Christian Wolff: Natural right 6 – Right of necessity

One of the major topics of Wolff’s earlier volumes of Jus naturae was the distinction between the primaeval community of things and the later introduction of private ownership. Wolff considered the move toward the latter a good thing, but now he reveals that the ownership is not an absolute thing: there is a tacit assumption that if a person is bereft of necessities of life, they can even use things owned by another to satisfy these necessities. This right he calls a residual right remaining from the primaeval community.

This residual right, Wolff continues, is but an example of the more extensive class of rights of necessity (jus necessitatis). By this he refers to any right to do something that is usually not allowed, for the sake of some indispensable obligation that could not be otherwise satisfied. In other words, a right of necessity occurs in cases where several laws collide with one another. Indeed, he adds, all natural laws have tacit exceptions that they need not be followed, if some inevitable necessity prevents this. For instance, although we are usually obligated to help people in danger, the case is different if we are also in danger and have to first and foremost save ourselves.

While duties toward others can be overridden by right of necessity, Wolff insists, duties toward God cannot. In other words, Wolff thinks God should be worshipped, no matter what the necessity. Immediately after saying this, Wolff notes some exceptions. We should worship God internally, but we cannot do this, if we happen to be out of our mind – still, even in this case, Wolff notes, the obligation to worship exists, but it has just been suspended until we come back to our senses. In case of external worship, such as going to church, on the other hand, there might be some other duty that requires immediate satisfaction and thus prevents us from going to church for the time being.

Wolff goes into more detail investigating various cases where a right of necessity holds. One very classical example is that of shipwreck, with people trying to save themselves by using a boat that cannot carry all the passengers. Wolff thinks that, in general, first come is first served, and if all enter the boat at the same time, the stronger ones can just throw away the weaker ones. The case is somewhat different, he thinks, if the owner of the boat is present, as they have the right to decide who is to board the boat.

An example particularly relevant to rights remaining from the primaeval community occurs when a person is starving, but cannot obtain food by purchase, work or even begging. In such a state, Wolff says, the person is allowed to just take what they need from others, if necessary, even by using violence, and this is not to be seen as theft or robbery. More generally, if a person necessarily requires the use of a thing they cannot otherwise obtain, they can use such a thing belonging to someone else: for example, we are allowed to use weapons of another person, if we are threatened by an assailant and have no means of our own to defend ourselves. Even so, Wolff adds, the thing in question should be returned to its original owner, if possible. If not, for instance, if the thing is consumed by its use, like a piece of food, similar thing or at least something of equal worth should be returned.

A case that intrigues Wolff very much is that of a common danger making it necessary to destroy the property of a person, say, when an impending shipwreck necessitates throwing some cargo in the sea or when preventing the spread of fire requires wrecking some building. The basic principle is simple – if the destruction is necessary, it can be done, but the damages are to be compensated – but the more intricate question is who is to contribute in each case. In the case of cargo thrown from the ship, Wolff suggests that the compensation should be the duty of the owner of the ship and of everyone who had cargo that was not thrown in the sea, and to determine how much each is to contribute, the value of the destroyed and the saved cargo and of the ship with all instruments is to be estimated. To make matters even more complicated, Wolff adds that passengers and the payment they have contributed should also be taken into account, as well as the weight of various pieces of cargo and even of the passengers (e.g. if someone has thrown away lighter, but more expensive cargo, they should be more responsible of the damages). And of course, if the ship sinks, even if cargo was thrown in sea, no contribution is required.

In the case of the house destroyed because of raging fire, Wolff explains, the owners of the buildings that the fire could have reached should first and foremost contribute to the compensation for the damages. Wolff makes two important exceptions: firstly, those whose buildings were not saved, but burned down, need undoubtedly not contribute, and secondly, if the destroyed building was already being burned to ground, no one has to compensate for anything. Finally, if there was a certain person who was responsible, either through deliberate choice or through negligence, of the fire, this person is solely responsible for the compensation.

Wolff argues that the rights remaining from the primaeval community also go further than mere jus necessitatis. This is the case with what Wolff calls res innoxia utilitas, that is, something that we can use to our advantage without harming anyone, not even the owner of the thing, An example Wolff provides is a river: its owner is not hurt in any way, if someone draws water from it. A perhaps more important case of innoxia utilitas is that of using other people's lands. Passage through those lands and their rivers, roads and bridges should be allowed for both people and their merchandise, unless there is reasonable fear for damages, Wolff insists, although the owners might ask for a fee to provide for the maintenance of the road network. Wolff even thinks one is allowed to remain for a time in the lands of others for just reasons, and homeless people should even have the right of perpetual habitation. People should even have a right to acquire things they need for living for a fair price, which requires the maintenance of inns for travelers.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Conflicting duties

After duties toward oneself and God, Crusius comes to what could be called the essence of natural law, that is, the duties toward other human beings. In effect, this section brings forward completely new facts about humans - they live in societies, because they can benefit from one another, because they feel attachment and love to one another and because they generate further human beings. Yet, in a sense this realm of natural law in the strict sense is grounded on realms of ethics and natural theology. Firstly, according to Crusius, accomplishing duties toward other people presupposes that one has already perfected oneself, as ethics demands. Secondly, and even more importantly, both the need for other humans and the duties toward them are based on the will of God, which humans are supposed to obey. In other words, Crusius notes, we are obligated to love God, because he loves us, and since God wants humans to live in a community, we are obligated to do that and help one another. As it should be clear by now, Crusius doesn’t think we should expect any earthly happiness from doing our duties, and indeed, he insists that good and security of the community is always more important than our own happiness.

The central role of divinity in Crusius’ account is a clear move against the suggestion of Wolffians that atheists could form a rational society. Crusius admits that one could construct a discipline based merely on the idea of a human community, which would then describe means by which human beings in such a community could live well. Yet, such a discipline would lack the power to oblige anyone to follow its rules, Crusius insists, which is then provided by the assumption of God’s existence. Furthermore, he adds, the aid of God and his judgement is required, when convincing people who cannot follow complex chains of reasoning.

Crusius admitted that although in principle all of natural law could be deduced, God has also given a faculty for discerning answers to questions concerning it, for the sake of people who are untrained in reasoning - this faculty he calls conscience. Now, Crusius admits that individual conscience is fallible. Thus, he concludes, we should justify our moral sentiments with proper proofs, to remove the possibility of error.

The task of demonstrating natural law starts by finding out its principle. Crusius notes that this notion of principle has an ambiguous meaning. Firstly, when looking for this principle, one might be searching for the ultimate force which turns rules of natural law into proper laws - this, as we have seen, is the will of God. Secondly, and more pertinently, the search for a principle might look for grounds, by which natural law can be known.

The question for grounds of knowing natural law, Crusius continues, has again many possible meanings. Firstly, one might be looking for capacities which enable human being to know natural law - these capacities are, as Crusius has pointed out, reason and conscience. Secondly, and again more pertinently, one might search for the concepts, from which natural law can be deduced and especially the highest law, from which other parts of natural law can be deduced. These concepts, Crusius concludes, are human nature, its relation to God and all the relations connecting human beings to one another, while the highest law says that we humans should act toward one another in accordance with the perfection of our essence, our relationship to God and all the connections God has created between humans. This may sound like a mouthful, but Crusius adds a helpful explanation - we should be guided by an obedience and love toward God, love all humans for their own sake, be aware that natural law concerns also other humans, since they have been created for the same goals, and because of love toward other humans, join a community to advance divine purposes.

Crusius divides natural law into further parts. Firstly, there is the natural law in a yet more restricted sense - the study of how we should behave, when we assume no difference between governed and governors - civil law - study of a need to form a government and of rules of behaviour for governed and governors - and finally, law of nations - study of duties that nations have toward one another. In practice, Crusius still appears to continue with a more general study of how, for instance, duties in all areas of natural law can be divided. For instance, he notes that duties in natural law are necessary or contingent, while necessary duties are either absolutely or hypothetically necessary.

If we go through some important divisions Crusius notes, firstly, he states that some duties in law of nature are based on the obligated person loving someone, while others are based more on communal nature of human beings. The first type of duties do not require reciprocity, while the other type demands that both persons help one another. Another important division concerns whether duties are negative or positive. First type consists of duties telling us not to do what goes against God’s purposes, while second type consists of duties telling us to do what God’s purposes demand.

Crusius notes that the object of duties can also vary. Some duties we are meant to do toward certain individual persons, while other duties are directed indeterminately toward all humanity and still third type consists of duties toward parts of whole humanity, such as our own nation. Crusius notes that the latter two types divide into positive duties that are meant to help all humanity and to negative duties where we are meant to avoid making the accomplishment of human goals impossible.

In addition to duties, Crusius for the first time notices also rights. Similarly to duties, Crusius divides rights to negative and positive rights. We have a negative right for something when no law nor a condition validated by law determines or restricts our actions concerning it, barring laws that restrict all actions. That is, if there’s nothing to restrict us from eating an apple - for instance, no one else owns it - we have a negative right to eat it. Positive rights, on the other hand, are such that are generated by laws or conditions validated by laws, such as contracts - for instance, we have a positive right to eat an apple we definitely own. Some positive rights are based on civil laws, while others are based even on natural law. For instance, many duties prescribed in natural law can also be regarded as positive rights, Crusius notes - we are obligated to keep ourselves healthy, but it is also our right to do so.

Crusius notes that both duties and rights can be internally or externally obligated. By an internally obligated duty Crusius means a duty that has its justifying ground in the matter itself, for instance, when we are obligated to follow a rule that is reasonable. Externally obligated duty, on the other hand, is to be done for other reasons than for the inherent nature of the action, for instance, when we are obligated to follow a decree of a king in order to retain the stability of community. Internally obligated right, on the other hand, has a justifying ground, which might be such that is not known, while externally obligated right seems like a right, although it might have no justifying ground - clearly, one can also have rights that are both internally and externally obligated.

Crusius notes that while a person might have an internal right for something, another person might not be internally obligated to respect that right, firstly, because the other person might not know the relevant circumstances justifying that right, and secondly, because it might not be determined who exactly is bound to satisfy that right (for instance, when a person has a right to expect the community to provide her livelihood, but no particular citizen is tasked to take care of that). Similarly, Crusius continues, a person might be internally obligated to do something for another person, although this other person would have no internal right to expect this, since God can in certain conditions demand that we do such things. Furthermore, although a person would have an external obligation to do something for another, this other person might have no internal right for this - for instance, when the first person has signed a contract that would make her lose all her belongings, the other person has no true right to ask for this. What can be said, according to Crusius, at least generally, is that externally valid right corresponds to an externally obligated duty, that is, we are bound to generally respect what seems like a right. Of course, Crusius notes, a mere external right is never a true right in the eyes of God, no matter what all humans think.

Now, it might seem like all these various duties and rights might sometimes contradict one another. True, Crusius admits, duties and rights are connected to some goals, and actions striving toward different goals can hinder one another. Yet, this does not mean that statements describing our various duties and rights would ever contradict one another - and since they are based on God’s decrees, Crusius insists, they can’t. What happens in such a case of collisions is that our finite minds forget that divine laws can be infinitely multilayered and describe various exceptions when certain rules of conduct do not hold.

Thus, in case of such a collision, Crusius concludes, we should try to determine which of the duties and rights is to be respected most in these particular conditions - for instance, if we know one duty to be absolutely necessary and the other just in certain conditions necessary, then we must follow the absolutely necessary duty. What we shouldn’t do is to just accept the opinion of majority in all cases.

In case of conflicting duties in particular, Crusius notes the importance of distinguishing objective from subjective duties. By an objective duty Crusius means a duty that is meant generally for all humanity, but not specifying who or in what conditions is to fulfil it. A subjective duty, on the other hand, is specifically meant to be fulfilled by a certain individual in certain conditions. If of two colliding duties one is objective and the other is subjective, Crusius concludes, the subjective duty must always be preferred, since we can always assume someone else will fulfill the objective duty.

If both duties are either subjective or objective, Crusius suggests several possibilities to choose between them - for instance, if one duty is more certain, then we should follow it. An important dividing line for Crusius is the goal that a duty has - for instance, a duty to make humans more virtuous means more than a duty to make them happy. If no other ground for choice can be found, then one must look for the quantitative extensiveness of what is achieved by the duties.

A peculiar case Crusius considers happens when we have a single duty to fulfill, but we are uncertain which person should be its target. Crusius suggests we should usually choose the more virtuous or at least the more useful person. The exception is the case when the other person is in danger of dying and needs our instant care.

Crusius notes that usually, when we have a determined duty colliding with someone’s right, then the duty must prevail. Crusius notes that this duty must be based on something more than mere another right, since then we are actually dealing with a collision between rights. Furthermore, he notes as exceptions cases where, firstly, upholding the duty would break a number of humanly important rights, and secondly, when the goods gained by upholding the duty are not incomparably small in comparison with goods lost by breaking the right.

Finally, Crusius considers the cases, where rights collide with other rights. He notes that positive rights are weightier than negative rights. If many persons have a positive right to the same thing, then the thing in question should be divided, if it is possible, and if not, then give the right to the person who first claimed it. If all the colliding rights are just negative, then actually all human beings would have the same right to the thing, and since anything cannot be divided between all humans, Crusius argues, the first one to put their claim on the thing should have the right for it. Finally, Crusius notes that even if technically we would have a right for something, in order to maintain good relations to others it is often best to cancel our own claim to have a right.

So much for the general part of natural law, next I’ll be tackling the most general duties and rights in it.

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 2 – The city of God

While the metaphysical compendiums in Wolffian tradition have usually ended with a look on natural theology, Darjes has left cosmology as the final chapter of his metaphysics. This makes some sort of sense, since he has already emphasised that cosmology is no proper part of metaphysics, since it does not deal with characteristics of all things or of things from one of the highest genera of things – cosmology is about world, which is a certain complex of things, consisting of many kinds of things (in Darjesian philosophy, material bodies and immaterial souls and spirits).

Another oddity is Darjes' inclusion of certain notions from natural law to his discussion. He is particularly interested of the concept of right and possession. Right to something, for Darjes, means that a person has the ability to use that something without hurting other persons or their rights. This seemingly innocuous definition allows Darjes to conclude that in fact God is the primary owner of everything – God surely can control everything that exists, and he cannot really hurt rights of others, since he made all things in the first place.

Darjesian definition has also important consequences for the rights of finite entities. Firstly, he notes that finite entities can really have rights only for complex things, because they have no power to do anything to simple entities. Secondly, since all things already belong to God originally, finite entities can have right to anything, only if God has provided them the right to use things in some manner.

In addition to owning everything, God also governs world. This means that he sets the goals toward which this ”city of God” strives. The main purpose divinity has set for everything, according to Darjes, is the happiness and perfection of all rational beings. Thus, Darjes concludes, all rational beings should strive for their own happiness and perfection and help others to find these also – and definitely not hinder others in their search.

Darjes does not go into particularities of what actions are good for happiness and perfection, but merely notes what tools God uses for guiding rational entities toward their appointed goal. Firstly, God can directly reveal some guidelines. Secondly, God might appoint further rewards and punishments and even a kind of heaven and hell, to provide further incitement for good actions. Despite these rather naive Christian notions, Darjes also supposes that all rational entities will eventually be able to perfect themselves – the purpose of punishments is also just to help personal perfection.

We are now finally finished with Darjesian metaphysics. Next up on the list is a return to the work of Martin Knutzen.