We could say that Neoplatonists like
Proclus and Simplicius with their studies of Plato and Aristotle were
the latest possible point at which the use of commentary as a
philosophical tool was introduced. During the Middle Ages the success
of commentaries was obvious and one could even say that the modern
indiscriminate use of references in articles resembles a form of
commentary.
We have already seen a philosophical
commentary, in which Lange presented a number of passages ripped out
of their context from Wolff's writings and then criticized what he
thought was meant in those passages. A more faithful reading of Wolff
is presented by Andreas Rüdiger, a follower of Christian Thomasius
we have met a few times before, in his work Herrn Christian
Wolffens Meinung von dem Wesen der Seele und eines Geistes überhaupt:
und D. Andreas Rüdigers Gegen-Meinung.
Rüdiger gives his reader not just isolated passages, but a whole
text of Wolff's rational psychology from the German metaphysics, and
leaves his own opinions to a preface and footnotes.
As the name of the work belies, Rüdiger
belongs to Wolff's critics, not to his followers. Some of what
Rüdiger has to say is clearly based on confusions already dealt by
Wolff. For instance, when Rüdiger complains that regarding soul as
consisting of a mere force of representing the world would deprive it
of all the complexity of its characteristics, such as freedom of
its will, we could just point out to Wolff's answer that the force of
representation is not meant to be all of what soul is, but only a
convenient point from which to deduce all the characteristics of
soul.
This does not mean that Rüdiger's
criticism is wholly based on confusion. For instance, Rüdiger asks
how Wolff can suppose there's an essential difference between souls
of humans and of animals, when the difference is based on nothing
more than the degree of clarity in their representations. Indeed, he
continues, we cannot even say in earnest that animals have less clear
experience of things, when their sensory apparatus is sometimes far
subtler than ours.
What is probably the most crucial point
is the already discussed uneasy synthesis of the notions of the
pre-established harmony and the freedom of will. The pre-established
harmony is explained by pointing out that even two clocks can show
same time without any causal interference, but the problem is how a
free agent and a deterministic mechanism could follow the exactly
same course of actions. Yes, neither of these series is necessary,
but still in one series the later events are determined by the
previous events. The problem is exaggerated by Wolff's suggestion that
in soul all events are grounded on previous events, just like in the
material world: how could one not think of Wolffian soul as a sort of
automaton after this?
The problem lies, as Rüdiger points
out, in Wolff's notion of ground that combines quite distinct types
of relations. Material causes are grounds, but so are human motives
(Rüdiger adds animal movements as a group distinct from these two).
True, causes and motives do share some characteristics, but they
appear to have also crucial differences: cause produces always
certain effect necessarily, while motive requires still the will of a
person to become reality, that is, while there is not motiveless
action, motive does not necessarily lead to action. This distinction
is one that Wolff himself noted and he has made it quite clear that
he believes in human freedom in choosing what motive to follow.
Furthermore, his willingness to distance himself from the
pre-established harmony might show a certain skepticism of this
theory.
What is remarkable in Rüdiger's book
is his willingness to actually suggest an alternative solution to the
problem of soul/body-interaction, while earlier critics had just
expressed their faith on the possibility of said interaction. Rüdiger
notes, firstly, that the matter/soul-distinction can be understood in
two separate ways. Firstly, there is the Aristotelian distinction
between matter and form, where soul is stated to be one type of form.
Aristotelian matter, Rüdiger says, means just substrate (that which
is) of a form, which then is the force or activity of the matter
(what it does) – thus, form or soul of a living thing consists just
of living and its other essential activities. Clearly, such a soul
cannot exist without corresponding matter or substrate, and the
distinction is more conceptual than ontological.
Still, this does not mean that we could
not separate an independent spiritual substance from an independent
material substance, and this is what e.g. Descartes did – there is
an entity, Descartes said, that is conscious of itself and its own
body and various other things, but is still separable from the
spatial body. What Rüdiger finds troubling is the identification of
spatiality as the distinct characteristic of material substances.
Instead, he claims that all created substances must occupy space –
and this he thinks is the key to the problem of
soul/body-interaction. Soul is not antispatial, but occupies space
and even has extension, even if it doesn't act like material
substance and exclude other entities from a certain place: thus, a
body and a soul can share the same space and also interact with one
another, even if this interaction is not like interaction of material
substances. What Rüdiger has in mind is then a sort of astral body
floating around the crass physical body, and soul is then identified
either with this more spiritual body, or in the Aristotelian manner,
with its activities.
This seems like a good place to turn to
consider Rüdiger's philosophy in general, as the book here will be
his last seen in this blog. Of all the philosophers considered thus
far, I think I have done least justice to Rüdiger. Partially this
has been caused by difficulties in tracking down his works, but most
of the blame must be put on my original inability to recognize his
independence of the more pietist side of Thomasian legacy, embodied
in Lange.
Sure, Rüdiger does have his
antiscientist streak, evident best in his vitalistic physics, which
cannot but feel quaint nowadays – just look at his theory of soul.
Then again, even here Rüdiger is just part of general progression,
following Paracelcian influences inherent in German thought and
anticipating ideas of Schellingian philosophy of nature. Furthermore,
Rüdiger is not speaking from the standpoint of a mystic, but of a
practicing doctor, with considerable empirical information.
Still, the most lasting legacy of
Rüdiger lies in his methodological considerations on the differences
of mathematical and philosophical thinking and on his criticism of
Wolffian notion of ground. Both topics were later on picked up by
Kant, and the connection is probably not just accidental. Kant has in
both cases been influenced by Crucius who had been taught by a person
called Hoffman, who was a follower of Rüdiger. I shall see in a
couple of years whether Hoffman considered these topics, but for now,
I shall leave this school of philosophy and start to consider
eloquence.
