Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Cultivating oneself benefits all

The most general duties in natural law, Crusius begins, are those that we are obligated to perform to everyone, no matter what the particular stand in life is and no matter what further contracts or agreements we might have made with them. In other words, they are the duties that we should be able to deduce without any further assumptions from the basic principle of natural law.

One of these duties (or more likely, a combination of several related duties) is that we should always be joyfully ready to serve and help a person in need of assistance - for instance, if we find a lost tourist in our hometown, we should be ready to show where she has to go. This is a general duty, Crusius affirms, that we are obligated to perform to anyone, no matter who they are. Even our enemies do not make an exception, and furthermore, we shouldn’t even hate or envy them. Still, this does not mean we are not allowed to make any preferences, Crusius accedes, since we are more obligated to serve friends, as long as we do it fairly and equitably.

Crusius doesn’t think that we are obligated to serve people without any reward, but admits that usually services are to be paid for in some form. It is only when people do not have the means to pay that we might be obligated to help them without reward, and even this obligation is not so strict if the people in question can help themselves, if they are to blame for their condition or if someone else could help them. Furthermore, even if no other reward for a service can be expected, the one assisted is obligated to be thankful for help. Analogically to a demand for a reward, if someone offends us, we have a right to expect the offender to repay the deed.

Furthermore, Crusius continues, if circumstances permit it, we should try to be truthful, that is, what we think should correspond to what our words mean. Here the conditional is important, and Crusius is not willing to go down the route where Kant - at least as he is usually interpreted - would go. That is, Crusius does not want to say that we are always obligated to speak truth, because in some cases this might break some other duties. He still advises to avoid straight out lies, even if they were made with good intentions. Instead, Crusius allows dissemblance, for instance, using silence and gestures to suggest that things are otherwise than they actually are.

In addition to the duties aimed strictly toward other people, Crusius notes that dealings with other people create an obligation to do something for ourselves. That is, in order to serve others we have to have abilities by which we can help them, which means that we are obligated to cultivate our skills. Partially, Crusius reminds us, this duty of self-cultivation has already been dealt with in ethics, but there are still certain aspects of this cultivation that concern the natural law more. A particular example is the need for what Crusius calls decorum, in other words, what is considered to be external signs of virtue - say, one has to dress in a manner that a decent person is expected to dress in one’s own society. Although decorum is not virtue as such, it at least implies to the onlooker that she is seeing a virtuous person, Crusius suggests - or at least it doesn’t deter her. Thus, decorum is of assistance in making people want to ask help from you.

Crusius also notes that if a society is to work properly, all people cannot cultivate the same abilities, even if they were abilities required for the noblest causes. Thus, a need for particular life careers arises. Crusius considers the possibility that each person would pursue the career that is best suited to a person. Yet, he remarks, it is too difficult to determine what would be the best career for each person. Instead, Crusius advises everyone to strive for a career, which suits their wishes and doesn’t waste their talents - or even earlier, their parents should find out what the person likes and guide them toward it. This strategy works, Crusius thinks, because person’s desires usually show what they are most suited to do - desire for a certain career should come out naturally, and as all things natural are God’s design, this desire must be good.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Conflicting duties

After duties toward oneself and God, Crusius comes to what could be called the essence of natural law, that is, the duties toward other human beings. In effect, this section brings forward completely new facts about humans - they live in societies, because they can benefit from one another, because they feel attachment and love to one another and because they generate further human beings. Yet, in a sense this realm of natural law in the strict sense is grounded on realms of ethics and natural theology. Firstly, according to Crusius, accomplishing duties toward other people presupposes that one has already perfected oneself, as ethics demands. Secondly, and even more importantly, both the need for other humans and the duties toward them are based on the will of God, which humans are supposed to obey. In other words, Crusius notes, we are obligated to love God, because he loves us, and since God wants humans to live in a community, we are obligated to do that and help one another. As it should be clear by now, Crusius doesn’t think we should expect any earthly happiness from doing our duties, and indeed, he insists that good and security of the community is always more important than our own happiness.

The central role of divinity in Crusius’ account is a clear move against the suggestion of Wolffians that atheists could form a rational society. Crusius admits that one could construct a discipline based merely on the idea of a human community, which would then describe means by which human beings in such a community could live well. Yet, such a discipline would lack the power to oblige anyone to follow its rules, Crusius insists, which is then provided by the assumption of God’s existence. Furthermore, he adds, the aid of God and his judgement is required, when convincing people who cannot follow complex chains of reasoning.

Crusius admitted that although in principle all of natural law could be deduced, God has also given a faculty for discerning answers to questions concerning it, for the sake of people who are untrained in reasoning - this faculty he calls conscience. Now, Crusius admits that individual conscience is fallible. Thus, he concludes, we should justify our moral sentiments with proper proofs, to remove the possibility of error.

The task of demonstrating natural law starts by finding out its principle. Crusius notes that this notion of principle has an ambiguous meaning. Firstly, when looking for this principle, one might be searching for the ultimate force which turns rules of natural law into proper laws - this, as we have seen, is the will of God. Secondly, and more pertinently, the search for a principle might look for grounds, by which natural law can be known.

The question for grounds of knowing natural law, Crusius continues, has again many possible meanings. Firstly, one might be looking for capacities which enable human being to know natural law - these capacities are, as Crusius has pointed out, reason and conscience. Secondly, and again more pertinently, one might search for the concepts, from which natural law can be deduced and especially the highest law, from which other parts of natural law can be deduced. These concepts, Crusius concludes, are human nature, its relation to God and all the relations connecting human beings to one another, while the highest law says that we humans should act toward one another in accordance with the perfection of our essence, our relationship to God and all the connections God has created between humans. This may sound like a mouthful, but Crusius adds a helpful explanation - we should be guided by an obedience and love toward God, love all humans for their own sake, be aware that natural law concerns also other humans, since they have been created for the same goals, and because of love toward other humans, join a community to advance divine purposes.

Crusius divides natural law into further parts. Firstly, there is the natural law in a yet more restricted sense - the study of how we should behave, when we assume no difference between governed and governors - civil law - study of a need to form a government and of rules of behaviour for governed and governors - and finally, law of nations - study of duties that nations have toward one another. In practice, Crusius still appears to continue with a more general study of how, for instance, duties in all areas of natural law can be divided. For instance, he notes that duties in natural law are necessary or contingent, while necessary duties are either absolutely or hypothetically necessary.

If we go through some important divisions Crusius notes, firstly, he states that some duties in law of nature are based on the obligated person loving someone, while others are based more on communal nature of human beings. The first type of duties do not require reciprocity, while the other type demands that both persons help one another. Another important division concerns whether duties are negative or positive. First type consists of duties telling us not to do what goes against God’s purposes, while second type consists of duties telling us to do what God’s purposes demand.

Crusius notes that the object of duties can also vary. Some duties we are meant to do toward certain individual persons, while other duties are directed indeterminately toward all humanity and still third type consists of duties toward parts of whole humanity, such as our own nation. Crusius notes that the latter two types divide into positive duties that are meant to help all humanity and to negative duties where we are meant to avoid making the accomplishment of human goals impossible.

In addition to duties, Crusius for the first time notices also rights. Similarly to duties, Crusius divides rights to negative and positive rights. We have a negative right for something when no law nor a condition validated by law determines or restricts our actions concerning it, barring laws that restrict all actions. That is, if there’s nothing to restrict us from eating an apple - for instance, no one else owns it - we have a negative right to eat it. Positive rights, on the other hand, are such that are generated by laws or conditions validated by laws, such as contracts - for instance, we have a positive right to eat an apple we definitely own. Some positive rights are based on civil laws, while others are based even on natural law. For instance, many duties prescribed in natural law can also be regarded as positive rights, Crusius notes - we are obligated to keep ourselves healthy, but it is also our right to do so.

Crusius notes that both duties and rights can be internally or externally obligated. By an internally obligated duty Crusius means a duty that has its justifying ground in the matter itself, for instance, when we are obligated to follow a rule that is reasonable. Externally obligated duty, on the other hand, is to be done for other reasons than for the inherent nature of the action, for instance, when we are obligated to follow a decree of a king in order to retain the stability of community. Internally obligated right, on the other hand, has a justifying ground, which might be such that is not known, while externally obligated right seems like a right, although it might have no justifying ground - clearly, one can also have rights that are both internally and externally obligated.

Crusius notes that while a person might have an internal right for something, another person might not be internally obligated to respect that right, firstly, because the other person might not know the relevant circumstances justifying that right, and secondly, because it might not be determined who exactly is bound to satisfy that right (for instance, when a person has a right to expect the community to provide her livelihood, but no particular citizen is tasked to take care of that). Similarly, Crusius continues, a person might be internally obligated to do something for another person, although this other person would have no internal right to expect this, since God can in certain conditions demand that we do such things. Furthermore, although a person would have an external obligation to do something for another, this other person might have no internal right for this - for instance, when the first person has signed a contract that would make her lose all her belongings, the other person has no true right to ask for this. What can be said, according to Crusius, at least generally, is that externally valid right corresponds to an externally obligated duty, that is, we are bound to generally respect what seems like a right. Of course, Crusius notes, a mere external right is never a true right in the eyes of God, no matter what all humans think.

Now, it might seem like all these various duties and rights might sometimes contradict one another. True, Crusius admits, duties and rights are connected to some goals, and actions striving toward different goals can hinder one another. Yet, this does not mean that statements describing our various duties and rights would ever contradict one another - and since they are based on God’s decrees, Crusius insists, they can’t. What happens in such a case of collisions is that our finite minds forget that divine laws can be infinitely multilayered and describe various exceptions when certain rules of conduct do not hold.

Thus, in case of such a collision, Crusius concludes, we should try to determine which of the duties and rights is to be respected most in these particular conditions - for instance, if we know one duty to be absolutely necessary and the other just in certain conditions necessary, then we must follow the absolutely necessary duty. What we shouldn’t do is to just accept the opinion of majority in all cases.

In case of conflicting duties in particular, Crusius notes the importance of distinguishing objective from subjective duties. By an objective duty Crusius means a duty that is meant generally for all humanity, but not specifying who or in what conditions is to fulfil it. A subjective duty, on the other hand, is specifically meant to be fulfilled by a certain individual in certain conditions. If of two colliding duties one is objective and the other is subjective, Crusius concludes, the subjective duty must always be preferred, since we can always assume someone else will fulfill the objective duty.

If both duties are either subjective or objective, Crusius suggests several possibilities to choose between them - for instance, if one duty is more certain, then we should follow it. An important dividing line for Crusius is the goal that a duty has - for instance, a duty to make humans more virtuous means more than a duty to make them happy. If no other ground for choice can be found, then one must look for the quantitative extensiveness of what is achieved by the duties.

A peculiar case Crusius considers happens when we have a single duty to fulfill, but we are uncertain which person should be its target. Crusius suggests we should usually choose the more virtuous or at least the more useful person. The exception is the case when the other person is in danger of dying and needs our instant care.

Crusius notes that usually, when we have a determined duty colliding with someone’s right, then the duty must prevail. Crusius notes that this duty must be based on something more than mere another right, since then we are actually dealing with a collision between rights. Furthermore, he notes as exceptions cases where, firstly, upholding the duty would break a number of humanly important rights, and secondly, when the goods gained by upholding the duty are not incomparably small in comparison with goods lost by breaking the right.

Finally, Crusius considers the cases, where rights collide with other rights. He notes that positive rights are weightier than negative rights. If many persons have a positive right to the same thing, then the thing in question should be divided, if it is possible, and if not, then give the right to the person who first claimed it. If all the colliding rights are just negative, then actually all human beings would have the same right to the thing, and since anything cannot be divided between all humans, Crusius argues, the first one to put their claim on the thing should have the right for it. Finally, Crusius notes that even if technically we would have a right for something, in order to maintain good relations to others it is often best to cancel our own claim to have a right.

So much for the general part of natural law, next I’ll be tackling the most general duties and rights in it.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Worshipping God

After talking about duties toward oneself, Crusius turns his interest to duties toward God. In some sense, he notes, we have been talking about them all the time, because all duties are based on God’s will and therefore duties toward God. Still, there are some duties that are specifically duties about God, which is their immediate object.

Now, one might wonder how God can be an object of a duty, since God is supposedly immutable and no one can actually do anything to him. Crusius clarifies that it is more a question of, firstly, our notion of God, and secondly, of our relationship to God. In other words, it is our immediate duty toward God to act in accordance with his perfection and our relationship to him.

It is thus our duty to obey God, Crusius says. In fact, he says, all duty is in a sense obeying God since God wants us to obey all duties. Crusius considers the question whether the duty to obey God would make God an awful tyrant. Crusius notes that this duty is not just arbitrary whimsy of a dictator, but flows from the very nature of divinity.

Two sides exist in human mind, Crusius continues, cognitive understanding and volitive will, and both have their own duties toward God. If we start from the side of the understanding, Crusius notes that we are obligated to know God, since it is noblest thing to know the ultimate source of everything. This does not mean that we should know God perfectly, since as we are imperfect entities, our knowledge is always limited. Still, we should try to know what God actually is and what kind of properties he has, what he wills and what he has achieved in the world (creating and sustaining the world, to start from the obvious). Furthermore, Crusius remarks, we should try to know other things as parts of a hierarchy, the pinnacle of which is God.

Yet, knowing God is not the only cognitive duty toward God that Crusius recognises. Indeed, he notes that in addition to knowledge we might have beliefs, not just in the broad sense of convictions, but in the sense of weaker convictions that might still be doubted. Now, Crusius says, we might have rational reasons to believe in this strict sense something, even if we couldn’t demonstrate its certainty. Particularly, he says, if disbelief would break an obligation toward God, we should choose belief, even if the truth of this belief could not be perfectly demonstrated. For instance, accepting general skepticism would imply that God has made us incapable of knowing anything, which Crusius considers a blasphemy. Even seemingly absurd statements about God (e.g. his trinitarian nature) should be believed, Crusius concludes, if there just is external evidence making it probable.

When it comes to will, Crusius suggests, we have a duty to love God, since God loves us also. This love of God implies that we try to live as virtuously as possible, since God wants us to be good. Other things implied by love of God, Crusius goes on, are that we should respect God, be thankful to him and humble ourselves before him.

All the duties mentioned thus far have been internal duties, that is, they concern our mental actions. We do have external duties toward God, Crusius insists. Firstly, all the so-called internal actions have some external signs, and we might say that showing the external signs of appropriate internal actions is an external duty. Then again, Crusius continues, we also have an external duty to e.g. pray to God, if we have difficulties in upholding our internal duties. Still, he concludes, there is no external duty toward God that would have no relation to internal duties.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - No true happiness before death

As it must be evident by now, Crucius values virtuous living most highly. Still, he does not reject other possible goals at least if they do not contradict virtuous life, which would just eventually evoke the wrath of God.

The only question is then what this secondary goal might be. A natural candidate might be satisfaction or pleasure caused by fulfillment of some desire. Since such pleasures are relative to desires, which humans have plenty, a single case of pleasure cannot be very high on the list of goals. What could be high is a state of ultimate happiness, in which all desires would be constantly fulfilled and no unhappiness would be anymore possible. Crucius notes that this rather sensualistic sounding end is something we cannot achieve during our temporal life, so that it cannot be any realistic goal for this life.

Crucius sets then his goal somewhat lower. Although we would not be in a pleasurable state, we could still be content, if we just were free from pain. Now, humans cannot be wholly content - this would mean that we wouldn’t be active anymore - but we could still be content in the sense of being pleased in some measure and being free of pain in some measure. The best state we could hope for during our temporal life would be such, in which the amount of pleasure would be remarkable, even if it must be just temporary.

Crucius goes into very particular details, when describing means for increasing happiness. Thus, he notes that one key element is to to make sure that desires are hindered as rarely as possible, and when they do, this hindrance must be as non-painful.To achieve this, Crucius notes, our desires should be such that they encourage us and others to act virtuously. Furthermore, to ease the pain, Crucius’ suggests the antidote of thinking pleasant things, which pushes bad thoughts away.

Although Crucius thus accepts pleasures in some measure, he is of the opinion that as a whole humans have a too strong desire for pleasure. Thus, he concludes, we should restrict desire for temporal satisfaction. Crucius therefore advocates continence of all sorts, whether it concerns gluttony or ambition. His particular target is sexuality, which he deems to be too strong a desire, useful only very rarely and detriment to virtue, unless bound by custom of marriage.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Evil behaviour and how to get rid of it

Crusius notes that none of us humans follow duties given in ethics perfectly. In other words, all people are in some measure evil, and because this is so common occurrence, Crusius suggests that humans must have a natural tendency to do evil.

Now, Crusius continues, it is interesting to ask what is the cause of this natural tendency. One possible suggestion could be that this cause lies somewhere outside humans, for instance, in the matter as such. Crusius notes that this explanation isn’t believable. True, matter might hinder our actions or then awaken some unpleasant sensations in us. Yet, neither of these need make us do anything evil - for instance, even if see horrific things, it is still down to us to decide how to react to them.

Similarly, the cause of evil cannot be any Satanic spiritual entity, Crusius notes. At most such a devilish figure could tempt human beings into evil actions. Still, even after being tempted, a person would have the choice whether to follow the suggestions of the tempter.

Crusius also denies that any divine entity could be behind human evil. It certainly couldn’t be God, Crusius says, because he has at most created the conditions, which allow the appearance of evil, but he still hasn’t caused this appearance. Furthermore, Crusius doesn’t believe that any Manichaean evil divinity could explain the problem of evil, because at most such a divinity could create a tendency to evil in humans. In addition, no other divinity beyond God can even exist, Crusius continues.

The reason for evil lies then in the human themselves, and the only question is whether it lies in their essential imperfection or in their arbitrary choices. The first of these was often dubbed metaphysical evil, but Crusius notes that due to its essentiality and necessity it is not true evil, but at most something that makes real evil possible. Indeed, he continues, trying to explain human evil through essential imperfection is just an attempt to confuse the difference between evil and good persons.

True evil, Crusius concludes, is thus caused by abuse of free will, when it has chosen a state that is contrary to what God has ordained. This abuse moves us away from our original state, which has been either indifferent to goodness and badness or then tends toward goodness. Crusius notes that this abuse or vice might be caused by two things: firstly, weakness of forces that should regulate us toward good decisions, and secondly, actively perverted direction of these regulating forces.

In addition to the division of vices by their cause, Crusius notes at least two ways to classify them. Firstly, vices can be divided according to the faculty it involves - understanding, will or both. Secondly, we can speak of simple or complex vices. Thus, there are simple vices of understanding, such as inattention or perverted curiosity for novelties, and simple vices of will, such as laziness and self-seeking. Of complex vices Crusius notes only three he considers most remarkable: avarice or perverted desire of wealth, lust or perverted desire for completely passive pleasures and ambition or perverted desire to be noticed by others.

Crusius notes that vicious behaviour is on the long run detrimental to a person. It involves always self-deception, since a vicious person has an improper notion of the worth of something. Furthermore, Crusius suggests, vicious person things wrongly that she can fulfil her desires, although they should be instead regulated. The result of this false idea is that the desire just grows and grows, when one gets used to pleasures and requires more stimulation to get to the same level of pleasure. If this continues, vices become habitual and enslave the person so that no free will can ever correct the situation.

Vicious person is then heading toward sickness of body and soul, Crusius notes. Furthermore, he continues, vicious people also hurt others, which alienates her from her fellow humans. But the worst consequence, according to Crusius, is that vicious person has lost her connection to God.

Vicious life is then painful, and this pain is sometimes good tool, by which a person can find an impetus for changing her life better. Generally, a person can cure her vicious behaviour by distancing oneself from all the things luring her to vicious actions and by strengthening both the motives pushing one toward good actions and forces necessary for doing those good actions.

Crusius notes that it is not clear how well repentance and struggle toward better life can heal the damage caused for oneself and for others by one’s own vicious behaviour. At least such corrective measures weaken the effects of vicious behaviour, but even a complete purification of one’s soul couldn’t really make damage undone. It is then unclear whether God will accept these measures or whether he has designed yet another form of punishment for the purpose of clearing one’s consciousness. Because this cannot be known from rational reasons, Crusius concludes, we must assume God has revealed his will on this matter, but this is more of a question of religion than of ethics.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Goal of human life

After a theoretical study of will and basic drives affecting it, Crucius turns his interest toward practical philosophy or morals, that is, the study of how will should be used. Wolffian systems of philosophy often included a discipline of general practical philosophy, which was meant to serve as a basis for all practical philosophy. Crucius admits that such a discipline exists, in a sense, but because of its abstract nature it should be merely included within more concrete practical disciplines.

The basic topic of morals - how will should be used - comprises actually two different, although related questions, Crucius continues. Firstly, there is the question of how human being can make herself happy. This question is dealt with a discipline quite unique to Crucius’ system - a study of happiness. It goes beyond mere question of obligations, because although Crusius admits that we are in a sense obligated to become happy and perfect ourselves, the study of happiness is more about finding the most advantageous means for happiness.

Human happiness involves satisfaction of basic human desires. Now, Crucius says, since one of these basic drives is a drive for good conscience, happiness involves also trying to follow the demands of conscience. Indeed, he adds, one might say that these demands are designed to make humans happy. The demands underlie the second question of morals: what should human beings do, in other words, what duties humans have?

Crucius notes that the demands of conscience - duties or moral laws - assume the existence of a lawgiver, who has decreed these laws. Our obligation to follow these laws, Crucius says, is not caused by the lawgiver forcing us to do something. Instead, the obligation is generated by all the goods the lawgiver or God gives to us - indeed, even the duties themselves are such goods. If a human being subjects his own will to divine will and follows the divine laws, Crucius concludes, he will be virtuous, and because of that, happy.

The sum of these divine laws, or natural law, forms the second major part of morals for Crucius. It divides into further disciplines according to the object of the duties: natural theology deals with human duties toward God, natural law in a more limited sense deals with human duties toward one another and ethics duties toward oneself. Crucius adds that humans also have duties toward animals and even inanimate objects, but these ares so few that the don’t warrant their own discipline. He also adds that we should start from ethics, because we must first perfect our own capacities, before we are able to fulfill other duties.

The aim of ethics is then to perfect human beings, and in order to know how to do it, Crucius says that we must first know the goal God has given to humanity. Before going into that, Crucius notes that God, as the wisest and most perfect being, must have created the whole world for some reason, which is also evident, he continues, from the wise organisation of the parts and whole of the world. The goal that God has envisioned for the whole world, Crucius emphasises, must be that the world can be known and enjoyed rationally. Then again, human beings appear to be only such rational beings, while animals and plants exist only for the sake of human cultivation.

Why God then had to create the world at all, when he could just have thought about it? Crucius’ answer is that God’s goal in creation must involve free actions, which make the fate of the world unpredictable. Furthermore, since God appears to have made humans social, these actions are probably united efforts of many humans. God wants that these actions are virtuous, so that he could reward humans. Then again, it depends on the human choices whether all of them can be rewarded or whether some of them must be punished.

What then, finally, is the goal of humanity or the reward God is willing to give to virtuous people? Crucius notes that this goal cannot be just knowledge, because cognitive is in his system just means for volition. Then again, although Crucius admits that humans have right to use goods of the world, none of them can really satisfy humans. Indeed, because humans have unlimited desires, true reward could only be endless life in another world. Crucius notes that such a moral proof of human immortality is its only possible proof, because all theoretical proofs of immortality fall short of convincing everyone - for example, simplicity of human soul does not mean its immortality, because animals also have simple souls without being immortal.

What kind of behaviour is then required of humans or what it means to be virtuous? Crucius notes that, firstly, this world is not a prison for human beings. Especially body is something that soul truly requires for living in the current world. Thus, Crucius continues, we must keep this vessel in good shape for the duration of our life. Particularly we have no right to forfeit the body given to our use or commit a suicide. In addition to body, Crucius continues, we must also train our understanding. In practice, this means that we must acquire as many concepts as possible and use our understanding in diverse manners.

Since both body and understanding are mere tools for will, the perfection of will is an essential element of virtuous behaviour. Here, the important thing is to retain the freedom of human will - affections should remain mild and strong passions should be avoided, lest we become slave of our drives. Particularly, all goals should be subordinated to conscience and obedience of God, since these cannot be subordinated to anything else. Finally, Crucius points out that subordination here does not mean simply that humans would be constantly thinking about such a goal. Instead, it means, says Crucius, that we should, from time to time, check our behaviour and see whether there is something to fix.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Basic drives

Just like will can affect understanding, Crusius notes, drives of the will can be controlled through understanding. That is, the more lively the representations of objects of drives are, the livelier the respective drives are. What does this liveliness of both representations and drives mean? Like Baumgarten before him, Crusius explains that liveliness of representations is definitely not the same thing as their distinctness. Indeed, the more distinct our ideas of sensible things become, the less we often feel the need to strive for those things, Crusius argues. Instead of distinctness, liveliness, for Crusius, is characterised by the heightened grade of activity, by which we represent something.

From the standpoint of drives, the liveliness of the respective representations differs from both the strength and longevity of drives. In other words, no matter how lively our thoughts of the objects of our drives, these drives might not be able to withstand resistance nor might they be able to continue over a long period of time. Indeed, all these three characteristics - liveliness, strength and longevity - are for Crusius independent. In fact, he reduces the traditional four temperaments to different combinations of the three characteristics: drives of phlegmatic are lacking in all three characteristics, drives of sanguine are lively, drives of choleric are strong and drives of melancholic last long.

Crusius notes that drives and desires come in many different grades, starting from temporary affections and ending with extremely forceful passions. Crusius goes through a various species of such affections and passions, which was a common topic in current discussions of will. What is more interesting is Crusius’s statement that drives and desires can create new drives and desires. Thus, we might wind up desiring a subspecies of an old desire (like desire for truth might lead into a desire for curiosity) or an individual under that class (like love of philosophy might lead into a love for a particular school of philosophy), we could wind up desiring means for fulfilling other desires (such as when we desire gold), parts of certain desired objects (like when desire for general tidiness evolves into a desire for cleanliness), consequences and effects (like when we love children of our friends) and even mere signs (when we desire medals given for honourable services) and things sensed at the same time (when we desire to live in place with good memories).

Desires and drives can thus be based on other desires and drives, but Crusius insists that such series of desires must end with some first desires: then again, there might well be many different first desires. Now, Crusius notes that some of these first desires are contingent in the sense that they are based on our upbringing, while others are ingrained in the God-designed essence of humanity - the latter he calls basic desires. Indeed, he continues, all reasoning entities must have such basic desires or drives, so that they can become happy by fulfilling those desires. No basic desire can be inherently evil, Crusius believes, because otherwise God wouldn’t have given such to us. Because all desires correspond to some concepts, all reasoning entities must have some innate concepts, Crusius concludes, although they need not be immediately conscious of these concepts.

Crusius remarks that basic desires should not be confused with seemingly universal desires, objects of which could be derived through abstraction from any desires. Such abstract desires include a desire to avoid pain, desire for our own existence, a desire for applying one’s own capacities to the fullest extent and a desire to take advantage of suitable opportunities. A particularly important abstract desire is the sum of all desires that constitutes a desire for happiness, which Crusius defines as sum of all possible pleasures and a complete lack of pain. This desire is important, Crusius thinks, because it leads to a further desire for everlasting happiness, which has an infinite object and thus leads humans to accept the existence of God (note how Kant’s idea of God as a postulate for morality follows a similar path). Although all humans seem to share this desire, like all abstract desires, it is not truly a basic desire - indeed, happiness means different thing for different people, because it is a sum of their peculiar desires. Animals, Crusius adds, do not have this desire, since they do not have the requisite capacity for abstraction.

Of the true basic desires or drives, some are specific to humans. In fact, they are also such desires that have abstract objects and cannot thus belong to mere animals. Although these basic human desires should be common to all human beings, Crusius emphasises that they can exist in different force in different individuals. Furthermore, these drives can be hindered by one another or even some other drives, thus making it not obvious that everyone follows them.

Crusius counts three basic human desires, first of which is a desire to perfect oneself and one’s own capacities. This basic drive involves many other desires, such as desires to use and improve our cognitive abilities, to act according to best of reasons and to perfect our body. All these various desires require us to achieve a certain place in human society - freedom, power, riches, friendship and power. Finally, we also try to see and own perfect things, whether this perfection means real force inherent in these things or an ideal perfection, such as order and regularity.

The second basic human desire, Crusius says, is a drive for love. Love, in its moral sense, Crusius defines as a habit of regarding goals of another person as goals of oneself and of taking pleasure in well-being of others. When loving another person, Crusius continues, we do not aim at our own happiness, but at a mutual feeling of love, which would mean unification of the two persons involved. This love is not to be confused, Crusius warns, with such emotions like affection toward children or sexual desire. Particularly, it should be distinguished from so-called self-love, which is actually just satisfaction with one’s own perfections. This drive for love, Crusius admits, is universal, but sadly very weak and easily overpowered by other desires.

The final basic human drive Crusius admits in the drive to know the laws God has appointed for our behaviour. This drive could also be called drive for conscience, where conscience means judgement about the morality of one’s own actions. Crusius, thus, does not equate conscience with a consciousness of one’s faults, but more as a knowledge of one’s obligations and duties. Because we humans have this drive for knowing moral law, Crusius continues we must have an innate idea of this law. He does not mean that individual duties would be implanted in us, but only a general rule of action: do what is in accordance with the perfection of God, with one’s own relation to God and with the essential perfection of human nature and avoid the opposite. Since this drive for conscience is in our own nature, Crusius adds, we must have an innate idea of God and a natural respect for him. Just like our desire for love, the desire for conscience can be suppressed by stronger desires. Still, when these desires dissipate after we have done the objectionable deed, the conscience often reawakens and causes disagreeable pangs.

In addition to basic human desires, we share some basic desires with other animals. These animal desires concern only the goals of our animal nature, such as nourishment and reproduction. Crusius notes that we cannot really a priori determine what all these desires are, but we can only empirically search for their most general classes. Crusius counts two of these classes: drives to affect one’s body in a certain manner and drives to achieve a certain state of one’s body. The drives of the first class differ from one animal to another, depending on their specific capacities of e.g. movement. In any case, Crusius is certain that such drives presuppose soul having an innate idea of one’s own body and thus speak against the notion of soul moving from one body to another.

The second class might be further described as a drive for achieving pleasant bodily feelings. These feelings are attached to some bodily states - for instance, to certain smells and tastes - and are not necessarily connected with the perfection of body, just like pain is no signal of our body becoming more imperfect. Of specific drives, Crusius notes that a drive for nurturing children is clearly a drive of the first class, while sexual drives are caused by drives from both classes.

The relationship between human reason and animal drives is complicated. Animal drives are naturally strong and at least partially independent, which can be seen e.g. by the fierceness of bodily pains. Then again, Crusius admits that making our representations more distinct can dampen the animal drives. Furthermore, reason might add something to animal drives, such as when it combines sexuality with love.