Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Economic considerations

Just like so many authors writing on natural law before him, Crusius has something to say about contracts. Natural law as such leaves many things undetermined, Crusius notes, adding that individuals have a chance to fill the gaps with contracts, that is, agreements, which determine the conditions under which one person provides goods or services to another. This definition of a contract leaves many things open - contracts can determine flow of goods or services only in one or in many directions, it can be made between two or more persons and it can be affected through written or implicit signs. Still, Crusius emphasises, one thing must be ensured, in order that a contract will be legal - contracts must not break natural law. If a contract is legal, then natural law commands everyone to respect it.

A legal or valid contract can be broken only if persons involved mutually agree to it, Crusius remarks. Thus, if I am still willing to hold on to a contract, but other persons who made it are not, the others are still obligated to follow the contract, because otherwise the very culture of contracts would be in jeopardy. Of course, if the others fail to hold on to their end of the bargain, I am not obligated to hold on to my end. Crusius notes that these rules apply only to true contracts, which should not include such things as marriage and relation between governor and governed. In addition, although I would have a right to enforce a contract upon a person, it might still in some cases be advisable and in accordance with one’s conscience to not do it.

When a contract then is not valid or legal? Crusius notes that in some cases the persons in question cannot make contracts. No one can make contracts with God, since God’s omnipotence cannot be restricted - this rather peculiar idea is easier to understand once one remembers that in Crusius’ system all right is based on the might and will of God. Furthermore, a person cannot make contracts, if they can reason only inadequately, which is the case e.g. with children.

In addition to requirements concerning the persons making the contract, Crusius considers many other requirements of a valid contract. Firstly, contract must be made fairly, for instance, ambiguous wordings and especially deceptions are not allowed. This does not mean that a person making the contract cannot have any hidden intentions, and holding on to the literal meaning of the contract against the wishes of the persons involved is not to be taken as a lie or deception. Secondly, contract cannot obligate us to do anything that would be against natural or other law or contract determining the matter otherwise, for instance, we cannot be contracted to kill an innocent person or to steal something belonging to another person. Finally, contracts can be made only on matters that fall under our own control, that is, a contract cannot obligate us to do something we are not capable of.

An interesting case arises, when force is used to make a person enter a contract. Generally, Crusius says, although one can be enforced to hold onto a contract they have made, no one can be enforced to make a contract. Interestingly, Crusius notes that there are certain exceptions to this general rule. For instance, enforcing might be in some cases in accordance with natural law and would then make a contract based on it valid. A particular case arises in a situation where the persons making a contract have been in war with one another before making a contract and the contract enforces a peace upon them. Here, the previous condition - war between persons - is such a great threat to general security that any means avoiding it should be accepted.

Some previous treatises of natural law had considered in great length the relations between master and servant, and more precisely, in the context of family relations. Crusius takes as his stance that master/servant -relations have nothing to do with family relations and are thus merely special type of contracts. Hence, he emphasises that rights of a master cannot contain e.g. power of the life of a servant.

In addition to contracts of various kind, property was also a staple element in various treatises of natural law. Crusius’ work is no exception. He elucidates that something is a property of a person, if this thing that is property is not another person and the person in question - the owner of the property - has a right to possess it, while no other person has the same right. Property is thus something more than mere possession, which is just a physical capacity to control a thing. In addition, the relationship of owning differs from that of governing, which is explicitly a relation between persons.

Crusius contextualises the discussion of property issues in a state of nature. He admits that states do play a function in securing property rights, but adds immediately that the institution of property predates states, since property relations are found even in the most uncivilized conditions. Indeed, he says, a duty to respect other people’s property is implied by basic duties of natural law. It follows from a general duty of human love, since it demands us to respect what another person has worked for, and also from the duty to live in communities, since the existence of property enables the practices of buying services and goods and of making contracts. Finally, he notes, property rights are implied by the fallen state of human nature, since we must protect the fruits of our labour against vicious people.

What can then be owned and what not? The very definition of Crusius explicitly denies the possibility of slavery, unless one means by slavery a very intimate form of service, defined by explicit legal contracts. Furthermore, Crusius continues, in a state of nature what is owned must be a thing which can be used only through our own work and which can be created only through work or which is necessarily required when using things mentioned in the first clause. Thus, a piece of land cannot be considered anyone’s property in a state of nature, although this does not prevent that in some actual state the notion of property might be extended to a piece of land in order to encourage its use.

Owning something needs more than mere possessing, Crusius reminds us, thus, original acquiring of something ownerless as a property requires more than just taking it into one’s possession. More particularly, Crusius insists, original acquiring requires that the owner-to-be or their representative makes some effort to gain the thing. Derivative acquiring of property that someone else owns, on the other hand, can occur through many means. For instance, persons can make an explicit or implicit contract involving transfer of property, or a person can take into their possession something that another person has abandoned. Crusius considers inheritance a special case: a dead person cannot make a true contract stipulating the transference of their property, but for the sake of upholding tranquil society, testaments should be considered binding.

Violence is again an ambiguous element in Crusius’ account. He admits that in some situations violence can be used to acquire property belonging to another person, but makes it also clear that in most cases violent taking away of someone’s property is wrong, just like stealing and fraud cannot be used in acquiring property. If a person breaks another person’s property rights, the latter has a right for a compensation, provided that the first person still has enough means for providing their own sustenance. Still, Crusius reminds us, property rights are always just hypothetical, and for example, in case of extreme need, a person has a right to appropriate other person’s property, provided that this other person still owns enough for enjoyment of the fruits of their work.

Finally, Crusius notes that when property changes owner, the goods are usually compensated with something that is thought to have the same value. By value Crusius means magnitude of the goodness of a thing, in connection with needs of either particular individual or generally all human beings. Because needs change from time to time, in a state of nature it requires always a clear agreement what is a fair compensation of come goods. To ease transactions, Crusius notes, states provide universal signs for value (that is, money). Crusius does not consider in more detail what such monetary economy implies, but merely notes that such a sign must be made of a durable material and not be either too rare or too common, because the rarity of the material affects the inherent value of money - rarer means more expensive - and can in extreme cases make transactions more difficult.

In next post, we will round up Crusius discussion of natural law proper with his account of families.

Christian Wolff: Reasonable thoughts on the social life of men and especially on the community (1721)

It is clear that Wolff must have already had made preparations for the Vernünfftige Gedancken von dem gesellschafftlichen Leben der Menschen und insonderheit dem geimeinen Wesen, when he published the previous title in the ”Reasonable thoughts” -series. Wolff's German ethics concentrated on the individual in abstraction from his social surroundings, but the current book promises to correct this mistake.

Wolff accepts the tradition of contractual origin of societies, which emphasises the essentialy individual nature of human beings and which was later criticised by Hegel. The story begins from an imagined point where individuals have not yet formed any societies. If human beings could provide for themselves, the story would also end here, but they have various needs for which they require the help of others. Thus arises the need for contracts, where one person offers what the other desires. Some of these contracts call for the persons involved to live together as a unit, and such units and the interpersonal relations within them are what Wolff is describing in the book.

The origin story provides Wolff already with some general principles that are valid of all societies. Every society has been generated for the purpose of promoting the well-being of its occupants – hence, the end of the society lies in the individuals and their common good. When the society strives to do something for the good of its members, it is morally mound by the same natural laws as the individuals themselves. If the society breaches those laws, individuals have then no duty to remain within that society. Finally, all of these societies can be regarded as individuals in their own right, and every society should be independent of other societies of the same sort.

Wolff calls the study of these societies politics, but the first half of the book is actually dedicated to what was traditionally known as economics after a pseudo-Aristotelian book of the same name. This was not economics in the modern sense – a study of e.g. commerce – but study of oikos or household, while politics was restricted to a study of polis or community. Wolff's book quickly turns into a description and justification of the customs of his own culture, the 18^th century Germany. Thus, we hear that a household contains three types of relations: those between a husband and a wife, those between parents and children and those between masters and servants.

The traditionality of the book can be seen in Wolff's definition of marriage as a union of a man and a woman for the sake of conceiving and educating children. Wolff's justification of the tradition of marriage betrays a common ambivalent relation to sexuality. Wolff admits that the desire for sex is natural as the necessary means for the reproduction of human species – even a person in an ideal state of knowledge would want to have sex. Thus, having sex is even a duty: once you are capable, just go and do it.

Then again, Wolff thinks sex is good only as a means for reproduction. Especially the pleasure connected to sex exists only for the sake of hinting that conception of children is good. Hence, any sex that cannot lead to the birth of children is by definition forbidden. Wolff explicitly mentions e.g. bestiality, prostitution and homosexuality, but refrains from describing all possible sexual vices in order to avoid giving any bad influences. And who is the worse sinner, the prostitute or the client? Wolff's definite answer is the prostitute: while the client is governed by his sexual impulses, the prostitute could use reason, but chooses to make sin for the sake of money.

Often the defenders of traditional marriage shy away from the unwanted consequences of their premisses. Wolff takes his premisses seriously and denies even all heterosexual sex that cannot lead to conception. Thus, sex and marriage with an elderly and generally with an infertile person is forbidden. Still, Wolff does allow marriage continue throughout the life time of the married persons, so that they can take care of one another in their old age.

Mere conception of children is not enough, but one is duty-bound to take care of the children until they can take care of themselves. Hence, the need for marriage. Because one is committed only to raise one's own children, women should not have many partners, Wolff says – otherwise, we could not determine who the father is. In principle men could have many wives, but children of one wife are enough for one man to provide for – shortage of cash is the only reason for dismissing polygyny.

Husband and wife must then take care of their children. Here Wolff can conveniently just copy what he has said in his ethical writings, because duties for the welfare of others coincide with the duties for oneself: one must feed and cloth the child, and especially one must educate him or her, both in intelligence and will. Wolff shows some progressiveness, when he urges the parents to depend more on the children's intelligence than on beating and punishments – that is, when the children start to understand things better. When the children can finally provide for themselves, the duty of the parents stops, but the children are for the rest of their lives committed to respecting their parents for their kind deeds.

If the parents work for the good of the children, the servants are hired to work for their masters. Although the masters thus appear to be more in need, it is actually the servants who have the worse position: servants cannot provide for themselves and so they must sell their services for their living. What servants are to do is mostly decided by the contract made with the master – they just have to do it obediently and the master has to see that the servants are not overtasked. Wolff even allows the possibility that servants (or slaves) would be owned by the master, who could then also sell them to others. Wolff restricts slavery only to persons whose happiness essentially requires external governance. We immediately recognise a common excuse for the enslavement of Africans: they just couldn't manage themselves.

Wolff lived in an age when social relations were for the most part hierarchic. Thus, even in household there must be one person leading others. Children are still not fully rational and so are to obey their parents, while the servants are bound by the contract to obey their masters. When it comes to mixing children and servants, Wolff expressly instructs to avoid it. Children might disturb the work of the servants, but the true reason for Wolff's command appears to be the fear of corrupting influence that servants as persons of lower status might have on children.

The case of husband and wife is more interesting. The result is, of course, determined by the gender roles of the time. Husband or the lord of the house is to be the final master over the household, while the lady of the house is relegated into the position of a trusted advisor, who knows the affairs of the household best, and a representative of the lord, whom the other occupants must obey. Yet, Wolff admits that in principle men and women are not that different. Women are just more bound to the children, and it is customarily the men who have to provide for their families. Hence, the men know more about the ways of the world and should therefore rule the household. Although Wolff's argument is meant to uphold the status quo, it leaves open the option that under different customs women might have the opportunity to educate themselves and become as capable of taking care of the household as men are.

Wolffian economics shows then barely a hint of progression from the traditional trappings. We shall see if things fare better with the actual politics.