Having investigated how to define and divide concepts, Crusius turns next to the question what applied logic has to say about propositions. He notes that most perfections and imperfections that propositions could have do not require specific rules, since they would concern the whole logic. The only topics left to consider in this regard, Crusius says, are rules for avoiding obscurity in propositions and rules for analysing propositions into their constituent propositions.
Starting with obscurities in propositions, Crusius notes the most prominent reasons why a proposition is obscure. These reasons include ambiguity of words and concepts belonging to two different genera. Crusius exemplifies the latter with one of his pet peeves: when we speak of grounds of something, we might be talking of causes or of existential grounds.
A specific case of obscurity Crusius mentions involves words indicating some quantity, like great or best. Such words create obscurities, he explains, if we do not have any clear measure to which to compare them (thus, if I say that this is the best world, this is still obscure, since we do not know on what scale this goodness is measured on). Even more obscure the case becomes, if instead of one quantity we have several and we do not know what it is we are talking about (for instance, if someone is said to have good memory, it is unclear whether e.g. they are quick to memorise things or whether they retain for a long time what they have memorised).
Moving on to the second topic or logical analysis or exposition of propositions, Crusius means by this showing what other propositions are thought at the same time when a certain proposition is thought distinctly. He notices at once that logical analysis does not mean going through all propositions that can be deduced from the proposition-to-be-analysed, if they cannot be thought with this original proposition. This does not mean that the propositions found through analysis need to be explicitly observable in the analysed proposition, Crusius adds: for example, although it is not evident from the form of the proposition, all real definitions include an implicit statement that the subject of the proposition exists or is at least possible. Similarly imperatives include also implicit propositions about the will of the speaker and often even indications of moral necessity.
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