Christian Wolff: Natural right 7 – Who inherits whom

After discussing the relation of children to their parents, Wolff moves on to discuss questions of inheriting a deceased person. Starting with the general notion, he explains that no matter why a person would become an heir to a deceased person, they still have to accept the inheritance, either by explicitly declaring it or by implicitly acting in a manner that makes it obvious that they are the heir. Of course, the would-be-heir has also the right to renounce the inheritance.

After accepting inheritance, the heirs receive all the property of the deceased, together with all the rights and duties related, except rights and duties tied to the deceased personally. This means, Wolff notes, that the heirs must use the assets inherited to pay all the debts of the deceased, but if these are not enough to cover the debts, the heirs are not obligated to add anything from their other assets. Still, the heirs are obligated to make in front of witnesses a precise inventory of all the assets of the deceased, in order to show all the debtors how much they can expect to get.

Who then gets to be an heir? An obvious choice, Wolff states, are the children of dead parents, both legitimate and illegitimate. In this case, the inheritance is to be divided up among the children, except if some, but not all of them have already reached adulthood, in which case the minors should get a larger share, in order to sustain their education. The same principle applies, Wolff thinks, with grandparents with no living children, but with living grandchildren, because everyone has an obligation to take care of any of their descendants in a direct line.

If a person dies childless, the next best thing is then to make the parents the heirs, since a child should take care of their parents also. On the other hand, Wolff underlines, there is no special obligation to transfer property to relatives not in the direct line of the deceased, such as siblings or cousins, although in practice one often does feel the need to leave something to them after one’s death.

The right of a child to inherit their parents and the right of a parent to inherit their childless children are based on the natural law, Wolff insists, and therefore inalienable in principle. He does admit the possibility of disinheriting such natural heirs, if the would-be-heirs have lived an immoral life or have acted against their duties toward the deceased person.

Wolff notes that a person may create a testament, that is, an express declaration concerning the transfer of the ownership of their property after their death. Such a testament, he adds, might also contain statements of other things to be done after the testator’s death, say, about the burial of their body. The suggested transfer of property needs to be accepted by the declared heirs only after the death of the testator, Wolff points out, so that they need not be informed about the content of the testament before this happens. Obviously, although a testament has already been made, the testator can always make a new one replacing the older versions.

Testaments are clearly allowed, if the testator has no natural heirs or if these have been disinherited, but what if the testator has e.g. children who are not disinherited? Wolff states that if parents can help others in their needs without neglecting their children, they are allowed to do so by the natural law. Thus, a testator can make provision even for people other than natural heirs in their testament. Wolff especially mentions legacies, that is, specific items or fixed sums of money, dedicated to certain persons in the testament.

According to Wolff, in addition to recounting who should inherit the property, the testator should also include in the testament an indication if some natural heir is to be disinherited. Furthermore, he adds, the testament should state the reason why someone has been disinherited, so that the disinherited person can, if they want, contest the validity of the reason. Even if the reason holds, the heirs can admit a right to the inheritance even to the disinherited person, but the testament remains in this case otherwise valid.

Even if a natural heir has not been mentioned in the testament – say, if they have been born after the testament has been made – Wolff thinks that they should be admitted to the inheritance along with other heirs. Otherwise, the testament remains valid, except if the funds of the deceased are then insufficient e.g. to account for all the appointed legacies.

What should the testament be like? Wolff states that any form is acceptable, as long as it can be established that it has been the will of the deceased. Thus, the testator can just declare their will in the presence of witnesses, but they can also write a document or sign one written by someone else. If a written document is used and it contains signatures of witnesses, these witnesses need not know the specific content of the testament, just that it has been the will of the testator.

If a person dies intestate – that is, without having made a testament – Wolff advises not presuming that the person would have wanted their assets to remain ownerless. Thus, he argues, we must presume what the will of the deceased was, working, as it were, on the basis of a tacit testament. Of course, the first available option is to give the inheritance to the children of the deceased or their descendants, and if such do not exist, to the parents of the deceased or their ancestors. If there is no heir in the direct line, Wolff continues, more and more remote relatives are to be tried. If all else fails, he concludes, at least in the state of nature the inheritance should go to anyone taking the assets into their possession.

Like with any contract, Wolff states, testaments may include all kinds of conditions for the receiving of inheritance or legacy. He points out that when waiting for the condition to fulfill, other heirs may use the assets in question, and if it is certain that the condition will never be fulfilled, all the inheritance should go to the other heirs. Wolff also notes some possible conditions of inheritance in a testament:

• A parent may appoint a successor to an underage or mentally insane child, so that if the child dies before reaching adulthood or being cured, the inheritance meant for the child goes to the successor
• The testator may bequest what Wolff calls fideicommissum, where the inherited property or a part of it is to be eventually returned to another person (e.g. to someone within the family of the testator).

Wolff ends the chapter with the question how inheritance affects a married couple. He begins by noting that if one spouse dies before the other, the remaining spouse is not automatically on the list of heirs. Of course, Wolff adds, if the surviving spouse has insufficient funds for a pleasant life, the to-be-deceased spouse should leave something to their spouse as a token of their love. This something could be a share in the whole inheritance, but if this is impossible, Wolff advises giving at least a legacy or fideicommissum.

Christian Wolff: Natural right 7 – Parental relations

After discussing marital relations, Wolff moves on to the question of kinship. Since he mainly provides definitions for great-great-great-grandmothers, nephews, stepfathers and like, we can be quick about this chapter. The rare interesting tidbits include Wolff’s off-hand remark that the line of ancestors of every human has no end and an idea that married people share relatives, because they have become one person – indeed, he insists, this is true even of people who have had intercourse with one another. He also notes that even illegitimate children belong to the families of people who have conceived them.

Wolff next moves on to the question of paternal society, that is, society contracted between parents and their children. Actually, he corrects himself, paternal society is a quasi contract, because children are not in a position to do proper contracts. In other words, Wolff explains, parents are obligated, as if by a contract, to raise their children up, while the children are obligated to do everything they can to make this raising up possible.

What this quasi contract implies, Wolff continues, is that parents are obligated to preserve their children and to make them capable of providing for themselves in matters necessary for their own preservation. Thus, he argues, parents do not have the right to kill their children, but they should take care of the life, health, and integrity of their children's bodies. In addition, parents should provide the children with healthy food and clothing suitable for protecting the body against the ravages of the elements. Furthermore, the children should be encouraged to exercise their power of locomotion in a manner suitable to their age.

Building up the mental capacities of children in an age-appropriate fashion is, Wolff thinks, an important part of the duties of parents. In a summarised fashion, he notes that the newborn child should first be taught to speak and understand speech. Then, at early childhood, the use of higher faculties should be slowly exercised, starting with instilling clear, although probably very confused notions of familiar things and progressing toward a capacity of making notions more distinct. An important part in this development is taking precautions against erroneous and superstitious notions and building a custom of not agreeing with anything without any reason. Finally, in youth, the capacities of judgement and reason should be strengthened. A child becomes an adult, when they have a sufficient capacity of judgement so that they are able to live on their own.

In addition to cognitive skills, Wolff emphasises the need to improve the moral virtues of children so that they would be eventually capable of living their lives according to the natural law. As long as they are still ignorant of what natural law entails, he adds, parents should command what they ought and ought not to do. Indeed, Wolff states, children should not be allowed to do anything without their orders or without the presence and counsel of the parents. This means, he explains, that parents have an authority to determine the actions of their children, as long as they are incapable of doing so, while the children are then obliged to shape their actions according to the will of their parents. This authority changes with the growth of the child, so that the younger the child is, the more responsible about their actions the parents are.

Parental authority entails, in Wolff’s opinion, that disobedience of parents is not allowed: children are to follow what their parents say, not their own feelings or suggestions of others. Parents are even obligated to make their children obedient, and if necessary, use punishments and rewards as motivation for obedience. Then again, Wolff adds, parents cannot command their children to do anything against natural law, and if they do so, the children are in no way obligated to follow such commands: if they happen to do so and they are not yet capable of understanding the natural law, the fault lies not in the children, but in the parents.

Wolff underlines that parental authority belongs to both parents, not just to the father. This means, he explains, that any commands parents set for their children must be mutually consented to by both the mother and the father. The inevitable question is what to do if the will of the mother and the father conflict with one another. Wolff recognises that sometimes the marriage contract might contain a clause that specifically states what is to be done in such conflict situations, but otherwise the parents just have to follow the general guidelines given for the parity of votes in decisions of societies.

Although parental authority involves the right to punish the child for disobedience, in Wolff’s opinion, there are also limits to this right. Obviously, punishing a child for disobeying an illicit command is not allowed. Furthermore, Wolff adds, killing or torturing children or inflicting damage on their body or health is not permitted. He also suggests that punishment should not be executed, if there is any hope of amendment without it, and lighter punishments should be preferred, if it is enough for moral improvement.

Moral upbringing needs more than punishments, and Wolff emphasises the importance of setting a good example. Indeed, he even states that children have a right to demand from the parents that they behave in a morally proper manner. Actually this right extends to all human beings, so that anyone should take care of what they do in front of children. Similarly, parents should take care that their children do not associate with ill-mannered people.

Wolff thinks that the natural law is not just about duties, but following it is the surest way to happiness. Thus, it is very understandable that he would think it is the duty of parents to make their children happy and to derive pleasure from their happiness. Indeed, Wolff says, parents should love their children like themselves, so that they will prefer children over any strangers.

Wolff sees frugality and diligence as important virtues all children should learn. This does not mean that children should be overburdened with labour, since this is against the law of nature. Still, Wolff underlines, parents should accustom their children to such work that they are capable of, and in fact, direct them to a career where they will be most useful to other human beings. This means, firstly, that the parents can demand their children to help them in domestic chores, since as members of the familial society they are obligated to help it. Furthermore, Wolff adds, the parents can also command their children to help them in their own professions, because such a work teaches the children valuable skills for later life (Wolff’s old-fashioned examples include a boy helping his father in a workshop and a girl helping her laundress mother to wash clothes). Still, he notes, this work should not prevent children from studying and it should definitely not set their future career in stone, if they have skills for other things.

Parents should, according to Wolff, not just provide basic skills required for adult life, but to the best of their abilities, strive to ensure that their children will have all that they need for a pleasant and comfortable life, such as wealth, friendships and good reputation. This means also, he adds, that they should provide securities in case that they would die before the upbringing of the children has finished.

Parents are in an optimal situation the greatest benefactors of their children, which implies, Wolff thinks, that the children should love and honour their parents and strive to return the favour to them, when the opportunity arises. Indeed, he insists, children should aim to please their parents, even during their adulthood, and with the exception of their spouse and their own children, they should prefer the well-being of their parents over other people. In other words, children are obliged to provide support for a comfortable and pleasant life to their elderly parents, unless they are equally impoverished or can barely support their own family.

Children are usually incapable of managing any property that they obtain, for instance, as inheritance. Thus, Wolff notes it is the duty of the parents to manage it, but they do not own it and cannot even use profits arising from it, except insofar as these are used for the upbringing of the child owning it. Parents also are not allowed to sell or give away such a property, unless this is done for the benefit of the children. When a child has grown up, the parents are obligated to give the property for the child to manage. Before that, the children are not allowed to do anything themselves with that property and they are not allowed to enter into any contracts regarding it: if they do, the parents have a right to rescind such contracts, especially if these contracts are harmful to the children.

Children may also receive some things for their use from their parents, Wolff continues, but such things usually remain the property of the parents. The case is different, if the parents explicitly donate such things to their children, he adds, but notes instantly that even then the children cannot sell or give away these things before adulthood.

The end of parental authority, Wolff states, is the moment of emancipation, where the children have been raised to a state where they can provide for themselves and determine their actions in accordance with the natural law. He notes that marriage provides a particular point of emancipation, while death of just one parent does not, because the parental authority still resides in the other parent.

Wolff moves on to discuss adoption, where a child of someone else is assumed as a child of one’s own: if the child in question is already an adult, it is called arrogation, while adoption in the proper sense concerns children still under parental authority. Somewhat peculiarly, Wolff thinks it quite possible that only one person of a married couple adopts a child, so that the adopted child then becomes the stepchild of the other spouse. In any case, he notes, the adopted child is juridically considered a part of the adopters family, giving especially men with no sons the opportunity to find someone to continue their family name (we can clearly see Wolff taking his historical context for granted).

Even if a child is adopted, Wolff states, the natural parents still have a responsibility to ensure that the child is raised properly, because this is determined by the natural law. Still, this does not mean that adoption would be illicit, he adds, since the parents have a right to let someone else to fulfill their duties (then again, merely raising a child of another does not mean adoption). Children, on the other hand, cannot hand themselves over to adoption, if they still live under parental authority. With arrogation this is possible, since then the adopted person is already an adult and responsible for themselves, although Wolff advises not doing it without the consent of the parents, since even adult children should not displease their parents.

A certain kind of adoption Wolff considers is called unione prolium, where people entering a new marriage agree that their children from their previous marriages are to be considered as children of both (again, this involves more than just spouses agreeing to raise the children of both together). Wolff considers in detail the economic consequences of such a contract: for instance, if the children have their own property, such as inheritance from a dead parent, the union does not affect its ownership (the property can be used for the education of the child owning it, Wolff concedes). Furthermore, he notes, if the children are adults, their will about the union should be consulted, and even if they are not adults, the union must be ratified anew when they have been emancipated or an impartial judge is to be asked to give consent on their behalf. The union can also be dissolved only with the consent of the children.

As one would expect, Wolff forbids parents to marry their children, but for a peculiar reason: a child should revere their parents, but spouses should form a one person and thus be equal. A peculiar consequence of this justification is that while marriages between an ancestor and a descendant in direct line ar illicit (because a child should revere their grandparents etc. as enabling their parents to procreate and raise them), marriage between a brother and a sister would not be against natural law.

Wolff considers the problem of parents who cannot raise their children due to, for instance, poverty, or in the most extreme case, their own death. His first instinct is to say that the task falls then to the grandparents, who have a responsibility to take care of not just their own children, but also the children of their children. Because grandparents usually die before parents, this is often not the most convenient solution. In such cases of orphaned children, Wolff states that the duty falls to other relatives. This is so, he argues, because we have a general duty to show gratitude to all our ancestors by assisting them and one form of assisting our ancestors is to assist their duty of taking care of their descendants, that is, our relatives.

In the extreme case of orphaned children without any living relatives, Wolff muses, it is open for anyone willing to take care of the orphans. Depending on the age of the child, this person will be called either tutor or curator, the difference being that a curator is responsible only for administering the property of the child, while a tutor is also responsible for raising and educating the child. Tutors take thus care of children still requiring full parental guidance, while curators are appointed to children who are more grown up, but still unable to handle their own assets. Wolff points out that curators are required also by persons, who cannot be educated anymore, but still are incapable of administering their finances, such as persons with debilitating disease. Wolff concentrates more on tutors, as duties of curators can often be easily deduced from those of a tutor.

Raising children requires money, but where is a tutor to get that money? Wolff thinks that tutors are not obliged to pay it all from their own pockets, but can use the profits derived from the capital belonging to the children or even that capital itself, if profits are not enough. If a child does not own anything, then the tutor must rely on the generosity of others. In every other measure except the financial obligations, the tutor steps in the role of a parent, so that they have parental authority over the children and also all the same duties as parents.

Wolff considers it allowed that the duties of a tutor or a curator are divided among many persons, so that e.g. one curator administers one part of the property and a second curator another part, or that one tutor is responsible for the actual education of the children, while the other just administrates their funds. In this case, he advises, it is best to appoint also one curator or tutor into a role of supervising the work of other curators or tutors.

Wolff goes in great detail into the economic side of being a tutor or a curator, such as drawing inventories of the assets of the children and making yearly accounts of all financial transactions involving it. We may skip these specifics and just note that tutors and curators are responsible for all their actions involving the assets of the children and even have to remit any damages to those assets from their own funds. If a tutor or a curator is negligent with their duties, their supervising tutor or curator can appoint another one in their stead.

The duties of a tutor end, Wolff says, when children turn into puberty, while the duties of a curator end with children becoming adults (of course, the death of the tutor or the curator or the children also ends their relationship). A tutor or a curator who has performed their duties admirably, he adds, deserves a fee, but the children cannot be forced to give one. Still, Wolff notes, tutors and curators are at least entitled to a reimbursement of any expenses they have incurred in the administration of the assets.

At this point, Wolff introduces the notion of dowry – that is, property given by a bride or someone in her stead to the husband for the expenses of married life – probably because customarily the parents provided the dowry. Wolff notes that it is the wife who actually owns the dowry and the husband has merely a right to use and profit from it. He thinks that the parents are obligated to provide dowry, if their daughter has no property of her own, but that the parents cannot be forced to provide it. Of course, Wolff adds, anyone else beyond the parents can provide the dowry for a woman, as long as it is not done with shameful intentions.

Wolff considers also a custom similar to dowry, namely, morgengabe, which the groom donates to his bride as a gift for their first sexual intercourse. He notes that such a gift is not obligatory, but allowed by natural law.

Wolff ends the chapter with a discussion of children entering a marriage. He thinks that children should not enter marriage or even betrothal without the consent of their parents, but they should first seek the counsel of them. Parents, Wolff adds, should not withhold their consent, unless the marriage would manifestly harm the happiness of their children. Still, he notes, even if children do marry without the consent of their parents, the marriage is still valid, because by marrying they have shown their adulthood.

Christian Wolff: Natural right 7 – Marriage and sexuality

The closer and closer we get to the core societal relations, the more we feel the great distance our modern culture has from the thinkers of the past. Wolff’s ideas about such intimate matters as sexuality and romantic relations are a concrete example of this feeling of disconnectedness.

Wolff begins his discussion of marriage by noting that humans are just like other animals in that they are driven by their nature to procreate. Procreation is thus something in accordance with natural law, he states. The act of procreation is pleasurable, since God has wanted to make such natural things feel good, yet, Wolff insists, we humans should engage in it only for the real end, that is, for the generation of offspring and not for the pleasure involved. Thus, he concludes, all acts directed toward sexual pleasure, without even the possibility of procreation, are against the natural law. In this way, Wolff bundles up bestiality with homosexuality, masturbation, sex acts without vaginal intercourse and pornography, seeing all of them as equal crimes against nature.

It is not enough to just conceive a child, but they need the help of others to stay alive and to grow up to a state where they can finally start to care for themselves. Wolff suggests that all animals have a natural tendency to love and care for their young. With animals, he states, this natural drive lasts until the offspring are mature enough to live by themselves, but with humans, it lasts for their whole lifetime. Again, due to the naturalness of this drive, Wolff thinks, parents are obligated to raise the children they have conceived.

Because the persons who conceived the child should also raise them, Wolff argues, the question of parentage should not be in doubt. Thus, he concludes, procreation should not be done willy-nilly, but there should be a definite society – matrimonial contract – in which the members commit themselves to the task of reproduction and raising of their offspring. Because the end of this society or the goal of marriage includes the task of procreation, Wolff insists, it should not be initiated by people incapable of this, whether this incapacity is due to age, infertility, castration, impotency, asexuality or even tightness of vagina. He also considers the case of people with both masculine and feminine traits and comes to the conclusion that if they can reproduce, they are allowed to marry, but not if they are completely infertile.

As to the number of participants in a conjugal society, Wolff quickly rules out the plurality of husbands, because it would make determining the fatherhood of a child impossible (it would be interesting to hear what Wolff would think about DNA testing). He considers the even more outlandish case where a wife is lent to another man for the sake of providing him a baby and finds this equally against the natural law.

Plurality of wives is a more tough case to crack for Wolff, because this does not involve a similar problem of recognising parenthood. He emphasises that monogamy is sufficient for propagating human species and that a large number of children born to a polygamous family is more difficult to raise up. Furthermore, Wolff suspects that the true reason for polygamy is usually not reproduction, but sexual pleasure, especially as humans in their present condition are not masters of their desires. What finally pushes the balance against polygamy, Wolff thinks, is that allowing it would inevitably lead to men having no wives, which would be against their right to procreate.

Marriage, in Wolff’s eyes, should be a society for just one man and one woman, who allow to each other, and only to each other, the use of their bodies for the sake of procreation and who promise to raise any children they conceive. Marriage contract gives then the spouses an exclusive right for intercourses with one another. Copulation is to be initiated only for the sake of procreation, Wolff underlines, and any sexual act that cannot lead to pregnancy is denied, even in marriage – somewhat gruesomely, he explicitly mentions sex with a dead wife as forbidden. Wolff insists in a very chilling manner that it is a duty to concede to intercourse with a spouse and a sin to refuse to do so.

If a married person has intercourse with anyone else but their spouse, this adulterous action injures the exclusive right of the spouse, Wolff emphasises, which makes the feeling of jealousy legitimate. He adds that it is especially damaging, if both persons having intercourse are married to others, since then there are two injured parties. Wolff admits that intentionality is a key element, so that a person having intercourse with someone they think is unmarried does not commit adultery, while a married person having intercourse with their spouse without recognising them does commit adultery.

Wolff moves on to discuss the concept of stuprum, which means intercourse with an unmarried woman who does not promiscuously have sex with different men (a virgin or a widow, as he clarifies). He differentiates between cases where the unmarried woman has voluntarily consented to the intercourse and cases where the man has violently forced the woman to have intercourse with him (essentially the latter case means rape). Both cases, Wolff adds, are blameworthy, but in the latter, the blame cannot be extended to the woman.

Quite coldly, Wolff insists that promiscuous women cannot be victim of violent stuprum or rape, since they already have indiscriminate sex with men. He does at least admit that these women cannot be blamed, if a man forces them to have sexual acts that are not geared toward reproduction.

Wolff also considers further consequences of stuprum. If a baby is born, Wolff thinks that both the man and the woman are obligated to raise the offspring. Furthermore, he adds, if the man has duped the virgin or the widow to sex with a promise of marriage, the man is obligated to marry the woman. If such a promise has not been made or the intercourse leads to no pregnancy, the man is not obligated to marry the woman.

Although Wolff at first restricted stuprum to intercourse with unmarried women, he later thinks that even forced intercourse with a married woman is to be classified as non-consensual stuprum or rape. His main point is that rape can never be the blame of the victim. Indeed, Wolff thinks that a woman has an unlimited right to defend her purity against such a violation, going even so far as killing the perpetrator, if the danger cannot be avoided otherwise. Furthermore, he adds, husband, son, father, or in fact, anyone else has an obligation to defend a woman being assaulted. If the rape has already occurred, Wolff states, the rapist can be punished violently, either by the woman herself or anyone she appoints to the task.

According to Wolff, marriage requires nothing else but a mutual declaration of the man and the wife that they will procreate and raise children together. This promise is then consummated by intercourse, Wolff adds and suggests that intercourse by itself is even sufficient for establishing marriage. Still, marriage can be preceded by engagement or betrothal, where a man and a woman agree that they will marry themselves, for instance, when a certain date has been reached. A betrothal already obligates the bride and the groom to marry themselves, but it in turn may be preceded by formal discussions about engagement, which as yet obligate them to nothing.

Wolff also ponders the problem of a person being betrothed to several persons. His main solution is that the betrothal contracted earlier is the valid one. Of course, Wolff adds, if a person hears that their betrothed has betrothed someone else, they are free to withdraw from the engagement, even if they had been the first one. Furthermore, if the later betrothed couple engages in intercourse – and in Wolff’s eyes, consummates their marriage – their marriage is valid, but they are obligated to make sufficient compensation to the injured party.

Betrothal must be made only with sufficient understanding of the persons involved, Wolff insists. Thus, if a man has engaged a woman, believing that she is still a virgin, he has a right to withdraw from the engagement, Wolff concludes. Similarly, if a man is revealed to be impotent, engagement is dissolved. Other reasons for the dissolution of engagement, Wolff lists, are mutual consent of the betrothed, insanity or incurable disease, and indeed, any event that would have caused either party not to consent in the first place.

Wolff points out that the betrothal may involve giving some property as a security for the future marriage. If nothing else is agreed or if there are no customs ruling the matter otherwise, the security is to be returned for the spouse who was the original owner, when the marriage has been consummated. Instead of or in addition to the security, one betrothed may also give gifts to the other. Wolff suggests that such gifts are given on tacit condition that if the marriage is not consummated, they should be returned to their original owner.

In addition, Wolff continues, betrothal may also involve a penalty, where the dissolution of the engagement before marriage obligates the party at fault to return any security and gifts they have reached, while the innocent party will have the right to keep security and gifts given to them. Existence of such a penalty means that a betrothed may break the engagement without any other retribution. On the other hand, if the betrothal is dissolved by mutual consent, security and gifts must be returned by both parties, unless they have agreed otherwise.

Like any other contracts, betrothals may also involve further conditions that must be affected before the betrothal is valid. Wolff notes that even such a conditional betrothal prevents the betrothed to engage in a new, unconditional betrothal. On the other hand, he admits, they can enter a conditional betrothal, where the condition is explicitly that the original conditional betrothal will not become valid. Even if such conditions exist and there is only one conditional engagement pending, Wolff thinks, the betrothed can simply consummate their marriage by having intercourse.

What kind of conditions are then allowed? Wolff notes that no shameful or impossible conditions are allowed and make the whole betrothal null. Then again, he does accept the condition that one of the future spouses will give the other a sum of money on the day of marriage – this is legally a gift, he argues, and gifts are something allowed by natural law. Of course, the receiver of the gift is not obligated to marry the giver, before the money has been actually delivered.

Wolff takes time to consider even a case where one party promises to marry the other, and the other one accepts the promise on the condition that the promising person does not find any more suitable person for a spouse. He notes that such a condition must be attached to a date, before which it must be fulfilled, because otherwise the marriage could be waited indefinitely and the promise would be effectively null. If there is such a date, Wolff argues, then the promising person is free to marry anyone before that date, and the suggestor of the condition will have to marry the promising person, if they have still persevered in their will to marry them.

Marriage is also an economic contract, since procreation and raising of the kids involves various costs. Wolff thinks that the spouses should live in the same place and share the administration of all the goods required for domestic life, since that is required for intercourse and upbringing of the children. He clarifies that what the spouses acquire is not naturally common between them, but each must contribute to the costs of family life as much as they can.

Wolff thinks that especially the wife has special obligations toward the household and the raising of the children. He explicitly mentions only breast feeding here, although in his earlier, German writings he had suggested that it was more convenient for the wife to take more responsibility of the children and the household, because of her naturally closer engagement with the unborn and just born children.

If the wife can manage it after the household duties, Wolff adds, they are obligated, like other people, to work for their living, either in the service of their husband (Wolff mentions being a shop assistant) or in their own (Wolff mentions such professions as a launderer, a hairdresser and a midwife). If the wife works for her husband, she is entitled to a ratio of the profit of the husband’s business, while if she works for herself, the profits she gains are her own and she just has to provide from it her share of the common expenses of the household. Wolff does mention the possibility that the spouses make a contract, where the wife transfers all her property and her future profits to the ownership or at least management of her husband, but does not really recommend it. Then again, he adds, the contract may be done the other way round, so that the wife manages the property of the husband, if she is just capable of doing this.

Both spouses, Wolff reminds the reader, are obligated to contribute to the costs of raising their children and to the acquiring of domestic goods, according to their means. Thus, if one of them is poor and cannot earn anything by working, the other alone is obligated to cover the costs, but if even the poorer spouse has some property, they must contribute from this small amount to the expenses. Wolff suggests as the most convenient means pooling all they acquire through work and all they own into a single mass of capital. The profits left after the expenses have been covered are then to be divided according to the proportion of their contributions.

If nothing else is agreed upon, each spouse has their own property, Wolff explains, so that neither can sell, give away or pawn any property of the other spouse. If some damage happens to the property of one spouse and both have their own assets, the loss is not shared, except in the case that the damage was caused by the other spouse who has to then make the necessary restitutions. The husband and the wife could agree about sharing their property, and then the consent of both is required for any transactions made of it and any damage of the property would concern both of them.

Because the husband and the wife are expected to provide for the well-being of their whole family, Wolff argues, they are obligated to care for the other spouse. Since humans have a general duty to care for any human being, Wolff states, the particular duty of caring for one’s spouse adds up to the general duty, so that spouses should care for each other more than for anyone else. He also suggests that this active caring for the other makes the spouses constantly think of the good of the other and feel pleasure for their happiness, which is a sign of love. Indeed, Wolff insists, husband and wife should love each other more than anyone else and anyone entering marriage has at least tacitly promised this. The mutual love of the married persons, he concludes, makes them into one person.

An important effect of the reciprocal love of the spouses, Wolff thinks, is that they want to share everything with one another, not just financially, but down to all the little details of their lives, facing both favorable and unfavorable events as a pair. Wolff notes that a man and a woman could commit themselves to such holistic sharing of lives, but if such a commitment didn’t involve procreation, this union would not be marriage. On the contrary, he adds, if the man and the wife do procreate and raise children, but otherwise do not share anything in their lives, this is a marriage, but far from a perfect one.

By nature, marriage is, according to Wolff, an equal society, where everything should happen with the consent of both the wife and the husband and each spouse has a right to declare their opinion on matters concerning such affairs as the upbringing of the children and the management of the household. Because marriage is a society with just two members, it is obvious that in a conflict of opinions the votes will always go even. Thus, Wolff advises, the spouses should agree with themselves beforehand who is to have the decisive vote in what matters.

More generally, Wolff says, the wife and the husband should determine by mutual consent what rules are to be obeyed in their family life. They may agree, he admits, that the wife transfers some or all their authority to the husband, and such transfer obliges the wife then to obey her husband. Indeed, Wolff notes, in some places such a transfer might be customary, and then a woman marrying a man is implicitly understood to have agreed to giving up of her authority. He points out that the law of nature does not command the wife to do so, but gives equal authority to both parties. Even if such an agreement has been made, Wolff advises the husband to temper his power over the wife with love, especially when the husband punishes his wife for disobedience.

The only obstacle for dissolving marriage that Wolff mentions is children who still need to be raised to adulthood. If the couple does not have such children and the laws of the land say nothing about the matter, marriage can be dissolved at will by either party. Wolff lists some reasons that should be a valid ground for divorce in any law, such as adultery, refusal to have intercourse, malicious desertion and irreconcilable hostility. Death of one spouse also naturally dissolves the marriage.

Once a marriage is dissolved, the former spouses can enter into new marriage contracts, which makes what Wolff calls successive polygamy licit. Indeed, he thinks it is even an obligation to marry, if you just have the necessary means for the economic requirements of a married life. Even if a person has promised to their dying spouse that they will not remarry, this promise is not valid, unless the reason for it is that the widow still has to raise their children. Wolff thinks that a man may take a new wife immediately after the dissolution of the previous one, but advises the women to wait until it is certain that they are not pregnant from the previous marriage.

In the special case of widowhood, Wolff states, the responsibility for the upbringing of the children remains on the surviving spouse. If the children have some property of their own, for instance, as an inheritance, Wolff allows using proceeds from that capital to cover the costs of raising them.

Wolff also considers the question, whether a spouse (in his examples, usually the husband) ever has an obligation to fund raising children of the other spouse (in the examples, usually the wife), conceived with another person. In case of children born from adultery, Wolff is clear that the responsibility lies with the adulterer. In case of remarriage, the remarrying person should reserve from their own property as much as is sufficient to cover their half of the expenses of raising children from the previous marriage. If the remarrying person is a widow and neither they nor their children have sufficient funds for this, Wolff advises the person marrying the widow to take care of the costs.

What about children born out of wedlock, and more generally, the question when a child is to be presumed an offspring of someone else? Wolff notes that the motherhood of the child is always certain, at least if the mother gives birth in the presence of others. As for fatherhood, he thinks that children born in marriage should be acknowledged by the father, unless there is proof of adultery. If no official marriage is in place and if the woman is known to have had intercourse with a man at a presumed time of conception, the man is obligated to acknowledge the child, unless she has had sexual relations with other men (in fact, Wolff thinks that no man needs to acknowledge the legitimacy of children of prostitutes or promiscuous women). If the man denies having had intercourse, the only test for deciding whether they lie is to ask them to take an oath on the matter (of course, methods have developed from the time of Wolff).

In any case, Wolff states, illegitimate children cannot be blamed for the deeds of their parents. Thus, their rights are to be just as same as those of legitimate children and their parents have the exact same obligations toward them. Furthermore, Wolff insists, illegitimacy is no stain on anyone’s reputation and no reason for dishonour.