Christian Wolff: Natural right 7 (1747)

In his penultimate book on natural right, Wolff has finally progressed further from the consideration of different varieties of contracts – or at least this seems to be so, since the topic of this book is societies or communities of different sorts. Actually, when the reader begins the first chapter, it is quickly clear that societies are, for Wolff, just another kind of contract (or at least implicit or quasi contract), which is constituted for the sake of achieving some end by combining the forces of those who enter the contract.

The society, Wolff explains, then consists of certain members, which can be individual persons or other societies. Due to the contract they have made (explicitly or implicitly) when entering the society, they are all obligated to do whatever they can to achieve the goal of the society. In addition, the members are also obligated to assist other members in their efforts for the society. Depending on the contract, they may have some further individual obligations. If a member does not fulfill these obligations, Wolff insists, other members have a right to compel them to do so. They should also not allow anyone outside or within society to do anything that would harm the society and prevent it from reaching its goal.

If nothing else is agreed, Wolff thinks, the society will be equal in the sense that all members have the same right and the same obligations, and if certain undertakings of the society must happen in a certain order, there is no order of priority who should do what first. Of course, he adds, the members might have agreed to an unequal society, where some people can have more rights or more obligations than others and where there can be precedence in how things are done. In fact, Wolff suggests, such agreed upon differences in rights and obligations will transmit to people who replace members of an unequal society.

What a society should do for the sake of its goal, in Wolff’s opinion, should be determined by the common consent of its members. Indeed, he suggests, when the society is founded, the members should agree upon the general rules or laws followed by its members: anyone admitted later to the society is then understood to have tacitly promised that they will follow the laws of the society. These laws can later be modified and even cancelled and new laws can also be made. The health of the society depends on members acting in accordance with them, Wolff thinks and suggests that a society has a right to enact penalties for all transgressions of its laws and to offer rewards for people observing them – what these penalties and rewards are, should be decided by the members of the society.

In addition to general laws, society may face individual cases, where a suitable course of action must be decided. Wolff emphasises that in such an event, every member should have a right to declare their opinion on what should be done. This right is fulfilled with voting. If the votes are unanimous, a decision has been clearly made. If not, unless the laws of the society say otherwise and demand a unanimous vote, the majority vote determines the decision. Wolff thinks that to determine the majority vote, one person has a single vote, although he does admit the possibility that votes of those who contribute more to the society deserve more weight.

Wolff considers in great lengths the problem of even votes. A simplest solution, he states, is to leave things as they would have been without the vote (he calls this calculus of Minerva). Of course, this is not always a viable option, so other solutions must be found. Wolff’s next suggestion is to follow the alternative which had least opposition (although he doesn’t explicitly say it, this suggestion appears to demand a use of negative votes). If this brings no solution, in some cases a lot can be used, but if this cannot be done, Wolff suggests using the laws of probability to determine what would be the safest alternative that would most likely do less harm than others. Finally, he notes, the laws of the society may also determine a person who has a right to give the decisive vote in case votes go otherwise even.

Whatever the result of the vote, Wolff explains, it is a legitimate decision, as long as the voting was done according to the laws and customs for voting in the society. Thus, no member has any right to oppose such decisions. Then again, Wolff thinks, dissenting voters cannot be blamed later, if something bad results from the decision made.

Who is then to decide what matters put to vote? Wolff suggests that a right to bring questions to public consultation and to make decisions based on the results of voting should be conferred to some official. If some member of the society wishes to propose some question for public consultation, they should present this wish to the official. If the official refuses to bring the question forward, the proposer has a right to ask the whole society to vote on whether to put the question on public consultation.

Wolff thinks that since individuals cannot achieve all their ends, nature itself obliges us to contract societies: no one is permitted to live a solitary life, to live for oneself alone and not for others. He even speaks of the natural society, which nature institutes without distinction among all humans, the end of which is mutual assistance in perfecting oneself. This natural society is an equal society, Wolff explains, so that all humans have, according to it, the same rights and obligations – indeed, these are the rights and obligations determined by natural right.

A society, Wolff suggests, won’t be licit, if the goal of the society is illicit. This does not mean, he adds, that a society with a licit goal is automatically licit, since it may use illicit means for its goal. One, but not only example of an illicit society is such that is unjust in the sense that its goal is contrary to the rights of someone. An illicit society creates no obligations and it has no members, but is just a collection of criminals and thugs.

Wolff suggests treating societies as persons. This means that just like individual humans, societies have duties toward themselves. Thus, every society is bound to perfect itself and to avoid things that make it less perfect. A society is also obligated to preserve itself and to defend against anyone trying to damage it.

Taking societies as persons leads Wolff to insist that all societies are naturally free, living in a state of nature in regard to one another. Hence, they should be permitted to determine their own actions, as long as they do nothing to contravene the rights of other individuals and societies.

The duties of societies toward themselves impose certain obligations to the members of the societies. Indeed, it is the members who should perfect the society, that is, they should increase the capacities of themselves and their associates to better achieve the end of the society. Of course, the capacities of individuals have their limits. Thus, Wolff explains, although an individual can be part of many societies and contribute to many ends, if their capacities are not enough for this, they are not allowed to enter multiple societies.

A society may be temporary, Wolff explains, if it is meant to exist only for a certain time or if its goal is something that can be achieved only once, or it can be meant to exist for all perpetuity. Even a perpetual society may be destroyed, for example, if the members decide so or if all of them die – or at least so many that it is impossible to achieve the end of the society.

Wolff thinks that a person can leave the society, only if this does not hurt other members – thus, he instructs the leaving person to take care that someone ready to put the same effort into the society takes their place. Then again, there are cases where even this is not required, for instance, when the society is doing something harmful or when the member has lost their powers so much that they cannot contribute to its affairs. Wolff also notes that the society can also remove some members from the society, for example, if they refuse to provide to the society what they are obligated to provide or if they refuse to listen to the opinions of other members about common affairs.

According to Wolff, society rules its members concerning actions that further the end of the society, and indeed, he thinks, the concept of ruling has no meaning outside societies. Wolff notes that a society can retain the power to rule its members within itself or it can transfer this power to an individual or individuals (even to such that are not members of the society). The conditions of this transfer – e.g. if the transfer is temporary or for life, if all power is transferred or only some part of it etc. – is to be decided by the society. Indeed, Wolff explains, they determine the fundamental laws of the society (in case of states, we would probably call it a constitution). If the ruler then demands something against these fundamental laws from the members of the society, they need not obey this.

Before moving on to discuss particular societies, Wolff makes the remark that societies can have obligations toward individual human beings and toward other societies and they can also receive rights from either. Thus, societies can enter into contracts, and if they do, they are obligated to honour these contracts and can be blamed, if they do not do so.

Crusius, Christian August: Road to certainty and reliability – Interpretation

The final chapter of the logic of Crusius deals with interpretation or the search for the correct sense of some signs of thought – usually words in a text – that is, the attempt to determine what thoughts these signs or words express. He notes that this sense has two meanings. Firstly, the grammatical sense of words means for Crucius the sum of the meanings these words can have in a language. He notes that words can have many primary meanings, that is, they can refer to various objects, and furthermore, they can also have secondary meanings which express not what the words primarily refer to, but certain attitudes of our mind in regard to designated topics.

The second meaning, Crusius adds, is the logical sense of the words, which tells us what these words mean at a certain place and in a certain context, and notes that to get to this logical meaning, we first have to check the primary and secondary grammatical meanings of the words. In addition to grammatical and logical sense, Crusius speaks also of a mediate sense of the words, which includes correct consequences of the primary meanings, but only under the condition that the speaker has intended to imply these consequences. Furthermore, he mentions a symbolic sense of words, where certain topics are used for the purpose of designating and prefiguring other topics.

Crusius divides interpretation of text in two kinds, the first of which is grammatical interpretation, where obscure words are made distinct through other words that more easily convey some concrete ideas – he points out that translation can be regarded as grammatical interpretation from one language to another. The second kind Crusius then calls, quite expectedly, a logical interpretation, where the meaning of the words is determined through justifications found in the text itself or elsewhere.

Crusius further divides logical interpretation into common and scholarly forms. By common logical interpretation he means interpretation that uses only a natural sensation of true and false perceived in a concrete idea without knowing the idea distinctly. Then again, in scholarly logical interpretation the justifications of the interpretation are known distinctly. Crusius adds two degrees of perfection to scholarly logical interpretation: we can either know the justifications distinctly according to their content, or we may be capable of justifying them according to their form and ability to prove things from them with the rules of logic.

Crusius takes as his starting point the fact we usually understand a lot, if not most of the texts we read without interpretation, if texts are just written straightforwardly and not ambiguously. Interpretation, he then adds, is required only for obscure passages. Then again, Crusius notes that we should observe why many passages in a text are distinct without interpretation and analyse concrete ideas about them. Such distinct passages, he thinks, form a secure ground for interpreting the whole text.

Crusius counts three essential grounds, on which to base the interpretation of the words of a text or a speech. Firstly, he says, we should observe the author and their characteristics: for instance, what capacities they have, in what context they have lived, what is the time and the occasion where they have spoken or written and what kind of sciences, religion, habits and customs they have had. Secondly, Crusius continues, we should observe the means the author has used or the characteristics of the language, in which they have written or spoken, both of the particular languages used and of the human language in general. Finally, he concludes, we should determine the purpose of the speaker, both in whole speeches and texts and in their individual passages. In addition to these essential grounds, Crusius points out, we should also observe contingent means of expression, such as the tones, gestures and hand movements. Besides all of these, he finishes the discussion, we should most importantly consider the text or speech itself and compare its words and passages to one another, in order to find out any harmonies within it.

Interpretation is no demonstration, Crusius notices, but uses the method of probability, because words are arbitrary signs and internal conditions of humans can be known only through probabilities. Interpretation can be hypothetically demonstrative, he admits, if we assume that presupposed circumstances and statements of the author should not contradict one another. Furthermore, Crusius remarks, interpretation can have moral certainty that is effectively as good as demonstration, and just as we know from his study of probabilities, moral certainty can be generated from mere cognitive reasons, but also from additional grounds given by obligations. Still, he concludes, all interpretations must be justified logically as sharply as possible, that is, we must prove that the interpretation has at least objective probability or otherwise it is doubtful or false.

Where to then start the search for the sense of the text? Crusius notes that we should firstly reject any opinions that would make all interpretation uncertain and doubtful, because otherwise the whole notion of interpreting would become impossible and language would be useless: besides it would be against our own purposes – we ourselves want to use language – and against the divine wish to reveal themselves to humanity through linguistic means. If this preliminary has been fulfilled, Crusius continues, we should determine what is familiar and proceed from that to what is unfamiliar. Furthermore, he adds, because we must understand the words from the standpoint of the author, we should try to find out their circumstances and place ourselves into their perspective. In addition, Crusius notes, since we have a natural disposition and capacity for imitation, we should consider good examples of correct and well-made interpretations.

Crusius outlines four most general presumptions of probability in interpretation. Firstly, as long as we have no reason to suppose that a person is a fool, rash or incapable and their words can be interpreted in a reasonable fashion, or at least they cannot be proven to be indecipherable, we should not presume them to contradict themselves. Secondly, we should presume everyone to speak distinctly and with understanding and to avoid obscurity and ambiguity – still, this does not mean that they would also determine their words carefully. Thirdly, we should presume that the author says what their purpose demands, and finally, we should presume that everyone speaks and writes according to their state of mind (for instance, that their emotions can be seen in what they say and write).

Crusius proceeds to some particular rules for determining the meaning of the words. Firstly, he notes, we should not dismiss at start what has been proven to be their character, but we should accept what indubitably follows from this character. Then again, what does not conflict with this character should not be taken as a problem to be solved, although it isn’t a necessary consequence of this character. Furthermore, we should try to experience as much as possible about the external and the internal circumstances of the author to get a correct idea of their character and to find the right perspective, from which they consider things, although we need not know all the details of their life. Finally, because unfamiliar is to be explained from familiar, we should read the text to be interpreted a couple times through.

Considering the language of a text, Crusius notes that if the text is not a riddle, its words should be presumed to have a unified meaning, although this meaning can be a whole consisting of many grammatical meanings: especially if there have been more authors than one, he points out, the words could have multiple meanings. Furthermore, if we just know the language used well, Crusius continues, we should find out all the grammatical possibilities of interpreting words – that is, possible definitions of words that do not go against the nature of the language used – and all the exegetical possibilities – that is, possible definitions that in addition to grammatical ground do not contradict any other grounds of interpretation. If then we have a string of words, the combination of which is both a grammatical and exegetical possibility, we should primarily assume that the words form a unified meaning, although Crusius admits that is not always the only or even the best interpretation. Then again, he adds, if some peculiar phrase seems just a weirdness of the language used, we should assume that it is so.

Crusius instructs the reader to follow primarily the most usual sense of the words, unless there are some weighty reasons to do otherwise: if we do decide to follow another interpretation, we should show that the other reading is possible and prove that it is better in this particular case. If the author has used signs of opposition, he continues, we must suggest their words to have such a sense that recreates this opposition. In general, Crusius adds, we should presume that different words refer to different concepts, unless there are weighty reasons to do otherwise. He admits that this last principle has many exceptions. A person speaking with emotion often repeats the same issue in different words, because they can only think of this one thing. Furthermore, if a person wants to gain the attention of the listener or the reader, they often state something obscurely and then say the same thing in clearer terms. In addition, a person wanting to say something with unrestricted generality often uses many equivalent expressions for the same thing, because they want to drown their opponents with their words. Finally, Crusius concludes, if an author is a genius with words, they often show their skill by inventing new expressions for the same things.

Crusius suggests that we should not assume that a word in a text is used with all its possible meanings, although we should also not ignore any meaning that makes sense in the context of the text. If a sentence of an author should be determined by another sentence of theirs, he continues, we should choose a sentence naturally fit for this task. Furthermore, if the subject of a sentence is in doubt, we should assume that it is the one that is in itself a subject.

Crusius goes through some means for finding affections, and in general, the state of mind of the speaker. Firstly, he says, we should study the general theory of will and its changes, together with their natural and arbitrary signs. Secondly, we should find as much information about the individual circumstances of the speaker as possible, and finally, we should observe all circumstances about the nature of the topic, whether they are present in the text or elsewhere. Similarly, Crusius adds, is to be evaluated the emphasis of the words in a text, where by emphasis he means an expression of a certain intensity of the movements of the mind, caused by the perceived magnitude and importance of the issues.

Crusius mentions three ways how we can determine the purpose of the author, the easiest being if they say it themselves and we should just observe it. The second possibility is that we determine the purpose from the nature of the topic, insofar as we can assume the author to be a reasonable person. Finally, we might be able to determine the purpose from the consideration of the text as a hypothesis and then confirm it by comparing it with the circumstances of the text (text should be the means for the assumed purpose). The final method, Crusius notes, is the most usual one, but he adds that the circumstances need not cohere with the suggested purpose necessarily, but their coherence can also be only probable or possible, because although the circumstances do not prove the truth of the purpose, they at least can help to clear out some difficulties. In the latter case, he adds, the knowledge of the possibility of coherence is either determined and perfect, if we see distinctly why and how circumstances can agree with the presupposed purpose, or undetermined, if we just see no conflict between the circumstances and the assumed purpose.

Considering contingent means for expressing thoughts, like tones and gestures, Crusius notes that we should observe whether what we assume to be a sign actually is a sign or whether it is common to many things and whether it is a certain, probable or merely possible sign. If, he adds, we do not ourselves immediately observe these signs or have historical documents telling us about them, but we just assume them for the sake of completeness or as subsidiary hypotheses, they must be particularly proven or they must be confirmed through the proof of the main hypothesis or we should not assume them to be true, but add them merely as possible determinations for the sake of distinctness or for justification of reasonableness of the text against objections and accusations.

When considering the text itself, Crusius notes, we should observe partly the connection of a passage to what precedes and what follows it, partly the parallel passages. Considering the preceding and the following, he thinks, is our main source of interpretation, because it is not just the nearest and the easiest means, but its use is also required by all other methods, because through it we avoid the danger of putting our own opinions to the mouth of the author. As further rules Crusius suggests that if we compare the preceding and the following to explain a text correctly, we should not assume ambiguous phenomena to prove anything, we should not fabricate connections from careless subordination of a part of the text to the abstracted purpose, and we should not assume a connection with a more distant idea, when we have a nearer idea to connect it with.

By parallel passages Crusius means passages that have something similar in them, whether similar linguistic expressions used or discussion of similar things. He notes that parallel passages are of great use in interpretation, because they help to determine the more obscure passages from the author’s own explanation – it is difficult to err, if the author explains something in many places. Crusius notes that parallel passages can be used positively, to determine the sense of words, or negatively, to determine what is not meant. Sometimes they can be used to prove the possibility, sometimes probability and sometimes certainty of interpretation.

The main rule of Crusius for parallel passages is, again, to explain more obscure from more distinct. He adds the more detailed rule that parallel passages of verbal expression can in themselves prove only the real possibility of a definition, but in deciding between several meanings, parallel passages can decide which is most probable. If we have two parallel passages, Crusius notes, one of which describes more circumstances and more determinations, we should not take them as equivalent, just because of their parallelism. If the parallel passages are from the same author, they prove usually more than if they were from different writers, but if we use a parallel passage from another writer, we must be able to presume a sufficient similarity between them, since otherwise the parallel passages can prove only logical possibilities. Generally, Crusius insists, the closer a justification for interpretation is found, the more reliable it is.

When we are trying to determining the grammatical meaning of words, Crusius tells the reader, we can rely on the common use of language, on etymology and on such words or languages that have affinity with the given. The first method to be tried, he thinks, should always be the common use of language. We should first search for the meaning and the application of the words, where it can be known with moral certainty, from such people who know the language. With the help of these familiar words, we should then determine the more doubtful and obscure words from the context. Crusius underlines that the certainty of the interpretation does not lie with the masters of language or dictionaries, which also contradict one another. Instead, such sources must be compared with one another and we must see how words are used in different contexts, following the rules of probability.

If we are forced to use etymological means, Crusius continues, we must check how reliable these etymologies are. Even if they are reliable, he notes, this proves only that the interpretation is possible and the proof relies on an analogy with other words, the meaning of which can be assumed from the use of language. Etymology can prove probabilities only in cases where counter examples are rare, and usually a real possibility is proven only through many examples. Finally, affinity of certain words or languages can only prove such a possibility of meaning under the condition that the earlier means are not available and the context also suggests the assumed possible meaning.

To determine the logical meaning of the words in certain context, Crusius notes, we should first note that a grammatical ambiguity does not necessarily make the words obscure and ambiguous in this context, because experience shows that we can use ambiguous words and make ourselves understood. Means for finding the sense of the words in a context are, he counts, opposition of concepts (what a concept is opposed to or at least what it is distinguished from), subordination of concepts or ascribing predicates and relation to it, parallel passages and special additional means. Crusius also suggests two possible methods for deciding the meaning in the context. Firstly, we can infer the meaning from the just mentioned oppositions and connections, or secondly, we can assume a possible interpretation and see if it fits with the text. Latter method is to be used, Crusius thinks, if there are not many predicates and opposites to be found in the text and the word is used by the writer only a few times – if it concerns matter of common life and the meaning of a word can be assumed to be certain and it makes sense in a context, the explanation is morally certain

Searching for the sense and connection of propositions, Crusius thinks, we should observe what can be assumed as more familiar: subject or predicate, conclusion or premisses, parts or whole propositions. If every explanation of a text leaves some prominent difficulties, he notes, we must take care that they don’t have just subjective probability. All in all, Crusius thinks, probabilities of interpretation are easily very high, since there are often harmonies to be found and the meaning of many words has moral certainty. Thus, he says, it would be absurd to assume that we wouldn’t understand an ordinary letter from a friend, and even more obscure documents contain some distinct elements.