Wolff’s ideas are perhaps nowhere more alienating from a modern perspective, but when he discusses a condition whereby a person is subjected to another person called master, so that the subject is obligated to provide work for the master in exchange for sustenance. It is not at first clear, whether Wolff means outright chattel slavery or the somewhat less, but still quite horrid practice of indentured servitude. In fact, he divides between two types of this condition, calling them voluntary and involuntary servitude, depending on whether one submits to it willingly or whether one is compelled to endure against one’s will.
In the state of nature, where private property does not exist, but all is shared in common, Wolff thinks, there is no place for servitude of any kind. When ownership is included, he continues, entering into voluntary servitude becomes a natural right. Wolff tries to justify this seeming contradiction by arguing that if anyone has no other means for procuring the necessities of life, they should be allowed to exchange their labour for daily sustenance. Indeed, he adds, one could even ask for a certain price for this, so that one would be essentially selling oneself into servitude.
Even more disturbing is Wolff’s assertion that if parents are otherwise unable to provide for their children with what is required for their upbringing, the parents are allowed to sell them into servitude, so that their new master will have to then take care of their upbringing. He does add that this is the only acceptable reason for selling kids into servitude and not merely trying to cover for your own debts, which are essentially your responsibility, not your children’s. Wolff points out that similarly it is forbidden to sell your spouse to servitude in order to cover for your debts. Although you cannot sell anyone else servitude to cover your own debts, Wolff suggests, your debtor can sell you to servitude, if you cannot fulfill your obligation to them.
What powers does a master then hold over the person in servitude? Wolff notes that their rights are restricted to things that in some sense pertain to the work that the person in servitude should provide. Thus, he explains, the master can compel their subject to do work, if all else fails, even with threats and beatings. Yet, even in punishing the person in servitude, Wolff thinks, the master should be humane.
In fact, Wolff’s account of the relation of the master to their subject resembles his account of the relation of parents to their children. The master should love their subjects, as all humans should love one another, and just like a parent would do, the master should take care of the moral conduct of their subjects. A more concrete obligation is that of providing wholesome food and proper clothing, and in case of the person in servitude falling ill, necessary medication.
The master has a right to ask the person in servitude to do any work, so far as their health permits. Still, Wolff points out, the subject has the right to work also elsewhere, if their duties to the master just allow it. They may also receive inheritance and donations, making it possible that they gather their own property. Such a property, Wolff insists, belongs to the person in servitude alone, and the master cannot convert it to their own use. Still, Wolff adds, since the master is responsible for the moral conduct of their subject, they can and even should take care that the subject does not misuse these assets.
Even with the right to own things, Wolff is adamant that entering servitude means losing one’s inherent freedom. Thus, he says, servitude shouldn’t be imposed on anyone unwillingly, at least not without just cause. The master has a right of authority over the person in servitude and can sell this right, donate it to another person or even leave it as inheritance.
The master can also liberate the person in servitude, Wolff states, unless this is detrimental to the subject – remember that being in servitude should provide at least sustenance, so someone might still prefer this unfree condition. Thus, Wolff argues, the master cannot liberate sick, old or weak people, just because they cannot perform their labours, but the master must continue providing their upkeep. He further points out that if the master dies without any heir, everyone in their servitude will be liberated – the same is also true if the people in servitude are themselves instigated as heirs.
The authority of the master does not reach into the very life of the person in servitude, Wolff emphasises, because life is inalienable. Thus, he argues, the master cannot inflict too severe beatings on the person in servitude nor force them to work excessively. Indeed, Wolff emphasises, cruel behaviour, together with failure to provide food, is the only reason why one would be justified to flee servitude.
According to Wolff, servitude as such continues indefinitely, unless otherwise agreed, but what about those children who were sold into servitude by their parents? Wolff answers that the master is obligated to liberate such children, once the work they have done has sufficiently repaid their purchase price and the cost of their upbringing. Children can also be born to people in servitude – indeed, Wolff insists, even in servitude, people are allowed to marry for the sake of procreation. Such children, he states, are themselves born into servitude, but just like in the case of children sold into servitude, this is only a temporary phase that ends, when the costs of their upbringing have been met.
In a seemingly different condition from servitude live servants, whom Wolff defines as people who are hired to perform certain tasks for a fixed period in return for upkeep and a specific wage. Yet, he proposes, such servants exist also in a condition of servitude, which just has more limitations and could thus be called imperfect servitude. Thus, even when considering these limitations, being servant resembles in some aspects being in servitude: for instance, the master has the right to command the servant in the bounds of their contract, and while the servant is working for the master, they cannot attend to their own affairs without the master’s consent. Then again, the relation of the master and the servant resembles that of servitude also in that the master is obligated to promote the well-being of the servant.
The major difference from servitude, Wolff points out, is that the society between the servant and the master is only temporary. Before their contract has expired, the master cannot dismiss the servant nor can the servant leave the master, unless the other person has broken the terms of their contract. Then again, once the contract has expired, the master cannot retain an unwilling servant nor can the servant force themselves upon the master.
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