Although Wolff has just spoken in considerable detail about donations, he does note that usually we expect to receive something in return, when we give or do things to another person. Indeed, Wolff continues, if the other person can give or do something in turn, we are entitled to expect that they do. We can even expect that they will give or do something in the same ratio as we have given or done to them.
The phrase “same ratio” already presupposes that we can somehow quantify things we give or do. In other words, we expect them to have a specific value that we can determine. Now, Wolff notes that value of things is at least partially arbitrary - there is nothing in a piece of furniture to suggest that it should be tradable to so and so many bananas. Yet, Wolff at once concedes, we can at least insist that value is at least proportional to certain physical quantity. In other words, if a kilo of potatoes or an hour of work has a definite value, then two kilos of potatoes and two hours of work have double of that value.
In addition, Wolff also notes that the value of things should be determined by their place in economic processes. Thus, a price of land should reflect its possible produce, while the price of an industrial product is to be determined by the prices of the raw materials used for the thing, the price of work required in doing the product and other expenses. Wolff also notes that some ethical rules should govern the prices. For instance, we should take care that the most necessary things would have a smaller price than luxury items.
Determining the value of a thing in comparison to another thing is not an easy task. Hence, Wolff concludes, to simplify transactions we should choose a certain class of corporeal things as a common measure of value, that is, as money. This money, Wolff says should consist of some truly durable matter that will not be corrupted by rust nor won’t spoil. Then again, he also notes that money should consist of matter that is not needed for much else beyond its use as a measure of value. Finally, he concludes, money should consist of rare matter, so that its own value would be stable enough.These criteria suggest, Wolff concludes, that gold and silver are optimal raw materials for money.
Just like with all other countable things, Wolff continues, the price of money should be proportional to its quantity, or more precisely, its weight. To make it easier to know how much money weighs, gold or silver should be cut into small proportions or coins, with the weight of the coin stamped on it. This marking on a coin should be a reliable sign of its weight, thus, Wolff concludes, coins should not be forged e.g. by mixing baser metals with gold and silver.
Existence of money makes it possible to estimate how wealthy a person is - just turn all the property of a person into its monetary price, subtract possible debts and consider what kind of things the person could buy with that quantity of money. Wolff delineates several levels of things one could purchase with money. The lowest level is formed by necessities, which are essential for keeping a human being alive. A step further is the level of commodities, which are not as necessary, but still useful for everyday life. Above commodities is the level of jucundities, that is, things which make life pleasant, and above them, things required by decorum. Whatever remains beyond that level, Wolff concludes, is superfluous luxury.
Now, Wolff defines poverty as a state in which a person can afford at most only the necessities of life, if even those. On the contrary, a rich person is such that can afford even superfluities. Wolff gives some laughably obvious tricks for avoiding poverty, “spend less than you produce” being the most trivial. Still, he does not regard poverty as mere sign of laziness or reckless behaviour. Instead, he insists that poverty is just bad fortune, just like richness is also just good fortune. Wolff also suggests that it is decorate that rich people should try to equalise the gap between the rich and the poor by donating some of their money to the poor.
tiistai 14. huhtikuuta 2020
tiistai 18. helmikuuta 2020
Christian Wolff: Natural right 4 (1744)
Christian Wolff continues his journey through natural right or law simply with a more detailed look on possible types of transactions. He begins from cases where transactions go only to one direction, that is, cases where a person gives some property or does some action to another person, without receiving anything in return, in other words, donations - a topic he also decides to concentrate on in the prologue of the book.
In a sense, this starting point is quite natural, since unidirectional transaction is simpler than a transaction in both directions. Yet, it also might imply a deeper principle in Wolff’s philosophy - we are obligated to create perfection around us, hence, we are obligated to help others by donations or beneficial actions. This obligation, Wolff says, is present even in a state where everything is shared with everyone and no private property exists - at this stage it is not things, but actions that are, in a sense, donated. Although donating is duty, Wolff clarifies, it is still only an imperfect duty, that is, we cannot say to whom we have to donate. Thus, no one can be forced to donate to a particular person. On the other hand, the recipient of donation is obligated to be grateful to the donor.
In another sense, donation is not just a one-sided deal, Wolff points out, because the recipient of the donation must still accept it. This is especially crucial when we remember that donation might be only conditional - for instance, someone might donate a sum of money to a person, on the condition that the recipient will train to be a doctor. Although one might see no reason for not accepting an unconditional donation, donations with such additional conditions are a completely different thing.
Wolff notes that donations can also happen through words and letters, and just like in the previous book, we find him speculating whether the donor can still cancel the donation, if the post hasn’t delivered the donation letter. Such verbal donations still, of course, obligate the donor to do what has been promised, whether it is a physical delivery of a thing or some other action.
Something Wolff has also noted in previous parts of natural law is that no contract or promise is valid, if the persons making them are not adults in their full senses. Thus, also in this case, no minors, people with mental conditions or intoxicated are allowed to donate. Wolff also notes that we are allowed to donate only with proper consideration and not rashly. Still, it is the duty of donor to notice when the donation has not been considered. If the donor does not do the necessary self-check, the recipient does not have the obligation to do it for them - although if a recipient notices that donor has acted rashly, Wolff admits, they should return the donation.
A peculiar case of donation Wolff singles out is the handing out of alms, by which Wolff means simply a donation meant for covering the bare necessities of life. Although everyone is obligated to give alms - even more so than to donate in general, because bare necessities are essential to all human beings - again, giving alms is just an imperfect duty and no one can be forced to it. On the other hand, beggars do have the right to argue to anyone, why they should be given alms.
Although Wolff then does accept the practice of begging, he does want to restrict who can do begging. According to Wolff, everyone should primarily take care of themselves with their own work. Hence, begging is allowed, he says, only if the would-be beggar cannot provide themselves with their own work, which can happen if they don’t have the capacity to do work, if they could and wanted to work, but no one would hire them, or if they did work, but the work would not pay enough for necessities of life.
In a sense, this starting point is quite natural, since unidirectional transaction is simpler than a transaction in both directions. Yet, it also might imply a deeper principle in Wolff’s philosophy - we are obligated to create perfection around us, hence, we are obligated to help others by donations or beneficial actions. This obligation, Wolff says, is present even in a state where everything is shared with everyone and no private property exists - at this stage it is not things, but actions that are, in a sense, donated. Although donating is duty, Wolff clarifies, it is still only an imperfect duty, that is, we cannot say to whom we have to donate. Thus, no one can be forced to donate to a particular person. On the other hand, the recipient of donation is obligated to be grateful to the donor.
In another sense, donation is not just a one-sided deal, Wolff points out, because the recipient of the donation must still accept it. This is especially crucial when we remember that donation might be only conditional - for instance, someone might donate a sum of money to a person, on the condition that the recipient will train to be a doctor. Although one might see no reason for not accepting an unconditional donation, donations with such additional conditions are a completely different thing.
Wolff notes that donations can also happen through words and letters, and just like in the previous book, we find him speculating whether the donor can still cancel the donation, if the post hasn’t delivered the donation letter. Such verbal donations still, of course, obligate the donor to do what has been promised, whether it is a physical delivery of a thing or some other action.
Something Wolff has also noted in previous parts of natural law is that no contract or promise is valid, if the persons making them are not adults in their full senses. Thus, also in this case, no minors, people with mental conditions or intoxicated are allowed to donate. Wolff also notes that we are allowed to donate only with proper consideration and not rashly. Still, it is the duty of donor to notice when the donation has not been considered. If the donor does not do the necessary self-check, the recipient does not have the obligation to do it for them - although if a recipient notices that donor has acted rashly, Wolff admits, they should return the donation.
A peculiar case of donation Wolff singles out is the handing out of alms, by which Wolff means simply a donation meant for covering the bare necessities of life. Although everyone is obligated to give alms - even more so than to donate in general, because bare necessities are essential to all human beings - again, giving alms is just an imperfect duty and no one can be forced to it. On the other hand, beggars do have the right to argue to anyone, why they should be given alms.
Although Wolff then does accept the practice of begging, he does want to restrict who can do begging. According to Wolff, everyone should primarily take care of themselves with their own work. Hence, begging is allowed, he says, only if the would-be beggar cannot provide themselves with their own work, which can happen if they don’t have the capacity to do work, if they could and wanted to work, but no one would hire them, or if they did work, but the work would not pay enough for necessities of life.
sunnuntai 9. helmikuuta 2020
Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - The law of the land
The purpose of state or republic, according to Crusius, is to guarantee common good of its citizens, and prudence in affairs of state means finding the best means for this common good. Crusius notes that no one constitution is the only possible means for common good - all three simple constitutions (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy) and their various combinations could work. Following tradition beginning from Aristotle, Crusius remarks that all of these constitutions could also be corrupted, if the regents of the state cared only for themselves and their own class (e.g. the three simple constitutions could be corrupted into tyrannies, oligarchies and ochlocracies). This corruption or illness of republic, Crusius clarifies, is not to be confused with mere irregularity of republic, where its constitution does not wholly serve the common good - irregularity does not yet give subjects right to overthrow their regents nor does it give other republics a right to meddle in its affairs.
In practice, Crusius advises that constitution of a republic should somehow restrict the power of regent. At least during the crucial time, when a new regent is required, either citizens should have a say in choosing the new government of the republic or this should be precisely determined by the constitution, so that the common good would not be too dependent on whims of an arbitrary individual. Indeed, the constitution should allow for strengthening and weakening the power of the regent, as the situation demanded.
In monarchy, Crusius specifies, regularity of the state demands that the power of the monarch is restricted by immutable laws, and even better, by an independent council or collegium, because individual rulers can easily become vicious. Still, Crusius adds, these restrictions shouldn’t get in the way of swift decisions, if common good required them. Furthermore, Crusius suggests that monarchies should be hereditary, because this would allow educating future monarchs to their position.
In addition, hereditary monarchies fall more rarely in civil wars, Crusius believes. In fact, he considers civil war so great a danger that he counsels making hereditary lines definite. Crusius advises particularly against monarchies with several monarchs, because at worst this encourages civil wars and at best it still weakens the republic.
Crusius has not as much to say about aristocracies and democracies. He notes that aristocracies should not be hereditary, because that could prevent best people becoming regents. Furthermore, Crusius thinks that rules stating how an aristocratic counsel comes to a decision should be clear, so that there would be no ambiguity about the decision making process. Of democracies Crusius really has nothing to say beyond noting that it requires a completely civilised nation.
In addition to choosing a constitution, Crusius continues, prudence in affairs of state concerns also the day-to-day decisions of a republic. Individual republics have their own particular circumstances requiring particular decisions, but Crusius notes that some general rules can be justified already by the general nature of republics.
Crusius begins by noting that good and prudent government has three goals, none of which should be ignored nor emphasised over others. First goal is to secure the position of regent and apply his powers most efficiently. Crucius remarks that writers like Machiavelli had focused on this goal, forgetting that the good of the regent was intricately connected with the good of the citizens, the second goal of prudent government. This second goal was overemphasised, Crusius says, by republican writers, who had forgotten that a republic still required an efficient regent. Finally, Crucius picks as the third goal the status of republic among other republic. Just like with other goals, he notes that some politicians focused too much on this particular goal, forgetting that external glory of state is based on its internal happiness.
Crusius states that prudence in affairs of state uses the very same capacities as prudence in private affairs, although it applies these capacities in different matters, which it then ought to be informed of. Specifically prudent governor should know the geographical characteristics of the land and the citizens, the political constitution of the whole republic and various communities within it, economic state of the republic, and finally, interests and goals of neighbouring republics.
Crusius emphasises the role of religion as the basis of security of republics. In addition to religion, sciences, arts and freedom of thinking should be protected, because they serve as means for securing all the goals of human life and make republics respected. Despite the lip service to freedom of thinking, Crusius is not willing to tolerate ideas working against the security of state, such as, he insists, atheism.
Crusius advises regents to be careful in choosing their officials and to prefer intelligent and virtuous people over those of high birth. Still, he also suggests that regents should not replace their own intelligence with the intelligence of their officials and that they should closely control the doings of those officials, because they work in the name of the regent. Crusius insists that officials should always follow direct commands of regent, to make the republic secure, while laws, according to Crucius, can be broken, if it is prudent to do so. Indeed, Crusius suggests, good example of regent guides subjects better than any laws.
Crusius speaks for strict regulation of state spendings - republic should always have some reserve finances, in case money is required for emergencies. Money shouldn’t particularly be given freely to subjects, Crusius argues, because they wouldn’t respect what they haven’t worked for, and they particularly shouldn’t have the right to press their own coinage. Instead, subjects should be taxed heavily, Crusius says, since no citizen should have means to live by oneself, but be in various ways dependent on other citizens. Indeed, a person providing sustenance to others should be congratulated, Crusius suggests, because they help to realise one goal of republic. To make taxation fair, Crusius notes, richer individuals should pay the most. Generally, he insists that money should be directed to move from owner to another from time to time, since in this manner it helps the state and the subjects more than if it remained stagnant. Thus, if some goods in land were still ownerless, they could be taken as regent’s property, so that they could be used for everyone’s benefit.
Crusius has not very much to say about legislation, beyond the general fact that laws should be applicable to different subjects. Furthermore, Crusius emphasises that laws should definite, so that there can be no room for misinterpretation, whether it is accidental or purposeful. Against another sort of fraud is directed Crusius’ advise that regents should be careful that religious communities won’t meddle into civil life of their members, since this is often a way to deceive lower classes.
When it comes to foreign relations, Crusius advocates for maintaining the army in good condition, because a strong army has an important role in preventing foreign conquest and in raising the prestige of the republic, which is important for achieving its goals. In commerce, Crusius holds onto essentially mercantilist ideals: foreign imports should be restricted, because losing gold weakens the state, and if something is to be imported, it should be raw materials that are then further developed into manufactures that could be sold to other countries for more money. Crusius still does not believe that republics are only competitors of one another. Indeed, he says that just like humans require friends, countries require alliances for their own security.
In practice, Crusius advises that constitution of a republic should somehow restrict the power of regent. At least during the crucial time, when a new regent is required, either citizens should have a say in choosing the new government of the republic or this should be precisely determined by the constitution, so that the common good would not be too dependent on whims of an arbitrary individual. Indeed, the constitution should allow for strengthening and weakening the power of the regent, as the situation demanded.
In monarchy, Crusius specifies, regularity of the state demands that the power of the monarch is restricted by immutable laws, and even better, by an independent council or collegium, because individual rulers can easily become vicious. Still, Crusius adds, these restrictions shouldn’t get in the way of swift decisions, if common good required them. Furthermore, Crusius suggests that monarchies should be hereditary, because this would allow educating future monarchs to their position.
In addition, hereditary monarchies fall more rarely in civil wars, Crusius believes. In fact, he considers civil war so great a danger that he counsels making hereditary lines definite. Crusius advises particularly against monarchies with several monarchs, because at worst this encourages civil wars and at best it still weakens the republic.
Crusius has not as much to say about aristocracies and democracies. He notes that aristocracies should not be hereditary, because that could prevent best people becoming regents. Furthermore, Crusius thinks that rules stating how an aristocratic counsel comes to a decision should be clear, so that there would be no ambiguity about the decision making process. Of democracies Crusius really has nothing to say beyond noting that it requires a completely civilised nation.
In addition to choosing a constitution, Crusius continues, prudence in affairs of state concerns also the day-to-day decisions of a republic. Individual republics have their own particular circumstances requiring particular decisions, but Crusius notes that some general rules can be justified already by the general nature of republics.
Crusius begins by noting that good and prudent government has three goals, none of which should be ignored nor emphasised over others. First goal is to secure the position of regent and apply his powers most efficiently. Crucius remarks that writers like Machiavelli had focused on this goal, forgetting that the good of the regent was intricately connected with the good of the citizens, the second goal of prudent government. This second goal was overemphasised, Crusius says, by republican writers, who had forgotten that a republic still required an efficient regent. Finally, Crucius picks as the third goal the status of republic among other republic. Just like with other goals, he notes that some politicians focused too much on this particular goal, forgetting that external glory of state is based on its internal happiness.
Crusius states that prudence in affairs of state uses the very same capacities as prudence in private affairs, although it applies these capacities in different matters, which it then ought to be informed of. Specifically prudent governor should know the geographical characteristics of the land and the citizens, the political constitution of the whole republic and various communities within it, economic state of the republic, and finally, interests and goals of neighbouring republics.
Crusius emphasises the role of religion as the basis of security of republics. In addition to religion, sciences, arts and freedom of thinking should be protected, because they serve as means for securing all the goals of human life and make republics respected. Despite the lip service to freedom of thinking, Crusius is not willing to tolerate ideas working against the security of state, such as, he insists, atheism.
Crusius advises regents to be careful in choosing their officials and to prefer intelligent and virtuous people over those of high birth. Still, he also suggests that regents should not replace their own intelligence with the intelligence of their officials and that they should closely control the doings of those officials, because they work in the name of the regent. Crusius insists that officials should always follow direct commands of regent, to make the republic secure, while laws, according to Crucius, can be broken, if it is prudent to do so. Indeed, Crusius suggests, good example of regent guides subjects better than any laws.
Crusius speaks for strict regulation of state spendings - republic should always have some reserve finances, in case money is required for emergencies. Money shouldn’t particularly be given freely to subjects, Crusius argues, because they wouldn’t respect what they haven’t worked for, and they particularly shouldn’t have the right to press their own coinage. Instead, subjects should be taxed heavily, Crusius says, since no citizen should have means to live by oneself, but be in various ways dependent on other citizens. Indeed, a person providing sustenance to others should be congratulated, Crusius suggests, because they help to realise one goal of republic. To make taxation fair, Crusius notes, richer individuals should pay the most. Generally, he insists that money should be directed to move from owner to another from time to time, since in this manner it helps the state and the subjects more than if it remained stagnant. Thus, if some goods in land were still ownerless, they could be taken as regent’s property, so that they could be used for everyone’s benefit.
Crusius has not very much to say about legislation, beyond the general fact that laws should be applicable to different subjects. Furthermore, Crusius emphasises that laws should definite, so that there can be no room for misinterpretation, whether it is accidental or purposeful. Against another sort of fraud is directed Crusius’ advise that regents should be careful that religious communities won’t meddle into civil life of their members, since this is often a way to deceive lower classes.
When it comes to foreign relations, Crusius advocates for maintaining the army in good condition, because a strong army has an important role in preventing foreign conquest and in raising the prestige of the republic, which is important for achieving its goals. In commerce, Crusius holds onto essentially mercantilist ideals: foreign imports should be restricted, because losing gold weakens the state, and if something is to be imported, it should be raw materials that are then further developed into manufactures that could be sold to other countries for more money. Crusius still does not believe that republics are only competitors of one another. Indeed, he says that just like humans require friends, countries require alliances for their own security.
keskiviikko 1. tammikuuta 2020
Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - How to win friends and influence people
After dealing with the general rules of prudence, Crusius turns to its first area of application, that is, private affairs. He begins by noting that large parts of this study can be discarded, because they belong already to other sciences. Firstly, prudential care of one’s body and health belongs to medicine, secondly, prudential care of one’s understanding and intellect is the matter of logic, and finally, prudential care of one’s will and motivations has already been dealt in various parts of ethics and moral philosophy.
What is left for Crusius to consider is the prudential care of relationships with other people - in other words, how to get others to respect, honour and care for us. Unlike in case of proper moral philosophy, this is not so much a question of what one is deep down like and what an ideal, omniscient, God-like observer would say about one’s character, but more about how one appears to other people. Thus, although a person would be far from perfection in some field, she might still be respected, because she was viewed as perfect, at least when compared to other people.
Even so, Crusius is quick to warn his readers to avoid such a mere relative honour, because an honour based on being better than someone else will just create envy in others. In fact, he notes, lasting respect and honour must be based on true perfections. Furthermore, he continues, one should be careful in not bragging about one’s perfections and showing them only with good understanding, if one wants others to respect them.
A further, but related question Crusius considers is how to get people to love oneself. Love, Crusius defines, is awakened by perceiving perfections in someone and makes the lover attempt connecting with the beloved. Most often love is awakened, Crusius says, by perception of a perfection of will, because good will and good behaviour are signs of a person who is easy to connect with. Indeed, Crusius notes, a simple way to find love is to show love. Similarly, one should avoid things like mocking others and being ungrateful, if one does not want to be despised by others.
Crusius defines friendship as a type of love, more particularly, as connection of persons, in which both attempt to promote one another’s private ends. Because friendship is kind of love, Crusius advises, finding friends is a lot like making people love oneself. Indeed, he notes that best means for getting friends is to make oneself indispensable to others.
With this rather Dale Carnegian part of Crusius’ philosophy behind us, we have only one more part of the book to consider - that of prudential affairs of state.
What is left for Crusius to consider is the prudential care of relationships with other people - in other words, how to get others to respect, honour and care for us. Unlike in case of proper moral philosophy, this is not so much a question of what one is deep down like and what an ideal, omniscient, God-like observer would say about one’s character, but more about how one appears to other people. Thus, although a person would be far from perfection in some field, she might still be respected, because she was viewed as perfect, at least when compared to other people.
Even so, Crusius is quick to warn his readers to avoid such a mere relative honour, because an honour based on being better than someone else will just create envy in others. In fact, he notes, lasting respect and honour must be based on true perfections. Furthermore, he continues, one should be careful in not bragging about one’s perfections and showing them only with good understanding, if one wants others to respect them.
A further, but related question Crusius considers is how to get people to love oneself. Love, Crusius defines, is awakened by perceiving perfections in someone and makes the lover attempt connecting with the beloved. Most often love is awakened, Crusius says, by perception of a perfection of will, because good will and good behaviour are signs of a person who is easy to connect with. Indeed, Crusius notes, a simple way to find love is to show love. Similarly, one should avoid things like mocking others and being ungrateful, if one does not want to be despised by others.
Crusius defines friendship as a type of love, more particularly, as connection of persons, in which both attempt to promote one another’s private ends. Because friendship is kind of love, Crusius advises, finding friends is a lot like making people love oneself. Indeed, he notes that best means for getting friends is to make oneself indispensable to others.
With this rather Dale Carnegian part of Crusius’ philosophy behind us, we have only one more part of the book to consider - that of prudential affairs of state.
tiistai 24. joulukuuta 2019
Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Art of fulfilling your goals
Having completed Crusius’ account of natural law - study of what we human beings must strive for - we still have a second part of his moral philosophy to deal with - study of prudence or the best means for achieving our goals. While natural law is meant to affect our use of will by making us choose best goals, study of prudence should affect our understanding.
Crusius notes that many particular arts also tell what are the best means for achieving some particular end, but such arts are not included in the general study of prudence. Furthermore, Crusius also won’t accept in this study means that are clear enough from common experience. The only thing left, then, Crusius says, is to look at means that can be derived from the nature of human soul and the principles of whole moral philosophy.
Crusius notes that the means we are discussing can be means either of private or public matters, which divides the study of prudence into two parts. In addition to these two parts, Crusius remarks, a third part should be added, which would universally look at general means for any goal whatsoever. This general part of the study of prudence is then further divided into two parts. First part would study the best ways how to apply a given means, while the second part would explain how we can find means in general for different goals.
Starting from the first part, Crusius notes that one should at first try to simplify one’s goals. For instance, if we have a complex goal to reach, we should try to analyse this goal into finer components that could be pursued more easily. Furthermore, Crusius lists various general methods for ensuring that a given goal is reached, such as finding many possible means for one goal. Finally, Crusius suggests that we should always consider whether the means we use for achieving one goal could be used at the same time for pursuit of a different goal.
The second part Crucius divides into three sections, first of which deals with ways to find means pertaining to understanding. Crusius explicitly mentions such capacities as a capacity to look at things and perceive conditions affecting the use of those things as means. Furthermore, Crusius mentions the capacity to gather experience and information from different sources.
The second section is then about means concerning will. Crusius lists, among other things, bravery, cheerful mind and good moral taste as those means. All of these had their own reasons why Crusius included them - bravery would let us continue to fulfill our actions, no matter what the circumstances, cheerful mind would let us ignore potential harms and good moral taste would let us pick quickly what is right and what is wrong.
The largest section is the one where Crusius deals with means concerning relations to other persons. Firstly, he notes that no matter how moral and prudent our actions are, they definitely should appear so in the eyes of other people. Thus, he says, our actions should look like we have chosen our goals with reason and not seem purposeless.
In addition to making others think highly of oneself, Crusius also suggests that one should acquire skills to know what others actually think. Partially, he notes that there are certain general rules to follow here, such as that people often believe only what they can perceive and that they believe things that accord with their own desires.
Beyond such general rules, Crusius thinks that we can learn to interpret an individual person’s mind. In case of ourselves, these readings might be certain, while with other people, Crusius admits, we can often know their mind only with probability. Still, he says, we can use introspection to learn the nature of the capacities of mind, and then draw analogies to other people’s minds.
Crusius draws very stringent limits to in what measure we can hope to know other people. Just like many other philosophers before him, Crusius notes that while physiognomy or study of human mind from mien and other bodily features is in principle a possible science, it is definitely a quite uncertain science - person’s taste can tell us more than his facial expression, Crusius suggests. Furthermore, unlike some Wolffians, Crusius thinks that what person says or does in a state of intoxication - or other similar abnormal state - does not tell what they think in ordinary life.
Crusius notes that many particular arts also tell what are the best means for achieving some particular end, but such arts are not included in the general study of prudence. Furthermore, Crusius also won’t accept in this study means that are clear enough from common experience. The only thing left, then, Crusius says, is to look at means that can be derived from the nature of human soul and the principles of whole moral philosophy.
Crusius notes that the means we are discussing can be means either of private or public matters, which divides the study of prudence into two parts. In addition to these two parts, Crusius remarks, a third part should be added, which would universally look at general means for any goal whatsoever. This general part of the study of prudence is then further divided into two parts. First part would study the best ways how to apply a given means, while the second part would explain how we can find means in general for different goals.
Starting from the first part, Crusius notes that one should at first try to simplify one’s goals. For instance, if we have a complex goal to reach, we should try to analyse this goal into finer components that could be pursued more easily. Furthermore, Crusius lists various general methods for ensuring that a given goal is reached, such as finding many possible means for one goal. Finally, Crusius suggests that we should always consider whether the means we use for achieving one goal could be used at the same time for pursuit of a different goal.
The second part Crucius divides into three sections, first of which deals with ways to find means pertaining to understanding. Crusius explicitly mentions such capacities as a capacity to look at things and perceive conditions affecting the use of those things as means. Furthermore, Crusius mentions the capacity to gather experience and information from different sources.
The second section is then about means concerning will. Crusius lists, among other things, bravery, cheerful mind and good moral taste as those means. All of these had their own reasons why Crusius included them - bravery would let us continue to fulfill our actions, no matter what the circumstances, cheerful mind would let us ignore potential harms and good moral taste would let us pick quickly what is right and what is wrong.
The largest section is the one where Crusius deals with means concerning relations to other persons. Firstly, he notes that no matter how moral and prudent our actions are, they definitely should appear so in the eyes of other people. Thus, he says, our actions should look like we have chosen our goals with reason and not seem purposeless.
In addition to making others think highly of oneself, Crusius also suggests that one should acquire skills to know what others actually think. Partially, he notes that there are certain general rules to follow here, such as that people often believe only what they can perceive and that they believe things that accord with their own desires.
Beyond such general rules, Crusius thinks that we can learn to interpret an individual person’s mind. In case of ourselves, these readings might be certain, while with other people, Crusius admits, we can often know their mind only with probability. Still, he says, we can use introspection to learn the nature of the capacities of mind, and then draw analogies to other people’s minds.
Crusius draws very stringent limits to in what measure we can hope to know other people. Just like many other philosophers before him, Crusius notes that while physiognomy or study of human mind from mien and other bodily features is in principle a possible science, it is definitely a quite uncertain science - person’s taste can tell us more than his facial expression, Crusius suggests. Furthermore, unlike some Wolffians, Crusius thinks that what person says or does in a state of intoxication - or other similar abnormal state - does not tell what they think in ordinary life.
Finally, Crusius warns against trying to predict person’s future actions, even if we know what they have in their mind. He does not completely discard the possibility, but suggests that this is possible only in cases, where a person is wont to follow their inclinations and external impulses. Because of a possibility of a freely chosen action, Crusius notes, such deductions of future actions are always unreliable - a human being could always choose to act otherwise.
perjantai 13. joulukuuta 2019
Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Republics and nations
Until this moment, Crusius has been speaking of a state of nature, that is, a state without no government. Then again, he notes, human beings cannot remain in this state of nature, because their fallen state creates problems. Some people want to do harm to others, and a need to defend oneself leads to the formation of communities. Crusius insists that not everyone can take part in the actual decision making of a community, which requires some form of representation. Furthermore, communities require some principles to fill gaps in the law of nature and means by which to enforce natural law and contracts.
These needs generate an incentive to form republics, by which Crusius means communities in which one or more persons take care of common welfare and security, in order that natural duties and rights of moral person would be better protected. Crusius also insists that God wants republics, because they are in the current state of the world the best means for common welfare. Crusius does admit that first republics were probably dictatorships. Still, he thinks that this genesis does not lessen our obligations toward them. Furthermore, he notes that republics are not absolutely necessary, since in state of nature many things can be determined through contracts.
Crusius notes that republics have two different kinds of members - regents or rulers and subjects or citizens - both of which have their own duties and rights. Although he notes that a republic can have many regents and that even the whole nation could be a regent, most of his discussion seems to rise from the monarchic context of a single ruler.
Duty of regents is, Crusius says, to take care of the welfare of the whole republic and to use their powers only for this purpose and not to restrict individual rights further than necessary. Rights of regent, which Crusius calls rights of majesty, can either be historically determined, such as a right to hunt in certain places where others are not allowed. Still, Crusius notes, some of their rights are determined already by the very notion of regency and thus belong to natural law.
A central right of regents, in Crusius’ account, is the right to explicitly or implicitly appoint civil laws, which are meant for the best of the whole republic and which subjects are obligated to follow. Civil laws either generally say that something should be done or not done, or they assign rights to certain people and to other people a duty to respect those rights.
Crusius bases the obligation toward civil laws on a more fundamental obligation toward natural law - civil laws should be obeyed, because natural law says so. Civil laws are mostly needed where natural law leaves matters very undetermined, for instance, with questions concerning property. In addition, they can be used to bolster parts of natural law that are not accepted by everyone.
Crusius considers also the relationship of civil laws to rights and duties based on natural laws. He notes that civil laws can cancel negative natural rights, for instance, a civil law can cancel a right to hunt. Then again, Crusius adds, positive right can be cancelled only for a good reason. Crusius thinks also that a civil law can cancel those natural duties, which are indeterminate or not in itself necessary, because civil security is more important than following these duties. Then again, he emphasises, immutable natural duties cannot be denied by any civil law, because even civil law is based on such duties.
In addition to devising civil laws, Crusius says that regent is also tasked to apply natural and civil laws as the highest judge of republic. This does not mean that regent would have to sit in court all day, because they can assign officials and judges to help them in their work. Then again, regent cannot leave judicial power to the hands of ordinary citizens - thus, Crusius condemns practices such as dueling. Finally, according to Crusius, regents themselves can judged only by God, so that the security of republic can be maintained.
Crusius says that a regent has a right to punish and thus force subjects to follow laws. In extreme cases they can even kill people, as a deterrent, but Crusius advises this should not be done lightly. Still, Crusius suggests that righteous death penalty should be regarded as deriving from God’s will.
As has already been noted, Crusius wanted regents to avoid meddling into private affairs of citizens, as much as it is possible. This means also that regent should respect property of private persons, although they have a right to tax citizens during extreme times. Crusius also notes that private affairs of regent do not fall under right of majesty, in other words, regent does not have any special rights when e.g. buying or selling property.
Crusius remarks that republic might contain smaller communities. These communities fall also under the command of regent. Thus, Crusius notes, they must provide enough information of their activities to regent, in order to determine whether they won’t pose a threat to a republic. If these communities are harmless, their activities belong to the private sphere.
Crusius also considers the origin of regent’s rights. Originally, he says, majesty must be decided by pact. Such a constitutional pact can be entered freely, but Crusius admits it might also arise through force, if the alternative is even worse. This pact can be explicit - for instance, in case of elections - or implicit. Crusius considers it as a case of an implicit pact, when children continue to live in a republic that has raised them - it is not their parents that have decided the issue, but children themselves, because they enjoy the security provided by the republic.
Crusius says that rights of regent and their limits are determined by the original pact - unless regents want to turn into dictators, they should not try to overcome those limits. Crusius is of the opinion that the rights of regent can be restricted only by an explicit pact or by clear implicit conditions, such as regent’s duty to act for the benefit of the whole republic.
Crusius notes that regent has power also over churches in republic. Indeed, he insists that churches must be regulated more than other communities, because churches are large, depravations can be easily masked as religious dogmas and unruly persons often become church officials. Still, Crusius adds, regent should otherwise give churches the same rights as other communities.
Crusius has further rules about the relationship of regent and religion. Firstly, he begins, regents themselves should not make new religions and they should not make essential changes to religion. Since regents should not meddle in private affairs, they should not force anyone to convert to a religion. Particularly, they should not take children from their parents and make them part of a different religious community. Generally, Crusius says, nobody should be punished just because of their religion. Furthermore, unless the good of the republic demands so, Crusius continues, regent should not force religious community to change its characteristics.
Crusius thinks that power of regents over a religion goes somewhat further, if they follow that particular religion, because then they are obligated to aim for the best of its followers - for instance, regents would then have also judicial power in church. Crusius suggests that regents are obligated to help their religious community survive all internal conflicts. Indeed, he adds, they can even determine the rules of the religious community, if the general good so demands.
According to Crusius, regent can pick some religion as an official religion of the republic, in so far as nobody is forced to uphold it involuntarily. Crusius notes that while regent can punish people who disturb general peace, even if they do it for the sake of their conscience, this does not mean he can punish people just for having a different religion. Still, Crusius allows regents to punish external mockery of the official religion, which Crusius considers to include atheism or deism.
Crusius thinks subjects have a duty to follow civil laws and administration of majesty, thus denying all disobedience. According to Crusius, this duty is based not just on the original pact, but also on the duty of upholding security of whole community. This duty also implies, Crusius says, that despite all their faults, regents must be thought to be good, because on the public image of the regent is based the security of whole republic. Similarly, Crusius continues, subjects must think that a regent always acts according to the best interest of republic.
Crusius admit that if regents forget the duty of upholding common good, citizens are only externally obligated to follow them. He then raises the interesting question whether this external duty of obedience contradicts inner duty of citizens to follow their own conscience. His answer differs from one case to another. Firstly, he notes that when citizens are unsure what is best for the republic, they should just follow their regent. Even if the citizens would know a better course of action than what regent suggests, regent’s suggestion should be follow not be bad as such.
What then if regent’s decision would be foolish or even ethically unsound? Advise of Crusius is to avoid as much conflict as possible. He denies all active rebellion, but accepts a sort of passive resistance, where regent’s commands are not just followed. Even in this case, Crusius says, this disobedience should be done without arousing too much commotion and the citizens should accept the punishment, if their disobedience becomes public.
Since the rights of regent are based on original, explicit or implicit, pact, these rights might vanish and subjects wouldn’t then be obligated to follow their regent. Crusius warns that this could happen only if the regent had committed a great crime, since revolution always endangers public security. Furthermore, he adds that the decision to start a revolution should not rise from a single person, but from whole nation or at least from a majority of nation or from a selected group of its representatives.
While within a republic or a nation, civil laws rule in addition to natural law, when it comes to relation of nations, Crusius says, no such civil laws exist. This means, firstly, that all nations have similar right and no nation can rule or judge over another. Secondly, Crusius adds, it means that all obligations of nations must be based on either natural law or on contracts made by them. Still, the mere existence of free nations changes the natural law somewhat from that holding in a state of nature, for instance, since the existence of nations often implies the existence of entities other than individuals that can own property.
Because free nations have no further ruler above them, Crusius notes, they have a right to force their own rights, in other words, they can start just wars. Just war is no illegal revenge, Crusius clarifies, but a righteous way for a nation to uphold its rights. Still, he points out, war is always an unnatural state and should happen only at very extreme situations, after all diplomatic means have been used. Furthermore, Crusius continues, warring nations should use the least amount of violence and to end the war as soon as possible, while neutral states should not be disturbed during war. Despite these antiwar attitudes, Crusius makes one concession: raging barbarian hordes can be attacked, no matter what.
These needs generate an incentive to form republics, by which Crusius means communities in which one or more persons take care of common welfare and security, in order that natural duties and rights of moral person would be better protected. Crusius also insists that God wants republics, because they are in the current state of the world the best means for common welfare. Crusius does admit that first republics were probably dictatorships. Still, he thinks that this genesis does not lessen our obligations toward them. Furthermore, he notes that republics are not absolutely necessary, since in state of nature many things can be determined through contracts.
Crusius notes that republics have two different kinds of members - regents or rulers and subjects or citizens - both of which have their own duties and rights. Although he notes that a republic can have many regents and that even the whole nation could be a regent, most of his discussion seems to rise from the monarchic context of a single ruler.
Duty of regents is, Crusius says, to take care of the welfare of the whole republic and to use their powers only for this purpose and not to restrict individual rights further than necessary. Rights of regent, which Crusius calls rights of majesty, can either be historically determined, such as a right to hunt in certain places where others are not allowed. Still, Crusius notes, some of their rights are determined already by the very notion of regency and thus belong to natural law.
A central right of regents, in Crusius’ account, is the right to explicitly or implicitly appoint civil laws, which are meant for the best of the whole republic and which subjects are obligated to follow. Civil laws either generally say that something should be done or not done, or they assign rights to certain people and to other people a duty to respect those rights.
Crusius bases the obligation toward civil laws on a more fundamental obligation toward natural law - civil laws should be obeyed, because natural law says so. Civil laws are mostly needed where natural law leaves matters very undetermined, for instance, with questions concerning property. In addition, they can be used to bolster parts of natural law that are not accepted by everyone.
Crusius considers also the relationship of civil laws to rights and duties based on natural laws. He notes that civil laws can cancel negative natural rights, for instance, a civil law can cancel a right to hunt. Then again, Crusius adds, positive right can be cancelled only for a good reason. Crusius thinks also that a civil law can cancel those natural duties, which are indeterminate or not in itself necessary, because civil security is more important than following these duties. Then again, he emphasises, immutable natural duties cannot be denied by any civil law, because even civil law is based on such duties.
In addition to devising civil laws, Crusius says that regent is also tasked to apply natural and civil laws as the highest judge of republic. This does not mean that regent would have to sit in court all day, because they can assign officials and judges to help them in their work. Then again, regent cannot leave judicial power to the hands of ordinary citizens - thus, Crusius condemns practices such as dueling. Finally, according to Crusius, regents themselves can judged only by God, so that the security of republic can be maintained.
Crusius says that a regent has a right to punish and thus force subjects to follow laws. In extreme cases they can even kill people, as a deterrent, but Crusius advises this should not be done lightly. Still, Crusius suggests that righteous death penalty should be regarded as deriving from God’s will.
As has already been noted, Crusius wanted regents to avoid meddling into private affairs of citizens, as much as it is possible. This means also that regent should respect property of private persons, although they have a right to tax citizens during extreme times. Crusius also notes that private affairs of regent do not fall under right of majesty, in other words, regent does not have any special rights when e.g. buying or selling property.
Crusius remarks that republic might contain smaller communities. These communities fall also under the command of regent. Thus, Crusius notes, they must provide enough information of their activities to regent, in order to determine whether they won’t pose a threat to a republic. If these communities are harmless, their activities belong to the private sphere.
Crusius also considers the origin of regent’s rights. Originally, he says, majesty must be decided by pact. Such a constitutional pact can be entered freely, but Crusius admits it might also arise through force, if the alternative is even worse. This pact can be explicit - for instance, in case of elections - or implicit. Crusius considers it as a case of an implicit pact, when children continue to live in a republic that has raised them - it is not their parents that have decided the issue, but children themselves, because they enjoy the security provided by the republic.
Crusius says that rights of regent and their limits are determined by the original pact - unless regents want to turn into dictators, they should not try to overcome those limits. Crusius is of the opinion that the rights of regent can be restricted only by an explicit pact or by clear implicit conditions, such as regent’s duty to act for the benefit of the whole republic.
Crusius notes that regent has power also over churches in republic. Indeed, he insists that churches must be regulated more than other communities, because churches are large, depravations can be easily masked as religious dogmas and unruly persons often become church officials. Still, Crusius adds, regent should otherwise give churches the same rights as other communities.
Crusius has further rules about the relationship of regent and religion. Firstly, he begins, regents themselves should not make new religions and they should not make essential changes to religion. Since regents should not meddle in private affairs, they should not force anyone to convert to a religion. Particularly, they should not take children from their parents and make them part of a different religious community. Generally, Crusius says, nobody should be punished just because of their religion. Furthermore, unless the good of the republic demands so, Crusius continues, regent should not force religious community to change its characteristics.
Crusius thinks that power of regents over a religion goes somewhat further, if they follow that particular religion, because then they are obligated to aim for the best of its followers - for instance, regents would then have also judicial power in church. Crusius suggests that regents are obligated to help their religious community survive all internal conflicts. Indeed, he adds, they can even determine the rules of the religious community, if the general good so demands.
According to Crusius, regent can pick some religion as an official religion of the republic, in so far as nobody is forced to uphold it involuntarily. Crusius notes that while regent can punish people who disturb general peace, even if they do it for the sake of their conscience, this does not mean he can punish people just for having a different religion. Still, Crusius allows regents to punish external mockery of the official religion, which Crusius considers to include atheism or deism.
Crusius thinks subjects have a duty to follow civil laws and administration of majesty, thus denying all disobedience. According to Crusius, this duty is based not just on the original pact, but also on the duty of upholding security of whole community. This duty also implies, Crusius says, that despite all their faults, regents must be thought to be good, because on the public image of the regent is based the security of whole republic. Similarly, Crusius continues, subjects must think that a regent always acts according to the best interest of republic.
Crusius admit that if regents forget the duty of upholding common good, citizens are only externally obligated to follow them. He then raises the interesting question whether this external duty of obedience contradicts inner duty of citizens to follow their own conscience. His answer differs from one case to another. Firstly, he notes that when citizens are unsure what is best for the republic, they should just follow their regent. Even if the citizens would know a better course of action than what regent suggests, regent’s suggestion should be follow not be bad as such.
What then if regent’s decision would be foolish or even ethically unsound? Advise of Crusius is to avoid as much conflict as possible. He denies all active rebellion, but accepts a sort of passive resistance, where regent’s commands are not just followed. Even in this case, Crusius says, this disobedience should be done without arousing too much commotion and the citizens should accept the punishment, if their disobedience becomes public.
Since the rights of regent are based on original, explicit or implicit, pact, these rights might vanish and subjects wouldn’t then be obligated to follow their regent. Crusius warns that this could happen only if the regent had committed a great crime, since revolution always endangers public security. Furthermore, he adds that the decision to start a revolution should not rise from a single person, but from whole nation or at least from a majority of nation or from a selected group of its representatives.
While within a republic or a nation, civil laws rule in addition to natural law, when it comes to relation of nations, Crusius says, no such civil laws exist. This means, firstly, that all nations have similar right and no nation can rule or judge over another. Secondly, Crusius adds, it means that all obligations of nations must be based on either natural law or on contracts made by them. Still, the mere existence of free nations changes the natural law somewhat from that holding in a state of nature, for instance, since the existence of nations often implies the existence of entities other than individuals that can own property.
Because free nations have no further ruler above them, Crusius notes, they have a right to force their own rights, in other words, they can start just wars. Just war is no illegal revenge, Crusius clarifies, but a righteous way for a nation to uphold its rights. Still, he points out, war is always an unnatural state and should happen only at very extreme situations, after all diplomatic means have been used. Furthermore, Crusius continues, warring nations should use the least amount of violence and to end the war as soon as possible, while neutral states should not be disturbed during war. Despite these antiwar attitudes, Crusius makes one concession: raging barbarian hordes can be attacked, no matter what.
sunnuntai 6. lokakuuta 2019
Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Married with children
If we ignore the rather short and uninteresting section on oaths, Crusius ends his account of natural law proper by investigating family life. His idea of families has a strong theological colouring. God, Crusius says, has created humans in such a manner that they seek sexual relations, so that the world would be filled with human beings. Furthermore, Crusius continues, God wants that all children will be raised and taught such important matters as belief in God. This duty of raising and educating children, Crusius thinks, belongs to their parents, and in order that parentage of children were certain, couples should be married, that is, form contracts, which forbid sexual relations with other people and which obligate parents to raise their children.
Crusius notes that although human procreation should be regulated and restricted to married people, not every human being need to have children. Of course, only celibacy is a real alternative for Crusius, since he considers sexual organs should be used only for reproduction. In other words, Crusius think sex is allowed only in the context of marriage.
Although Crusius calls marriage a contract, he notes that it is quite different from an ordinary contract, since it only determines the persons entering the married state, while the duties involved are already determined by our duty to obey God. Thus, although normal contracts can be broken, if the people involved just all want so, marriage contract is meant to last for a whole lifetime, because children need a secure family, so that divorces are acceptable only in very special circumstances, Crusius argues. Although one might think so, Crusius is of the opinion that infertility is no real reason for divorce, since it might well be just temporary. Indeed, the only acceptable reason for divorce, in Crusius’ eyes, is adultery, because it makes the proper end of marriage insecure.
Because the main end of marriage is procreation, Crusius continues, polyandry - marriage of one woman with several men - is in his opinion nonsense, because one woman needs only one man to become pregnant (Crusius does not seem to consider the possibility that a woman might have different children for different men). Polygamy - marriage of one man with several women - Crusius considers at least more possible, but ultimately rejects it. Raising children of many women is more difficult, Crusius says and adds that God must have meant us for monogamy, because the two genders are born in almost same numbers (a few more men are born, Crusius explains, because God has foreseen that men will die in wars).
Although the main purpose of marriage is raising children, Crusius think that it has an important secondary purpose, namely, the communion between husband and wife. In a quite sexistic fashion, Crusius insists that women cannot really give intellectual satisfaction to men, but they can provide companionship and sexual satisfaction - a rather bleak view of what marriage is all about. In a similarly sexistic fashion Crusius says that women have a stronger drive for taking care of children, because God meant them to be more involved with the upbringing of children.
Raising children, Crusius says, involves three different duties. A parent must, firstly, take care that the children live and become strong and healthy, secondly, guide them toward virtuous life, and finally, teach them such skills that they require for becoming useful citizens and for cultivating their skills. Although a parent would die, she is obligated to take care of her children, for instance, through inheritance.
In addition to these duties, Crusius continues, parents have a right - which Crusius calls paternal right - to decide the means by which their children are to be raised. This right involves a right to force children to do something, although only in certain limits: for instance, children are not for sale. Paternal right becomes less and less important, when children grow, although, as one might have suspected, Crusius says that daughters should be ruled by their parents as long as these daughters are not married.
Just like parents, children also have some rights, Crusius notes. Children have a right to demand sustenance and education from their parents, until they get old enough to provide for themselves. Children also have a right to expect that their parents do not restrict their freedom needlessly. Finally, unless their parents have decreed otherwise, the children have a right to inherit their parents.
Crusius also indicates that children must have some duties also. Due to their being minors, children must obey their parents, except if this would mean doing things that are against natural law. In addition, Crusius says, children are obligated to be thankful of what their parents have done for them (of course, he continues, children should love and honour their parents, even if their parents have not raised them at all). An important part of these duties is that children must take care of their parents in their old age. These duties are such that no civil laws can overcome them - for instance, a king should not punish his parents.
Crusius notes that although human procreation should be regulated and restricted to married people, not every human being need to have children. Of course, only celibacy is a real alternative for Crusius, since he considers sexual organs should be used only for reproduction. In other words, Crusius think sex is allowed only in the context of marriage.
Although Crusius calls marriage a contract, he notes that it is quite different from an ordinary contract, since it only determines the persons entering the married state, while the duties involved are already determined by our duty to obey God. Thus, although normal contracts can be broken, if the people involved just all want so, marriage contract is meant to last for a whole lifetime, because children need a secure family, so that divorces are acceptable only in very special circumstances, Crusius argues. Although one might think so, Crusius is of the opinion that infertility is no real reason for divorce, since it might well be just temporary. Indeed, the only acceptable reason for divorce, in Crusius’ eyes, is adultery, because it makes the proper end of marriage insecure.
Because the main end of marriage is procreation, Crusius continues, polyandry - marriage of one woman with several men - is in his opinion nonsense, because one woman needs only one man to become pregnant (Crusius does not seem to consider the possibility that a woman might have different children for different men). Polygamy - marriage of one man with several women - Crusius considers at least more possible, but ultimately rejects it. Raising children of many women is more difficult, Crusius says and adds that God must have meant us for monogamy, because the two genders are born in almost same numbers (a few more men are born, Crusius explains, because God has foreseen that men will die in wars).
Although the main purpose of marriage is raising children, Crusius think that it has an important secondary purpose, namely, the communion between husband and wife. In a quite sexistic fashion, Crusius insists that women cannot really give intellectual satisfaction to men, but they can provide companionship and sexual satisfaction - a rather bleak view of what marriage is all about. In a similarly sexistic fashion Crusius says that women have a stronger drive for taking care of children, because God meant them to be more involved with the upbringing of children.
Raising children, Crusius says, involves three different duties. A parent must, firstly, take care that the children live and become strong and healthy, secondly, guide them toward virtuous life, and finally, teach them such skills that they require for becoming useful citizens and for cultivating their skills. Although a parent would die, she is obligated to take care of her children, for instance, through inheritance.
In addition to these duties, Crusius continues, parents have a right - which Crusius calls paternal right - to decide the means by which their children are to be raised. This right involves a right to force children to do something, although only in certain limits: for instance, children are not for sale. Paternal right becomes less and less important, when children grow, although, as one might have suspected, Crusius says that daughters should be ruled by their parents as long as these daughters are not married.
Just like parents, children also have some rights, Crusius notes. Children have a right to demand sustenance and education from their parents, until they get old enough to provide for themselves. Children also have a right to expect that their parents do not restrict their freedom needlessly. Finally, unless their parents have decreed otherwise, the children have a right to inherit their parents.
Crusius also indicates that children must have some duties also. Due to their being minors, children must obey their parents, except if this would mean doing things that are against natural law. In addition, Crusius says, children are obligated to be thankful of what their parents have done for them (of course, he continues, children should love and honour their parents, even if their parents have not raised them at all). An important part of these duties is that children must take care of their parents in their old age. These duties are such that no civil laws can overcome them - for instance, a king should not punish his parents.
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