Last time I gave a preliminary account
of what philosophy and its negation, philomoria, were for J. J. Lange
and how the two were supposed to be related. This time I shall say
something about the concrete methodology of philosophy as Lange
conceived it.
As we should remember from the previous
text, for Lange philosophy was essentially striving towards wisdom,
which was defined as a connection with God. This connection or harmony
is actually what humans are intended to live in. Yet, in the current
state of things humans are naturally disharmonious. The natural human
being is disturbed by sense impressions, and while education can help
a person to correct her original state, it might lead her to even
worse things – like Aristotelianism.
It is this state of disharmony that
Lange strives to cure in Medicina mentis.
Although Lange mentions many methods of cure, such as conversation
with other persons and prayer, philosophically most interesting is
the use of lumen naturale,
natural light or human cognitivie capacities.
As one might
remember, Descartes was in addition to Socrates the only philosopher
that Lange viewed in a completely positive light. For instance, Lange
views Cartesian method of doubt as a sober form of skepticism,
because it strives to find a reliable and indubitable ground, while
an unhealthy skepticism, like the ancient Pyrrhonism, leads merely to
turbulence of mind and eventually to libertine denial of all values.
Interestingly,
Lange sees the core of unhealthy skepticism not in doubt, but in
refusal to accept some facts. Thus, Lange regards both infamous
atheists of the time, Spinoza and Hobbes, as partial skeptics,
because they did not accept the validity of the Christian notion of
God. This peculiarity is connected with Lange's definition of
skepticism as the opposite of what he calls formal truth.
What then is a
formal truth for Lange? First of all, a material truth is simply a
validity of some fact: this is so and so. Formal truth, on the other
hand, is a material truth that is in harmony with a mind. Thus, a
material truth might not be a formal truth for some person, if that
person fails to assent this truth. Then again, a material truth might
not be a formal truth, if it is only a part of the whole picture or
fails to describe anything essential to the mind involved. In other
words, formal truth is an assent by mind of an essential material
truth.
The bad form of
skepticism, then, is the opposite of formal truth, because it
involves a failure to assent to an essential material truth. Thus,
atheism as a rejection of God's existence is by Lange's definitions
this sort of skepticism. On the other hand, Descartes is not a
skeptic in this sense, because ultimately Descartes doesn't reject
e.g. God's existence.
In light of Lange's
appreciation of the great French philosopher, it is no wonder that
Lange's ideas of using the natural light of human reason derive
largely from Descartes. Indeed, Lange even calls the use of natural
light meditation, borrowing the name obviously from Cartesian
Meditations. The meditation, Lange says, should begin from an
indubitable starting point. Like Descartes, Lange affirms that this
starting point is not demonstrated syllogistically. In fact, Lange
goes a step further and says that it is indemonstrable in all senses,
that is, an incontrovertible fact.
Lange's rejection
of the demonstrability of the first truth is connected with another
modification of Cartesian meditations. While Descartes begins from an
indubitable proposition, ”I think, therefore I am”, Lange begins
from a non-propositional self-consciousness, which he further defines
as perception of mind by itself.
Similarly, Lange
does not demonstrate other truths concerning mind from the fact of
its existence, but says that these truths are just contained within
the original self-consciousness. Indeed, he explicitly criticises
Descartes for limiting the foundational notion of mind to cognition.
Still, what Lange actually tells of mind has a Cartesian air: mind is
a non-material substance, but intrinsically connected to a material
body, through which it receives impressions of material things and
which it can control.
Langian meditations
continue in a Cartesian manner, although not through demonstrations:
thinking about oneself leads one to think of God, through whom one
can even find some certainty in thinking sense objects. Yet, the most
important point for Lange is to point out that through
self-consciousness one can discern also the limits of natural light
and the need for a supernatural light of divine revelation: reason
itself shows the need for antirationalism.
Lange's Cartesian
inspired antirationalism has an interesting relation to Jacobi's
later antirationalism. The purpose of both writers is the same: to
move the attention from the mundane science to God as the true
meaning of human life, and both also begin from some immediate,
indemonstrable starting point: Lange from self-consciousness and
Jacobi from Glauben or faith. Yet, for Jacobi it is not
Descartes, but Hume, who offers the starting point.
Considering that
Descartes was a stout believer, but Hume leaned more towards
agnosticism or even atheism, Jacobi's position might seem awkward.
But the tides of philosophy had changed from the days of Lange. For
Lange, the immediate starting point was human self-consciousness,
which immediately led to God as the ground of that consciousness.
Self-consciousness was thus a justification for the existence of God,
while God was the only thing giving value and stability to the sense
world.
At the time of
Jacobi, on the other hand, self-consciousness as the first principle
was almost exclusively used by philosophers of Kantian inspiration.
Now, one thing that philosophers like Fichte appeared to do was to
downgrade the role of God in the trinity of self-consciouness, God
and material things. Indeed, they seemingly tried to account for the
existence of the material things in terms of mere self-consciousness.
Jacobi thought this
strategy was ultimately nihilistic, because it destroyed the true
source of values. Furthermore, it made it more difficult for Jacobi
to use Lange's strategy of justifying the existence of God through
self-consciousness: who needs God to account for the existence of
material objects, if they can be accounted by the self-consciousness
itself?
In this light
Jacobi's endorsement of Hume becomes more understandable. Hume had
argued that we couldn't really demonstrate the substantiality of the
objects of experience through our mere self-consciousness, but that
we had to just believe in their stable existence. This stability
inhered then somewhere beyond self-consciousness, and Jacobi could
then just assume that it inhered in God as the source of all values.
So much for Lange,
for the time being. Next time, we shall see what happened 17th
of March, 1716, around 7 PM, at Halle.
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