Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - The law of the land

The purpose of state or republic, according to Crusius, is to guarantee common good of its citizens, and prudence in affairs of state means finding the best means for this common good. Crusius notes that no one constitution is the only possible means for common good - all three simple constitutions (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy) and their various combinations could work. Following tradition beginning from Aristotle, Crusius remarks that all of these constitutions could also be corrupted, if the regents of the state cared only for themselves and their own class (e.g. the three simple constitutions could be corrupted into tyrannies, oligarchies and ochlocracies). This corruption or illness of republic, Crusius clarifies, is not to be confused with mere irregularity of republic, where its constitution does not wholly serve the common good - irregularity does not yet give subjects right to overthrow their regents nor does it give other republics a right to meddle in its affairs.

In practice, Crusius advises that constitution of a republic should somehow restrict the power of regent. At least during the crucial time, when a new regent is required, either citizens should have a say in choosing the new government of the republic or this should be precisely determined by the constitution, so that the common good would not be too dependent on whims of an arbitrary individual. Indeed, the constitution should allow for strengthening and weakening the power of the regent, as the situation demanded.

In monarchy, Crusius specifies, regularity of the state demands that the power of the monarch is restricted by immutable laws, and even better, by an independent council or collegium, because individual rulers can easily become vicious. Still, Crusius adds, these restrictions shouldn’t get in the way of swift decisions, if common good required them. Furthermore, Crusius suggests that monarchies should be hereditary, because this would allow educating future monarchs to their position.

In addition, hereditary monarchies fall more rarely in civil wars, Crusius believes. In fact, he considers civil war so great a danger that he counsels making hereditary lines definite. Crusius advises particularly against monarchies with several monarchs, because at worst this encourages civil wars and at best it still weakens the republic.

Crusius has not as much to say about aristocracies and democracies. He notes that aristocracies should not be hereditary, because that could prevent best people becoming regents. Furthermore, Crusius thinks that rules stating how an aristocratic counsel comes to a decision should be clear, so that there would be no ambiguity about the decision making process. Of democracies Crusius really has nothing to say beyond noting that it requires a completely civilised nation.

In addition to choosing a constitution, Crusius continues, prudence in affairs of state concerns also the day-to-day decisions of a republic. Individual republics have their own particular circumstances requiring particular decisions, but Crusius notes that some general rules can be justified already by the general nature of republics.

Crusius begins by noting that good and prudent government has three goals, none of which should be ignored nor emphasised over others. First goal is to secure the position of regent and apply his powers most efficiently. Crucius remarks that writers like Machiavelli had focused on this goal, forgetting that the good of the regent was intricately connected with the good of the citizens, the second goal of prudent government. This second goal was overemphasised, Crusius says, by republican writers, who had forgotten that a republic still required an efficient regent. Finally, Crucius picks as the third goal the status of republic among other republic. Just like with other goals, he notes that some politicians focused too much on this particular goal, forgetting that external glory of state is based on its internal happiness.

Crusius states that prudence in affairs of state uses the very same capacities as prudence in private affairs, although it applies these capacities in different matters, which it then ought to be informed of. Specifically prudent governor should know the geographical characteristics of the land and the citizens, the political constitution of the whole republic and various communities within it, economic state of the republic, and finally, interests and goals of neighbouring republics.

Crusius emphasises the role of religion as the basis of security of republics. In addition to religion, sciences, arts and freedom of thinking should be protected, because they serve as means for securing all the goals of human life and make republics respected. Despite the lip service to freedom of thinking, Crusius is not willing to tolerate ideas working against the security of state, such as, he insists, atheism.

Crusius advises regents to be careful in choosing their officials and to prefer intelligent and virtuous people over those of high birth. Still, he also suggests that regents should not replace their own intelligence with the intelligence of their officials and that they should closely control the doings of those officials, because they work in the name of the regent. Crusius insists that officials should always follow direct commands of regent, to make the republic secure, while laws, according to Crucius, can be broken, if it is prudent to do so. Indeed, Crusius suggests, good example of regent guides subjects better than any laws.

Crusius speaks for strict regulation of state spendings - republic should always have some reserve finances, in case money is required for emergencies. Money shouldn’t particularly be given freely to subjects, Crusius argues, because they wouldn’t respect what they haven’t worked for, and they particularly shouldn’t have the right to press their own coinage. Instead, subjects should be taxed heavily, Crusius says, since no citizen should have means to live by oneself, but be in various ways dependent on other citizens. Indeed, a person providing sustenance to others should be congratulated, Crusius suggests, because they help to realise one goal of republic. To make taxation fair, Crusius notes, richer individuals should pay the most. Generally, he insists that money should be directed to move from owner to another from time to time, since in this manner it helps the state and the subjects more than if it remained stagnant. Thus, if some goods in land were still ownerless, they could be taken as regent’s property, so that they could be used for everyone’s benefit.

Crusius has not very much to say about legislation, beyond the general fact that laws should be applicable to different subjects. Furthermore, Crusius emphasises that laws should definite, so that there can be no room for misinterpretation, whether it is accidental or purposeful. Against another sort of fraud is directed Crusius’ advise that regents should be careful that religious communities won’t meddle into civil life of their members, since this is often a way to deceive lower classes.

When it comes to foreign relations, Crusius advocates for maintaining the army in good condition, because a strong army has an important role in preventing foreign conquest and in raising the prestige of the republic, which is important for achieving its goals. In commerce, Crusius holds onto essentially mercantilist ideals: foreign imports should be restricted, because losing gold weakens the state, and if something is to be imported, it should be raw materials that are then further developed into manufactures that could be sold to other countries for more money. Crusius still does not believe that republics are only competitors of one another. Indeed, he says that just like humans require friends, countries require alliances for their own security.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Republics and nations

Until this moment, Crusius has been speaking of a state of nature, that is, a state without no government. Then again, he notes, human beings cannot remain in this state of nature, because their fallen state creates problems. Some people want to do harm to others, and a need to defend oneself leads to the formation of communities. Crusius insists that not everyone can take part in the actual decision making of a community, which requires some form of representation. Furthermore, communities require some principles to fill gaps in the law of nature and means by which to enforce natural law and contracts.

These needs generate an incentive to form republics, by which Crusius means communities in which one or more persons take care of common welfare and security, in order that natural duties and rights of moral person would be better protected. Crusius also insists that God wants republics, because they are in the current state of the world the best means for common welfare. Crusius does admit that first republics were probably dictatorships. Still, he thinks that this genesis does not lessen our obligations toward them. Furthermore, he notes that republics are not absolutely necessary, since in state of nature many things can be determined through contracts.

Crusius notes that republics have two different kinds of members - regents or rulers and subjects or citizens - both of which have their own duties and rights. Although he notes that a republic can have many regents and that even the whole nation could be a regent, most of his discussion seems to rise from the monarchic context of a single ruler.

Duty of regents is, Crusius says, to take care of the welfare of the whole republic and to use their powers only for this purpose and not to restrict individual rights further than necessary. Rights of regent, which Crusius calls rights of majesty, can either be historically determined, such as a right to hunt in certain places where others are not allowed. Still, Crusius notes, some of their rights are determined already by the very notion of regency and thus belong to natural law.

A central right of regents, in Crusius’ account, is the right to explicitly or implicitly appoint civil laws, which are meant for the best of the whole republic and which subjects are obligated to follow. Civil laws either generally say that something should be done or not done, or they assign rights to certain people and to other people a duty to respect those rights.

Crusius bases the obligation toward civil laws on a more fundamental obligation toward natural law - civil laws should be obeyed, because natural law says so. Civil laws are mostly needed where natural law leaves matters very undetermined, for instance, with questions concerning property. In addition, they can be used to bolster parts of natural law that are not accepted by everyone.

Crusius considers also the relationship of civil laws to rights and duties based on natural laws. He notes that civil laws can cancel negative natural rights, for instance, a civil law can cancel a right to hunt. Then again, Crusius adds, positive right can be cancelled only for a good reason. Crusius thinks also that a civil law can cancel those natural duties, which are indeterminate or not in itself necessary, because civil security is more important than following these duties. Then again, he emphasises, immutable natural duties cannot be denied by any civil law, because even civil law is based on such duties.

In addition to devising civil laws, Crusius says that regent is also tasked to apply natural and civil laws as the highest judge of republic. This does not mean that regent would have to sit in court all day, because they can assign officials and judges to help them in their work. Then again, regent cannot leave judicial power to the hands of ordinary citizens - thus, Crusius condemns practices such as dueling. Finally, according to Crusius, regents themselves can judged only by God, so that the security of republic can be maintained.

Crusius says that a regent has a right to punish and thus force subjects to follow laws. In extreme cases they can even kill people, as a deterrent, but Crusius advises this should not be done lightly. Still, Crusius suggests that righteous death penalty should be regarded as deriving from God’s will.

As has already been noted, Crusius wanted regents to avoid meddling into private affairs of citizens, as much as it is possible. This means also that regent should respect property of private persons, although they have a right to tax citizens during extreme times. Crusius also notes that private affairs of regent do not fall under right of majesty, in other words, regent does not have any special rights when e.g. buying or selling property.

Crusius remarks that republic might contain smaller communities. These communities fall also under the command of regent. Thus, Crusius notes, they must provide enough information of their activities to regent, in order to determine whether they won’t pose a threat to a republic. If these communities are harmless, their activities belong to the private sphere.

Crusius also considers the origin of regent’s rights. Originally, he says, majesty must be decided by pact. Such a constitutional pact can be entered freely, but Crusius admits it might also arise through force, if the alternative is even worse. This pact can be explicit - for instance, in case of elections - or implicit. Crusius considers it as a case of an implicit pact, when children continue to live in a republic that has raised them - it is not their parents that have decided the issue, but children themselves, because they enjoy the security provided by the republic.

Crusius says that rights of regent and their limits are determined by the original pact - unless regents want to turn into dictators, they should not try to overcome those limits. Crusius is of the opinion that the rights of regent can be restricted only by an explicit pact or by clear implicit conditions, such as regent’s duty to act for the benefit of the whole republic.

Crusius notes that regent has power also over churches in republic. Indeed, he insists that churches must be regulated more than other communities, because churches are large, depravations can be easily masked as religious dogmas and unruly persons often become church officials. Still, Crusius adds, regent should otherwise give churches the same rights as other communities.

Crusius has further rules about the relationship of regent and religion. Firstly, he begins, regents themselves should not make new religions and they should not make essential changes to religion. Since regents should not meddle in private affairs, they should not force anyone to convert to a religion. Particularly, they should not take children from their parents and make them part of a different religious community. Generally, Crusius says, nobody should be punished just because of their religion. Furthermore, unless the good of the republic demands so, Crusius continues, regent should not force religious community to change its characteristics.

Crusius thinks that power of regents over a religion goes somewhat further, if they follow that particular religion, because then they are obligated to aim for the best of its followers - for instance, regents would then have also judicial power in church. Crusius suggests that regents are obligated to help their religious community survive all internal conflicts. Indeed, he adds, they can even determine the rules of the religious community, if the general good so demands.

According to Crusius, regent can pick some religion as an official religion of the republic, in so far as nobody is forced to uphold it involuntarily. Crusius notes that while regent can punish people who disturb general peace, even if they do it for the sake of their conscience, this does not mean he can punish people just for having a different religion. Still, Crusius allows regents to punish external mockery of the official religion, which Crusius considers to include atheism or deism.

Crusius thinks subjects have a duty to follow civil laws and administration of majesty, thus denying all disobedience. According to Crusius, this duty is based not just on the original pact, but also on the duty of upholding security of whole community. This duty also implies, Crusius says, that despite all their faults, regents must be thought to be good, because on the public image of the regent is based the security of whole republic. Similarly, Crusius continues, subjects must think that a regent always acts according to the best interest of republic.

Crusius admit that if regents forget the duty of upholding common good, citizens are only externally obligated to follow them. He then raises the interesting question whether this external duty of obedience contradicts inner duty of citizens to follow their own conscience. His answer differs from one case to another. Firstly, he notes that when citizens are unsure what is best for the republic, they should just follow their regent. Even if the citizens would know a better course of action than what regent suggests, regent’s suggestion should be follow not be bad as such.

What then if regent’s decision would be foolish or even ethically unsound? Advise of Crusius is to avoid as much conflict as possible. He denies all active rebellion, but accepts a sort of passive resistance, where regent’s commands are not just followed. Even in this case, Crusius says, this disobedience should be done without arousing too much commotion and the citizens should accept the punishment, if their disobedience becomes public.

Since the rights of regent are based on original, explicit or implicit, pact, these rights might vanish and subjects wouldn’t then be obligated to follow their regent. Crusius warns that this could happen only if the regent had committed a great crime, since revolution always endangers public security. Furthermore, he adds that the decision to start a revolution should not rise from a single person, but from whole nation or at least from a majority of nation or from a selected group of its representatives.

While within a republic or a nation, civil laws rule in addition to natural law, when it comes to relation of nations, Crusius says, no such civil laws exist. This means, firstly, that all nations have similar right and no nation can rule or judge over another. Secondly, Crusius adds, it means that all obligations of nations must be based on either natural law or on contracts made by them. Still, the mere existence of free nations changes the natural law somewhat from that holding in a state of nature, for instance, since the existence of nations often implies the existence of entities other than individuals that can own property.

Because free nations have no further ruler above them, Crusius notes, they have a right to force their own rights, in other words, they can start just wars. Just war is no illegal revenge, Crusius clarifies, but a righteous way for a nation to uphold its rights. Still, he points out, war is always an unnatural state and should happen only at very extreme situations, after all diplomatic means have been used. Furthermore, Crusius continues, warring nations should use the least amount of violence and to end the war as soon as possible, while neutral states should not be disturbed during war. Despite these antiwar attitudes, Crusius makes one concession: raging barbarian hordes can be attacked, no matter what.

Friedrich II: Anti-Machiavelli (1740)

Friedrich II (1712-1786)

Royalty is not a common sight in lists of philosophers. Few clear examples come to mind immediately: Marcus Aurelius, princess Elisabeth of Bohemia – and Friedrich II of Prussia. Known by the title ”philosopher-king”, this enlightened despot appeared to have a golden touch. In his life time, Prussia rose from a slightly larger German territory into ranks of European superpowers, boomed economically and received a more modern system of justice. Furthermore, he strove to raise the status of Prussian culture to the level of French culture he loved and invited to his court many French litterateurs and philosophers, such as Voltaire. He even called back Christian Wolff, whom his father had long ago exiled because of suspicions of heresy.

Despite the grand sound of all these efforts, it might well be asked what this person is doing on a blog concentrating expressly on philosophical writings. Well, Friedrich II did write – poetry, but also some more philosophical works. It is especially his L'Anti-Machiavel that will now be my topic.

As the name of the book suggests, target of this critical work is Machiavelli and especially his most famous work, The Prince, famous for it utter immorality. In this work, Machiavelli had declared that a good prince should use all the means necessary to get to his ends – war, plunder, deception, murder, slander, you name it. Even if Machiavelli's advice appears rather cynical, he was in his heart a republican, and The Prince was merely an attempt to find a suitable local prince, who could use it for the honourable end of uniting Italy under a home-bred rule.

Friedrich connects his own work with quite another philosophical debate – he considers Machiavelli to be even greater threat than Spinoza, because while latter had erred only in matters of speculation, the former wrote falsities in important practical matters. If Spinoza was commonly seen as gateway to atheism, Machiavelli led to even worse immoralism – to the idea that a ruler should not strive for the good of his people.

While Friedrich's motives are clearly based on morality, his argumentation is not. Instead, he tries to show that a Machiavellian prince cannot even fulfill his own ends with the means of Machiavelli's book. A prince cannot really rule without the support of his citizens, as is witnessed by many revolutions against despised rulers, Friedrich notes. Deceptiveness and cruelty might help one in gaining kingship, but such qualities cannot be used for retaining one's rule.

Furthermore, Friedrich notes that Machiavelli's The Prince does not take into consideration relativistic nature of cultures. In other words, methods of rule fit for 16th century Italy – a time of petty principalities fighting for equally petty reasons – do not work in other lands, let alone at other times. In 18th century, small principality just couldn't afford to e.g. wage war alone, but should accept alliances with other principalities.

Interestingly, Friedrich's book touches even a more metaphysical question. One of the chapters of Machiavelli's book concerned the role of fortune in state affairs – and whether a prince could negate its influence. Here Friedrich notes that Machiavelli assumes, without further ado, that fortune exists. Yet, he notes skeptically, there has been no convincing proof showing that true fortune or contingency exists – nor, for that matter, any proof showing that e.g. providence has cared for everything

Next time, we'll move back to aesthetics.