinite spirit. But Darjes goes even further and insists that even skeptics that doubt the existence of an infinite spirit should be called atheists. Indeed, Darjes extends the notion of atheist even further, by defining God as a certain kind of infinite spirit – that is, God is also defined, according to him, by having freely created all the finite entities. Therefore, Aristotle, who thinks that the perfect self-thinking intellect has not created anything, and Stoics, who think that even divine Logos doesn't do anything freely, could be called atheists, Darjes concludes.

Darjes spends quite a lot of time on debunking the arguments of all these supposed atheists, but his main argument is undoubtedly his supposed proof of God's existence. While Christian Wolff based his assumption on the existence of God to a variant of cosmological argument – the existence of e.g. my own soul can be explained only through God – and used the so-called ontological argument merely as an explanation of God's existence (i.e. by noting that God in its perfection has all that it takes to exist) and while Baumgarten had exclusively relied on ontological argument (that is, by arguing that a combination of all perfections must also contain perfection of existence), Darjes appears to just try to throw various arguments and see what sticks. He begins by noting that a notion of infinite spirit must be possible – indeed, spirits are possible, and there seems to be no problem in supposing a spirit that is more perfect than anything else, he insists. Then, Darjes continues, infinite spirit must exist, because it is such a thing that exists, if it just is possible. As if not completely convinced of this ontological proof, Darjes defends the existence of God with two other proofs – firstly, he uses the cosmological argument that all finite entities must be dependent on God, and secondly, a somewhat weaker proof that God's existence is probable, because otherwise we would have to make too many assumptions to explain everything in the world.

A topic that Darjes seems to regard as wanting a more thorough examination is the characterisation of God. A general foundation of the examination is that as a perfect entity God must have also perfect attributes. Indeed, these attributes are unique to God, Darjes says, and one cannot then make a true distinction between God's essence and his attributes, because there isn't any entity that would have similar attributes and still not be God.

Darjes notes that some attributes of God, such as his infinity, spirituality, immutability, necessity and uniqueness, do not concern anything that God does, while others or the so-called operational attributes do. A good example of the latter is the cognition of God, which should be the best kind of cognition possible – that is, Darjes says, God should be omnipotent. This omnipotent cognition of God is for Darjes threefold. Firstly, God knows through his very constituting force all the things that could be – this is natural cognition of God. Secondly, God also knows freely all the things happening through his spontaneous actions. Finally, Darjes notes, God must have cognition mediating between the other two kinds of cognition, that is, cognition of causal chains that lead to actualisation of different possibilities.

A counterpart to God's cognition is his volition, which Darjes classifies into two kinds corresponding with two kinds of God's cognition. Firstly, God wills through his very nature that all things must cohere with all the attributes of God. Of course, Darjes notes, all things simply must cohere with the perfection of divinity. In other words, God wills that some things, which necessarily are in a certain manner, must be as they are. Secondly, God's volitions are not restricted to necessities, but God also wills things that might not be as they are, such as the existence of some non-divine entities. Whatever the kind of volition, Darjes notes, the object of this volition must be optimally good. More particularly, God wills that there are finite, but free entities, that they will always have means for perfecting themselves through their free actions and that they should not squander their freedom. Furthermore, Darjes remarks, God never wills anything evil, but at most permits evil, that is, lets something bad happen, if it is necessary for the existence of something even more good. God doesn't even punish people, Darjes says, if this punishment does not contribute to the development of the punished persons.

Merely willing, God would just decree things, but in addition, he also executes his decrees, Darjes notes. In particular, this means that God has caused the existence of finite entities, that is, has created them. Darjes notes that it is unsure whether this act of creation happened at some particular point or whether it has been going on through eternity. In any case, Darjes continues, God does not just create finite things, but also continues to sustain them with the same act, by which he created them in he first place. God could, undoubtedly, just annihilate all finite entities, but he doesn't have any reason to do that.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 2 – Mind-body-interaction

No German metaphysician at the middle of 18th century could avoid the question what happens between soul or spirit and body, and Darjes is no exception to this trend. He is quite clear that soul and body are in some measure harmonious, that is, from occurrings in body it is possible to know something about occurrings in soul and vice versa. He is also quite explicit that this harmony is not complete, in other words, that there are actions in body or soul that are not reflected in the actions of the other.

Wolffian school recognised three different solutions to the mind-body problem: firstly, the assumption that soul and body had some real causal influence to one another, secondly, the occasionalism, according to which God bridged the divide between soul and body, and thirdly, the Leibnizian pre-established harmony. Like everyone else in Wolffian school, Darjes does not take occasionalism seriously, because it contradicts the freedom of human actions. Furthermore, like many philosophers of his generation, Darjes does not necessarily respect the traditional Wolffian answer or the pre-established harmony. Indeed, Darjes notes that because harmony of soul and body is to be explained, just assuming the existence of such a harmony is no real answer.

The only respectable option in Darjes' eyes is then the assumption of real interaction between soul and body. Like his wont always, Darjes makes intricate distinctions. He notes that body influences soul in quite a different manner than soul influences body. As a spontaneously active entity, soul cannot be affected by a causal chain originating outside it. Instead, Darjes argues, some movement in the nervous fluid can only remove impediments from the activities of soul and thus give occasion to some sensuous representation. Soul, on the other hand, should have the ability to casually influence nervous fluid and through it whole body.

Darjes concludes his account of rational psychology with few remarks on activities of soul and ways to classify souls and spirits and put them into a hierarchy (it is no wonder that he places soul requiring perceptual content in a lower rung than pure spirit). What we might still point out is his remark that soul cannot be said to be present in a single place in the body, but in the whole body and all its organic parts.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 2 – What is a soul?

Just like Wolffian tradition in general, Darjes distinguishes between empirical study of human personality – the recounting of what we can observe in ourselves – and rational study of it – explanation of these observations. The important characteristic in humanity, Darjes says, is that in addition to body, human person must have as its constituting element some spontaneous entity. He considers for the moment the possibility that a person would consist of more than one spontaneous entity, but finally notes that there is no reason to assume it.

Darjes goes on to develop further common characteristics of this spontaneous entity, based on its essence. First of all, it is an entity, and as such, it can be regarded as a possibility – it does not involve any contradiction – but also as actually existing – is perpetuates and is a substrate for properties. Furthermore, as an entity it must necessarily act.

Secondly, the spontaneous entity constituting one part of human is a simple entity. This means that it cannot be divided into any constituents. This implies, according to Darjes, that this element of humanity cannot be destroyed in the same manner as its body can. Thirdly, this entity acts spontaneously. In other words, it controls its natural conatus toward acting and regulates it according to its own perceptions on what is good or bad.

Darjes notes that the spontaneous entity every human being has two different aspects. Firstly, it is an animal soul, which interacts with body and thus represents things with the inferior cognitive faculty. Secondly, it is a spirit, which is a connected to a nexus of truths and thus represents things with the superior cognitive faculty. Human soul is thus a rational animal, combining features of both animal soul and spirit. Souls in general can then be classified into mere animal souls, rational animal souls and pure spirits. Still, Darjes thinks that these three classes are not completely distinct, but what once was a mere soul and not a spirit could develop into a real spirit.

Animal souls are then characterised by the inferior cognitive faculty. In other words, this animal soul – or just soul – cognises things through the medium of external sensations, which must be explicable through previous external sensations. A mere soul requires new external sensations to get new cognitions, and if the flow of sensations stops, soul effectively dies. That is, the entity that is the soul can well go on existing in another form, but it wouldn't anymore be a mere animal soul.

Spirits, on the other hand, are not intrinsically connected to sensations. That is, even if spirit does not sense anything, it might still produce new representations from its old representations through conceptualising intellect and reasoning. Thus, cessation of sensations does not mean death of a spirit. Furthermore, spirits, Darjes says, are not just spontaneous, but their actions are based on reasoned decisions – in other words, Darjes concludes, spirits are free.

Rational soul, such as that of a human being, is then both an animal soul and a spirit. As a soul, rational soul is dependent on sensations, while as a spirit it should not be dependent on sensations or it should be able to have cognitions without sensations. Still, in another sense rational soul, even as a spirit, is not completely independent of sensations, because sensations or in general changes in the body might hinder the use of conceptual faculties of rational soul. An obvious question is why rational soul needs this connection with the body and sensations, when these just seem to drag it down and restrict it. Darjes suggests as an answer that we require sensations as the original source of cognitions. Indeed, he considers it probable that only God would not require sensations for its cognition, while all finite spirits are finite just because of this dependence on external sensations.

As a spirit, human soul might still exist separately from its body and is thus practically immortal, Darjes notes, although it might still be annihilated. A more problematic question, according to Darjes, is what was the state of human soul before its connection with its body. Darjes notes that the final explanation of this connection must go back to God, but recounts three possible options. Firstly, one might think soul is created out of the souls of its parents. Darjes quickly discards this option, because it would make sense only if soul would be a complex entity.

Secondly, soul might be created by God at the very same moment as the body comes into existence, or thirdly, soul might have lived before the birth of the body. Darjes admits that both options are possible, but leans more clearly to the side of pre-existence. His argumentation is based on observation of human semen, which contains, of course, small organic bodies – this, Darjes insists, is sufficient evidence for the pre-existence of human soul. Clearly, soul in this pre-existent state would not have similar cognitions as us, because the corpuscles of the semen could not sustain human life.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 2 – Souls and bodies

The final chapters in Darjesian empirical psychology concern the interaction of soul with the body. He is not yet trying to explain this interaction – explanations belong more to the next section or rational psychology. Thus, Darjes is now merely out to note the various situations where such interaction occurs.

Darjes begins by saying that we observe a certain complex entity or body as one constituent in my existence. Indeed, he notes, this body is a mechanistic machine or a system of non-spontaneous entities, and just like all machines, it can only work through motions. Now, at some situations we perceive that certain motions within my body – e.g. those occurring in my sense organs – correspond with certain cognitive states. When these movements stop, this specific cognitive state stops, when the movements change, so does the cognitive state, and finally, if some internal state of the body, like a disturbance in blood circulation, confuses the movements, the cognitive state becomes also confused and doesn't become clarified until the confused state of the body stops.

Clearly what Darjes has been describing is sensation, which is one type of the so-called inferior cognitive faculty. Yet, Darjes notes, not all inferior cognitive faculty need not have so close connection to motions of body. This is especially true of imagination, which associatively moves from one representation to another, which it has often been connected with. Thus, while the original representation might have a connection with actual motions in my body, the second representation might have no such connection. Furthermore, the association makes it also possible that superior cognition has some connection with motions of our body. In other words, we can use sensuous symbols to represent e.g. universal conceptions and so make it possible that motions of body awaken certain universal thoughts in us.

In addition to the relation of body with human cognition, Darjes also considers the relation of appetites and aversions with body. He firstly notes that appetites and aversions by themselves do not produce any motions in our bodies – if we just crave for food, this still does not make us do anything. One must also have made a decision on the means by which e.g. our hunger should be dealt with, and this decision of means will then be followed by movement of our body. Although body by itself is a system of non-spontaneous entities, because of this relation to spontaneous choices of human soul we can call certain motions of our bodies spontaneous and free. On the other hand, certain motions in our body have no such relation to spontaneous choices and can then be called forced motions.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 2 – Desires and fears

Darjes singles out a distinct group of cognitions, namely, those where the objects cognised are something which we either incline to or recline from, in other words, appetites and aversions. The difference between appetites and aversions and other cognitions is quite evident, whenever we have the object of appetite or aversion present to us – we feel pleasure or pain. On the other hand, whenever we do not have the object with us, we desire for or fear it.

Darjes notes that appetites and aversions can be quantified, depending on how strong the respective desire or fear is. This quantification comes to the fore especially when appetites and aversions contradict one another. In other words, whenever an appetite and an aversion clash, the stronger prevails. One might wonder how appetites and aversions could clash. The simple answer lies in two sources of human cognition. If our appetites and aversions are based on the inferior cognitive faculty, they are sensible, and if they are based on the superior cognitive faculty, they are rational or volitions and nolitions belonging to a faculty called will. Thus, our sensible and rational appetites and aversions can clash, and if the sensible have the other hand, we experience some affect, while if the rational side preponderates, we have something analogous to affects.

A further distinction Darjes mentions concerns the relation of appetites and aversions to previous cognitive states – some of these rise from earlier states, others are innate to human mind. He still does not mean that we could simply explain appetites and aversions mechanically through the earlier states or the nature of human mind. Indeed, he is quick to emphasise that appetites and aversions spontaneous and hence contingent. This does not mean that appetites and aversions would be completely inexplicable, just that these explanations would use other means than mechanical causality.

In case of volitions and nolitions in particular, the explanation is based on their goals. It is somewhat unclear whether these goals are chosen by the will or not. In any case, when these goals are given, the will considers all the possible means for this goal and freely chooses the one it considers best. Of course, at least humans can have an erroneous view on what means are best and even what goals are good. Darjes is adamant that this possibility of error is the only explanation for the human ability to freely choose bad things. In fact, a spontaneous entity who couldn't make errors could not choose anything bad, Darjes concludes.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 2 (1744)

The second volume of Darjesian metaphysics begins with empirical psychology – or pneumatics, as Darjes prefers to call it – that is, explication of things we can experience in ourselves. The starting point for Darjes is the observation that we have in us something that resembles things that are not part of myself. In other words, we have representations, through which we are conscious of objects. Having a representation and being conscious of it, Darjes insists, is still not completely identical – we can have obscure, unconcious representations, while consciousness brings clarity to representations.

An important aspect of representation and cognition Darjes emphasises is the spontaneity behind it: my representations continue sometimes as vividly as before, sometimes not, and it is up to my attention whether they do. Furthermore, I can direct my attention successively to different aspects of the object of my cognition, that is, I can reflect this object. While consciousness makes representation clear, refection makes it distinct. This state of distinctness, Darjes insists is something we can only achieve while awake, and indeed, Darjes defines being awake as a possibility to reflect.

Darjes notes that sometimes reflection is hindered by associations awakened by something we find in the reflected object. This association is connected with the capacity of cognition to reproduce earlier representations. Another faculty – memory – is then required for recognising reproduced memories.

We have mentioned so far only representations of individual things, but we can also compare and contrast objects. Thus, it is possible to represent also connections between things – these things are similar or not equal or one might be the cause of the other.

An important subset of representations Darjes touches upon are sensations or representations of things that induce mutations in me, that is, objects of our senses or sensibles. Darjes notes that sensations can be divided according to the different parts of body the sensible object affects – the same object is represented differently, when it affects ear and when it affects eyes. Following Wolffian tradition, Darjes calls the part of cognition dealing with all these different kinds of sensations inferior cognitive faculty. A partial reason for this evaluative nomenclature must be that sensations are distracting – reflecting on an object becomes impossible, because sensation of another object might be stronger and prevent our reflection.

Darjes notes that there is no guarantee that we would sense or represent all things that affect our body, and indeed, he suggests that there must be some further reason explaining why we sense something. Analogically, we might represent things that can induce changes in my body, while they are not actually inducing such changes. This is the faculty of imagination, which Darjes includes also under inferior cognitive faculty. He, furthermore, divides objects of imaginations into, firstly, phantasms, which are complete objects that can be also sensed, and figments, which are combinations of parts that can be sensed.

The inferior cognitive faculty can only represent things that affect us, thus, it cannot be used for representing e.g. essences of things or universals. This task, Darjes says, must be left for superior cognitive faculty, which represents things in an insensible manner, that is, in such a manner that it isn't and even cannot be sensed. Darjes doesn't go into further details as to how this insensible cognition happens, but notes only that it is possible through the faculty of reflection. Through reflection and the use of signs, cognition forms universal and distinct concepts. If the concepts concern things in themselves, without relations to other things, we are speaking of intellect or understanding, while if they concern relations between things, we are speaking of reason. It is good to note that while it it easy to conceptually represent connections between things, Darjes admits that the inferior faculty has something analogous to reason, through which it can also represent connections.

Before moving to the next part, concerned with appetites and aversions, we might very briefly note what Darjes has to say about habit. The basis of habit, he suggest, is repetition of representations and operations involved with them. This repetition makes concepts stronger and thus makes cognising them more easy.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 1 - Building bodies

Ever since Descartes suggested that matter is defined by extension, philosophers had been proposing theories as to what Cartesian idea of matter had overlooked, since clearly, extension as such is not yet matter. Darjes enters this discussion in the section on somatology, or theory of bodies or composite entities. He notes that to make a set of multiple entities into a unified entity, it isn't enough just to put them together. Instead, these parts must also cohere with one another.

Now, as we saw in the previous post, Darjes thought that in order that entities can cohere, all of those entities must be non-spontaneous, but also some of them must be active. In other words, there are no completely passive bodies in Darjesian metaphysics, only more or less active. The level of activity in bodies can even be perceived, Darjes suggests, since the difference of fluids and solids reduces to it – fluid bodies have more active entities in them than solid bodies, which have only so much active entities as required for the sake of coherence. Since the difference between fluids and solids is ultimately based on the essential difference between active and passive entities, the difference between fluids and solids must also be essential, Darjes concludes. Somewhat surprisingly, this means that fluids cannot really change into solids or vice versa.

A significant part of philosophical treatises of corporeal objects from this period often include an account of simple mechanical interactions, in which two bodies collide with one another. Darjes is no exception to this rule. He considers several cases – what if only one is moving or both, what if colliding bodies are solids or fluids etc. We need not get too far into the details, but just to note the general attempt to determine the result of the collision from the constituents and the structure of the colliding bodies. For instance, in a collision between a solid and a fluid, the fluid gives away, because a fluid body has more active constituents, which will move according to their own drive, as soon as bonds of coherence holding them together loosen a little bit, while the solid can remain unified in an easier manner.

As a final part of the first tome of his metaphysics Darjes introduces a discipline called mechanology, a study of machines. Machines, for Darjes, are systems of non-spontaneous entities, in which systems, again, mean collections of entities that can affect one another. Systems and therefore also machines are to be clearly differentiated from cohering bodies – in a system, the constituting bodies do not form a single entity, but remain independent of one another. Darjesian understanding of machines is quite extensive – the constituting parts of machines can be solid or fluid bodies or theoretically even elements. Indeed, the whole mechanology remains on a quite general level, where Darjes finds out such revelatory truths as that the state of a machine depends on its previous state.

The second tome of Darjes metaphysics moves then to the investigation of soul, which shall also be the topic of my next post.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 1 - Monads without spontaneity equals elements

After ontology, Darjes turns his attention to monadology, which in his philosphy means two things: firstly, a discipline for the study of simple entities in general, and secondly, particularly study of those simple entities, which constitute complex entities, or elements. It is just natural to start with the general part.

Now, the essence of any simple entity, Darjes begins, consists of two things. Firstly, as simple it is indivisible or does not consist of further entities. Secondly, an an entity it is impenetrable or it cannot be a determination of any other entity. Just like in all previous Wolffian philosophy, because of its simplicity, a simple entity cannot have been generated from previously existing entities that would retain their existence even after the generation of new entity. Instead, a generated simple entity would have to have appeared instantaneously out of nothing. Similarly, when a simple entity is destroyed, it will be completely annihilated.

Another commonplace with earlier Wolffians is the importance of force as a basic characteristic of simple entities. For instance, because a simple entity does not consist of many entities, the only way quantities can be applied to it is through the strength or intensity of its basic force. What is more original is Darjes' attempt to use the notion of force as a way to divide simple entities into further genera. Some forces do not act by themselves, but require still some efficient cause to activate them – simple entities with such forces Darjes calls passive. Some forces require only a removal of obstacles for their activation – simple entities with such forces Darjes calls active. And it wouldn't be a Darjesian division, if he wouldn't note the possibility of a third genera, with simple entities with both active and passive characteristics, although in practice he doesn't mention them often.

The essence of passive simple entities in Darjesian philosophy is simple. By themselves, they do nothing. They can be activated by impenetrability of other simple entities, which move to the place where the passive entity is and thus force it to move away from its original location. After this, the passive entity acts, that is, it moves, and cannot stop from moving, unless something external stops it. In effect, a passive simple entity isn't spontaneous, that is, it cannot determine itself to act.

Active entities, on the other hand, might be spontaneous. Yet, it is also possible, Darjes says, that an active entity is not spontaneous, in other words, it might require only removal of obstacles for its own activity, but perhaps cannot itself remove those obstacles. In case of spontaneous simple entities, on the other hand, these obstacles come mainly from the entity itself – in a sense they forbid themselves of doing things. Spontaneous entities can remove such a self-imposed obstacle and thus, in a sense, choose to do something. In other words, they act first on themselves and through this self-action act toward other things. Darjes suggests that this self-action happens always through representations or perceptions – the simple entity perceives some goal as good, that is, as conforming to its essence, and proceeds to actualise that goal.

After defining the three species of simple entities – passive, non-spontaneously active and spontaneous simple entities – Darjes goes on to discuss their possible interactions with one another. In case of mere passive entities, these interactions – mostly collisions – happen according to the laws of motion, which had been a hot philosophical topic since the time of Descartes. The introduction of active entities complicates interactions, even when the active entities are not spontaneous, since a collision might not just force an active entity to move, but also to remove impediments for natural movement of the entity. In case of a spontaneous simple entity, finally, other entities cannot really make it do anything, but merely provide an occasion for the spontaneous entity to do something.

An important relation between simple entities in Darjesian scheme is coherence, that is, a relation of proximity in which the simple entities have become so unified that one cannot be moved without moving the other. For such a coherence it is not enough that the simple entities just lie passively side by side, Darjes notes, because then one of them could be simply moved without any change in the other. Instead, the diverse entities must act on one another and this act cannot be mere movement – in other words, they must somehow attract one another. Thus, at least some of the cohering entities must be naturally active. Then again, Darjes notes, a spontaneous simple entity cannot really cohere with other simple entities, because other entities can at most provide an occasion for it to act. These results are important especially for the special part of Darjesian monadology, because Darjes thinks that unified bodies are essentially constituted from simple entities by coherence. Hence, elements – simple entities constituting bodies – cannot be spontaneous. Furthermore, because infinite entity must be most perfect in every sense, and like many philosophers before him, Darjes regards activity and especially spontaneity as more perfect than passivity, all elements are revealed to be finite.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 1 - Connecting substances

While in previous post I discussed Darjesian notions of entity and substance, when regarded in abstraction from other entities and substances, now we shall see what happens when entities and substances are connected to one another. Darjes notes that these connections fall into three general classes, depending on whether the connection exists between mere entities, between both mere entities and substances or between substances. In case of the first kind of connection the things connected are regarded as just being impenetrable to one another. Example of a such a connection would be placing many entities into a same space so as to form a figure.

If in addition to or in place of mere entities substances are added to the connection, Darjes notes, we get forces to the equation. Such connections involve either the existence of substances or then their states – for instance, existence of certain substances might be connected with a state of one substance. In other words, such substantial connections concern various interactions between substances, for example, when one substance acts upon a passive substance or when one substance removes obstacles stopping some substance from acting.

All connections involving mere entities are extrinsic in the sense that it doesn't affect entities if we e.g. arrange them to form a figure. Thus, these connections are completely contingent. One might think that the case might be different with substantial connections, but Darjes notes that this is not so – substances can exist independently of one another, so there is no necessity that e.g. a substance affects another substance. Because no connections between entities or substances is necessary, Darjes says, these connections must ultimately be dependent on some necessary entity.

A particular type of connection Darjes mentions is the relationship between cause and what is caused. Like always, Darjes makes interesting divisions rarely seen in previous Wolffian philosophy. Thus,he notes when discussing cause or caused, one can firstly regard cause and caused as mere subjects – that is, as a material cause and caused – secondly as containing a reason for the possibility of something or having a reason of possibility in some other entity – this is what Darjes calls active/passive causating reason – and finally, as containing or having in something else a reason for actuality – active or passive causality. Like many other Wolffians before him, Darjes goes into great lengths in describing various causal notions, such as principal cause and instrumental cause or mediate and immediate cause, and we need not follow him in such a detail.

Just like almost all Wolffians thus far, Darjes defines the notion of space through the spatial relations an entity could have. Indeed, spatial relations are based on certain connections between entities, in which one entity cannot take the place of the other entities. Such space is then no true entity, but merely an abstraction out of real entities and their relationships. While spatial relationships are completely external to the entities or substances, if one adds activities to the equation, the connection becomes at least more internal. Darjes speaks of presence, by which he means the factor of one substance affecting another – the more a substance affects another, the more present it is to that other substance. Darjesian presence is then a much stronger relationship than mere spatial closeness – if one unites entities by bringing them close to one another, the union is merely external, while a union involving substances being present to one another is internal.

Before moving to more particular parts of metaphysics, Darjes finally considers the notions of infinity and finity, which he defines simply through the notion of perfection – finite entity is such that something can be more perfect than it, while an infinite entity is as perfect as is possible. The finity of an entity does not mean it couldn't be also perfect in some measure. It just isn't completely perfect and all perfection it has must belong also to the infinite entity. It is then immediately clear that all passivity, incompleteness and possibility of non-existence are signs of finity.

Already at this place in metaphysics, Darjes introduces Wolffian aposteriori and apriori proofs of God's existence, although he is, of course, not yet speaking of God. He notes, firstly, that since all finite entities are contingent, they must ultimately depend on a necessary infinite entity. Hence, if finite entities exist, an infinite entity surely must exist also (aposteriori proof). Since it is clearly possible that a finite entity would exist, an infinite entity must also be a possibility. Because infinite entity can be only impossible or necessary, it must then exist necessarily (apriori proof). We see here a similar dual role played by the two proofs as in Wolff's theology, the difference being that Darjes has to assume only the possibility of something finite.

Infinite and finite form then the major division of entities. Infinite entity is essentially unique, so no further division of that species is possible. Finite entities, on the other hand, can divide into further subspecies, depending on whether they are simple or complex.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 1 - Forceful being

We have been studying what Darjes calls primary philosophy, but we finally come to his ontology, when we see his definition of an entity (ens). In effect, by an entity Darjes means something that is not accident, that is, which can be in itself. What this being in itself means, according to Darjes, is at least that in the same place as one entity exists, no other entity can exist. Thus, impenetrability of an entity is an ontological characteristic for Darjes, while accidents might share the same place by occurring in same entity. An entity need not exist, but it can be a merely possible entity. If it does exist, Darjes calls it a substance.

Darjes notes that all substances can contain something which is a reason for something else being what it is. In other words, they are forces that can act on other things. Now, because this activity is an essential part of what substances are, they can also be divided according to their level of activity. The highest kind of substance is completely active and needs at most something to remove obstacles from its way to start acting – they are what Darjes calls an effective conatus. At the lowest rang of substances are completely passive substances, which require some efficient reason to make them act – these are what Darjes calls bare potentia. Between these two extremes fall cases where substances are in some sense passive and in some sense active – these substances Darjes calls either ineffective conatuses or potentias with conatus (it is difficult to say whether Darjes means these two to be separate groups, depending on whether the emphasis is on the active or the passive side of the substance or whether they are just two names for the same thing).

Darjes does not just distinguish between different kinds of forces or substances, but also between different kinds of actions these substances can make occur. The actions might happen within the substances or be intrinsic to it – these would be immanent actions. Then again, the actions might also be extrinsic to the substance – these would be transitive actions. Of course, Darjes also admits that some actions might be partially immanent and partially transitive.

Like all Wolffians, Darjes is a nominalist who insists that no universals can exist. Hence, all substances must be individuals. Although substances cannot then be divided into universals and individuals, Darjes does divide them into complete and incomplete substances, depending on whether a substance acts or not. He also notes that a substance can be variably or contingently complete, if it sometimes happens to act and sometimes not. Even if a substance would be contingently complete, it still might be a necessary existent, since there is no necessity that a necessary existent would always act.

A notion near to completeness is the subsistence of a substance. Darjes defines subsistent substance as a complete substance that is not sustained by something else. Here, sustaining means a relation in which one force determines another to act in a precise manner. Thus, subsisting substance would act and not be acted upon by other substances.

Darjes goes on to define states of an entity. In effect, these are nothing more than collections of some determinations that the entity has. For instance, being a substance or substantiality and subsistence are states that some entity might have. Depending on the determinations making up the state, the state can be internal, external or mixed, and it can be necessary or contingent. For instance, if there are some entities existing absolutely necessarily, then they have an absolutely necessary state of substantiality. With contingent entities, on the other hand, their state of substantiality is also contingent and in fact depends ultimately on some absolutely necessary substance.

Darjes does not remain on mere level of definitions, but tries to determine some general characteristics true of all substances, based mostly on the principle of sufficient reason. The most important conclusion is that all substances must persevere in their state of action or non-action, until some further reason makes them change their state. Thus, an action continues, until something comes to impede it.

Darjes also spends some time considering how to quantify forces. His idea is to measure forces through the actions they can make happen. For instance, if two passive substances have the same quantity of force is they are as quick in producing same actions, then they will produce same action in same time. Thus, by checking what the substances can achieve and how quickly they do it, one can compare the quantity of their forces with one another.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics I (1743)

Darjes is quickly becoming one of the most interesting second-generation Wolffians. In his logical works he has shown himself to have an analytical mind with an ability to make clear and still profound distinctions, has manifested extensive historical knowledge of such then rarely mentioned things like the medieval theory of supposition, and finally, has been quite original, for instance, in his metaphysical reading of predication. It will be interesting to see whether this positive view will continue through the first part of his metaphysical work, Elementa metaphysices.

As metaphysics is in the heavy core of philosophy, I will use several articles to go through in more detail what Darjes had to say about its many facets. I shall begin by asking what he himself considered to be the nature of metaphysics. We find an interestingly original take already in Darjes' view on the nature of philosophy. While previous Wolffians had either emphasised the object of philosophy – e.g. happiness – or then saw the essence of philosophy in finding reasons, for Darjes philosophy is all about abstracting. In other words, Darjes does not think philosophy or science is about explaining things, but about describing their general features.

Darjesian definition of metaphysics seems more in line with the Wolffian tradition. Its topic, Darjes says, are possible objects and the primary genera to which the possible objects divide into. Metaphysics then divides naturally into two different disciplines – ontology as the study of possible objects as such and special metaphysics as the study of primary genera of possible objects.

Thus far the division of metaphysics with Darjes doesn't seem surprising, but when it comes to special metaphysics, Darjes introduces some interesting novelties. Like with many Wolffians, for Darjes basic division of things was into simple and composite things. Darjes found from this division two primary parts of special metaphysics – monadology and somatology. This was already a bit of a novelty, since this division did not completely correspond with the usual division into cosmology on the one hand, psychology and natural theology on the other hand. While e.g. Wolff's cosmology contained a study of elements, in Darjesian division elements as simple objects were a topic to be handled in monadology – they formed the topic of monadology proper.

In addition to monadology proper, Darjes divided monadology into psychology – study of souls – and something called pneumatology – study of spirits – where both souls and spirits were not elements of bodies. We will have to consider the full import of this division later, but at least the pneumatology should contain natural theology as the study of infinite spirit, while finite spirits should be the topic of pneumatology proper. Just like other Wolffians, Darjes suggests that psychology should have an emprical side, because experiences are our only route to some capacities of souls. Darjes also extends this demand to pneumatology, which should have its own experimental side.

The main difference from other Wolffians is the lack of world as a proper topic of metaphysics. Indeed, this is quite logical, since world is not a primary genera of entities, but a collection of some of them – bodies form a corporeal world, while souls and spirits together form a moral world and both of them together a transcendental world or the world in the most extensive sense.

Next time, I shall begin with Darjesian primary philosophy, which strangely isn't identical with ontology and wasn't included in Darjes's division of metaphysics.

Joachim Darjes: Introduction in inventing art or theoretical-practical logic (1743)

Darjes has been one of those philosophers who, while outwardly staying within the Wolffian school, have in truth distanced themselves from some key tenets of Wolff's system and taken their ideas to original directions. We have already seen Darjes suggest rather interesting innovations in his book on logic. If you know the field of German philosophy in the first half of 18th century, you won't be surprised to hear that his Latin book on same topic, Introductio in artem inveniendi seu logicam theoretico-practicam, is a much fuller treatment.

In a sense, most of the additions concern the necessary presuppositions of logic, that is, its metaphysical underpinnings. Like all the Wolffians thus far, Darjes considers certain key notions that we hold to be logical as ontological – for instance, the principle of contradiction is not a principle denying the affirmation and negation of the same proposition, but describes the ontological impossibility of incompatible things actualising at the same position. Darjes goes even further than other Wolffians, suggesting in a manner reminiscent of Russell that the subject-predicate -relation is not just a human convention, but reflects the order of reality itself.

Another interesting novelty in Darjesian ontology is that the basic ingredients of the reality are not so much individuals, but characteristics, of which individuals are then full combinations, to which no new characteristics can be added. Part of this ontological picture is the idea that some of these characteristics are atomic or not analysable to further characteristics. This picture resembles Wolffian idea of determinations, but seems ontologically stronger – Darjes takes characteristics to be things, if only partial ones.

Another interesting, if only a passing addition to the preface of logic, is Darjes's account of truth. As you might recall, with Wolff, truth in the logical sense was assigned a place only in the applied logic, because truth required relating the content of pure logic – concepts, judgements and syllogisms – to what they are supposed to represent. In a sense, Darjesian reorganisation is quite natural. With Darjes, as with all Wolffians thus far, logic is based on psychology, because concepts, judgements and syllogisms exist within human soul. Surely the relation of these logical items to what they represent is not a mere afterthought, but a necessary part of the psychology of human thinking underlying logic.

I have already described the most important novelties in the Darjesian logic itself in my description of its German version. This does not mean that his Latin logic would have nothing of interest, beyond the preface. One peculiar feature of Darjesian Latin logic book is its emphasis on invention, clearly expressed in the title of the work. Darjes is anxious to present not just theorems, but also solutions to problems – for instance, Darjes does not just define clear concepts, but also explains how to make one's concepts clearer. This is not a complete novelty, since we just saw Bilfinger doing something similar in his own logic.

Although sections on rules for disputations, communication of truths and hermeneutics are an addition in Darjes's Latin logic, they are not that peculiar in the more extensive context of logic textbooks. More interesting is the second part of Darjesian logic, which he calls dialectics, in separation from the part containing analytics. In effect, what Darjes means by dialectics is a study of probability and a search for probable truths – it is like reading part of Aristotelian logic through Bayesian eyes. What is even more intriguing is Darjes's idea of applying probability to pondering testimonies or to evaluating different hermeneutical possibilities.

This is just a glimpse of Darjes's innovations. Next time I shall again return to Wolff's natural law.

Joachim Darjes: Universal institutions of jurisprudence (1740)

Darjes is one of those philosophers who are not afraid to dabble in many fields of philosophy. We have already seen his take on logic and some of his metaphysical views, while the current work, Institutiones jurisprudentiae universalis, belongs to the same genre as Wolff's series on natural law, first volume of which was published in the same year as Darjes's book. Unlike Wolff, Darjes manages to go through the whole of natural law and the so-called law of nations within the space of one book.

Darjes uses a similar structure in his book as earlier writers on natural law – he starts from an individual human being and moves through simple interpersonal relationships to communities and finally to a civil state. Similarly familiar is Darjes's view of what makes up the good of human beings – because humans have body and soul and external possessions, they should take care of their physical, mental and economical state.

Body, soul and possessions are something we should respect in everyone – this is the basis for human interaction in Darjes's philosophy, and it is so fundamental that it holds even in an ”absolute human condition”, that is, the so-called state of nature, in which no communities yet exist. Darjes also admits that even before creating communities humans are capable of making pacts with one another and that they are indeed obligated to hold onto them – this is what forms the beginning of trade.

Yet, pacts are not the only thing pulling humans together, Darjes says, because there are certain natural reasons for human interaction – Darjes is speaking of marital relations and parental relations, but also of relations between master ans servant. All of these relations form then natural communities, the conglomeration of which is family (one does wonder what the relationship between master and servant does in this list). In comparison, all the other communities are then just hypothetical, in other words, they are not natural, but based on some further conditions.

It is then not surprising to see Darjes expounding next the theory of civil states. He does note the possibility of several families living in a state of anarchy – in principle, anarchy means for Darjes that all families are equal to one another. The need for civil state rises then in quite a Hobbesian manner from a need for security and involves giving some people the right to govern the whole collection of families. This right to rule does not mean complete abrogation of the rights of other citizens, but it does give the rulers the necessary authority for maintaining security. Darjes think rulers have even the right to restrict the emigration of the citizens of their civil state.

Interestingly, Darjes also considers religious communities. He firstly sets them under the authority of the civil state – civil state has a right to eradicate even religious communities within its borders, if they happen to threaten its security. Furthermore, religious communities must respect the right of conscience, which means that they can't forcefully convert other people to their cause. Then again, Darjes says, a religious community and its rulers have a right to homogenize the beliefs of their members. They can't really force anyone to change their views, but they can use their representatives to expound what dogmas their creed has – and they can excommunicate people who steer too far away from these dogmas.

The final part in Darjes's book consists of the so-called law of nations or the study of relations between states. The main idea of Darjes is that states live in a condition of nature toward one another. Like in case of individuals, the state of nature does not imply completely lawless state. Instead, Darjes thinks there are certain infringible rules of conduct that must be obeyed in international affairs. Thus, a state should respect he borders of other states, hold the treaties made with other states and declare a war only when the other state has given a just cause for it.

So much for Darjes and natural law. Next time we shall be one step closer to Kant, when we for the first time meet one of his teachers.

Joachim Georg Darjes: The existence of freely existing necessary human actions (1739)

We have already seen one book of Darjes, namely, an interesting text book on logic, which deviated slightly from the normal Wolffian manner of presentation. De necessaria actionum hominis liberarum existentium existentia is just a short text of under ten pages and its topic seems rather worn out in the field of German philosophy: how to reconcile the principle of sufficient reason with the apparent freedom of human action. Yet, although Darjes' solution to this question is far from original, it at least is a refreshingly clear and straightforward account of one position in this dilemma.

Darjes begins, like a good Wolffian, by accepting the principle of sufficient reason. We have many times seen how difficult it is to read this principle, and in many cases, to decide what it actually means. Darjes has a very strict understanding of the principle – if a sufficient reason exists, then that which it is reason of must also exist. In effect, sufficient reason becomes with Darjes almost the same thing as determining cause.

How does such a determinism then combine with free actions? Well, it all comes down to how freedom is defined. For Darjes, freedom of human actions lies in the fact that it is the human itself, who gets to decide what she will do from several equally possible actions. Although such free actions cannot be based on anything outside humans, they can be based on something inside humans. This basis of action must be, Darjes concludes, a representation of maximal good in human mind.

Combining determinism and freedom becomes then quite easy. Human being has a representation of highest good and her actions are determined only through that representation – hence, they are free actions. Then again, this representation determines necessarily what the action following it will be, and so the determinism is retained.

One might think that Darjes's attempt to break the Gordian knot is as effective and as against the rules of the game as the fabled original was. Indeed, it all seems to depend on Darjes merely assuming what freedom of actions means. Yet, Darjes does have other arguments for his position. Notably, he says that his definitions are believable, because they agree with some of our important intuitions. We do think it is possible to know from the values and beliefs of a person how she will act in certain situations – the whole popular psychology is based on this assumption. Unless our representations truly determined our actions, none of this would be true.

As interesting as Darjes's defense of his deterministic position is, the shortness of the text makes it a bit undeveloped. Next time, we shall see what Wolff had to say about free actions in his writings on natural law.

Joachim Georg Darjes: Theoretical art of reasoning (1737)

Joachim Georg Darjes (1714-1791)

Going through even the most insignificant philosophers of a certain era might seem like a complete waste of time – surely one would be better using one's time by just concentrating on the most memorable and influential figures, like Kant and Hegel. Yet, it is just by looking at these seemingly unimportant figures that one finds, on the one hand, clear trends and fashions, and on the other hand, unexpected breaks in trends and surprising novelties.

Darjes' book Die lehrende Vernunft-kunst is one of those rare works that appears to be quite traditional, but has interesting deviations from the current norm. On the surface, the book seems to follow quite faithfully the trend of Wolffian textbooks on logic, with some minor deviations. Thus, the book begins with the ontological principle of contradiction, introduces as its consequence something called a law of certainty (if something is A, then it is A), and finally mentions the principle of sufficient reason as the explanation of how actuality differs from possibility. Quite standard division of cognition into historical, philosophical and mathematical forms comes next together with a classification of philosophical sciences, which in its essentials appears quite Wolffian. Chapters on philosophical style and general need of logic show also nothing surprising.

This has all been just the preface, and when the actual book begins, Darjes starts to really use the mathematical style. A typical Wolffian textbook of the time is usually presented in numbered paragraphs. Darjes uses them also, but he also notes whether the paragraph in question is meant to be a definition, arbitrary stipulation, statement drawn from experience, proposition or corollary to be proved or just an additional remark. One at once notes that many of the propositions of the book are based on experiences, justifying Hegel's often made complaint that logic of his time was just a bunch of empirical statements. Of course, because the logic is meant to be a study of human faculties of thought, it is just understandable that introspective evidence on these faculties is required.

It is with Darjes' account of mental faculties that we find the true novelties. The description of senses, imagination, memory and reflection are sufficiently similar to Wolffian empirical psychology, although Darjes' suggestion that all sensations are produced by actual objects seems a bit naive. The truly surprising statement comes with the study of understanding and concepts, which Darjes clearly defines as representations of universals. Thus, just by stipulating, it seems, Darjes has denied the existence of individual concepts. This makes a difference in classification of concepts. While Wolff had spoken of a formal difference between concepts (their differing degree of clarity) and their material difference (whether they denote individuals or universals), Darjes can speak only of their formal differences. But the differences go even further. For Wolff, understanding was merely a faculty for analysing and breaking apart our representations, whether they be individual or universal, and thus in a perfectly Lockean fashion just a further development of our perceptive faculties. Darjes, on the contrary, redefines understanding as a faculty of generalisations. In effect, Darjes is restricting the area of understanding, but so also clarifying its role – understanding is now clearly distinguished from senses and imagination, which might be seen as a step toward the Kantian separation of faculties.

Some differences can be also found in Darjes' account of definition and especially the distinction between real and nominal definitions. Wolff had stated that for nominal definition one had to be able to distinguish the defined from similar things, while for real definition one had to know why the defined thing was possible – a preferred method was to know how to generate this thing. Clearly, nominal definitions might not be real, but also real definitions might not be nominal, because one could generate things one couldn't properly distinguish. Darjes, on the other hand, defines the two types of definitions through notion of essence and essential property. Nominal definitions mean knowing some essential property of the thing defined, that is, a property that the thing has constantly – clearly enough for distinguishing the thing, but most likely also too much. The real definition is then characterised by Darjes as knowing the essence or the ground of all these essential properties. Here, a rule for generating this particular thing should be enough, but evidently it should also involve knowing what the essential properties of the thing are and being able to distinguish it – again Darjesian real definition is far stronger than Wolffian.

I will skip Darjes' account of language, although it shows surprising familiarity with the medieval theory of supposition, that is, the idea that the meaning of the word changes depending on the context of the other words. The reason for skipping is that Darjesian classification of judgements shows considerable movement towards the later Kantian classification of judgments. I have already noted that the division of judgements according to quality and quantity were already in place in Wolff'sLatin logic. Similar classifications occur with Darjes too, although with some nuances.

The classification according to quantity is almost identical to one with Wolff: judgements are either singular, particular, universal or undetermined. The difference is that while Wolff classified singular judgements as a type of particular judgements, Darjes notes that they could be classified with universal judgements, because e.g. Socrates is everyone in the class with only him as a member.

The classification according to quality shares similar resemblance with the Wolffian classification. Both Darjes and Wolff start by dividing all judgements into affirmative and negative, although Darjes apparently has rather idiosyncratic way of understanding negative judgements as attaching ”not” to the subject of the judgement. Then, while Wolff thought infinite judgements to be a type of negative judgements, Darjes takes them to be a type of affirmative judgements: affirmative judgement is either finite (its predicate is positive) or infinite (its predicate is negative). Similarly Darjes then divided negative judgements into conditionally and simply negative judgements.

The true innovation of Darjes lies in his third method of classifying judgements according to their ”whatness”. This rather obscure name hides behind it, among other things, both Kantian classifications of relation and modality. The basic division of judgements into simple and complex hails already from Wolff, although he understood also hypothetical judgements as simple, while for Darjes the only simple judgements are what Kant would later call categorical assertoric judgements.

Darjes then divides complex judgements into distinctly and indistinctly complex judgements. Starting from the easier subdivision, distinctly complex judgements are those which clearly consist of many judgements. Such judgements either hold that some subjudgements must hold together or deny that such subjudgements cannot hold at the same time. In the first type, the judgement could be simple conjunction saying that two subjudgements do happen to be true (”A is both B and C”), but it might also just state the hypothetical that one subjudgement is a condition of the other (”If A is B, it is C”). The second type contains then similarly judgements that state the fact that some subjudgement holds and another not (”A is not B, but C”), while it might also just present a disjunction of alternatives (”A is either B or C”). This side of the classification of complex judgements contains then two divisions from the Kantian classification of judgements according to their relation.

Indistincly complex judgements then contain words that somehow modify the basic sense of the judgement. A major part of such indistincly complex judgements are formed by what would be later called modalities, but what Darjes names explicative judgements – words like ”possibly”, ”impossibly”, ”necessarily” and ”contingently” explicate the relation between the subject and the predicate. Showing again his interest in medieval philosophy, Darjes notes that unlike what Michael Psellus said, ”truly” and ”untruly” are not similar explicators, but more like second-order statements about the truth or falsity of the judgements. The rest of the indistinctly complex judgements exclude something (”only A is/ is not B”), restrict the validity of a judgement (”in so far as p, q) or make some comparisons (”A is more B than C”). All in all, quite a mixed bunch, but most important is the inclusion of modalities, which has been the first time in my reading list that they appear in a logic book.

Like in most books on logic at the time, I can easily skip the part on syllogisms, because nothing significantly new comes up in that section. Then again, this does not mean I could close the text here, because there's still the final section on demonstration to go through. What is interesting in this context is Darjes' account of what he calls undeniable and deniable judgements or propositions. At first sight, there's nothing particularly strange about Darjes' definition of undeniable judgements – in an undeniable judgement, we can by having a distinct representation of the subject of the judgement say immediately that the predicate belongs to it. Well, the definition does have some superficial resemblance to later Kantian notion of an analytic judgement – and the feeling of resemblance is heigtened when one finds out that Darjes thinks the principle of contradiction suffices as a criterion of truth for undeniable judgements.

What makes Darjes' definition distinct from later Kantian notion of analytic judgements is his insistence that beyond definitions and tautologies judgements based on experience are also undeniable. Although this might at first seem rather unintuitive, Darjes does have a point. Consider the subject of an experimental judgement – this is just an individual we happen to represent. Now, it is quite clear that a judgement based on nothing but experience merely states some characteristic that is already evident in this representation – we see a duck and note that it seems white. In this sense the judgement is also based on the principle of contradiction – if the object seems white, we cannot but affirm this.

The difference with Kant arises probably from the fact that Darjesian definition of undeniable judgements speaks of representations in general, while Kantian definitions of analytical and synthetical judgements are made in terms of concepts. Indeed, Darjesian judgements of experience are always singular - we experience only individuals - and thus their subject cannot be or refer to universal or concept.

Of course, most of our judgements supposedly based on experiences actually overstep the limit of individual experiences just by making generalisations out of individual experiences (ironically, many of the supposed experiences in Darjes book appear to do do). The account of such judgements, Darjes tells us, should be based on probability – which apparently should be handled on the second part of Darjes' book. Unfortunately, I haven't been able to find this second book on ”übende Vernunft-lehre” or practical logic, and I cannot even say whether Darjes ever published it.

All in all, Darjes' book with all its small deviations and original quirks is a sign for an end of an era. Another sign will be seen in next post, when we say farewell to a certain opponent of Wolff.