Georg Friedrich Meier: Thoughts on honour - How to measure it

A common feature of philosophical studies from the so-called Wolffian school is the desire to quantify the concepts they investigated. Mathematics was seen as something that complements the bare philosophical method. Thus, it is no wonder that Meier would dedicate a whole chapter to the question of how to quantify honour.

Meier begins by noting that because different people look at the same things from different perspectives, different people honouring the same person see different things to commend in them. Thus, the more people honour a person, the more honourable the person is. Meier immediately adds that he is speaking of humans honouring a person. God also can honour a person, he thinks, and this is the greatest honour imaginable. He leaves undecided whether there are any other beings beyond God and humans that could honour someone.

The number of honouring people, Meier notes, need not be limited to contemporaries, but can include future human beings. Indeed, he says, honour received after death is even greater than honour received while living. Thus, he concludes, it is rational to strive for eternal honour.

Although honour given in the future is greater than honour given by contemporaries, Meier remarks, a great number of people honouring one now can still make honour great. This happens especially, if the people honouring you include such that are not close to us or live somewhere else – it is no great feat if a king is honoured by his subjects.

Although the number of people honouring you is one factor determining the quantity of honour, Meier says, it is not the only factor. Thus, someone desiring honour should not just spend their time gathering followers. Still, he points out, it is a factor, and therefore it is foolish to think less followers would mean greater honour.

It is impossible that all contemporaries or future generations would honour the same person, Meier notes. Many contemporaries ignore a greatly honoured person, but many even disrespect them, because people have a tendency to find faults in others. Often this overtly critical stance is caused by envy, Meier explains. Sometimes it is caused by pride, which makes one underestimate others, while sometimes the cause is an excessive desire to ridicule things.

Continuing with the topic of disrespect toward otherwise greatly honoured persons, Meier notes that some people want to build their reputation on the ruins of others, thinking there can be only one greatly honoured person. Furthermore, some misanthropists are not pleased with the perfections of humans. Finally, a common reason for such disrespect, in Meier’s opinion, is that people are often more inclined to think of the evil in the world than what is good, because evil is actually rarer and strikes us more forcefully.

It is not just how many people honour, but who honours you that matters, Meier continues. Great people are able to perceive the worthiest features, while small-minded people enlarge insignificant details. Thus, Meier concludes, the greater the people honouring you, the greater the honour received.

The greatness in question can be internal, that is, the great person can have all the capacities for recognising the greatest perfections in someone. These capacities include, Meier says, both cognitive and volitional capacities. A clear consequence of this is one Meier has already noted, that is, that honour by God is the greatest kind. Furthermore, if there are beings, beyond God, who have greater understanding and will than humans, honour given by them is greater than that given by humans.

No human is perfect in all aspects, Meier points out. Thus, honour is greater, if the persons honouring you are themselves internally great in the same sense as you are. For instance, a soldier knows best when to honour other soldiers. On the other hand, sometimes we tend to belittle people who are perfect in a sense different from ours.

Greatness can also be external, by which Meier means an appearance of greatness, insofar as this appearance is well founded, that is based on inner greatness. What this external greatness adds to internal greatness is a great number of followers, which then magnifies also the honour bestowed by externally great people. Thus, Meier notes, honour given by princes is great, assuming that the princes are also internally great (no one wants to be honoured by Nero). Again, since God is honoured by everyone, honour received from them is the greatest.

An interesting corollary Meier notes is that maximising greatness of people honouring you is not compatible with maximising the number of people honouring you. That is, since there are not that many really great people, if you want to be honoured only by the greatest, you can be honoured only by a few people.

If the first two factors of honour concerned the people honouring, the next two consider the person honoured, and more precisely, the perfections ascribed to them. Firstly, Meier explains, the number of perfections affects the honour of the person having them. Honour of a person is greater, if they have more types of perfections or more perfections of the same type: for instance, a writer is honoured more, if in addition to being eloquent they have deep ideas.

Supposing a person does not have some perfections, even if they could have these, lessens their honour, Meier thinks. If they in some sense could not have these perfections, the effects on their honour depend on what this sense is. If we are speaking of absolute impossibility, Meier explains, then of course such lack will not take away from one’s honour: indeed, it might even be considered foolish to reach for such absolutely impossible perfections. If it is a case of physical impossibility, that is, a lack of capacities necessary for reaching a perfection, honour is reduced if and only if such a lack is shameful: it is dishonourable to understand nothing, but not to not understand religious mysteries. Finally, a lack of morally impossible, or as we would say, morally bad perfections is even a boost to one’s honour, at least if such perfection would really be morally bad (for instance, Meier notes, being educated does not take away one’s moral purity).

Although more perfections means more honour, Meier warns the reader not to reach for excessively many perfections. No human being is able to reach all human perfections, and indeed, some perfections might even be morally detrimental to a person, depending on their life context. Then again, Meier adds, one should not try to cultivate an excessively small number of perfections: for instance, a soldier trying to become a mere expert killer seems like a mere beast.

In addition to the number, Meier continues, one should also consider the greatness of the perfections ascribed to a person. Indeed, he adds, it is more honourable to have a few great, instead of many insignificant perfections. True honour, Meier thinks, requires more than just a run of the mill perfection. A perfection worthy of honour should not be simple, but a synthesis of many perfections. It should be noble and fruitful, in other words, it should have many great and important consequences. Finally, Meier adds, perfections caused by something great are noble are also worthy of honour, since effects equal their causes.

Types of perfections can also be compared to one another, Meier notes. Thus, moral perfections are greater than physical (a good character is more honourable than beauty), internal perfections are greater than external (richness is not a great perfection), perfections of soul are greater than perfections of body, perfections of the higher capacities of soul are greater than perfections of lower capacities (science is more honourable than poetry), and perfections of freedom or virtues are highest of them all.

While the first four factors of the quantity of honour concern the content, the next ones concern the form of honour, Meier clarifies. In other words, they relate to the cognitive state on which the honour a person receives from someone is based on. Thus, clarity of this cognitive state adds to the honour, letting the person honouring see more of the person honoured. For honour to be really great, the person honouring must know the sum of all honourable perfections as a whole, and they must find and distinguish many and great perfections in that whole, and they must see their order and connection. This means, again, that God is the best one to honour you, because God knows a person in the most detailed and systematic fashion.

What then gives a cognitive state or concept more clarity? In case of honour, Meier begins, perfections of the honoured person should not be dimmed by imperfections of the same person. Thus, the honour will be great, if the person honouring sees nothing but the perfections and ignores all the imperfections of the person honoured (no one honours you more than your own mother) or if they see these imperfections only dimly, like good friends, or if the person honouring regards the perfections of the honoured person so strongly that this suppresses all ideas of imperfection (this is how members of a sect honour their leaders).

Clarity is also strengthened by perfections of the honoured not being dimmed by perfections of other persons, Meier continues. Thus, the honour will be great, if the person honouring honours no one in addition to the honoured person (like students honour their teacher, because they know no other scholars), if the person honouring honours other only in smaller degree or if the person honouring honours the honoured person so strongly that all ideas of perfections of others are darkened.

Attention is the source of all clarity, Meier emphasises. Thus, the honour becomes clearer and greater, the more attention the honouring person can give to the perfections of the honoured person. Honour becomes stronger, when the honouring person concentrates more on observing the merits of the honoured person, it becomes more extensive, when the honouring person observes very many perfections of the honoured person, and it becomes more enduring, when the honouring person observes the perfections very long immediately after one another.

Especially three things make attention very great, Meier adds: curiosity, where everything new awakens attention, wonder or intuitive cognition of novelty and captivation or being conscious of something in so great a measure that other concepts are obscured. Thus he concludes, honour becomes clearer and greater, if the honouring person thinks about the perfections of the honoured person with great curiosity, as something new and extraordinary, if the honouring person wonders about the honoured person or if the person honouring is captivated by observing the merits of the person honoured.

Most important facet in the quantity of honour, according to Meier, is the truth of the cognition it is based on: the more correct is the judgement of perfections, the greater the honour. Truth of honour, Meier explains, is to be evaluated like truth of cognition and judgements in general.Thus, honour is more correct and greater, the less perfections are ascribed to the honoured person that they do not have and the more those that they do have, the less errors of quantity are discovered in the judgement of honour, so that perfections would not be evaluated too highly, and the more correctly the person honouring thinks about the order and connection, in which perfections of the honoured person are discovered.

Meier notes that judgements turn often false, when they are derived from preconceptions. Thus, he concludes, honour is more correct, if the honoured person is judged through the lens of preconceptions. This means that honour should be based on impartial judgements. For instance, honour bestowed on us by our friends is not always false, but it often is greater than is deserved. On the contrary, enemies honour us too little, but therefore honour bestowed by them is that much more valuable. More generally, honour given with reproach is more correct than honour without reproach.

In addition to truth, the certainty of cognition or judgement is also important: uncertain honour is weak like dreams, Meier compares. Humans are convinced of truth of a judgement in three manners, Meier says: by deducing it from more general truths, by basing it on their own experience or by hearing of experiences of others. The first route or a priori deduction is closed for us, Meier thinks, since we cannot know honourable perfections of humans from mere arguments. Experiences of others can reach at most moral certainty, so the only way to complete certainty is observation. Thus, the more the person honouring personally observes perfections of the honoured, the more certain and the greater is the honour (for instance, Homer is best honoured by a person who has read his works). Of course, Meier adds, experience can be deceptive, and therefore honour becomes certain only after a repeated observation of perfections.

When the person honouring merely hears about the perfections of the honoured person, the judgement of honour is generally uncertain, but this uncertainty has different degrees, Meier explains. The most extreme degrees in this continuum of honour are an honour based on well attested testimonies of first-hand witnesses and an honour based on stories that have travelled through many persons.

According to Meier, the liveliness of the cognition or judgement also affects the honour. The livelier the experience of the perfections, the greater the honour, and only lively honour fills the person honouring with the idea of the honoured. Great honour requires, hence, intuitive knowledge of the perfections. Thus honour based on mere words (e.g. a title) is a small honour.

What a lively cognition of perfections does, Meier continues, is that it causes pleasure. We are especially pleased about perfections that we are interested in, that we take part of and that are useful for us. If this liveliness is strong enough, it leads to desire and to pleasure. Thus, the more the perfections of a person please, the livelier and greater the honour. Since love is pleasure over someone’s perfections, Meier notes, the more the honoured person is loved, the greater the honour. We can love without honouring, like parents love their children, and we can honour without loving, like we honour Alexander the Great, but honour without love is infinitely smaller than honour with love, Meier insists.

Beyond the quality of cognition, the duration of the honour is a facet of its greatness. If the honour lasts longer, the greater it is, and the degree of honour can go up and down through its duration. If honour is very great from the start, it cannot be augmented, while small initial honour can be improved easily.

An important concept Meier introduces is the notion of fixed honour, where a person has reached so high a degree of honour that it becomes impossible for them to be despised or ignored. Although honour would be fixed, it can still change, because in an honoured man faults are so noticeable. Another reason for the change is that the clarity, truth, certainty and liveliness of cognition might be very variable, because of the nature of soul and human cognition in general, because of a too strong a desire for novelty and love of change or because the cognition of topics is determined by their desires and inclinations.

Honour of long length, Meier says, gains special strength if it isn’t interrupted by periods of disrespect. Honour can be regained after interruption of disrespect, but such regaining is much more difficult than original gaining of honour.

Georg Friedrich Meier: Thoughts on honour (1746)

Meier’s philosophical work has provided plenty of examples of something we’ve otherwise rarely seen in German philosophy in the first half of 18th century: applied philosophy, that is, application of philosophical concepts and theories to often very concrete questions of practical nature. His Gedancken von Ehre is no exception, being a discussion of honour or respect.

Although Meier’s final object lies then in practice, he begins his study with a theoretical part. Quite plausibly, we have to first know what honour is, before we can say, for instance, how much honour we should try to gain for ourselves. Furthermore, Meier adds, theoretical investigation of the notion of honour might awaken in us a desire to do honourable things.

Meier defines honour as the sum of all representations and judgements made by others of one’s perfections. More precisely, this sum, if it is unexpressed, can be called internal honour, while the expression of this internal honour through words and other signs is the corresponding external honour. An important detail is that the honour must be bestowed by others and so no one cannot honour oneself - not even God.

Meier notes that there is also another sense in which we can talk of external honour, that is, when we are speaking of compliments that people are forced to give because of some law. This law can be natural law - and then we are speaking of a good name of someone - or a civil law - for instance, when a person must be bestowed a title. Such external honours, Meier warns, are not really honours in his sense, which requires much more than mere following of a law.

The opposite of honour - dishonour or disrespect - and the corresponding internal and external dishonour can be defined by just replacing perfection with imperfection, Meier notes. From a lack of dishonour cannot be deduced the presence of honour, he adds, because between the two lies a state where other persons do not have any conception whatsoever of one’s perfections or imperfections. Indeed, most people are regarded in such an indifferent manner by persons not close to them

Because Meier defines honour through notions of representations and judgement, he can apply logic and psychology in his investigation. Thus, he notes that since judgements can be affirmative or negative, honour can be also given for a person not having certain imperfections. He immediately explains that in the latter case the lack of imperfection must imply the presence of perfection, since it is not yet an honour to be no murderer. Indeed, he adds, the concept of honour should be reserved to only those cases where the perfection of a person is exceptionally great, since otherwise every person would be honoured.

An important epistemological detail Meier points out is that honour should be based only on true representations and judgements. Thus, even if a person would compliment another, say, for being a great scholar, it would be no real honour if the person giving the compliment would have no idea what being a great scholar really means. All forms of flattery are then ruled out as not bestowing true honour. Then again, since an honour can remain unexpressed, lack of compliments does not either imply a lack of honour.

Honour is then clearly something else than mere fame, which means just people knowing someone, but not necessarily knowing them for a perfection - even murderers can be famous for being murderers. Even if the reason for one’s fame would be something good, that is, even if they would have a good reputation, this would still not guarantee that one is honoured, if the person in question would have no exceptional perfections.

Honour is also dependent on the context in which the person is evaluated, Meier emphasises. Thus, a soldier’s leadership skills can be honoured in the context of a small regiment, but not in the context of the whole army. Honour is also dependent on who does the honouring, and small-minded people can never really honour anyone, Meier insists, because they can never have a notion of what truly great perfection is.

What perfections can then be honoured? Meier thinks that practically anything. Some people think that e.g. beauty is not something that can be honoured, since one has no say on whether they are beautiful. Meier thinks that this argument fails, since even such perfections that seem to be up to us - say, our diligence - are ultimately decided by God. Thus, Meier sees no reason why things like beauty could not also be honoured.

Possible objects of honour are thus infinitely varied and similarly also possible objects of dishonour, Meier explains. Indeed, one person can have both perfections and imperfections and even most honoured people can have their dark side. In other words, if someone is respected, they can also be disrespected, just for different reasons.