Wolff begins his account of more specific types of contract with a contract that actually does not involve chance, namely, one in which a person buys divination services from another. One might think that such a contract does involve chance, since in an act of divination does something with a fortuitous result - e.g. when a diviner chooses an arbitrary animal, she cannot know beforehand what sort of entrails it has. Still, Wolff notes, what is sold is not the arbitrary result of the divination, but the very act of divination, which is not in the same sense fortuitous.
Furthermore, Wolff remarks that the act of divination has no real connection with the future it is supposed to predict - for instance, no physical law combines the entrails of an animal with the fate of a person and neither can we suppose that God would have decreed such an arbitrary connection. Thus, Wolff concludes,divination is nothing but fraud and therefore forbidden by natural law.
An example of a contract that truly involves chance is such where a lot is used to determine e.g. which person is to get what portion of a divided land that they all have a share of. Wolff notes that such a contract is valid, if all the persons involved accept it and if there is no clear reason to determine the exact portions which everyone should own. After the lot has been determined, the ownership becomes fixed.
A more suspect form of a contract involving chance, according to Wolff, is provided by lottery and other games of chance, in which e.g. a person pays for a right to spin a wheel of fortune. Such games are externally valid, yet, Wolff adds, if the aim of the game has been mainly to gain profit, they do not agree with the true end of humans. Lotteries can accord with human duty, Wolff admits, if the profits are used for the sake of other people or for the glory of God. Furthermore, the organiser of the lottery can use some of the money gained to pay for the expenses of the lottery, including her own work.
A related type of contract is one where people agree on participating on a contest, after which the prize is awarded to the winner of the contest. Such a contest could involve only pure chance, but it can also depend on the intellect, strength or dexterity of the contestants. The former case, which also includes all kinds of bets, is again forbidden by natural law, because entering such a contest could have no other purpose, but to gain profits. Contests involving also intellectual or physical faculties are a different question, since they also help to train these faculties, Wolff admits. Even so, if entering such a contest requires financial investment, all contestants should have a surplus of money that they can spare for such a purpose.
An obvious example of a contract involving chance is insurance, in which one side of the contract pays for the other to gain assurance that in case something happens to a thing owned by the first side, the other side will pay an agreed sum. Wolff does not mention insurances in general, but he does mention one specific type of it, where the insured thing is transported by ocean or through some other perilous area. Such a contract, Wolff concludes, is quite acceptable and in accordance with natural law.
Wolff thinks it important to emphasise that insurance does not mean the same thing as usury - the amount of money received from an insurance is not dependent on the time between the accident and the handing of the money. Wolff does describe contracts combining in a sense usury and insurance: foenus nauticum, in which interest is paid for the use of money delivered by sea, and foenus quasi nauticum, where the delivery is made through other dangerous terrain. In these types of contracts the interest paid should be more than regular interest, to accommodate the dangers of travel.
Another contract involving both chance and nautical affairs is what Wolff calls bodemereia. In effect, this is a contract where a person invests a specific sum of money to a ship with the condition that she will gain some profit, if the ship arrives safely at port, but loses her investment, if it doesn’t. Ship’s captain, Wolff notes, is allowed to make a bodemereia -contract, if he has otherwise difficulties in raising money for a sailing trip.
A similar business investment involving fortuitous circumstances is pars metallica or kuckus. In effect, this is a contract involving a share or a partial ownership in a mine. Since the owner of such a share cannot by herself dig and prepare the metal belonging to her in particular, she is obligated to share the costs of digging and preparing metal. These costs and the possible profits are divided in the ratio of the shares of the owners. Since it is up to chance, whether a mine will produce enough metal for covering the expenses of mining, Wolff advises that only people with plenty of money to spare should buy mining shares. Still, since the ownership of the shares is completely independent of the ownership of other shares, owners can sell their shares and get their money back from them without the agreement of other owners. If instead people agree upon a joint ownership of a mine, this means founding of a mining company, from which owners can get rid of only by finding another person to take their place in the company board.
Wolff also describes a more generalised version of a contract, in which a person buys an ownership to some uncertain product of an action - he calls it emtio spei, which in its literal sense means purchase of expectations. If the action does not result in the desired product or the expectations fail, the price paid will still not be given back. Thus, Wolff concludes that emtio spei can rarely be accepted in natural law and that it should especially be avoided if the product desired could be bought at a reasonable price somewhere else.
An interesting form of contract Wolff discusses in this chapter is contractum vitalitium, in which one person buys from another what is called reditus vitalitium, that is, a right to annually receive some things or some type of work or obligation from the seller for as long as a certain person lives, where the person in question can be the buyer, the seller or someone completely different. In a sense, we might equate this type of contract with pension, although what is provided for the buyer is not necessarily money: for instance, it might be a certain ratio of some products. Furthermore, Wolff thinks that reditus vitalitium or pension can be donated or sold again by its buyer, although then also the possible death of the original buyer will end the pension.
Is contractus vitalitium in accordance with natural law? Wolff’s general answer is affirmative, on the condition that the provided pension helps the buyer to fulfill some natural duty toward oneself or others. For instance, if the pension helps the buyer to pay for necessities of life, it most certainly is in accordance with natural law.
A related type of contract is one where people agree on participating on a contest, after which the prize is awarded to the winner of the contest. Such a contest could involve only pure chance, but it can also depend on the intellect, strength or dexterity of the contestants. The former case, which also includes all kinds of bets, is again forbidden by natural law, because entering such a contest could have no other purpose, but to gain profits. Contests involving also intellectual or physical faculties are a different question, since they also help to train these faculties, Wolff admits. Even so, if entering such a contest requires financial investment, all contestants should have a surplus of money that they can spare for such a purpose.
An obvious example of a contract involving chance is insurance, in which one side of the contract pays for the other to gain assurance that in case something happens to a thing owned by the first side, the other side will pay an agreed sum. Wolff does not mention insurances in general, but he does mention one specific type of it, where the insured thing is transported by ocean or through some other perilous area. Such a contract, Wolff concludes, is quite acceptable and in accordance with natural law.
Wolff thinks it important to emphasise that insurance does not mean the same thing as usury - the amount of money received from an insurance is not dependent on the time between the accident and the handing of the money. Wolff does describe contracts combining in a sense usury and insurance: foenus nauticum, in which interest is paid for the use of money delivered by sea, and foenus quasi nauticum, where the delivery is made through other dangerous terrain. In these types of contracts the interest paid should be more than regular interest, to accommodate the dangers of travel.
Another contract involving both chance and nautical affairs is what Wolff calls bodemereia. In effect, this is a contract where a person invests a specific sum of money to a ship with the condition that she will gain some profit, if the ship arrives safely at port, but loses her investment, if it doesn’t. Ship’s captain, Wolff notes, is allowed to make a bodemereia -contract, if he has otherwise difficulties in raising money for a sailing trip.
A similar business investment involving fortuitous circumstances is pars metallica or kuckus. In effect, this is a contract involving a share or a partial ownership in a mine. Since the owner of such a share cannot by herself dig and prepare the metal belonging to her in particular, she is obligated to share the costs of digging and preparing metal. These costs and the possible profits are divided in the ratio of the shares of the owners. Since it is up to chance, whether a mine will produce enough metal for covering the expenses of mining, Wolff advises that only people with plenty of money to spare should buy mining shares. Still, since the ownership of the shares is completely independent of the ownership of other shares, owners can sell their shares and get their money back from them without the agreement of other owners. If instead people agree upon a joint ownership of a mine, this means founding of a mining company, from which owners can get rid of only by finding another person to take their place in the company board.
Wolff also describes a more generalised version of a contract, in which a person buys an ownership to some uncertain product of an action - he calls it emtio spei, which in its literal sense means purchase of expectations. If the action does not result in the desired product or the expectations fail, the price paid will still not be given back. Thus, Wolff concludes that emtio spei can rarely be accepted in natural law and that it should especially be avoided if the product desired could be bought at a reasonable price somewhere else.
An interesting form of contract Wolff discusses in this chapter is contractum vitalitium, in which one person buys from another what is called reditus vitalitium, that is, a right to annually receive some things or some type of work or obligation from the seller for as long as a certain person lives, where the person in question can be the buyer, the seller or someone completely different. In a sense, we might equate this type of contract with pension, although what is provided for the buyer is not necessarily money: for instance, it might be a certain ratio of some products. Furthermore, Wolff thinks that reditus vitalitium or pension can be donated or sold again by its buyer, although then also the possible death of the original buyer will end the pension.
Is contractus vitalitium in accordance with natural law? Wolff’s general answer is affirmative, on the condition that the provided pension helps the buyer to fulfill some natural duty toward oneself or others. For instance, if the pension helps the buyer to pay for necessities of life, it most certainly is in accordance with natural law.
