Georg Friedrich Meier: Thoughts on honour – What should we do for honour

If the aim of the previous chapter was to show that honour is good, the aim of this chapter, for Meier, is to investigate what does this obligate us to. The first, and the most obvious, obligation or duty is that we should try to gain honour. Meier justifies this from the more general duty that we should try to perfect ourselves, firstly, as an end in itself, and secondly, as means to other ends. As we have just noticed, Meier thinks that honour is good and thus makes us more perfect. Furthermore, he says, being honoured helps us to motivate other humans to reach perfection and it also makes others appreciate works of God more. Thus, honour works also as means for other goods.

Meier argues for the duty of gaining honour in another manner. The most sublime duty for us humans, he says, is to imitate the highest being or God: humans are supposed to be mirrors of divine majesty. Now, he continues, God is in themselves the most honourable being and also is to be honoured through their external works. Thus, Meier concludes, being honoured makes us resemble God more. Furthermore, as an imitation of God, striving for honour is, Meier thinks, a religious action and so service to God. According to Meier, we are obligated to make our free actions an unbroken service of God, where gaining honour then helps.

Meier also notes that we are obligated to act virtuously. Therefore, we are obligated to everything, which makes virtuous actions easier. Now, virtue is one reason for being honoured, hence, setting honour as one’s goal motivates acting virtuously. New motives increase our capacities, Meier continues, and so honour makes virtuous actions easier. Furthermore, he adds, the noblest or heroic virtues require ignoring many other conveniences of life – indeed even very life itself. Such virtues, Meier assumes, especially require honour as their motive.

In addition to virtue, Meier also uses satisfaction as a justification for taking honour as an obligated end. Life without satisfaction is no life, he begins, so we are obligated to find true satisfaction. Because honour gives us true satisfaction, we are obligated to find honour.

All duties, beyond the highest, have their restrictions, since our capacities are limited, Meier thinks. He has argued that honour is not the highest good for humans and thinks that therefore we should try to reach honour only insofar as it is possible for us. By possibility Meier means, firstly, absolute possibility. In other words, we are obligated to find honour only in such a measure that does not overreach human capacities.

In addition, Meier is referring to physical possibility. In other words, we are obligated to strive for honour only in such a measure that agrees with our own individual capacities. This means that the obligation to gain honour concerns only those persons who have the capacity to gain honourable perfections: if they don’t do so, they are despised for wasting their talents. Then again, those without any talents have a privilege to not follow this obligation. Furthermore, Meier adds, everyone is obligated to reach only for such quantities of honour which are possible for their capacities.

The final meaning of the possibility for Meier is moral possibility. Thus, we are obligated to gain honour only insofar as it does not contradict higher duties. If it does contradict, it stops being duty and becomes a sin. Meier gives as an example of breaking this rule a person who just writes philosophy, ignoring his family and friends, and who even forgets eating.

All our duties are free actions, while freedom, Meier explains, is a capacity to desire something that we represent distinctly as good and to avoid something that we represent distinctly as bad. Thus, we are obligated to desire an object we should reach, but also to represent it in as perfect a manner as possible. This means that we have two further obligations concerning honour. Firstly, we should desire honour as strongly as possible – although not too much, since it is not our highest duty. Secondly, we are obligated to determine our desire for honour with the most perfect cognition of honour. In other words, we should represent honour as clearly, correctly, certainly and vividly as is possible for us.

Now, clarity of cognition, Meier says, depends on our attention. Therefore we are obligated to turn our attention towards honour and to represent it as vividly, distinctly and completely as befits the honour and as other duties requiring our attention allow. Meier notes some consequences this duty implies. Firstly, he begins, we are obligated to not concentrate our attention too much on honour, since honour should not be our only nor the greatest object of our attention. Secondly, we should take care that attention toward honour will not prevent us engaging with more important matters, such as religion and our inner perfections. Particularly, Meier thinks, we should remember to take care of our imperfections.

A further consequence Meier notes is that we should care for different kinds of honour only insofar as they deserve. This means that we should mostly look for being honoured by God. We are also, Meier continues, obligated to pay more often and stronger attention to more useful types of honour. Since he thinks that future honour we are just hoping for is the most useful in comparison with current honour or honour we have already enjoyed, we should especially strive for the honour after death.

When we desire honour, Meier says, we are obligated to represent honour as correctly as possible and to avoid all errors in evaluating it, since these errors might turn our road toward honour sinful. Thus, we are obligated not to confuse apparent honour with true honour. Furthermore, we are obligated not to think of the honour we possess or hope for as being greater than it actually is. Then again, since we cannot have correct mathematical cognition of the quantity of our honour, we should be modest in ascribing honour to ourselves. Because most people are not capable of honouring us correctly, we should particularly avoid the error of evaluating our honour according to the number of people who honour or even just flatter us.

A further consequence of our obligation to represent honour correctly, Meier insists, is that we should not ascribe to our honour more or less worth than it has the right to. Thus, we should value every kind of honour according to its merits, for instance, taking honour given by God as the highest possible. In addition, we should be aware that honour varies from time to time. Indeed, we are obligated to think of honour as a good that is not completely in our control.

We should not ascribe to ourselves honour in general or some kind of it, before we are convinced of it with certainty or at least with high probability. Now, Meier thinks that only our being honoured by God can be known by full, demonstrative certainty. In all other cases, we must then always fear that we are not honoured. Meier sees this fear as a positive thing, because it makes us serve the world more. Then again, Meier says, not every kind of honour needs to be as strongly convinced of as others. We should especially try to convince ourselves of higher kinds, thus, we should be more convinced of being honoured for virtue than of being honoured for external matters, like beauty. In addition, we are obligated to be more certain of our future than of our past or current honour and most certain of our honour after our death.

We are also obligated to know our honour as vividly as possible, that is, we have to feel its goodness and enjoy or be satisfied about it. Meier thinks that the most difficult thing regarding this duty is to keep the enjoyment in its proper limits, not too strong and not too weak. Just like with certainty, enjoyment of honour should always be proportional to the kind of honour, for instance, satisfaction from future honour should be stronger than satisfaction from past or present honour.

Vivid cognition of honour leads to desiring it, which leads to making it the goal of our actions. Thus, Meier concludes, we are obligated to make the honour a goal of our actions, as much as it is possible. We should avoid not taking honour at all or only very little as our goal, like some scholars who either disdain honour or want it only for the sake of providing economic benefits for them. Then again, we should also not take it as our only or highest goal. Our primary goal, Meier says, should be the glory of God and religion, and after these, the general good of the whole world. Next on the proper hierarchy of goals is our own happiness and well-being of other people and especially those in our own country. Only at this point comes the place of the honour, which means, Meier notes, that the honour should also be taken as a means for serving God, the world, humankind, the country and ourselves. Furthermore, lower kinds of honour should serve the goal of reaching higher kinds of honour.

Our goals are motives for our actions, in other words, we should take honour as a motive for our actions. Just like with goals, Meier suggests that we should refrain from not taking the honour as a motive at all or taking it only as a minuscule motive, but also not take it as a too strong motive. In addition, we are obligated to take honour as a motive of our actions in as perfect a manner as possible, which requires knowing it as clearly, correctly, certainly and vividly as possible. We should also, Meier continues, make the best kinds of honour stronger motives of our actions than worse kinds. As it should be obvious by now, Meier thinks that the honour given by God should be our highest motive, future honour should be a higher motive than past or present honour, and honour for the sake of virtue and science should be a higher motive than honour for the sake of external perfections.

All previous duties lead us to desire honour, thus, Meier concludes, we are obligated to desire honour. This means that we are obligated to desire honour in its most perfect form. In other words, the perfection we try to reach should be worthy and excellent, but we should also strive for this perfection in a perfect manner. This perfection of desire is generated, Meier thinks, when we see it is a consequence of best possible cognitions. Thus, we are obligated to desire honour according to the best possible cognition. In other words, our desire for honour should be determined through strictest mathematical cognition of honour. Hence, we are obligated to not desire honour more strongly or weakly than it is worth. If we desire it too strongly, we ignore God, ourselves and other people, but if we desire it too weakly, we do not reach the honour our perfections would deserve.

Meier thinks that we should desire honour in proportion to different kinds of honour. Thus, we are obligated to desire future honour stronger than current honour. This implies, Meier says, that flattery should be distrusted at all costs: completely reasonable people would honour each other silently – or at least use only as much words as the case necessitated. Further consequences Meier lists are that we are obligated to desire honour for the sake of virtue and truth more than other kinds of honour and that we are obligated to desire honour given by God more than honour given by humans. He also suggests that it is probable that beyond humans there are higher and more excellent happy spirits that we will come to know after our death and that we are therefore obligated to strongly desire honour given by these spirits.

In addition to true honour, Meier insists, we should not desire any other honour, because it is a sin to desire apparent honour. More specifically, pretentious honour must be completely despised, while erroneous honour is in some sense good, but we should not just cause it. In addition, Meier continues, we are obligated to desire only such honour that we are justified to believe that we will receive, because we shouldn’t hope for something we cannot achieve. Finally, we are obligated to desire honour only for such perfections that we know we are capable of possessing, or otherwise we would desire apparent honour.

All desires can arise from obscure, confused or distinct concepts. Meier thinks that all these kinds of concepts should be involved in our desire for honour. Desire for honour arising from obscure concepts Meier calls a natural drive to honour. This natural drive is very strong, and according to Meier, it should not be weakened, because nature should usually be followed: although natural drives are most imperfect of the types of desire, they are still very useful to us humans, since they are stronger than desires generated by clear and distinct concepts. If nature has not implanted a drive for honour in us, we should try to awaken it. Meier says that this is difficult, but can be done if we just often think clear, distinct and vivid concepts of honour: they will eventually sink into our mind as vivid and obscure concepts.

When the drive to honour has awakened, Meier continues, we are obligated to strengthen it. Yet, he warns the reader, we should not desire honour not merely through this natural drive, because we are obligated to to desire it according to our best knowledge. Indeed, Meier emphasised, it is vitally important to link our natural drive only to true honour, because obscure concepts often lead to error. We are obligated to use this drive especially to desire the most insignificant kinds of honour that we must desire, because these kinds would not gain anything from clarity of concepts. Then again, we are obligated to use the drive to honour to strengthen our clear and reasonable desires to the best and highest kinds of honour.

We are obligated to desire honour according to confused cognition. Like with natural drive for honour, Meier emphasises that we should not desire honour merely through confused concepts and that we should link this confused desire only to true honour, because confused concepts easily lead to error. Particularly, we should verify our confused desire for honour through correct taste or philosophical demonstration. Furthermore, Meier continues, we should especially desire confusedly such kinds of honour that are too important to be desired with obscure concepts, but not important enough to be desired with distinct cognition. Finally, we use the confused desire to strengthen the reasonable desire for the best kinds of honour.

If our confused cognition, from which sensuous desires are generated, is very strong, Meier explains, this generates a pleasant affection called joy. In the case of honour Meier calls this joy the love of honour. Thus, we are obligated to love honour and we should not weaken this affection: like natural drives, Meier insists, affections are a gift of nature, which will not lead us astray, if we just link them to true honour. We are obligated to enjoy past, present and future honour, and of these, the hope of future honour should be the greatest. In other words, we should hope for honour more strongly than enjoy any honour. Meier notes that it is ridiculous to enjoy current honour, if it is not weakened by concern for our imperfections, and too strong enjoyment of past honour is as ridiculous as when a nobleman who has no other current merits, but keeping the countryside clear of foxes reminisces of his past actions.

Finally, Meier says, we are obligated to desire honour through our freedom or through distinct concepts. Best kinds of honour should be desired reasonably: these include, as always, honour given by God, honour beyond death and honour for the sake of virtue and truth. In Meier’s opinion, the reasonable desire for honour must be the guide and leader of all other desires for honour. Since drive to honour and love of honour must follow the reasonable desire for honour, we must weaken our drive and love for apparent honour.

Mere desire for honour is not enough for reaching honour, Meier says, since honour is an external good requiring numerous actions, which use even the body as a tool. Thus, we are obligated to do all such external actions, without which the honour cannot be reached. In other words, we are obligated to act according to our desire for honour – of course, it should not be our only or greatest task. Furthermore, Meier adds, we are obligated to direct our whole external condition in such a manner that it corresponds in the best way possible with the measure of our honour, because correspondence of everything in us makes us more perfect and because we are obligated to show our honour to the whole world.

We are obligated to grow in honour, Meier thinks. This implies, firstly, that we should not reach for new levels of honour, before the earlier ones are firmly in our possession. Furthermore, we should particularly take care that our honour does not end before our life. Indeed, if we too suddenly obtain a very great level of honour, we are put in a precarious position where the growth of our honour becomes impossible or at least very difficult. Thus, we should not desire nor accept too sudden a swelling of honour, such as the wunderkinds often have.

Meier notes that it is a common weakness of all humans to find faults in others. Thus, no matter how honourable and honoured we are, people will question our honour. Since we are obligated to retain our honour, we should defend it against all opposition. This means, firstly, that we should defend our good name against all attacks with all the means allowed by natural and civil right, because such civil honour is one condition of internal honour. We should also defend our internal honour directly, and the best means for this is to ignore all the attacks and just act toward the eyes of the world in such a manner that proves we deserve honour. Yet, Meier admits, the best means requires time, and sometimes we need to act more quickly. In such situations, we can use words, but even then we should avoid any boasting and give the appearance that we are unwilling to speak of our perfections. Two false means for saving honour are to be avoided, Meier cautions the reader. Firstly, we should nor insult our despisers, because then we would try to retain honour through sin, and secondly, we should avoid duels and court proceedings, since no one cannot be forced to honour us.

If duties contradict one another, the lesser obligation should be discarded. Since obligation to honour is not our highest duty, Meier argues, we should ignore it, if it contradicts a higher obligation: for instance, we are to discard honour, if we are despised because of piety, virtue or duties toward our soul or homeland. Similarly, if different kinds of honour contradict one another, we are obligated to ignore lower kinds, e.g. we should ignore honour given by humans if it would prevent us being honoured by God.

Meier notes that it is a common conceit that we ascribe to ourselves perfections that are not due to us. This can happen also with honour, since it depends on us only partially. We should especially, Meier insists, recognise that we have not merely through ourselves created our honour, but honour, like all good, is also dependent on God, who has given us perfections and maintains them. Indeed, he concludes, honour should be seen as a gift from God. Furthermore, we should also be thankful of people who honour us, since without them we would not have honour.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Conflicting duties

After duties toward oneself and God, Crusius comes to what could be called the essence of natural law, that is, the duties toward other human beings. In effect, this section brings forward completely new facts about humans - they live in societies, because they can benefit from one another, because they feel attachment and love to one another and because they generate further human beings. Yet, in a sense this realm of natural law in the strict sense is grounded on realms of ethics and natural theology. Firstly, according to Crusius, accomplishing duties toward other people presupposes that one has already perfected oneself, as ethics demands. Secondly, and even more importantly, both the need for other humans and the duties toward them are based on the will of God, which humans are supposed to obey. In other words, Crusius notes, we are obligated to love God, because he loves us, and since God wants humans to live in a community, we are obligated to do that and help one another. As it should be clear by now, Crusius doesn’t think we should expect any earthly happiness from doing our duties, and indeed, he insists that good and security of the community is always more important than our own happiness.

The central role of divinity in Crusius’ account is a clear move against the suggestion of Wolffians that atheists could form a rational society. Crusius admits that one could construct a discipline based merely on the idea of a human community, which would then describe means by which human beings in such a community could live well. Yet, such a discipline would lack the power to oblige anyone to follow its rules, Crusius insists, which is then provided by the assumption of God’s existence. Furthermore, he adds, the aid of God and his judgement is required, when convincing people who cannot follow complex chains of reasoning.

Crusius admitted that although in principle all of natural law could be deduced, God has also given a faculty for discerning answers to questions concerning it, for the sake of people who are untrained in reasoning - this faculty he calls conscience. Now, Crusius admits that individual conscience is fallible. Thus, he concludes, we should justify our moral sentiments with proper proofs, to remove the possibility of error.

The task of demonstrating natural law starts by finding out its principle. Crusius notes that this notion of principle has an ambiguous meaning. Firstly, when looking for this principle, one might be searching for the ultimate force which turns rules of natural law into proper laws - this, as we have seen, is the will of God. Secondly, and more pertinently, the search for a principle might look for grounds, by which natural law can be known.

The question for grounds of knowing natural law, Crusius continues, has again many possible meanings. Firstly, one might be looking for capacities which enable human being to know natural law - these capacities are, as Crusius has pointed out, reason and conscience. Secondly, and again more pertinently, one might search for the concepts, from which natural law can be deduced and especially the highest law, from which other parts of natural law can be deduced. These concepts, Crusius concludes, are human nature, its relation to God and all the relations connecting human beings to one another, while the highest law says that we humans should act toward one another in accordance with the perfection of our essence, our relationship to God and all the connections God has created between humans. This may sound like a mouthful, but Crusius adds a helpful explanation - we should be guided by an obedience and love toward God, love all humans for their own sake, be aware that natural law concerns also other humans, since they have been created for the same goals, and because of love toward other humans, join a community to advance divine purposes.

Crusius divides natural law into further parts. Firstly, there is the natural law in a yet more restricted sense - the study of how we should behave, when we assume no difference between governed and governors - civil law - study of a need to form a government and of rules of behaviour for governed and governors - and finally, law of nations - study of duties that nations have toward one another. In practice, Crusius still appears to continue with a more general study of how, for instance, duties in all areas of natural law can be divided. For instance, he notes that duties in natural law are necessary or contingent, while necessary duties are either absolutely or hypothetically necessary.

If we go through some important divisions Crusius notes, firstly, he states that some duties in law of nature are based on the obligated person loving someone, while others are based more on communal nature of human beings. The first type of duties do not require reciprocity, while the other type demands that both persons help one another. Another important division concerns whether duties are negative or positive. First type consists of duties telling us not to do what goes against God’s purposes, while second type consists of duties telling us to do what God’s purposes demand.

Crusius notes that the object of duties can also vary. Some duties we are meant to do toward certain individual persons, while other duties are directed indeterminately toward all humanity and still third type consists of duties toward parts of whole humanity, such as our own nation. Crusius notes that the latter two types divide into positive duties that are meant to help all humanity and to negative duties where we are meant to avoid making the accomplishment of human goals impossible.

In addition to duties, Crusius for the first time notices also rights. Similarly to duties, Crusius divides rights to negative and positive rights. We have a negative right for something when no law nor a condition validated by law determines or restricts our actions concerning it, barring laws that restrict all actions. That is, if there’s nothing to restrict us from eating an apple - for instance, no one else owns it - we have a negative right to eat it. Positive rights, on the other hand, are such that are generated by laws or conditions validated by laws, such as contracts - for instance, we have a positive right to eat an apple we definitely own. Some positive rights are based on civil laws, while others are based even on natural law. For instance, many duties prescribed in natural law can also be regarded as positive rights, Crusius notes - we are obligated to keep ourselves healthy, but it is also our right to do so.

Crusius notes that both duties and rights can be internally or externally obligated. By an internally obligated duty Crusius means a duty that has its justifying ground in the matter itself, for instance, when we are obligated to follow a rule that is reasonable. Externally obligated duty, on the other hand, is to be done for other reasons than for the inherent nature of the action, for instance, when we are obligated to follow a decree of a king in order to retain the stability of community. Internally obligated right, on the other hand, has a justifying ground, which might be such that is not known, while externally obligated right seems like a right, although it might have no justifying ground - clearly, one can also have rights that are both internally and externally obligated.

Crusius notes that while a person might have an internal right for something, another person might not be internally obligated to respect that right, firstly, because the other person might not know the relevant circumstances justifying that right, and secondly, because it might not be determined who exactly is bound to satisfy that right (for instance, when a person has a right to expect the community to provide her livelihood, but no particular citizen is tasked to take care of that). Similarly, Crusius continues, a person might be internally obligated to do something for another person, although this other person would have no internal right to expect this, since God can in certain conditions demand that we do such things. Furthermore, although a person would have an external obligation to do something for another, this other person might have no internal right for this - for instance, when the first person has signed a contract that would make her lose all her belongings, the other person has no true right to ask for this. What can be said, according to Crusius, at least generally, is that externally valid right corresponds to an externally obligated duty, that is, we are bound to generally respect what seems like a right. Of course, Crusius notes, a mere external right is never a true right in the eyes of God, no matter what all humans think.

Now, it might seem like all these various duties and rights might sometimes contradict one another. True, Crusius admits, duties and rights are connected to some goals, and actions striving toward different goals can hinder one another. Yet, this does not mean that statements describing our various duties and rights would ever contradict one another - and since they are based on God’s decrees, Crusius insists, they can’t. What happens in such a case of collisions is that our finite minds forget that divine laws can be infinitely multilayered and describe various exceptions when certain rules of conduct do not hold.

Thus, in case of such a collision, Crusius concludes, we should try to determine which of the duties and rights is to be respected most in these particular conditions - for instance, if we know one duty to be absolutely necessary and the other just in certain conditions necessary, then we must follow the absolutely necessary duty. What we shouldn’t do is to just accept the opinion of majority in all cases.

In case of conflicting duties in particular, Crusius notes the importance of distinguishing objective from subjective duties. By an objective duty Crusius means a duty that is meant generally for all humanity, but not specifying who or in what conditions is to fulfil it. A subjective duty, on the other hand, is specifically meant to be fulfilled by a certain individual in certain conditions. If of two colliding duties one is objective and the other is subjective, Crusius concludes, the subjective duty must always be preferred, since we can always assume someone else will fulfill the objective duty.

If both duties are either subjective or objective, Crusius suggests several possibilities to choose between them - for instance, if one duty is more certain, then we should follow it. An important dividing line for Crusius is the goal that a duty has - for instance, a duty to make humans more virtuous means more than a duty to make them happy. If no other ground for choice can be found, then one must look for the quantitative extensiveness of what is achieved by the duties.

A peculiar case Crusius considers happens when we have a single duty to fulfill, but we are uncertain which person should be its target. Crusius suggests we should usually choose the more virtuous or at least the more useful person. The exception is the case when the other person is in danger of dying and needs our instant care.

Crusius notes that usually, when we have a determined duty colliding with someone’s right, then the duty must prevail. Crusius notes that this duty must be based on something more than mere another right, since then we are actually dealing with a collision between rights. Furthermore, he notes as exceptions cases where, firstly, upholding the duty would break a number of humanly important rights, and secondly, when the goods gained by upholding the duty are not incomparably small in comparison with goods lost by breaking the right.

Finally, Crusius considers the cases, where rights collide with other rights. He notes that positive rights are weightier than negative rights. If many persons have a positive right to the same thing, then the thing in question should be divided, if it is possible, and if not, then give the right to the person who first claimed it. If all the colliding rights are just negative, then actually all human beings would have the same right to the thing, and since anything cannot be divided between all humans, Crusius argues, the first one to put their claim on the thing should have the right for it. Finally, Crusius notes that even if technically we would have a right for something, in order to maintain good relations to others it is often best to cancel our own claim to have a right.

So much for the general part of natural law, next I’ll be tackling the most general duties and rights in it.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Goal of human life

After a theoretical study of will and basic drives affecting it, Crucius turns his interest toward practical philosophy or morals, that is, the study of how will should be used. Wolffian systems of philosophy often included a discipline of general practical philosophy, which was meant to serve as a basis for all practical philosophy. Crucius admits that such a discipline exists, in a sense, but because of its abstract nature it should be merely included within more concrete practical disciplines.

The basic topic of morals - how will should be used - comprises actually two different, although related questions, Crucius continues. Firstly, there is the question of how human being can make herself happy. This question is dealt with a discipline quite unique to Crucius’ system - a study of happiness. It goes beyond mere question of obligations, because although Crusius admits that we are in a sense obligated to become happy and perfect ourselves, the study of happiness is more about finding the most advantageous means for happiness.

Human happiness involves satisfaction of basic human desires. Now, Crucius says, since one of these basic drives is a drive for good conscience, happiness involves also trying to follow the demands of conscience. Indeed, he adds, one might say that these demands are designed to make humans happy. The demands underlie the second question of morals: what should human beings do, in other words, what duties humans have?

Crucius notes that the demands of conscience - duties or moral laws - assume the existence of a lawgiver, who has decreed these laws. Our obligation to follow these laws, Crucius says, is not caused by the lawgiver forcing us to do something. Instead, the obligation is generated by all the goods the lawgiver or God gives to us - indeed, even the duties themselves are such goods. If a human being subjects his own will to divine will and follows the divine laws, Crucius concludes, he will be virtuous, and because of that, happy.

The sum of these divine laws, or natural law, forms the second major part of morals for Crucius. It divides into further disciplines according to the object of the duties: natural theology deals with human duties toward God, natural law in a more limited sense deals with human duties toward one another and ethics duties toward oneself. Crucius adds that humans also have duties toward animals and even inanimate objects, but these ares so few that the don’t warrant their own discipline. He also adds that we should start from ethics, because we must first perfect our own capacities, before we are able to fulfill other duties.

The aim of ethics is then to perfect human beings, and in order to know how to do it, Crucius says that we must first know the goal God has given to humanity. Before going into that, Crucius notes that God, as the wisest and most perfect being, must have created the whole world for some reason, which is also evident, he continues, from the wise organisation of the parts and whole of the world. The goal that God has envisioned for the whole world, Crucius emphasises, must be that the world can be known and enjoyed rationally. Then again, human beings appear to be only such rational beings, while animals and plants exist only for the sake of human cultivation.

Why God then had to create the world at all, when he could just have thought about it? Crucius’ answer is that God’s goal in creation must involve free actions, which make the fate of the world unpredictable. Furthermore, since God appears to have made humans social, these actions are probably united efforts of many humans. God wants that these actions are virtuous, so that he could reward humans. Then again, it depends on the human choices whether all of them can be rewarded or whether some of them must be punished.

What then, finally, is the goal of humanity or the reward God is willing to give to virtuous people? Crucius notes that this goal cannot be just knowledge, because cognitive is in his system just means for volition. Then again, although Crucius admits that humans have right to use goods of the world, none of them can really satisfy humans. Indeed, because humans have unlimited desires, true reward could only be endless life in another world. Crucius notes that such a moral proof of human immortality is its only possible proof, because all theoretical proofs of immortality fall short of convincing everyone - for example, simplicity of human soul does not mean its immortality, because animals also have simple souls without being immortal.

What kind of behaviour is then required of humans or what it means to be virtuous? Crucius notes that, firstly, this world is not a prison for human beings. Especially body is something that soul truly requires for living in the current world. Thus, Crucius continues, we must keep this vessel in good shape for the duration of our life. Particularly we have no right to forfeit the body given to our use or commit a suicide. In addition to body, Crucius continues, we must also train our understanding. In practice, this means that we must acquire as many concepts as possible and use our understanding in diverse manners.

Since both body and understanding are mere tools for will, the perfection of will is an essential element of virtuous behaviour. Here, the important thing is to retain the freedom of human will - affections should remain mild and strong passions should be avoided, lest we become slave of our drives. Particularly, all goals should be subordinated to conscience and obedience of God, since these cannot be subordinated to anything else. Finally, Crucius points out that subordination here does not mean simply that humans would be constantly thinking about such a goal. Instead, it means, says Crucius, that we should, from time to time, check our behaviour and see whether there is something to fix.

Christian Wolff: Reasonable thoughts of human acting and letting others act upon you - Do your duties

No modern system of ethics would be complete without a discussion of duties. Indeed, following Kant, we would probably think that duty is what ethics is all about – after all, ethics should tell what you ought to do. At first sight Wolff's discussion of duty seems quite in line with this Kantian idea. Wolff defines duty as something that one is bound to do by some law. In ethics, the law in question is the natural law.

On a closer look, Wolff's idea differs from Kant's later theory. As the reader might remember, for Wolff, natural law commands us to do those things that any conscious person would do, if she had perfectly clear and distinct concept of what is going on. Thus, duty is not just something we ought to do, but also something that we would do, if we had correct information. Furthermore, the motivating factor for this ideal person would be the purpose of perfecting everything. Wolffian duty has then a goal external to the duty itself.

For Wolff, ”you ought to do it” can then be translated by ”you would do it, if you just understood how good it is for you”. The problem in this identification is that it sometimes appears to lead to unintuitive results. Consider for instance the choice of using your money to buy new shoes and of giving it to the beggar on the street. If a perfectly rational person would be motivated to choose former over latter, that choice would be a duty in the Wolffian sense, although the opposite choice would appear to be more virtuous. Of course, it all comes down to whether Wolff thinks a perfectly rational person would make this choice. The answer requires a look at the detailed system of duties Wolff presents.

Wolff divides all duties into three classes: duties towards oneself, duties towards God and duties towards other people. I recall that the division precedes Wolff's ethics and goes probably all the way to medieval philosophy. Remnants of the division can be found still in Kant's ethics, which differentiates between duties towards oneself and duties towards orher people. Indeed, even in Wolff duties towards God play a minor role compared with other two sorts.

Duties towards God appear to cause some problems for Wolff, because an omnipotent being should not need the help of his creations for anything. Still, Wolff could not exclude God altogether, because that would have probably been considered a blasphemy. Wolff then suggests that God and his perfections can still motivate us to do virtuous things and that these divinely motivated duties might be called duties towards God. Problem is that then all duties would be also duties towards God, as long as the motivation for them would lie in God.

Wolff's way for solving the problem begins from the assumption that a perfectly rational person would in all likelihood know about God. His knowledge of God would then necessarily induce some feelings: he would love God for all his work for human beings, he would fear making God disappointed etc. Wolff suggests that we would then have a duty for pursuing those affections, which we could call a duty towards God – somewhat strange notion as such affections appear to be involuntary and not dependent on our will. In addition to these affections – well you can always say a few prayers and thus show your faith in the wisdom and omnipotence of God.

With the divinely inspired duties taken care of with few words of devotion, the Wolffian moral agent still has to tackle with duties toward himself and other persons. Personally, I've always found the class of duties toward oneself rather peculiar. This is probably because I have never understood how self-perfection could be taken as an end in itself. Surely it is moral to develop your skills for helping others, but it seems peculiar that mere developing skills in itself would be morally upright. Hegel had the intruiguing notion that perfecting your skills only for the sake of perfection is somewhat like sharpening your sword just for the sake of admiring it: it undoubtedly looks prettier, but isn't it a bit useless?

Wolff's ideas of duties towards oneself contain the further problem that they don't clash well with his ideas of the relationship between soul and body. Wolffian duties towards soul are rather straightforward. One should strengthen one's will through ethical reasoning and fables and one's reason through reading works of Wolff. (By the way, Wolff pronounces the publication of text books as his moral duty. No doubt the profits he gained from them must have been God's way of thanking Wolff for his dutyful life.).

It is the duties towards body that appear more problematic. As one might remember, body is in Wolffian scheme just a physical thing that is constantly in contact with the soul, which is the true personality of human being. Still, Wolff can earnestly say that soul must take care of its body, although body is not even itself conscious of anything. True, the fates of the body and the soul are connected and the soul feels everything that happens to the body, so that the soul would be in pain, if something bad happened to its body. Yet, this connection is only temporary and one might think it could be broken, if the body became too ill – but no, Wolff denies the right of suicide, apparently for no other reason but that the soul must show its dedicated perseverance by making the body to live as long as it can. Somewhat inconsistently, the soul must bear through all the hardships the body goes through, but the soul must still see to it that the body gets what it needs, i.e. that it is fed and clothed.

Although Wolff admits that eating well and clothing yourself warmly are moral duties, thus proving that your parents were right, he is fortunately not as interested of external glory. Glory and honour depend on what other people think of you and it is enough if you act as if you were worthy of glory, no matter what others think of you. Then again, dishonourable life deserves to be ridiculed. Indeed, Wolff makes the historically interesting remark that disease is usually no reason for shame, but if your nose drops due to illicit sexual behavior, that's your own fault (the slow detoriation of the nasal tissue is one possible symptom of syphilis disease, but Wolff's remark appears to be pointed at ”fornication with pictures of women” or masturbation, which was at that time suspected as one possible cause for the symptoms of syphilis).

One might expect that the apparent self-centredness of Wolff's morality would be mitigated when he comes to duties towards other people. Wolff even starts in a promising tone by declaring that one should do to others exactly what one ought to do for oneself. Yet, there is a twist. Apparently the highest point of perfection is independence, which makes a sort of sense in the Wolffian world view, where every soul already is a closed totality with not true connection with the external world: a soul perfects itself, when it appears to be what it truly is, that is, independent of anything else. Now, helping others in their need would constitute a breach of their independency and would thus take away from their perfection. Hence, Wolff advises that one should help others only when what they require is beyond their own skills and powers. Most of the duties towards others are then merely negative: one should not e.g. cheat others.

If we then come back to our original problem of a person wondering whether he should spend his money to new shoes or whether he should give it to a beggar, Wolff would in most likelihood suggest that we should somehow calculate whether helping the beggar is really worth more than new shoes. Yet, the requirement for independence would in most cases make the scales turn in favour of the shoes. This sounds dangerously close to a person who would not give anything to charity, because the poor are just too lazy to make themselves rich.

To be fair, Wolff is describing morality without any connection to a society or a commonwealth. It will be the task of Wolff's political works to describe societies in more detail, and we shall later see whether Wolff can find a place for solidarity and team spirit. But first, a slight detour to a student of Wolff.