After discussing marital relations, Wolff moves on to the question of kinship. Since he mainly provides definitions for great-great-great-grandmothers, nephews, stepfathers and like, we can be quick about this chapter. The rare interesting tidbits include Wolff’s off-hand remark that the line of ancestors of every human has no end and an idea that married people share relatives, because they have become one person – indeed, he insists, this is true even of people who have had intercourse with one another. He also notes that even illegitimate children belong to the families of people who have conceived them.
Wolff next moves on to the question of paternal society, that is, society contracted between parents and their children. Actually, he corrects himself, paternal society is a quasi contract, because children are not in a position to do proper contracts. In other words, Wolff explains, parents are obligated, as if by a contract, to raise their children up, while the children are obligated to do everything they can to make this raising up possible.
What this quasi contract implies, Wolff continues, is that parents are obligated to preserve their children and to make them capable of providing for themselves in matters necessary for their own preservation. Thus, he argues, parents do not have the right to kill their children, but they should take care of the life, health, and integrity of their children's bodies. In addition, parents should provide the children with healthy food and clothing suitable for protecting the body against the ravages of the elements. Furthermore, the children should be encouraged to exercise their power of locomotion in a manner suitable to their age.
Building up the mental capacities of children in an age-appropriate fashion is, Wolff thinks, an important part of the duties of parents. In a summarised fashion, he notes that the newborn child should first be taught to speak and understand speech. Then, at early childhood, the use of higher faculties should be slowly exercised, starting with instilling clear, although probably very confused notions of familiar things and progressing toward a capacity of making notions more distinct. An important part in this development is taking precautions against erroneous and superstitious notions and building a custom of not agreeing with anything without any reason. Finally, in youth, the capacities of judgement and reason should be strengthened. A child becomes an adult, when they have a sufficient capacity of judgement so that they are able to live on their own.
In addition to cognitive skills, Wolff emphasises the need to improve the moral virtues of children so that they would be eventually capable of living their lives according to the natural law. As long as they are still ignorant of what natural law entails, he adds, parents should command what they ought and ought not to do. Indeed, Wolff states, children should not be allowed to do anything without their orders or without the presence and counsel of the parents. This means, he explains, that parents have an authority to determine the actions of their children, as long as they are incapable of doing so, while the children are then obliged to shape their actions according to the will of their parents. This authority changes with the growth of the child, so that the younger the child is, the more responsible about their actions the parents are.
Parental authority entails, in Wolff’s opinion, that disobedience of parents is not allowed: children are to follow what their parents say, not their own feelings or suggestions of others. Parents are even obligated to make their children obedient, and if necessary, use punishments and rewards as motivation for obedience. Then again, Wolff adds, parents cannot command their children to do anything against natural law, and if they do so, the children are in no way obligated to follow such commands: if they happen to do so and they are not yet capable of understanding the natural law, the fault lies not in the children, but in the parents.
Wolff underlines that parental authority belongs to both parents, not just to the father. This means, he explains, that any commands parents set for their children must be mutually consented to by both the mother and the father. The inevitable question is what to do if the will of the mother and the father conflict with one another. Wolff recognises that sometimes the marriage contract might contain a clause that specifically states what is to be done in such conflict situations, but otherwise the parents just have to follow the general guidelines given for the parity of votes in decisions of societies.
Although parental authority involves the right to punish the child for disobedience, in Wolff’s opinion, there are also limits to this right. Obviously, punishing a child for disobeying an illicit command is not allowed. Furthermore, Wolff adds, killing or torturing children or inflicting damage on their body or health is not permitted. He also suggests that punishment should not be executed, if there is any hope of amendment without it, and lighter punishments should be preferred, if it is enough for moral improvement.
Moral upbringing needs more than punishments, and Wolff emphasises the importance of setting a good example. Indeed, he even states that children have a right to demand from the parents that they behave in a morally proper manner. Actually this right extends to all human beings, so that anyone should take care of what they do in front of children. Similarly, parents should take care that their children do not associate with ill-mannered people.
Wolff thinks that the natural law is not just about duties, but following it is the surest way to happiness. Thus, it is very understandable that he would think it is the duty of parents to make their children happy and to derive pleasure from their happiness. Indeed, Wolff says, parents should love their children like themselves, so that they will prefer children over any strangers.
Wolff sees frugality and diligence as important virtues all children should learn. This does not mean that children should be overburdened with labour, since this is against the law of nature. Still, Wolff underlines, parents should accustom their children to such work that they are capable of, and in fact, direct them to a career where they will be most useful to other human beings. This means, firstly, that the parents can demand their children to help them in domestic chores, since as members of the familial society they are obligated to help it. Furthermore, Wolff adds, the parents can also command their children to help them in their own professions, because such a work teaches the children valuable skills for later life (Wolff’s old-fashioned examples include a boy helping his father in a workshop and a girl helping her laundress mother to wash clothes). Still, he notes, this work should not prevent children from studying and it should definitely not set their future career in stone, if they have skills for other things.
Parents should, according to Wolff, not just provide basic skills required for adult life, but to the best of their abilities, strive to ensure that their children will have all that they need for a pleasant and comfortable life, such as wealth, friendships and good reputation. This means also, he adds, that they should provide securities in case that they would die before the upbringing of the children has finished.
Parents are in an optimal situation the greatest benefactors of their children, which implies, Wolff thinks, that the children should love and honour their parents and strive to return the favour to them, when the opportunity arises. Indeed, he insists, children should aim to please their parents, even during their adulthood, and with the exception of their spouse and their own children, they should prefer the well-being of their parents over other people. In other words, children are obliged to provide support for a comfortable and pleasant life to their elderly parents, unless they are equally impoverished or can barely support their own family.
Children are usually incapable of managing any property that they obtain, for instance, as inheritance. Thus, Wolff notes it is the duty of the parents to manage it, but they do not own it and cannot even use profits arising from it, except insofar as these are used for the upbringing of the child owning it. Parents also are not allowed to sell or give away such a property, unless this is done for the benefit of the children. When a child has grown up, the parents are obligated to give the property for the child to manage. Before that, the children are not allowed to do anything themselves with that property and they are not allowed to enter into any contracts regarding it: if they do, the parents have a right to rescind such contracts, especially if these contracts are harmful to the children.
Children may also receive some things for their use from their parents, Wolff continues, but such things usually remain the property of the parents. The case is different, if the parents explicitly donate such things to their children, he adds, but notes instantly that even then the children cannot sell or give away these things before adulthood.
The end of parental authority, Wolff states, is the moment of emancipation, where the children have been raised to a state where they can provide for themselves and determine their actions in accordance with the natural law. He notes that marriage provides a particular point of emancipation, while death of just one parent does not, because the parental authority still resides in the other parent.
Wolff moves on to discuss adoption, where a child of someone else is assumed as a child of one’s own: if the child in question is already an adult, it is called arrogation, while adoption in the proper sense concerns children still under parental authority. Somewhat peculiarly, Wolff thinks it quite possible that only one person of a married couple adopts a child, so that the adopted child then becomes the stepchild of the other spouse. In any case, he notes, the adopted child is juridically considered a part of the adopters family, giving especially men with no sons the opportunity to find someone to continue their family name (we can clearly see Wolff taking his historical context for granted).
Even if a child is adopted, Wolff states, the natural parents still have a responsibility to ensure that the child is raised properly, because this is determined by the natural law. Still, this does not mean that adoption would be illicit, he adds, since the parents have a right to let someone else to fulfill their duties (then again, merely raising a child of another does not mean adoption). Children, on the other hand, cannot hand themselves over to adoption, if they still live under parental authority. With arrogation this is possible, since then the adopted person is already an adult and responsible for themselves, although Wolff advises not doing it without the consent of the parents, since even adult children should not displease their parents.
A certain kind of adoption Wolff considers is called
unione prolium, where people entering a new marriage agree that their children from their previous marriages are to be considered as children of both (again, this involves more than just spouses agreeing to raise the children of both together). Wolff considers in detail the economic consequences of such a contract: for instance, if the children have their own property, such as inheritance from a dead parent, the union does not affect its ownership (the property can be used for the education of the child owning it, Wolff concedes). Furthermore, he notes, if the children are adults, their will about the union should be consulted, and even if they are not adults, the union must be ratified anew when they have been emancipated or an impartial judge is to be asked to give consent on their behalf. The union can also be dissolved only with the consent of the children.
As one would expect, Wolff forbids parents to marry their children, but for a peculiar reason: a child should revere their parents, but spouses should form a one person and thus be equal. A peculiar consequence of this justification is that while marriages between an ancestor and a descendant in direct line ar illicit (because a child should revere their grandparents etc. as enabling their parents to procreate and raise them), marriage between a brother and a sister would not be against natural law.
Wolff considers the problem of parents who cannot raise their children due to, for instance, poverty, or in the most extreme case, their own death. His first instinct is to say that the task falls then to the grandparents, who have a responsibility to take care of not just their own children, but also the children of their children. Because grandparents usually die before parents, this is often not the most convenient solution. In such cases of orphaned children, Wolff states that the duty falls to other relatives. This is so, he argues, because we have a general duty to show gratitude to all our ancestors by assisting them and one form of assisting our ancestors is to assist their duty of taking care of their descendants, that is, our relatives.
In the extreme case of orphaned children without any living relatives, Wolff muses, it is open for anyone willing to take care of the orphans. Depending on the age of the child, this person will be called either tutor or curator, the difference being that a curator is responsible only for administering the property of the child, while a tutor is also responsible for raising and educating the child. Tutors take thus care of children still requiring full parental guidance, while curators are appointed to children who are more grown up, but still unable to handle their own assets. Wolff points out that curators are required also by persons, who cannot be educated anymore, but still are incapable of administering their finances, such as persons with debilitating disease. Wolff concentrates more on tutors, as duties of curators can often be easily deduced from those of a tutor.
Raising children requires money, but where is a tutor to get that money? Wolff thinks that tutors are not obliged to pay it all from their own pockets, but can use the profits derived from the capital belonging to the children or even that capital itself, if profits are not enough. If a child does not own anything, then the tutor must rely on the generosity of others. In every other measure except the financial obligations, the tutor steps in the role of a parent, so that they have parental authority over the children and also all the same duties as parents.
Wolff considers it allowed that the duties of a tutor or a curator are divided among many persons, so that e.g. one curator administers one part of the property and a second curator another part, or that one tutor is responsible for the actual education of the children, while the other just administrates their funds. In this case, he advises, it is best to appoint also one curator or tutor into a role of supervising the work of other curators or tutors.
Wolff goes in great detail into the economic side of being a tutor or a curator, such as drawing inventories of the assets of the children and making yearly accounts of all financial transactions involving it. We may skip these specifics and just note that tutors and curators are responsible for all their actions involving the assets of the children and even have to remit any damages to those assets from their own funds. If a tutor or a curator is negligent with their duties, their supervising tutor or curator can appoint another one in their stead.
The duties of a tutor end, Wolff says, when children turn into puberty, while the duties of a curator end with children becoming adults (of course, the death of the tutor or the curator or the children also ends their relationship). A tutor or a curator who has performed their duties admirably, he adds, deserves a fee, but the children cannot be forced to give one. Still, Wolff notes, tutors and curators are at least entitled to a reimbursement of any expenses they have incurred in the administration of the assets.
At this point, Wolff introduces the notion of dowry – that is, property given by a bride or someone in her stead to the husband for the expenses of married life – probably because customarily the parents provided the dowry. Wolff notes that it is the wife who actually owns the dowry and the husband has merely a right to use and profit from it. He thinks that the parents are obligated to provide dowry, if their daughter has no property of her own, but that the parents cannot be forced to provide it. Of course, Wolff adds, anyone else beyond the parents can provide the dowry for a woman, as long as it is not done with shameful intentions.
Wolff considers also a custom similar to dowry, namely,
morgengabe, which the groom donates to his bride as a gift for their first sexual intercourse. He notes that such a gift is not obligatory, but allowed by natural law.
Wolff ends the chapter with a discussion of children entering a marriage. He thinks that children should not enter marriage or even betrothal without the consent of their parents, but they should first seek the counsel of them. Parents, Wolff adds, should not withhold their consent, unless the marriage would manifestly harm the happiness of their children. Still, he notes, even if children do marry without the consent of their parents, the marriage is still valid, because by marrying they have shown their adulthood.
