tiistai 15. toukokuuta 2018

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 2 – Desires and fears

Darjes singles out a distinct group of cognitions, namely, those where the objects cognised are something which we either incline to or recline from, in other words, appetites and aversions. The difference between appetites and aversions and other cognitions is quite evident, whenever we have the object of appetite or aversion present to us – we feel pleasure or pain. On the other hand, whenever we do not have the object with us, we desire for or fear it.

Darjes notes that appetites and aversions can be quantified, depending on how strong the respective desire or fear is. This quantification comes to the fore especially when appetites and aversions contradict one another. In other words, whenever an appetite and an aversion clash, the stronger prevails. One might wonder how appetites and aversions could clash. The simple answer lies in two sources of human cognition. If our appetites and aversions are based on the inferior cognitive faculty, they are sensible, and if they are based on the superior cognitive faculty, they are rational or volitions and nolitions belonging to a faculty called will. Thus, our sensible and rational appetites and aversions can clash, and if the sensible have the other hand, we experience some affect, while if the rational side preponderates, we have something analogous to affects.

A further distinction Darjes mentions concerns the relation of appetites and aversions to previous cognitive states – some of these rise from earlier states, others are innate to human mind. He still does not mean that we could simply explain appetites and aversions mechanically through the earlier states or the nature of human mind. Indeed, he is quick to emphasise that appetites and aversions spontaneous and hence contingent. This does not mean that appetites and aversions would be completely inexplicable, just that these explanations would use other means than mechanical causality.

In case of volitions and nolitions in particular, the explanation is based on their goals. It is somewhat unclear whether these goals are chosen by the will or not. In any case, when these goals are given, the will considers all the possible means for this goal and freely chooses the one it considers best. Of course, at least humans can have an erroneous view on what means are best and even what goals are good. Darjes is adamant that this possibility of error is the only explanation for the human ability to freely choose bad things. In fact, a spontaneous entity who couldn't make errors could not choose anything bad, Darjes concludes.

lauantai 5. toukokuuta 2018

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 2 (1744)

The second volume of Darjesian metaphysics begins with empirical psychology – or pneumatics, as Darjes prefers to call it – that is, explication of things we can experience in ourselves. The starting point for Darjes is the observation that we have in us something that resembles things that are not part of myself. In other words, we have representations, through which we are conscious of objects. Having a representation and being conscious of it, Darjes insists, is still not completely identical – we can have obscure, unconcious representations, while consciousness brings clarity to representations.

An important aspect of representation and cognition Darjes emphasises is the spontaneity behind it: my representations continue sometimes as vividly as before, sometimes not, and it is up to my attention whether they do. Furthermore, I can direct my attention successively to different aspects of the object of my cognition, that is, I can reflect this object. While consciousness makes representation clear, refection makes it distinct. This state of distinctness, Darjes insists is something we can only achieve while awake, and indeed, Darjes defines being awake as a possibility to reflect.

Darjes notes that sometimes reflection is hindered by associations awakened by something we find in the reflected object. This association is connected with the capacity of cognition to reproduce earlier representations. Another faculty – memory – is then required for recognising reproduced memories.

We have mentioned so far only representations of individual things, but we can also compare and contrast objects. Thus, it is possible to represent also connections between things – these things are similar or not equal or one might be the cause of the other.

An important subset of representations Darjes touches upon are sensations or representations of things that induce mutations in me, that is, objects of our senses or sensibles. Darjes notes that sensations can be divided according to the different parts of body the sensible object affects – the same object is represented differently, when it affects ear and when it affects eyes. Following Wolffian tradition, Darjes calls the part of cognition dealing with all these different kinds of sensations inferior cognitive faculty. A partial reason for this evaluative nomenclature must be that sensations are distracting – reflecting on an object becomes impossible, because sensation of another object might be stronger and prevent our reflection.

Darjes notes that there is no guarantee that we would sense or represent all things that affect our body, and indeed, he suggests that there must be some further reason explaining why we sense something. Analogically, we might represent things that can induce changes in my body, while they are not actually inducing such changes. This is the faculty of imagination, which Darjes includes also under inferior cognitive faculty. He, furthermore, divides objects of imaginations into, firstly, phantasms, which are complete objects that can be also sensed, and figments, which are combinations of parts that can be sensed.

The inferior cognitive faculty can only represent things that affect us, thus, it cannot be used for representing e.g. essences of things or universals. This task, Darjes says, must be left for superior cognitive faculty, which represents things in an insensible manner, that is, in such a manner that it isn't and even cannot be sensed. Darjes doesn't go into further details as to how this insensible cognition happens, but notes only that it is possible through the faculty of reflection. Through reflection and the use of signs, cognition forms universal and distinct concepts. If the concepts concern things in themselves, without relations to other things, we are speaking of intellect or understanding, while if they concern relations between things, we are speaking of reason. It is good to note that while it it easy to conceptually represent connections between things, Darjes admits that the inferior faculty has something analogous to reason, through which it can also represent connections.

Before moving to the next part, concerned with appetites and aversions, we might very briefly note what Darjes has to say about habit. The basis of habit, he suggest, is repetition of representations and operations involved with them. This repetition makes concepts stronger and thus makes cognising them more easy.

tiistai 24. huhtikuuta 2018

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 1 - Building bodies

Ever since Descartes suggested that matter is defined by extension, philosophers had been proposing theories as to what Cartesian idea of matter had overlooked, since clearly, extension as such is not yet matter. Darjes enters this discussion in the section on somatology, or theory of bodies or composite entities. He notes that to make a set of multiple entities into a unified entity, it isn't enough just to put them together. Instead, these parts must also cohere with one another.

Now, as we saw in the previous post, Darjes thought that in order that entities can cohere, all of those entities must be non-spontaneous, but also some of them must be active. In other words, there are no completely passive bodies in Darjesian metaphysics, only more or less active. The level of activity in bodies can even be perceived, Darjes suggests, since the difference of fluids and solids reduces to it – fluid bodies have more active entities in them than solid bodies, which have only so much active entities as required for the sake of coherence. Since the difference between fluids and solids is ultimately based on the essential difference between active and passive entities, the difference between fluids and solids must also be essential, Darjes concludes. Somewhat surprisingly, this means that fluids cannot really change into solids or vice versa.

A significant part of philosophical treatises of corporeal objects from this period often include an account of simple mechanical interactions, in which two bodies collide with one another. Darjes is no exception to this rule. He considers several cases – what if only one is moving or both, what if colliding bodies are solids or fluids etc. We need not get too far into the details, but just to note the general attempt to determine the result of the collision from the constituents and the structure of the colliding bodies. For instance, in a collision between a solid and a fluid, the fluid gives away, because a fluid body has more active constituents, which will move according to their own drive, as soon as bonds of coherence holding them together loosen a little bit, while the solid can remain unified in an easier manner.

As a final part of the first tome of his metaphysics Darjes introduces a discipline called mechanology, a study of machines. Machines, for Darjes, are systems of non-spontaneous entities, in which systems, again, mean collections of entities that can affect one another. Systems and therefore also machines are to be clearly differentiated from cohering bodies – in a system, the constituting bodies do not form a single entity, but remain independent of one another. Darjesian understanding of machines is quite extensive – the constituting parts of machines can be solid or fluid bodies or theoretically even elements. Indeed, the whole mechanology remains on a quite general level, where Darjes finds out such revelatory truths as that the state of a machine depends on its previous state.

The second tome of Darjes metaphysics moves then to the investigation of soul, which shall also be the topic of my next post.

torstai 8. maaliskuuta 2018

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 1 - Monads without spontaneity equals elements

After ontology, Darjes turns his attention to monadology, which in his philosphy means two things: firstly, a discipline for the study of simple entities in general, and secondly, particularly study of those simple entities, which constitute complex entities, or elements. It is just natural to start with the general part.

Now, the essence of any simple entity, Darjes begins, consists of two things. Firstly, as simple it is indivisible or does not consist of further entities. Secondly, an an entity it is impenetrable or it cannot be a determination of any other entity. Just like in all previous Wolffian philosophy, because of its simplicity, a simple entity cannot have been generated from previously existing entities that would retain their existence even after the generation of new entity. Instead, a generated simple entity would have to have appeared instantaneously out of nothing. Similarly, when a simple entity is destroyed, it will be completely annihilated.

Another commonplace with earlier Wolffians is the importance of force as a basic characteristic of simple entities. For instance, because a simple entity does not consist of many entities, the only way quantities can be applied to it is through the strength or intensity of its basic force. What is more original is Darjes' attempt to use the notion of force as a way to divide simple entities into further genera. Some forces do not act by themselves, but require still some efficient cause to activate them – simple entities with such forces Darjes calls passive. Some forces require only a removal of obstacles for their activation – simple entities with such forces Darjes calls active. And it wouldn't be a Darjesian division, if he wouldn't note the possibility of a third genera, with simple entities with both active and passive characteristics, although in practice he doesn't mention them often.

The essence of passive simple entities in Darjesian philosophy is simple. By themselves, they do nothing. They can be activated by impenetrability of other simple entities, which move to the place where the passive entity is and thus force it to move away from its original location. After this, the passive entity acts, that is, it moves, and cannot stop from moving, unless something external stops it. In effect, a passive simple entity isn't spontaneous, that is, it cannot determine itself to act.

Active entities, on the other hand, might be spontaneous. Yet, it is also possible, Darjes says, that an active entity is not spontaneous, in other words, it might require only removal of obstacles for its own activity, but perhaps cannot itself remove those obstacles. In case of spontaneous simple entities, on the other hand, these obstacles come mainly from the entity itself – in a sense they forbid themselves of doing things. Spontaneous entities can remove such a self-imposed obstacle and thus, in a sense, choose to do something. In other words, they act first on themselves and through this self-action act toward other things. Darjes suggests that this self-action happens always through representations or perceptions – the simple entity perceives some goal as good, that is, as conforming to its essence, and proceeds to actualise that goal.

After defining the three species of simple entities – passive, non-spontaneously active and spontaneous simple entities – Darjes goes on to discuss their possible interactions with one another. In case of mere passive entities, these interactions – mostly collisions – happen according to the laws of motion, which had been a hot philosophical topic since the time of Descartes. The introduction of active entities complicates interactions, even when the active entities are not spontaneous, since a collision might not just force an active entity to move, but also to remove impediments for natural movement of the entity. In case of a spontaneous simple entity, finally, other entities cannot really make it do anything, but merely provide an occasion for the spontaneous entity to do something.

An important relation between simple entities in Darjesian scheme is coherence, that is, a relation of proximity in which the simple entities have become so unified that one cannot be moved without moving the other. For such a coherence it is not enough that the simple entities just lie passively side by side, Darjes notes, because then one of them could be simply moved without any change in the other. Instead, the diverse entities must act on one another and this act cannot be mere movement – in other words, they must somehow attract one another. Thus, at least some of the cohering entities must be naturally active. Then again, Darjes notes, a spontaneous simple entity cannot really cohere with other simple entities, because other entities can at most provide an occasion for it to act. These results are important especially for the special part of Darjesian monadology, because Darjes thinks that unified bodies are essentially constituted from simple entities by coherence. Hence, elements – simple entities constituting bodies – cannot be spontaneous. Furthermore, because infinite entity must be most perfect in every sense, and like many philosophers before him, Darjes regards activity and especially spontaneity as more perfect than passivity, all elements are revealed to be finite.

keskiviikko 7. helmikuuta 2018

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 1 - Connecting substances

While in previous post I discussed Darjesian notions of entity and substance, when regarded in abstraction from other entities and substances, now we shall see what happens when entities and substances are connected to one another. Darjes notes that these connections fall into three general classes, depending on whether the connection exists between mere entities, between both mere entities and substances or between substances. In case of the first kind of connection the things connected are regarded as just being impenetrable to one another. Example of a such a connection would be placing many entities into a same space so as to form a figure.

If in addition to or in place of mere entities substances are added to the connection, Darjes notes, we get forces to the equation. Such connections involve either the existence of substances or then their states – for instance, existence of certain substances might be connected with a state of one substance. In other words, such substantial connections concern various interactions between substances, for example, when one substance acts upon a passive substance or when one substance removes obstacles stopping some substance from acting.

All connections involving mere entities are extrinsic in the sense that it doesn't affect entities if we e.g. arrange them to form a figure. Thus, these connections are completely contingent. One might think that the case might be different with substantial connections, but Darjes notes that this is not so – substances can exist independently of one another, so there is no necessity that e.g. a substance affects another substance. Because no connections between entities or substances is necessary, Darjes says, these connections must ultimately be dependent on some necessary entity.

A particular type of connection Darjes mentions is the relationship between cause and what is caused. Like always, Darjes makes interesting divisions rarely seen in previous Wolffian philosophy. Thus,he notes when discussing cause or caused, one can firstly regard cause and caused as mere subjects – that is, as a material cause and caused – secondly as containing a reason for the possibility of something or having a reason of possibility in some other entity – this is what Darjes calls active/passive causating reason – and finally, as containing or having in something else a reason for actuality – active or passive causality. Like many other Wolffians before him, Darjes goes into great lengths in describing various causal notions, such as principal cause and instrumental cause or mediate and immediate cause, and we need not follow him in such a detail.

Just like almost all Wolffians thus far, Darjes defines the notion of space through the spatial relations an entity could have. Indeed, spatial relations are based on certain connections between entities, in which one entity cannot take the place of the other entities. Such space is then no true entity, but merely an abstraction out of real entities and their relationships. While spatial relationships are completely external to the entities or substances, if one adds activities to the equation, the connection becomes at least more internal. Darjes speaks of presence, by which he means the factor of one substance affecting another – the more a substance affects another, the more present it is to that other substance. Darjesian presence is then a much stronger relationship than mere spatial closeness – if one unites entities by bringing them close to one another, the union is merely external, while a union involving substances being present to one another is internal.

Before moving to more particular parts of metaphysics, Darjes finally considers the notions of infinity and finity, which he defines simply through the notion of perfection – finite entity is such that something can be more perfect than it, while an infinite entity is as perfect as is possible. The finity of an entity does not mean it couldn't be also perfect in some measure. It just isn't completely perfect and all perfection it has must belong also to the infinite entity. It is then immediately clear that all passivity, incompleteness and possibility of non-existence are signs of finity.

Already at this place in metaphysics, Darjes introduces Wolffian aposteriori and apriori proofs of God's existence, although he is, of course, not yet speaking of God. He notes, firstly, that since all finite entities are contingent, they must ultimately depend on a necessary infinite entity. Hence, if finite entities exist, an infinite entity surely must exist also (aposteriori proof). Since it is clearly possible that a finite entity would exist, an infinite entity must also be a possibility. Because infinite entity can be only impossible or necessary, it must then exist necessarily (apriori proof). We see here a similar dual role played by the two proofs as in Wolff's theology, the difference being that Darjes has to assume only the possibility of something finite.

Infinite and finite form then the major division of entities. Infinite entity is essentially unique, so no further division of that species is possible. Finite entities, on the other hand, can divide into further subspecies, depending on whether they are simple or complex.

tiistai 23. tammikuuta 2018

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 1 - Forceful being

We have been studying what Darjes calls primary philosophy, but we finally come to his ontology, when we see his definition of an entity (ens). In effect, by an entity Darjes means something that is not accident, that is, which can be in itself. What this being in itself means, according to Darjes, is at least that in the same place as one entity exists, no other entity can exist. Thus, impenetrability of an entity is an ontological characteristic for Darjes, while accidents might share the same place by occurring in same entity. An entity need not exist, but it can be a merely possible entity. If it does exist, Darjes calls it a substance.

Darjes notes that all substances can contain something which is a reason for something else being what it is. In other words, they are forces that can act on other things. Now, because this activity is an essential part of what substances are, they can also be divided according to their level of activity. The highest kind of substance is completely active and needs at most something to remove obstacles from its way to start acting – they are what Darjes calls an effective conatus. At the lowest rang of substances are completely passive substances, which require some efficient reason to make them act – these are what Darjes calls bare potentia. Between these two extremes fall cases where substances are in some sense passive and in some sense active – these substances Darjes calls either ineffective conatuses or potentias with conatus (it is difficult to say whether Darjes means these two to be separate groups, depending on whether the emphasis is on the active or the passive side of the substance or whether they are just two names for the same thing).

Darjes does not just distinguish between different kinds of forces or substances, but also between different kinds of actions these substances can make occur. The actions might happen within the substances or be intrinsic to it – these would be immanent actions. Then again, the actions might also be extrinsic to the substance – these would be transitive actions. Of course, Darjes also admits that some actions might be partially immanent and partially transitive.

Like all Wolffians, Darjes is a nominalist who insists that no universals can exist. Hence, all substances must be individuals. Although substances cannot then be divided into universals and individuals, Darjes does divide them into complete and incomplete substances, depending on whether a substance acts or not. He also notes that a substance can be variably or contingently complete, if it sometimes happens to act and sometimes not. Even if a substance would be contingently complete, it still might be a necessary existent, since there is no necessity that a necessary existent would always act.

A notion near to completeness is the subsistence of a substance. Darjes defines subsistent substance as a complete substance that is not sustained by something else. Here, sustaining means a relation in which one force determines another to act in a precise manner. Thus, subsisting substance would act and not be acted upon by other substances.

Darjes goes on to define states of an entity. In effect, these are nothing more than collections of some determinations that the entity has. For instance, being a substance or substantiality and subsistence are states that some entity might have. Depending on the determinations making up the state, the state can be internal, external or mixed, and it can be necessary or contingent. For instance, if there are some entities existing absolutely necessarily, then they have an absolutely necessary state of substantiality. With contingent entities, on the other hand, their state of substantiality is also contingent and in fact depends ultimately on some absolutely necessary substance.

Darjes does not remain on mere level of definitions, but tries to determine some general characteristics true of all substances, based mostly on the principle of sufficient reason. The most important conclusion is that all substances must persevere in their state of action or non-action, until some further reason makes them change their state. Thus, an action continues, until something comes to impede it.

Darjes also spends some time considering how to quantify forces. His idea is to measure forces through the actions they can make happen. For instance, if two passive substances have the same quantity of force is they are as quick in producing same actions, then they will produce same action in same time. Thus, by checking what the substances can achieve and how quickly they do it, one can compare the quantity of their forces with one another.

perjantai 19. tammikuuta 2018

Joachim Darjes: Elements of metaphysics 1 – Connecting things

In previous post, we saw Darjes define basic notions of thinkable and possible and various determinations thinkables and possibles can have. The next step is to relate especially the possibles in various ways to one another. The most basic concepts in this relating are those of succession and coexistence. Darjes does provide definitions for these terms, but these definitions are somewhat circular or at least rely on our notions of what it means e.g. that a thing stops to exist, when another comes to existence. Thus, we might as well take these two notions as primitive relations, on basis of which temporal and spatial relations in general can be founded.

As one might have suspected, the primary mode of connection Darjes considers is that of reason/ground – that which makes something to be what it is. Darjes is one of the most careful philosophers in making distinctions between various forms of ground. The most important distinctions lie, firstly, between reason for the possibility of something and reason for the actual existence of something, and secondly, between a metaphysical/synthetical reason, which makes something be in itself what it is, and logical/analytic reason, which makes us know what something is. Further distinctions concern the questions whether a reason is by itself sufficient to ground something, whether a reason for something lies within the thing grounded or outside it and whether reason has truly caused something to occur or merely removed some obstacles preventing something to occur.

Like all Wolffians, Darjes is not happy to just define notions, but he wants also to show where they can be deployed. Especially the question of metaphysical reason of existence is important. Darjes notes that since essences must necessarily be, there really can't be any metaphysical reason for their existence. Instead, it is only us who can have analytical reasons for knowing that some essence exists, that is, we might have reasons for knowing something is possible.

If essences do not need metaphysical reasons, the connection of essences – or in general, any subjects – with further determinations not implicit in them does require. In essence, Darjes shows here his commitment to a version of the principle of sufficient reason. Like other Wolffians before him, Darjes tries to argue for this principle, but his arguments clearly just presuppose a number of things. Darjes suggests that a determination without a reason to back it up would not be able to prevent its opposite to latch on to the same subject, which would inevitably cause contradictions. In other words, Darjes merely presumes that some explaining or even causating factor is required for connecting a particular non-necessary and possible determination to a thing – or what amounts to the same thing, for removing the opposite determination. Darjes also hastily assumes that this presumption requires the stronger supposition of a sufficient reason – that is, that for the connection of a subject and determination there must be a finitely describable series of reasons, ending with a final reason, which requires no reason beyond itself.

The first particular kind of reason Darjes considers is the essence as a reason of some affections of a thing. Such affections Darjes calls attributes, although he at once admits this concept has two meanings, depending on whether the essence is the reason of their actuality or possibility – thus, attributes could be divided into actual and possible attributes. Now, some possible attributes might still require another reason for making them actual affections of the thing in question. Such affections would not be actual attributes. While most of the Wolffians would just name these non-attribute affections modes, Darjes has still some more divisions to make. The reason actualising the non-attribute affection might be something external to the thing in question, and in that case Darjes speaks of a mode. Then again, this reason might be something intrinsic to the thing, although not its essence – Darjes calls this a mode by analogue. These modes by analogue are an interesting addition to the normal classification of determinations of things. Firstly, they resemble modes, because they are not grounded on the essence of the thing: hence, they are at least analogical to modes. Secondly, they still resemble in a sense attributes more, because they do not require anything external to the thing for their explanation.

Even modes are not a simple group in eyes of Darjes. The modes in the most proper sense are actualised just through some external effective reason. Yet, Darjes says, some modes might also have partial actualising reason in something within the thing in question (Darjes also calls these affections mixed non-attribute affections). In effect, such immediate modes would otherwise be actualised by something internal to the thing in question – and would then be just modes by analogy – but some obstacle prevents this actualisation, which then requires some external reason removing this obstacle. Noticeably, while the place of relations in relation to modes has been somewhat murky in the Wolffia tradition, Darjes clearly takes them to be a subspecies of modes – modes divide into intrinsic modes, such as qualities and quantities, which can be cognised without any reference to other things, and into extrinsic modes or relations, the cognition of which requires a reference to other things.

At this moment, after going through all these various determinations things could have, Darjes makes a detour to different ways things could be distinguished, apparently through these various affections. Some distinctions, Darjes begins, concern merely the words used – this is a logical distinction – while other distinctions concern also what the words refer to and what is then something thinkable – metaphysical distinction. A metaphysical distinction, then, concerns either things thought – real distinction – or then just our conceptions of things – rational distinction. Although the distinction between real and rational distinctions appears a rather straightforward dichotomy, Darjes thinks these two types of distinction can be classified in a more gradual manner. Real distinction might concern something intrinsic to the things distinguished, but it might also be just an extrinsic distinction, based on different ways to denominate things. Furthermore, while rational distinction can be purely rational in the sense that it has nothing to do with the objects of our conceptions, in what Darjes calls eminent rational distinction this distinction is based on the objects of the concepts. Indeed, an extrinsic real distinction can well be connected with an eminent rational distinction, which is then in some sense intrinsic, although not real distinction. The importance of this highly abstract classification for Darjes is that two attributes or an attribute and an essence of the same thing can be distinguished only in an eminently rational manner – that is, the difference between the two is not just something in our heads, but it still doesn't require that two attributes or an attribute and an essence would be two separate things. Thus, while a thing might have several attributes, it still might not be divisible into several things.

We noted in the previous post that Darjes spoke of possibles of first and second order, when other Wolffians would have spoken of absolutely necessary and contingent things. This is because Darjes defines the notions of necessity and contingency in connection with combinations of determinations and subject – determination is necessary to a thing, if its opposite cannot belong to the thing, otherwise it is contingent. Such a notion of necessity and contingency is obviously relative to the thing in question. In addition to this subject-relativity, necessity and contingency can be relative to some hypothetical condition, and if not, Darjes speaks of absolute necessity and contingency. It is quite clear that essences and attributes are absolutely necessary, while all non-attribute affections are contingent – a thing has them because of some external or internal reason, and in another situation it might well have quite different affections. While Darjesian account of necessity and contingency is primarily about determinations, he still can speak of necessary and contingent things, because he regards existence as one possible determination of a thing. Furthermore, he notes that necessity and contingency can occur not only within determinations of a single thing, but also as characteristics of connections of things.

Like many Wolffians, Darjes concludes his discussion of connections between entities or nexuses with the notions of unity, order, truth and perfection. Starting with unity, Darjes notes that all connections between things form unities, which might be, depending on the nature of connection, absolute or relative, intrinsic or extrinsic and necessary or contingent. Thus, for instance, essence and respective attributes form a necessary, intrinsic and absolute unity. Then again, non-attributive affections form only a contingent unity with the essence. Furthermore, if thing has some mode produced by something external, the thing must form an extrinsic unity with this external reason.

Order Darjes defines as a characteristic of a series of connected things, where the things are connected because of same reasons – for instance, if some causal factor connects A1 to A2, the same factor connects A2 to A3 and so on. Darjes insists that we can always express this same reason in the form of a proposition, which then acts as a rule for the order in question. Truth, on the other hand, Darjes defines as the convenience of such things that have been posited together – for instance, truth in the usual sense of the word is the convenience of what we think about a thing or what we say about thing with the concept of this thing. Since the general definition of truth does not mention any series, all truths are not orders. Then again, in all orders the members of the series convene with one another. Perfections, finally, Darjes defines as consent of various things, where consent means that things conjoined are not adverse to one another.