Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Art of fulfilling your goals

Having completed Crusius’ account of natural law - study of what we human beings must strive for - we still have a second part of his moral philosophy to deal with - study of prudence or the best means for achieving our goals. While natural law is meant to affect our use of will by making us choose best goals, study of prudence should affect our understanding.

Crusius notes that many particular arts also tell what are the best means for achieving some particular end, but such arts are not included in the general study of prudence. Furthermore, Crusius also won’t accept in this study means that are clear enough from common experience. The only thing left, then, Crusius says, is to look at means that can be derived from the nature of human soul and the principles of whole moral philosophy.

Crusius notes that the means we are discussing can be means either of private or public matters, which divides the study of prudence into two parts. In addition to these two parts, Crusius remarks, a third part should be added, which would universally look at general means for any goal whatsoever. This general part of the study of prudence is then further divided into two parts. First part would study the best ways how to apply a given means, while the second part would explain how we can find means in general for different goals.

Starting from the first part, Crusius notes that one should at first try to simplify one’s goals. For instance, if we have a complex goal to reach, we should try to analyse this goal into finer components that could be pursued more easily. Furthermore, Crusius lists various general methods for ensuring that a given goal is reached, such as finding many possible means for one goal. Finally, Crusius suggests that we should always consider whether the means we use for achieving one goal could be used at the same time for pursuit of a different goal.

The second part Crucius divides into three sections, first of which deals with ways to find means pertaining to understanding. Crusius explicitly mentions such capacities as a capacity to look at things and perceive conditions affecting the use of those things as means. Furthermore, Crusius mentions the capacity to gather experience and information from different sources.

The second section is then about means concerning will. Crusius lists, among other things, bravery, cheerful mind and good moral taste as those means. All of these had their own reasons why Crusius included them - bravery would let us continue to fulfill our actions, no matter what the circumstances, cheerful mind would let us ignore potential harms and good moral taste would let us pick quickly what is right and what is wrong.

The largest section is the one where Crusius deals with means concerning relations to other persons. Firstly, he notes that no matter how moral and prudent our actions are, they definitely should appear so in the eyes of other people. Thus, he says, our actions should look like we have chosen our goals with reason and not seem purposeless.

In addition to making others think highly of oneself, Crusius also suggests that one should acquire skills to know what others actually think. Partially, he notes that there are certain general rules to follow here, such as that people often believe only what they can perceive and that they believe things that accord with their own desires.

Beyond such general rules, Crusius thinks that we can learn to interpret an individual person’s mind. In case of ourselves, these readings might be certain, while with other people, Crusius admits, we can often know their mind only with probability. Still, he says, we can use introspection to learn the nature of the capacities of mind, and then draw analogies to other people’s minds.

Crusius draws very stringent limits to in what measure we can hope to know other people. Just like many other philosophers before him, Crusius notes that while physiognomy or study of human mind from mien and other bodily features is in principle a possible science, it is definitely a quite uncertain science - person’s taste can tell us more than his facial expression, Crusius suggests. Furthermore, unlike some Wolffians, Crusius thinks that what person says or does in a state of intoxication - or other similar abnormal state - does not tell what they think in ordinary life.

Finally, Crusius warns against trying to predict person’s future actions, even if we know what they have in their mind. He does not completely discard the possibility, but suggests that this is possible only in cases, where a person is wont to follow their inclinations and external impulses. Because of a possibility of a freely chosen action, Crusius notes, such deductions of future actions are always unreliable - a human being could always choose to act otherwise.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Republics and nations

Until this moment, Crusius has been speaking of a state of nature, that is, a state without no government. Then again, he notes, human beings cannot remain in this state of nature, because their fallen state creates problems. Some people want to do harm to others, and a need to defend oneself leads to the formation of communities. Crusius insists that not everyone can take part in the actual decision making of a community, which requires some form of representation. Furthermore, communities require some principles to fill gaps in the law of nature and means by which to enforce natural law and contracts.

These needs generate an incentive to form republics, by which Crusius means communities in which one or more persons take care of common welfare and security, in order that natural duties and rights of moral person would be better protected. Crusius also insists that God wants republics, because they are in the current state of the world the best means for common welfare. Crusius does admit that first republics were probably dictatorships. Still, he thinks that this genesis does not lessen our obligations toward them. Furthermore, he notes that republics are not absolutely necessary, since in state of nature many things can be determined through contracts.

Crusius notes that republics have two different kinds of members - regents or rulers and subjects or citizens - both of which have their own duties and rights. Although he notes that a republic can have many regents and that even the whole nation could be a regent, most of his discussion seems to rise from the monarchic context of a single ruler.

Duty of regents is, Crusius says, to take care of the welfare of the whole republic and to use their powers only for this purpose and not to restrict individual rights further than necessary. Rights of regent, which Crusius calls rights of majesty, can either be historically determined, such as a right to hunt in certain places where others are not allowed. Still, Crusius notes, some of their rights are determined already by the very notion of regency and thus belong to natural law.

A central right of regents, in Crusius’ account, is the right to explicitly or implicitly appoint civil laws, which are meant for the best of the whole republic and which subjects are obligated to follow. Civil laws either generally say that something should be done or not done, or they assign rights to certain people and to other people a duty to respect those rights.

Crusius bases the obligation toward civil laws on a more fundamental obligation toward natural law - civil laws should be obeyed, because natural law says so. Civil laws are mostly needed where natural law leaves matters very undetermined, for instance, with questions concerning property. In addition, they can be used to bolster parts of natural law that are not accepted by everyone.

Crusius considers also the relationship of civil laws to rights and duties based on natural laws. He notes that civil laws can cancel negative natural rights, for instance, a civil law can cancel a right to hunt. Then again, Crusius adds, positive right can be cancelled only for a good reason. Crusius thinks also that a civil law can cancel those natural duties, which are indeterminate or not in itself necessary, because civil security is more important than following these duties. Then again, he emphasises, immutable natural duties cannot be denied by any civil law, because even civil law is based on such duties.

In addition to devising civil laws, Crusius says that regent is also tasked to apply natural and civil laws as the highest judge of republic. This does not mean that regent would have to sit in court all day, because they can assign officials and judges to help them in their work. Then again, regent cannot leave judicial power to the hands of ordinary citizens - thus, Crusius condemns practices such as dueling. Finally, according to Crusius, regents themselves can judged only by God, so that the security of republic can be maintained.

Crusius says that a regent has a right to punish and thus force subjects to follow laws. In extreme cases they can even kill people, as a deterrent, but Crusius advises this should not be done lightly. Still, Crusius suggests that righteous death penalty should be regarded as deriving from God’s will.

As has already been noted, Crusius wanted regents to avoid meddling into private affairs of citizens, as much as it is possible. This means also that regent should respect property of private persons, although they have a right to tax citizens during extreme times. Crusius also notes that private affairs of regent do not fall under right of majesty, in other words, regent does not have any special rights when e.g. buying or selling property.

Crusius remarks that republic might contain smaller communities. These communities fall also under the command of regent. Thus, Crusius notes, they must provide enough information of their activities to regent, in order to determine whether they won’t pose a threat to a republic. If these communities are harmless, their activities belong to the private sphere.

Crusius also considers the origin of regent’s rights. Originally, he says, majesty must be decided by pact. Such a constitutional pact can be entered freely, but Crusius admits it might also arise through force, if the alternative is even worse. This pact can be explicit - for instance, in case of elections - or implicit. Crusius considers it as a case of an implicit pact, when children continue to live in a republic that has raised them - it is not their parents that have decided the issue, but children themselves, because they enjoy the security provided by the republic.

Crusius says that rights of regent and their limits are determined by the original pact - unless regents want to turn into dictators, they should not try to overcome those limits. Crusius is of the opinion that the rights of regent can be restricted only by an explicit pact or by clear implicit conditions, such as regent’s duty to act for the benefit of the whole republic.

Crusius notes that regent has power also over churches in republic. Indeed, he insists that churches must be regulated more than other communities, because churches are large, depravations can be easily masked as religious dogmas and unruly persons often become church officials. Still, Crusius adds, regent should otherwise give churches the same rights as other communities.

Crusius has further rules about the relationship of regent and religion. Firstly, he begins, regents themselves should not make new religions and they should not make essential changes to religion. Since regents should not meddle in private affairs, they should not force anyone to convert to a religion. Particularly, they should not take children from their parents and make them part of a different religious community. Generally, Crusius says, nobody should be punished just because of their religion. Furthermore, unless the good of the republic demands so, Crusius continues, regent should not force religious community to change its characteristics.

Crusius thinks that power of regents over a religion goes somewhat further, if they follow that particular religion, because then they are obligated to aim for the best of its followers - for instance, regents would then have also judicial power in church. Crusius suggests that regents are obligated to help their religious community survive all internal conflicts. Indeed, he adds, they can even determine the rules of the religious community, if the general good so demands.

According to Crusius, regent can pick some religion as an official religion of the republic, in so far as nobody is forced to uphold it involuntarily. Crusius notes that while regent can punish people who disturb general peace, even if they do it for the sake of their conscience, this does not mean he can punish people just for having a different religion. Still, Crusius allows regents to punish external mockery of the official religion, which Crusius considers to include atheism or deism.

Crusius thinks subjects have a duty to follow civil laws and administration of majesty, thus denying all disobedience. According to Crusius, this duty is based not just on the original pact, but also on the duty of upholding security of whole community. This duty also implies, Crusius says, that despite all their faults, regents must be thought to be good, because on the public image of the regent is based the security of whole republic. Similarly, Crusius continues, subjects must think that a regent always acts according to the best interest of republic.

Crusius admit that if regents forget the duty of upholding common good, citizens are only externally obligated to follow them. He then raises the interesting question whether this external duty of obedience contradicts inner duty of citizens to follow their own conscience. His answer differs from one case to another. Firstly, he notes that when citizens are unsure what is best for the republic, they should just follow their regent. Even if the citizens would know a better course of action than what regent suggests, regent’s suggestion should be follow not be bad as such.

What then if regent’s decision would be foolish or even ethically unsound? Advise of Crusius is to avoid as much conflict as possible. He denies all active rebellion, but accepts a sort of passive resistance, where regent’s commands are not just followed. Even in this case, Crusius says, this disobedience should be done without arousing too much commotion and the citizens should accept the punishment, if their disobedience becomes public.

Since the rights of regent are based on original, explicit or implicit, pact, these rights might vanish and subjects wouldn’t then be obligated to follow their regent. Crusius warns that this could happen only if the regent had committed a great crime, since revolution always endangers public security. Furthermore, he adds that the decision to start a revolution should not rise from a single person, but from whole nation or at least from a majority of nation or from a selected group of its representatives.

While within a republic or a nation, civil laws rule in addition to natural law, when it comes to relation of nations, Crusius says, no such civil laws exist. This means, firstly, that all nations have similar right and no nation can rule or judge over another. Secondly, Crusius adds, it means that all obligations of nations must be based on either natural law or on contracts made by them. Still, the mere existence of free nations changes the natural law somewhat from that holding in a state of nature, for instance, since the existence of nations often implies the existence of entities other than individuals that can own property.

Because free nations have no further ruler above them, Crusius notes, they have a right to force their own rights, in other words, they can start just wars. Just war is no illegal revenge, Crusius clarifies, but a righteous way for a nation to uphold its rights. Still, he points out, war is always an unnatural state and should happen only at very extreme situations, after all diplomatic means have been used. Furthermore, Crusius continues, warring nations should use the least amount of violence and to end the war as soon as possible, while neutral states should not be disturbed during war. Despite these antiwar attitudes, Crusius makes one concession: raging barbarian hordes can be attacked, no matter what.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Married with children

If we ignore the rather short and uninteresting section on oaths, Crusius ends his account of natural law proper by investigating family life. His idea of families has a strong theological colouring. God, Crusius says, has created humans in such a manner that they seek sexual relations, so that the world would be filled with human beings. Furthermore, Crusius continues, God wants that all children will be raised and taught such important matters as belief in God. This duty of raising and educating children, Crusius thinks, belongs to their parents, and in order that parentage of children were certain, couples should be married, that is, form contracts, which forbid sexual relations with other people and which obligate parents to raise their children.

Crusius notes that although human procreation should be regulated and restricted to married people, not every human being need to have children. Of course, only celibacy is a real alternative for Crusius, since he considers sexual organs should be used only for reproduction. In other words, Crusius think sex is allowed only in the context of marriage.

Although Crusius calls marriage a contract, he notes that it is quite different from an ordinary contract, since it only determines the persons entering the married state, while the duties involved are already determined by our duty to obey God. Thus, although normal contracts can be broken, if the people involved just all want so, marriage contract is meant to last for a whole lifetime, because children need a secure family, so that divorces are acceptable only in very special circumstances, Crusius argues. Although one might think so, Crusius is of the opinion that infertility is no real reason for divorce, since it might well be just temporary. Indeed, the only acceptable reason for divorce, in Crusius’ eyes, is adultery, because it makes the proper end of marriage insecure.

Because the main end of marriage is procreation, Crusius continues, polyandry - marriage of one woman with several men - is in his opinion nonsense, because one woman needs only one man to become pregnant (Crusius does not seem to consider the possibility that a woman might have different children for different men). Polygamy - marriage of one man with several women - Crusius considers at least more possible, but ultimately rejects it. Raising children of many women is more difficult, Crusius says and adds that God must have meant us for monogamy, because the two genders are born in almost same numbers (a few more men are born, Crusius explains, because God has foreseen that men will die in wars).

Although the main purpose of marriage is raising children, Crusius think that it has an important secondary purpose, namely, the communion between husband and wife. In a quite sexistic fashion, Crusius insists that women cannot really give intellectual satisfaction to men, but they can provide companionship and sexual satisfaction - a rather bleak view of what marriage is all about. In a similarly sexistic fashion Crusius says that women have a stronger drive for taking care of children, because God meant them to be more involved with the upbringing of children.

Raising children, Crusius says, involves three different duties. A parent must, firstly, take care that the children live and become strong and healthy, secondly, guide them toward virtuous life, and finally, teach them such skills that they require for becoming useful citizens and for cultivating their skills. Although a parent would die, she is obligated to take care of her children, for instance, through inheritance.

In addition to these duties, Crusius continues, parents have a right - which Crusius calls paternal right - to decide the means by which their children are to be raised. This right involves a right to force children to do something, although only in certain limits: for instance, children are not for sale. Paternal right becomes less and less important, when children grow, although, as one might have suspected, Crusius says that daughters should be ruled by their parents as long as these daughters are not married.

Just like parents, children also have some rights, Crusius notes. Children have a right to demand sustenance and education from their parents, until they get old enough to provide for themselves. Children also have a right to expect that their parents do not restrict their freedom needlessly. Finally, unless their parents have decreed otherwise, the children have a right to inherit their parents.

Crusius also indicates that children must have some duties also. Due to their being minors, children must obey their parents, except if this would mean doing things that are against natural law. In addition, Crusius says, children are obligated to be thankful of what their parents have done for them (of course, he continues, children should love and honour their parents, even if their parents have not raised them at all). An important part of these duties is that children must take care of their parents in their old age. These duties are such that no civil laws can overcome them - for instance, a king should not punish his parents.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Economic considerations

Just like so many authors writing on natural law before him, Crusius has something to say about contracts. Natural law as such leaves many things undetermined, Crusius notes, adding that individuals have a chance to fill the gaps with contracts, that is, agreements, which determine the conditions under which one person provides goods or services to another. This definition of a contract leaves many things open - contracts can determine flow of goods or services only in one or in many directions, it can be made between two or more persons and it can be affected through written or implicit signs. Still, Crusius emphasises, one thing must be ensured, in order that a contract will be legal - contracts must not break natural law. If a contract is legal, then natural law commands everyone to respect it.

A legal or valid contract can be broken only if persons involved mutually agree to it, Crusius remarks. Thus, if I am still willing to hold on to a contract, but other persons who made it are not, the others are still obligated to follow the contract, because otherwise the very culture of contracts would be in jeopardy. Of course, if the others fail to hold on to their end of the bargain, I am not obligated to hold on to my end. Crusius notes that these rules apply only to true contracts, which should not include such things as marriage and relation between governor and governed. In addition, although I would have a right to enforce a contract upon a person, it might still in some cases be advisable and in accordance with one’s conscience to not do it.

When a contract then is not valid or legal? Crusius notes that in some cases the persons in question cannot make contracts. No one can make contracts with God, since God’s omnipotence cannot be restricted - this rather peculiar idea is easier to understand once one remembers that in Crusius’ system all right is based on the might and will of God. Furthermore, a person cannot make contracts, if they can reason only inadequately, which is the case e.g. with children.

In addition to requirements concerning the persons making the contract, Crusius considers many other requirements of a valid contract. Firstly, contract must be made fairly, for instance, ambiguous wordings and especially deceptions are not allowed. This does not mean that a person making the contract cannot have any hidden intentions, and holding on to the literal meaning of the contract against the wishes of the persons involved is not to be taken as a lie or deception. Secondly, contract cannot obligate us to do anything that would be against natural or other law or contract determining the matter otherwise, for instance, we cannot be contracted to kill an innocent person or to steal something belonging to another person. Finally, contracts can be made only on matters that fall under our own control, that is, a contract cannot obligate us to do something we are not capable of.

An interesting case arises, when force is used to make a person enter a contract. Generally, Crusius says, although one can be enforced to hold onto a contract they have made, no one can be enforced to make a contract. Interestingly, Crusius notes that there are certain exceptions to this general rule. For instance, enforcing might be in some cases in accordance with natural law and would then make a contract based on it valid. A particular case arises in a situation where the persons making a contract have been in war with one another before making a contract and the contract enforces a peace upon them. Here, the previous condition - war between persons - is such a great threat to general security that any means avoiding it should be accepted.

Some previous treatises of natural law had considered in great length the relations between master and servant, and more precisely, in the context of family relations. Crusius takes as his stance that master/servant -relations have nothing to do with family relations and are thus merely special type of contracts. Hence, he emphasises that rights of a master cannot contain e.g. power of the life of a servant.

In addition to contracts of various kind, property was also a staple element in various treatises of natural law. Crusius’ work is no exception. He elucidates that something is a property of a person, if this thing that is property is not another person and the person in question - the owner of the property - has a right to possess it, while no other person has the same right. Property is thus something more than mere possession, which is just a physical capacity to control a thing. In addition, the relationship of owning differs from that of governing, which is explicitly a relation between persons.

Crusius contextualises the discussion of property issues in a state of nature. He admits that states do play a function in securing property rights, but adds immediately that the institution of property predates states, since property relations are found even in the most uncivilized conditions. Indeed, he says, a duty to respect other people’s property is implied by basic duties of natural law. It follows from a general duty of human love, since it demands us to respect what another person has worked for, and also from the duty to live in communities, since the existence of property enables the practices of buying services and goods and of making contracts. Finally, he notes, property rights are implied by the fallen state of human nature, since we must protect the fruits of our labour against vicious people.

What can then be owned and what not? The very definition of Crusius explicitly denies the possibility of slavery, unless one means by slavery a very intimate form of service, defined by explicit legal contracts. Furthermore, Crusius continues, in a state of nature what is owned must be a thing which can be used only through our own work and which can be created only through work or which is necessarily required when using things mentioned in the first clause. Thus, a piece of land cannot be considered anyone’s property in a state of nature, although this does not prevent that in some actual state the notion of property might be extended to a piece of land in order to encourage its use.

Owning something needs more than mere possessing, Crusius reminds us, thus, original acquiring of something ownerless as a property requires more than just taking it into one’s possession. More particularly, Crusius insists, original acquiring requires that the owner-to-be or their representative makes some effort to gain the thing. Derivative acquiring of property that someone else owns, on the other hand, can occur through many means. For instance, persons can make an explicit or implicit contract involving transfer of property, or a person can take into their possession something that another person has abandoned. Crusius considers inheritance a special case: a dead person cannot make a true contract stipulating the transference of their property, but for the sake of upholding tranquil society, testaments should be considered binding.

Violence is again an ambiguous element in Crusius’ account. He admits that in some situations violence can be used to acquire property belonging to another person, but makes it also clear that in most cases violent taking away of someone’s property is wrong, just like stealing and fraud cannot be used in acquiring property. If a person breaks another person’s property rights, the latter has a right for a compensation, provided that the first person still has enough means for providing their own sustenance. Still, Crusius reminds us, property rights are always just hypothetical, and for example, in case of extreme need, a person has a right to appropriate other person’s property, provided that this other person still owns enough for enjoyment of the fruits of their work.

Finally, Crusius notes that when property changes owner, the goods are usually compensated with something that is thought to have the same value. By value Crusius means magnitude of the goodness of a thing, in connection with needs of either particular individual or generally all human beings. Because needs change from time to time, in a state of nature it requires always a clear agreement what is a fair compensation of come goods. To ease transactions, Crusius notes, states provide universal signs for value (that is, money). Crusius does not consider in more detail what such monetary economy implies, but merely notes that such a sign must be made of a durable material and not be either too rare or too common, because the rarity of the material affects the inherent value of money - rarer means more expensive - and can in extreme cases make transactions more difficult.

In next post, we will round up Crusius discussion of natural law proper with his account of families.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Cultivating oneself benefits all

The most general duties in natural law, Crusius begins, are those that we are obligated to perform to everyone, no matter what the particular stand in life is and no matter what further contracts or agreements we might have made with them. In other words, they are the duties that we should be able to deduce without any further assumptions from the basic principle of natural law.

One of these duties (or more likely, a combination of several related duties) is that we should always be joyfully ready to serve and help a person in need of assistance - for instance, if we find a lost tourist in our hometown, we should be ready to show where she has to go. This is a general duty, Crusius affirms, that we are obligated to perform to anyone, no matter who they are. Even our enemies do not make an exception, and furthermore, we shouldn’t even hate or envy them. Still, this does not mean we are not allowed to make any preferences, Crusius accedes, since we are more obligated to serve friends, as long as we do it fairly and equitably.

Crusius doesn’t think that we are obligated to serve people without any reward, but admits that usually services are to be paid for in some form. It is only when people do not have the means to pay that we might be obligated to help them without reward, and even this obligation is not so strict if the people in question can help themselves, if they are to blame for their condition or if someone else could help them. Furthermore, even if no other reward for a service can be expected, the one assisted is obligated to be thankful for help. Analogically to a demand for a reward, if someone offends us, we have a right to expect the offender to repay the deed.

Furthermore, Crusius continues, if circumstances permit it, we should try to be truthful, that is, what we think should correspond to what our words mean. Here the conditional is important, and Crusius is not willing to go down the route where Kant - at least as he is usually interpreted - would go. That is, Crusius does not want to say that we are always obligated to speak truth, because in some cases this might break some other duties. He still advises to avoid straight out lies, even if they were made with good intentions. Instead, Crusius allows dissemblance, for instance, using silence and gestures to suggest that things are otherwise than they actually are.

In addition to the duties aimed strictly toward other people, Crusius notes that dealings with other people create an obligation to do something for ourselves. That is, in order to serve others we have to have abilities by which we can help them, which means that we are obligated to cultivate our skills. Partially, Crusius reminds us, this duty of self-cultivation has already been dealt with in ethics, but there are still certain aspects of this cultivation that concern the natural law more. A particular example is the need for what Crusius calls decorum, in other words, what is considered to be external signs of virtue - say, one has to dress in a manner that a decent person is expected to dress in one’s own society. Although decorum is not virtue as such, it at least implies to the onlooker that she is seeing a virtuous person, Crusius suggests - or at least it doesn’t deter her. Thus, decorum is of assistance in making people want to ask help from you.

Crusius also notes that if a society is to work properly, all people cannot cultivate the same abilities, even if they were abilities required for the noblest causes. Thus, a need for particular life careers arises. Crusius considers the possibility that each person would pursue the career that is best suited to a person. Yet, he remarks, it is too difficult to determine what would be the best career for each person. Instead, Crusius advises everyone to strive for a career, which suits their wishes and doesn’t waste their talents - or even earlier, their parents should find out what the person likes and guide them toward it. This strategy works, Crusius thinks, because person’s desires usually show what they are most suited to do - desire for a certain career should come out naturally, and as all things natural are God’s design, this desire must be good.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Conflicting duties

After duties toward oneself and God, Crusius comes to what could be called the essence of natural law, that is, the duties toward other human beings. In effect, this section brings forward completely new facts about humans - they live in societies, because they can benefit from one another, because they feel attachment and love to one another and because they generate further human beings. Yet, in a sense this realm of natural law in the strict sense is grounded on realms of ethics and natural theology. Firstly, according to Crusius, accomplishing duties toward other people presupposes that one has already perfected oneself, as ethics demands. Secondly, and even more importantly, both the need for other humans and the duties toward them are based on the will of God, which humans are supposed to obey. In other words, Crusius notes, we are obligated to love God, because he loves us, and since God wants humans to live in a community, we are obligated to do that and help one another. As it should be clear by now, Crusius doesn’t think we should expect any earthly happiness from doing our duties, and indeed, he insists that good and security of the community is always more important than our own happiness.

The central role of divinity in Crusius’ account is a clear move against the suggestion of Wolffians that atheists could form a rational society. Crusius admits that one could construct a discipline based merely on the idea of a human community, which would then describe means by which human beings in such a community could live well. Yet, such a discipline would lack the power to oblige anyone to follow its rules, Crusius insists, which is then provided by the assumption of God’s existence. Furthermore, he adds, the aid of God and his judgement is required, when convincing people who cannot follow complex chains of reasoning.

Crusius admitted that although in principle all of natural law could be deduced, God has also given a faculty for discerning answers to questions concerning it, for the sake of people who are untrained in reasoning - this faculty he calls conscience. Now, Crusius admits that individual conscience is fallible. Thus, he concludes, we should justify our moral sentiments with proper proofs, to remove the possibility of error.

The task of demonstrating natural law starts by finding out its principle. Crusius notes that this notion of principle has an ambiguous meaning. Firstly, when looking for this principle, one might be searching for the ultimate force which turns rules of natural law into proper laws - this, as we have seen, is the will of God. Secondly, and more pertinently, the search for a principle might look for grounds, by which natural law can be known.

The question for grounds of knowing natural law, Crusius continues, has again many possible meanings. Firstly, one might be looking for capacities which enable human being to know natural law - these capacities are, as Crusius has pointed out, reason and conscience. Secondly, and again more pertinently, one might search for the concepts, from which natural law can be deduced and especially the highest law, from which other parts of natural law can be deduced. These concepts, Crusius concludes, are human nature, its relation to God and all the relations connecting human beings to one another, while the highest law says that we humans should act toward one another in accordance with the perfection of our essence, our relationship to God and all the connections God has created between humans. This may sound like a mouthful, but Crusius adds a helpful explanation - we should be guided by an obedience and love toward God, love all humans for their own sake, be aware that natural law concerns also other humans, since they have been created for the same goals, and because of love toward other humans, join a community to advance divine purposes.

Crusius divides natural law into further parts. Firstly, there is the natural law in a yet more restricted sense - the study of how we should behave, when we assume no difference between governed and governors - civil law - study of a need to form a government and of rules of behaviour for governed and governors - and finally, law of nations - study of duties that nations have toward one another. In practice, Crusius still appears to continue with a more general study of how, for instance, duties in all areas of natural law can be divided. For instance, he notes that duties in natural law are necessary or contingent, while necessary duties are either absolutely or hypothetically necessary.

If we go through some important divisions Crusius notes, firstly, he states that some duties in law of nature are based on the obligated person loving someone, while others are based more on communal nature of human beings. The first type of duties do not require reciprocity, while the other type demands that both persons help one another. Another important division concerns whether duties are negative or positive. First type consists of duties telling us not to do what goes against God’s purposes, while second type consists of duties telling us to do what God’s purposes demand.

Crusius notes that the object of duties can also vary. Some duties we are meant to do toward certain individual persons, while other duties are directed indeterminately toward all humanity and still third type consists of duties toward parts of whole humanity, such as our own nation. Crusius notes that the latter two types divide into positive duties that are meant to help all humanity and to negative duties where we are meant to avoid making the accomplishment of human goals impossible.

In addition to duties, Crusius for the first time notices also rights. Similarly to duties, Crusius divides rights to negative and positive rights. We have a negative right for something when no law nor a condition validated by law determines or restricts our actions concerning it, barring laws that restrict all actions. That is, if there’s nothing to restrict us from eating an apple - for instance, no one else owns it - we have a negative right to eat it. Positive rights, on the other hand, are such that are generated by laws or conditions validated by laws, such as contracts - for instance, we have a positive right to eat an apple we definitely own. Some positive rights are based on civil laws, while others are based even on natural law. For instance, many duties prescribed in natural law can also be regarded as positive rights, Crusius notes - we are obligated to keep ourselves healthy, but it is also our right to do so.

Crusius notes that both duties and rights can be internally or externally obligated. By an internally obligated duty Crusius means a duty that has its justifying ground in the matter itself, for instance, when we are obligated to follow a rule that is reasonable. Externally obligated duty, on the other hand, is to be done for other reasons than for the inherent nature of the action, for instance, when we are obligated to follow a decree of a king in order to retain the stability of community. Internally obligated right, on the other hand, has a justifying ground, which might be such that is not known, while externally obligated right seems like a right, although it might have no justifying ground - clearly, one can also have rights that are both internally and externally obligated.

Crusius notes that while a person might have an internal right for something, another person might not be internally obligated to respect that right, firstly, because the other person might not know the relevant circumstances justifying that right, and secondly, because it might not be determined who exactly is bound to satisfy that right (for instance, when a person has a right to expect the community to provide her livelihood, but no particular citizen is tasked to take care of that). Similarly, Crusius continues, a person might be internally obligated to do something for another person, although this other person would have no internal right to expect this, since God can in certain conditions demand that we do such things. Furthermore, although a person would have an external obligation to do something for another, this other person might have no internal right for this - for instance, when the first person has signed a contract that would make her lose all her belongings, the other person has no true right to ask for this. What can be said, according to Crusius, at least generally, is that externally valid right corresponds to an externally obligated duty, that is, we are bound to generally respect what seems like a right. Of course, Crusius notes, a mere external right is never a true right in the eyes of God, no matter what all humans think.

Now, it might seem like all these various duties and rights might sometimes contradict one another. True, Crusius admits, duties and rights are connected to some goals, and actions striving toward different goals can hinder one another. Yet, this does not mean that statements describing our various duties and rights would ever contradict one another - and since they are based on God’s decrees, Crusius insists, they can’t. What happens in such a case of collisions is that our finite minds forget that divine laws can be infinitely multilayered and describe various exceptions when certain rules of conduct do not hold.

Thus, in case of such a collision, Crusius concludes, we should try to determine which of the duties and rights is to be respected most in these particular conditions - for instance, if we know one duty to be absolutely necessary and the other just in certain conditions necessary, then we must follow the absolutely necessary duty. What we shouldn’t do is to just accept the opinion of majority in all cases.

In case of conflicting duties in particular, Crusius notes the importance of distinguishing objective from subjective duties. By an objective duty Crusius means a duty that is meant generally for all humanity, but not specifying who or in what conditions is to fulfil it. A subjective duty, on the other hand, is specifically meant to be fulfilled by a certain individual in certain conditions. If of two colliding duties one is objective and the other is subjective, Crusius concludes, the subjective duty must always be preferred, since we can always assume someone else will fulfill the objective duty.

If both duties are either subjective or objective, Crusius suggests several possibilities to choose between them - for instance, if one duty is more certain, then we should follow it. An important dividing line for Crusius is the goal that a duty has - for instance, a duty to make humans more virtuous means more than a duty to make them happy. If no other ground for choice can be found, then one must look for the quantitative extensiveness of what is achieved by the duties.

A peculiar case Crusius considers happens when we have a single duty to fulfill, but we are uncertain which person should be its target. Crusius suggests we should usually choose the more virtuous or at least the more useful person. The exception is the case when the other person is in danger of dying and needs our instant care.

Crusius notes that usually, when we have a determined duty colliding with someone’s right, then the duty must prevail. Crusius notes that this duty must be based on something more than mere another right, since then we are actually dealing with a collision between rights. Furthermore, he notes as exceptions cases where, firstly, upholding the duty would break a number of humanly important rights, and secondly, when the goods gained by upholding the duty are not incomparably small in comparison with goods lost by breaking the right.

Finally, Crusius considers the cases, where rights collide with other rights. He notes that positive rights are weightier than negative rights. If many persons have a positive right to the same thing, then the thing in question should be divided, if it is possible, and if not, then give the right to the person who first claimed it. If all the colliding rights are just negative, then actually all human beings would have the same right to the thing, and since anything cannot be divided between all humans, Crusius argues, the first one to put their claim on the thing should have the right for it. Finally, Crusius notes that even if technically we would have a right for something, in order to maintain good relations to others it is often best to cancel our own claim to have a right.

So much for the general part of natural law, next I’ll be tackling the most general duties and rights in it.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Worshipping God

After talking about duties toward oneself, Crusius turns his interest to duties toward God. In some sense, he notes, we have been talking about them all the time, because all duties are based on God’s will and therefore duties toward God. Still, there are some duties that are specifically duties about God, which is their immediate object.

Now, one might wonder how God can be an object of a duty, since God is supposedly immutable and no one can actually do anything to him. Crusius clarifies that it is more a question of, firstly, our notion of God, and secondly, of our relationship to God. In other words, it is our immediate duty toward God to act in accordance with his perfection and our relationship to him.

It is thus our duty to obey God, Crusius says. In fact, he says, all duty is in a sense obeying God since God wants us to obey all duties. Crusius considers the question whether the duty to obey God would make God an awful tyrant. Crusius notes that this duty is not just arbitrary whimsy of a dictator, but flows from the very nature of divinity.

Two sides exist in human mind, Crusius continues, cognitive understanding and volitive will, and both have their own duties toward God. If we start from the side of the understanding, Crusius notes that we are obligated to know God, since it is noblest thing to know the ultimate source of everything. This does not mean that we should know God perfectly, since as we are imperfect entities, our knowledge is always limited. Still, we should try to know what God actually is and what kind of properties he has, what he wills and what he has achieved in the world (creating and sustaining the world, to start from the obvious). Furthermore, Crusius remarks, we should try to know other things as parts of a hierarchy, the pinnacle of which is God.

Yet, knowing God is not the only cognitive duty toward God that Crusius recognises. Indeed, he notes that in addition to knowledge we might have beliefs, not just in the broad sense of convictions, but in the sense of weaker convictions that might still be doubted. Now, Crusius says, we might have rational reasons to believe in this strict sense something, even if we couldn’t demonstrate its certainty. Particularly, he says, if disbelief would break an obligation toward God, we should choose belief, even if the truth of this belief could not be perfectly demonstrated. For instance, accepting general skepticism would imply that God has made us incapable of knowing anything, which Crusius considers a blasphemy. Even seemingly absurd statements about God (e.g. his trinitarian nature) should be believed, Crusius concludes, if there just is external evidence making it probable.

When it comes to will, Crusius suggests, we have a duty to love God, since God loves us also. This love of God implies that we try to live as virtuously as possible, since God wants us to be good. Other things implied by love of God, Crusius goes on, are that we should respect God, be thankful to him and humble ourselves before him.

All the duties mentioned thus far have been internal duties, that is, they concern our mental actions. We do have external duties toward God, Crusius insists. Firstly, all the so-called internal actions have some external signs, and we might say that showing the external signs of appropriate internal actions is an external duty. Then again, Crusius continues, we also have an external duty to e.g. pray to God, if we have difficulties in upholding our internal duties. Still, he concludes, there is no external duty toward God that would have no relation to internal duties.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - No true happiness before death

As it must be evident by now, Crucius values virtuous living most highly. Still, he does not reject other possible goals at least if they do not contradict virtuous life, which would just eventually evoke the wrath of God.

The only question is then what this secondary goal might be. A natural candidate might be satisfaction or pleasure caused by fulfillment of some desire. Since such pleasures are relative to desires, which humans have plenty, a single case of pleasure cannot be very high on the list of goals. What could be high is a state of ultimate happiness, in which all desires would be constantly fulfilled and no unhappiness would be anymore possible. Crucius notes that this rather sensualistic sounding end is something we cannot achieve during our temporal life, so that it cannot be any realistic goal for this life.

Crucius sets then his goal somewhat lower. Although we would not be in a pleasurable state, we could still be content, if we just were free from pain. Now, humans cannot be wholly content - this would mean that we wouldn’t be active anymore - but we could still be content in the sense of being pleased in some measure and being free of pain in some measure. The best state we could hope for during our temporal life would be such, in which the amount of pleasure would be remarkable, even if it must be just temporary.

Crucius goes into very particular details, when describing means for increasing happiness. Thus, he notes that one key element is to to make sure that desires are hindered as rarely as possible, and when they do, this hindrance must be as non-painful.To achieve this, Crucius notes, our desires should be such that they encourage us and others to act virtuously. Furthermore, to ease the pain, Crucius’ suggests the antidote of thinking pleasant things, which pushes bad thoughts away.

Although Crucius thus accepts pleasures in some measure, he is of the opinion that as a whole humans have a too strong desire for pleasure. Thus, he concludes, we should restrict desire for temporal satisfaction. Crucius therefore advocates continence of all sorts, whether it concerns gluttony or ambition. His particular target is sexuality, which he deems to be too strong a desire, useful only very rarely and detriment to virtue, unless bound by custom of marriage.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Evil behaviour and how to get rid of it

Crusius notes that none of us humans follow duties given in ethics perfectly. In other words, all people are in some measure evil, and because this is so common occurrence, Crusius suggests that humans must have a natural tendency to do evil.

Now, Crusius continues, it is interesting to ask what is the cause of this natural tendency. One possible suggestion could be that this cause lies somewhere outside humans, for instance, in the matter as such. Crusius notes that this explanation isn’t believable. True, matter might hinder our actions or then awaken some unpleasant sensations in us. Yet, neither of these need make us do anything evil - for instance, even if see horrific things, it is still down to us to decide how to react to them.

Similarly, the cause of evil cannot be any Satanic spiritual entity, Crusius notes. At most such a devilish figure could tempt human beings into evil actions. Still, even after being tempted, a person would have the choice whether to follow the suggestions of the tempter.

Crusius also denies that any divine entity could be behind human evil. It certainly couldn’t be God, Crusius says, because he has at most created the conditions, which allow the appearance of evil, but he still hasn’t caused this appearance. Furthermore, Crusius doesn’t believe that any Manichaean evil divinity could explain the problem of evil, because at most such a divinity could create a tendency to evil in humans. In addition, no other divinity beyond God can even exist, Crusius continues.

The reason for evil lies then in the human themselves, and the only question is whether it lies in their essential imperfection or in their arbitrary choices. The first of these was often dubbed metaphysical evil, but Crusius notes that due to its essentiality and necessity it is not true evil, but at most something that makes real evil possible. Indeed, he continues, trying to explain human evil through essential imperfection is just an attempt to confuse the difference between evil and good persons.

True evil, Crusius concludes, is thus caused by abuse of free will, when it has chosen a state that is contrary to what God has ordained. This abuse moves us away from our original state, which has been either indifferent to goodness and badness or then tends toward goodness. Crusius notes that this abuse or vice might be caused by two things: firstly, weakness of forces that should regulate us toward good decisions, and secondly, actively perverted direction of these regulating forces.

In addition to the division of vices by their cause, Crusius notes at least two ways to classify them. Firstly, vices can be divided according to the faculty it involves - understanding, will or both. Secondly, we can speak of simple or complex vices. Thus, there are simple vices of understanding, such as inattention or perverted curiosity for novelties, and simple vices of will, such as laziness and self-seeking. Of complex vices Crusius notes only three he considers most remarkable: avarice or perverted desire of wealth, lust or perverted desire for completely passive pleasures and ambition or perverted desire to be noticed by others.

Crusius notes that vicious behaviour is on the long run detrimental to a person. It involves always self-deception, since a vicious person has an improper notion of the worth of something. Furthermore, Crusius suggests, vicious person things wrongly that she can fulfil her desires, although they should be instead regulated. The result of this false idea is that the desire just grows and grows, when one gets used to pleasures and requires more stimulation to get to the same level of pleasure. If this continues, vices become habitual and enslave the person so that no free will can ever correct the situation.

Vicious person is then heading toward sickness of body and soul, Crusius notes. Furthermore, he continues, vicious people also hurt others, which alienates her from her fellow humans. But the worst consequence, according to Crusius, is that vicious person has lost her connection to God.

Vicious life is then painful, and this pain is sometimes good tool, by which a person can find an impetus for changing her life better. Generally, a person can cure her vicious behaviour by distancing oneself from all the things luring her to vicious actions and by strengthening both the motives pushing one toward good actions and forces necessary for doing those good actions.

Crusius notes that it is not clear how well repentance and struggle toward better life can heal the damage caused for oneself and for others by one’s own vicious behaviour. At least such corrective measures weaken the effects of vicious behaviour, but even a complete purification of one’s soul couldn’t really make damage undone. It is then unclear whether God will accept these measures or whether he has designed yet another form of punishment for the purpose of clearing one’s consciousness. Because this cannot be known from rational reasons, Crusius concludes, we must assume God has revealed his will on this matter, but this is more of a question of religion than of ethics.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Goal of human life

After a theoretical study of will and basic drives affecting it, Crucius turns his interest toward practical philosophy or morals, that is, the study of how will should be used. Wolffian systems of philosophy often included a discipline of general practical philosophy, which was meant to serve as a basis for all practical philosophy. Crucius admits that such a discipline exists, in a sense, but because of its abstract nature it should be merely included within more concrete practical disciplines.

The basic topic of morals - how will should be used - comprises actually two different, although related questions, Crucius continues. Firstly, there is the question of how human being can make herself happy. This question is dealt with a discipline quite unique to Crucius’ system - a study of happiness. It goes beyond mere question of obligations, because although Crusius admits that we are in a sense obligated to become happy and perfect ourselves, the study of happiness is more about finding the most advantageous means for happiness.

Human happiness involves satisfaction of basic human desires. Now, Crucius says, since one of these basic drives is a drive for good conscience, happiness involves also trying to follow the demands of conscience. Indeed, he adds, one might say that these demands are designed to make humans happy. The demands underlie the second question of morals: what should human beings do, in other words, what duties humans have?

Crucius notes that the demands of conscience - duties or moral laws - assume the existence of a lawgiver, who has decreed these laws. Our obligation to follow these laws, Crucius says, is not caused by the lawgiver forcing us to do something. Instead, the obligation is generated by all the goods the lawgiver or God gives to us - indeed, even the duties themselves are such goods. If a human being subjects his own will to divine will and follows the divine laws, Crucius concludes, he will be virtuous, and because of that, happy.

The sum of these divine laws, or natural law, forms the second major part of morals for Crucius. It divides into further disciplines according to the object of the duties: natural theology deals with human duties toward God, natural law in a more limited sense deals with human duties toward one another and ethics duties toward oneself. Crucius adds that humans also have duties toward animals and even inanimate objects, but these ares so few that the don’t warrant their own discipline. He also adds that we should start from ethics, because we must first perfect our own capacities, before we are able to fulfill other duties.

The aim of ethics is then to perfect human beings, and in order to know how to do it, Crucius says that we must first know the goal God has given to humanity. Before going into that, Crucius notes that God, as the wisest and most perfect being, must have created the whole world for some reason, which is also evident, he continues, from the wise organisation of the parts and whole of the world. The goal that God has envisioned for the whole world, Crucius emphasises, must be that the world can be known and enjoyed rationally. Then again, human beings appear to be only such rational beings, while animals and plants exist only for the sake of human cultivation.

Why God then had to create the world at all, when he could just have thought about it? Crucius’ answer is that God’s goal in creation must involve free actions, which make the fate of the world unpredictable. Furthermore, since God appears to have made humans social, these actions are probably united efforts of many humans. God wants that these actions are virtuous, so that he could reward humans. Then again, it depends on the human choices whether all of them can be rewarded or whether some of them must be punished.

What then, finally, is the goal of humanity or the reward God is willing to give to virtuous people? Crucius notes that this goal cannot be just knowledge, because cognitive is in his system just means for volition. Then again, although Crucius admits that humans have right to use goods of the world, none of them can really satisfy humans. Indeed, because humans have unlimited desires, true reward could only be endless life in another world. Crucius notes that such a moral proof of human immortality is its only possible proof, because all theoretical proofs of immortality fall short of convincing everyone - for example, simplicity of human soul does not mean its immortality, because animals also have simple souls without being immortal.

What kind of behaviour is then required of humans or what it means to be virtuous? Crucius notes that, firstly, this world is not a prison for human beings. Especially body is something that soul truly requires for living in the current world. Thus, Crucius continues, we must keep this vessel in good shape for the duration of our life. Particularly we have no right to forfeit the body given to our use or commit a suicide. In addition to body, Crucius continues, we must also train our understanding. In practice, this means that we must acquire as many concepts as possible and use our understanding in diverse manners.

Since both body and understanding are mere tools for will, the perfection of will is an essential element of virtuous behaviour. Here, the important thing is to retain the freedom of human will - affections should remain mild and strong passions should be avoided, lest we become slave of our drives. Particularly, all goals should be subordinated to conscience and obedience of God, since these cannot be subordinated to anything else. Finally, Crucius points out that subordination here does not mean simply that humans would be constantly thinking about such a goal. Instead, it means, says Crucius, that we should, from time to time, check our behaviour and see whether there is something to fix.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Basic drives

Just like will can affect understanding, Crusius notes, drives of the will can be controlled through understanding. That is, the more lively the representations of objects of drives are, the livelier the respective drives are. What does this liveliness of both representations and drives mean? Like Baumgarten before him, Crusius explains that liveliness of representations is definitely not the same thing as their distinctness. Indeed, the more distinct our ideas of sensible things become, the less we often feel the need to strive for those things, Crusius argues. Instead of distinctness, liveliness, for Crusius, is characterised by the heightened grade of activity, by which we represent something.

From the standpoint of drives, the liveliness of the respective representations differs from both the strength and longevity of drives. In other words, no matter how lively our thoughts of the objects of our drives, these drives might not be able to withstand resistance nor might they be able to continue over a long period of time. Indeed, all these three characteristics - liveliness, strength and longevity - are for Crusius independent. In fact, he reduces the traditional four temperaments to different combinations of the three characteristics: drives of phlegmatic are lacking in all three characteristics, drives of sanguine are lively, drives of choleric are strong and drives of melancholic last long.

Crusius notes that drives and desires come in many different grades, starting from temporary affections and ending with extremely forceful passions. Crusius goes through a various species of such affections and passions, which was a common topic in current discussions of will. What is more interesting is Crusius’s statement that drives and desires can create new drives and desires. Thus, we might wind up desiring a subspecies of an old desire (like desire for truth might lead into a desire for curiosity) or an individual under that class (like love of philosophy might lead into a love for a particular school of philosophy), we could wind up desiring means for fulfilling other desires (such as when we desire gold), parts of certain desired objects (like when desire for general tidiness evolves into a desire for cleanliness), consequences and effects (like when we love children of our friends) and even mere signs (when we desire medals given for honourable services) and things sensed at the same time (when we desire to live in place with good memories).

Desires and drives can thus be based on other desires and drives, but Crusius insists that such series of desires must end with some first desires: then again, there might well be many different first desires. Now, Crusius notes that some of these first desires are contingent in the sense that they are based on our upbringing, while others are ingrained in the God-designed essence of humanity - the latter he calls basic desires. Indeed, he continues, all reasoning entities must have such basic desires or drives, so that they can become happy by fulfilling those desires. No basic desire can be inherently evil, Crusius believes, because otherwise God wouldn’t have given such to us. Because all desires correspond to some concepts, all reasoning entities must have some innate concepts, Crusius concludes, although they need not be immediately conscious of these concepts.

Crusius remarks that basic desires should not be confused with seemingly universal desires, objects of which could be derived through abstraction from any desires. Such abstract desires include a desire to avoid pain, desire for our own existence, a desire for applying one’s own capacities to the fullest extent and a desire to take advantage of suitable opportunities. A particularly important abstract desire is the sum of all desires that constitutes a desire for happiness, which Crusius defines as sum of all possible pleasures and a complete lack of pain. This desire is important, Crusius thinks, because it leads to a further desire for everlasting happiness, which has an infinite object and thus leads humans to accept the existence of God (note how Kant’s idea of God as a postulate for morality follows a similar path). Although all humans seem to share this desire, like all abstract desires, it is not truly a basic desire - indeed, happiness means different thing for different people, because it is a sum of their peculiar desires. Animals, Crusius adds, do not have this desire, since they do not have the requisite capacity for abstraction.

Of the true basic desires or drives, some are specific to humans. In fact, they are also such desires that have abstract objects and cannot thus belong to mere animals. Although these basic human desires should be common to all human beings, Crusius emphasises that they can exist in different force in different individuals. Furthermore, these drives can be hindered by one another or even some other drives, thus making it not obvious that everyone follows them.

Crusius counts three basic human desires, first of which is a desire to perfect oneself and one’s own capacities. This basic drive involves many other desires, such as desires to use and improve our cognitive abilities, to act according to best of reasons and to perfect our body. All these various desires require us to achieve a certain place in human society - freedom, power, riches, friendship and power. Finally, we also try to see and own perfect things, whether this perfection means real force inherent in these things or an ideal perfection, such as order and regularity.

The second basic human desire, Crusius says, is a drive for love. Love, in its moral sense, Crusius defines as a habit of regarding goals of another person as goals of oneself and of taking pleasure in well-being of others. When loving another person, Crusius continues, we do not aim at our own happiness, but at a mutual feeling of love, which would mean unification of the two persons involved. This love is not to be confused, Crusius warns, with such emotions like affection toward children or sexual desire. Particularly, it should be distinguished from so-called self-love, which is actually just satisfaction with one’s own perfections. This drive for love, Crusius admits, is universal, but sadly very weak and easily overpowered by other desires.

The final basic human drive Crusius admits in the drive to know the laws God has appointed for our behaviour. This drive could also be called drive for conscience, where conscience means judgement about the morality of one’s own actions. Crusius, thus, does not equate conscience with a consciousness of one’s faults, but more as a knowledge of one’s obligations and duties. Because we humans have this drive for knowing moral law, Crusius continues we must have an innate idea of this law. He does not mean that individual duties would be implanted in us, but only a general rule of action: do what is in accordance with the perfection of God, with one’s own relation to God and with the essential perfection of human nature and avoid the opposite. Since this drive for conscience is in our own nature, Crusius adds, we must have an innate idea of God and a natural respect for him. Just like our desire for love, the desire for conscience can be suppressed by stronger desires. Still, when these desires dissipate after we have done the objectionable deed, the conscience often reawakens and causes disagreeable pangs.

In addition to basic human desires, we share some basic desires with other animals. These animal desires concern only the goals of our animal nature, such as nourishment and reproduction. Crusius notes that we cannot really a priori determine what all these desires are, but we can only empirically search for their most general classes. Crusius counts two of these classes: drives to affect one’s body in a certain manner and drives to achieve a certain state of one’s body. The drives of the first class differ from one animal to another, depending on their specific capacities of e.g. movement. In any case, Crusius is certain that such drives presuppose soul having an innate idea of one’s own body and thus speak against the notion of soul moving from one body to another.

The second class might be further described as a drive for achieving pleasant bodily feelings. These feelings are attached to some bodily states - for instance, to certain smells and tastes - and are not necessarily connected with the perfection of body, just like pain is no signal of our body becoming more imperfect. Of specific drives, Crusius notes that a drive for nurturing children is clearly a drive of the first class, while sexual drives are caused by drives from both classes.

The relationship between human reason and animal drives is complicated. Animal drives are naturally strong and at least partially independent, which can be seen e.g. by the fierceness of bodily pains. Then again, Crusius admits that making our representations more distinct can dampen the animal drives. Furthermore, reason might add something to animal drives, such as when it combines sexuality with love.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably (1744)

(1715-1775)

Although most important of Christian Wolff’s critics, Adolph Friedrich Hoffmann, did not have the chance to publish anything beyond logic of his system, we could view the work of his student, Crucius, as a sort of completion, and furthermore, as a conduit, through which basic anti-Wolffian ideas were transmitted to Kant.

The first book of Crucius I shall be looking at, Anweisung vernünftig zu leben, is almost at the opposite of spectrum from the methodological work of Hoffmann, that is, the interest of Crucius lies in the question how to live well. But before studying that question, Crucius says, we must first investigate the nature of human will. While in Wolffian school this study was a part of psychology - itself a part of metaphysics - Crucius noted that human will could not actually be a topic of metaphysics, which should study only what is necessary. Instead, Crucius introduced a completely new discipline, thelematology, dedicated just to human will.

A further difference from Wolffian practices is the definition of will Crucius endorses. While Wolffians usually distinguished will as a rational faculty from sensible appetite, Crucius saw will more as having irrational and rational modifications - in other words, instead of the difference between animals and human beings, Crucius emphasised the difference between mere material and animated objects.

In addition, the relation between representation and will was somewhat different with Wolffians and with Crucius. While Wolffians apparently defined appetite and will as a capacity for certain type of representations - irrational or rational representations of good and evil - and actions flowed in a seemingly necessary manner from these representations, for Crucius will was more a power to act according to representations. In other words, Crucius thought that representations provided a mere model for action, while will was the cause actualising these models. Indeed, Crucius said that without will a representing entity couldn’t act. Still, Crucius noted, there isn’t really any merely representing entities, because representations of such an entity would be completely purposeless, and God never creates anything without a purpose.

Capacity for representations - what Crucius calls understanding - is then, he says, dependent on will as its goal. Then again, will is also dependent on understanding, Crucius continues, because without representations provided by understanding will wouldn’t have anything to act in accordance with. Despite this mutual presupposition, Crucius insisted, the two capacities must be based on different basic forces - that is, when we are speaking of finite entities, while with God understanding and will are merely different names for one infinite force. In case of finite entities, on the other hand, representing something does not explain why the entity strives for something, and similarly, striving for something does not explain why the entity has representations.

Will acts for some purposes, Crucius says, although in a sense we speak of purposes only when the subject of willing knows distinctly what it strives for. In a sense, this notion of purpose, Crucius notes, can mean three distinct, but related things. Firstly, we may say that the subject strives for some state of itself or subjective purpose, for instance, when Alexander the Great wanted to receive the title of the high king of Persia. Secondly, the subject may be said to strive for some external object or objective purpose, for instance, when Alexander the Great was interested of the realm of Persia. Finally, the subject strives for a formal purpose, that is, to be in some relation to the objective purpose, for instance, when Alexander the Great wanted to subject Persia under his rule.

Will, Crucius notes, is free, when and in so far as it could be directed to another purpose than it happens to be directed. When this freedom of will is applied, a person is said to make a decision. On the contrary, when will continues to strive for some purpose without any decision, Crucius defines will to be controlled by a drive. Some of the drives are basic or belong to the essence of the person, while other drives are essential or contingent consequences of these basic drives.

Once a striving of human will is fulfilled, Crucius says, the person enters into a state of pleasure, while a contrary state of events leads person into a state of pain. Because human being is controlled by many drives, a person can experience many types of pleasure and pain. Crucius notes that we have no reason to assume that other animals are conscious of anything, thus, we have no reason to assume they feel pleasure or pain. On the other hand, Crucius thinks that God can feel pleasure, but no pain, because God’s will is always fulfilled.

Crucius defines good and evil in terms of will: what is good for a person is what is in accordance with her will, while evil for a person is what is contrary to her will. This is only a relative notion, Crucius says, and against Wolffians, he is quick to distinguish good from perfection. Crucius does note that there is an absolute or metaphysical sense of goodness, as what is in accordance with God’s will.

Although will and understanding are two different forces, Crucius noted, will can affect understanding, because human beings can think purposefully. Will does not have a complete control over understanding, Crucius says, because it also follows its own laws, for instance, association, but it can at least determine how long understanding considers something. Furthermore, Crucius insisted that will could be said to affect itself in the sense that certain desires and drives could have an effect on one another and the power of decision could also affect the desires and drives.

In addition to understanding and itself, Crucius was certain that will - or more accurately, the whole soul of human being - could affect body, because when we earnestly willed to move healthy limbs, the limbs truly moved. Crucius explicitly argued against occasionalism by saying that God could not continuously act as a mediator between soul and body, because it would be below the status of divinity. Probably against the Leibnizian notion of pre-established harmony Crucius noted that God would not have created world, if it had no interaction with souls (what Crucius appears to have missed is the Berkelyan possibility that material world might not exist at all). Crucius admitted that this interaction could not be explained, because we did not know the nature of souls nor of the smallest parts of bodies. Still he was certain that we could know why God had to provide the possibility of the interaction - finite spirits had to exist in some definite place and not omnipresently, like God, thus, they had to be able to change their position in relation to other things.

A move toward accepting the soul-body -interaction had happened also within the Wolffian tradition. A more notably anti-Wolffian stance in Crucius’s thelematology was his insistence that will was free in a strong sense of not being externally coerced nor internally necessary. Crucius defended his position, firstly, through a need to take ethics seriously: unless will would be free in a strong sense, we would have no reason to praise or condemn the actions of a person and becoming virtuous would be down to mere luck.

A more metaphysical reason for believing the possibility of free will, Crucius noted, is that a series of causes must finally come back to an uncaused cause or basic activity. True, he admitted, not all basic activities were free: elemental activities are by nature continuously actualised, while other basic activities, like that of human understanding, are bound to certain conditions, but by their nature inevitable, whenever these conditions are in place. Free will differs from these other basic activities, because its actions are only made possible by external conditions, but free will is still required to turn this possibility into an actuality. To make matters more complicated, Crucius noted that finite understanding cannot demonstrate beforehand whether free will would actualise some possibility, but infinite understanding or God could know it intuitively.

While his ethical and metaphysical arguments for free will were not completely foolproof, Crucius had to rely on a mere assurance that we are conscious of being able to do things otherwise. He admitted that some philosophers had held this idea to be mere imagination. Yet, he concluded, God must have created some freely acting entities, so that creation as a whole would have some purpose.

Free will, Crucius assured, was not against the principle of sufficient reason, because all generated things do need a cause. Where Wolffians had went wrong was in insisting that the cause would always be completely determined to produce only a certain result - something that Wolff himself might actually have agreed upon. Furthermore, Crucius was also aware that we are not always completely free - we do have drives that might restrict our decisions, and we might require considerable effort for diminishing the hold of drives. Only God has a completely free will, which is not restricted by anything - true, God can will only things in conformity with his goodness, but, Crucius argued, this was merely an explanation of what kind of things God wills.

This is what we would usually hear about Crucius’s notion of will in a treatise on history of philosophy. But I would like to go all the way through this book and see how Crucius applies these abstract notions to more concrete questions. Next, I’ll be looking at the general properties of human desires.