Before moving on from the topic of subordination and distinction of concepts, Crusius takes some time to consider two related questions. Firstly, he entertains the possibility of presenting the various types of subordination and distinction as a kind of algebra, with symbols chosen to represent the different types. He seems optimistic about the possibility of such an endeavour, although it is not evident what he considers its benefits – at least the amount of symbols required is rather extensive.
The more interesting question concerns different grades or modalities of subordination and distinction. In effect, Crusius supposes there to be three kinds of modalities for both subordination and distinction. The first of these he calls essential subordination, which connects concepts all the time. The sum of everything subordinated essentially to a thing forms then, Crusius says, the logical essence of that thing. Furthermore, he adds, this logical essence can be divided into contingent properties, essential to the thing only with the supposition of God having freely created the current world, and necessary properties, essential whatever God might choose to create.
The second modality of subordination, according to Crusius, is natural subordination. This means, he says, that two kinds of things are regularly connected, although the essence of the thing allows that in an extraordinary case this connection would be lacking. Crusius calls such naturally subordinated properties naturalia, an example of which would be five fingers of a human. He notes that naturalia can be based in the essence of a thing, like the human capacity to speak. Then again, Crusius thinks, it might also be generated by a regular connection to an external cause, like the tanned skin colour in areas with more sunlight.
The final modality of subordination, Crusius continues, is contingent subordination. Here, a thing is connected to some property only occasionally or accidentally. Crusius also points out that while a property might be just accidental, capacity for it could still be natural or even essential: for instance, while wisdom is an accidental property of human beings, capacity for wisdom is natural or even essential property of humans.
Distinction, Crusius suggests, comes also in three modalities. The first of these is the necessity of distinction, that is, the impossibility of subordination, where no possibility of combining concepts is possible, without contradicting their essence. Similarly, the second modality is the natural distinction or the unnatural subordination, where the combination of concepts can occur only in extraordinary cases, where some naturalia have been cancelled. The final modality is then the accidental distinction or the mere possibility of subordination, where nothing essential or natural prevents the combination of concepts, but in this particular case the concepts just have not been combined.
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