It is clear that Wolff must have
already had made preparations for the Vernünfftige Gedancken von
dem gesellschafftlichen Leben der Menschen und insonderheit dem
geimeinen Wesen, when he
published the previous title in the ”Reasonable thoughts”
-series. Wolff's German ethics concentrated on the individual in
abstraction from his social surroundings, but the current book
promises to correct this mistake.
Wolff accepts the
tradition of contractual origin of societies, which emphasises the
essentialy individual nature of human beings and which was later
criticised by Hegel. The story begins from an imagined point where
individuals have not yet formed any societies. If human beings could
provide for themselves, the story would also end here, but they have
various needs for which they require the help of others. Thus arises
the need for contracts, where one person offers what the other
desires. Some of these contracts call for the persons involved to
live together as a unit, and such units and the interpersonal
relations within them are what Wolff is describing in the book.
The origin story
provides Wolff already with some general principles that are valid of
all societies. Every society has been generated for the purpose of
promoting the well-being of its occupants – hence, the end of the
society lies in the individuals and their common good. When the
society strives to do something for the good of its members, it is
morally mound by the same natural laws as the individuals themselves.
If the society breaches those laws, individuals have then no duty to
remain within that society. Finally, all of these societies can be
regarded as individuals in their own right, and every society should
be independent of other societies of the same sort.
Wolff
calls the study of these societies politics, but the first half of
the book is actually dedicated to what was traditionally known as
economics after a pseudo-Aristotelian book of the same name. This was
not economics in the modern sense – a study of e.g. commerce –
but study of oikos or
household, while politics was restricted to a study of polis
or community. Wolff's book quickly turns into a description and
justification of the customs of his own culture, the 18th
century Germany. Thus, we hear that a household contains three types
of relations: those between a husband and a wife, those between
parents and children and those between masters and servants.
The traditionality
of the book can be seen in Wolff's definition of marriage as a union
of a man and a woman for the sake of conceiving and educating
children. Wolff's justification of the tradition of marriage betrays
a common ambivalent relation to sexuality. Wolff admits that the
desire for sex is natural as the necessary means for the reproduction
of human species – even a person in an ideal state of knowledge
would want to have sex. Thus, having sex is even a duty: once you are
capable, just go and do it.
Then again, Wolff
thinks sex is good only as a means for reproduction. Especially the
pleasure connected to sex exists only for the sake of hinting that
conception of children is good. Hence, any sex that cannot lead to
the birth of children is by definition forbidden. Wolff explicitly
mentions e.g. bestiality, prostitution and homosexuality, but
refrains from describing all possible sexual vices in order to avoid
giving any bad influences. And who is the worse sinner, the
prostitute or the client? Wolff's definite answer is the prostitute:
while the client is governed by his sexual impulses, the prostitute
could use reason, but chooses to make sin for the sake of money.
Often the defenders
of traditional marriage shy away from the unwanted consequences of
their premisses. Wolff takes his premisses seriously and denies even
all heterosexual sex that cannot lead to conception. Thus, sex and
marriage with an elderly and generally with an infertile person is
forbidden. Still, Wolff does allow marriage continue throughout the
life time of the married persons, so that they can take care of one
another in their old age.
Mere conception of
children is not enough, but one is duty-bound to take care of the
children until they can take care of themselves. Hence, the need for
marriage. Because one is committed only to raise one's own children,
women should not have many partners, Wolff says – otherwise, we
could not determine who the father is. In principle men could have
many wives, but children of one wife are enough for one man to
provide for – shortage of cash is the only reason for dismissing
polygyny.
Husband and wife
must then take care of their children. Here Wolff can conveniently
just copy what he has said in his ethical writings, because duties
for the welfare of others coincide with the duties for oneself: one
must feed and cloth the child, and especially one must educate him or
her, both in intelligence and will. Wolff shows some progressiveness,
when he urges the parents to depend more on the children's
intelligence than on beating and punishments – that is, when the
children start to understand things better. When the children can
finally provide for themselves, the duty of the parents stops, but
the children are for the rest of their lives committed to respecting
their parents for their kind deeds.
If the parents work
for the good of the children, the servants are hired to work for
their masters. Although the masters thus appear to be more in need,
it is actually the servants who have the worse position: servants
cannot provide for themselves and so they must sell their services
for their living. What servants are to do is mostly decided by the
contract made with the master – they just have to do it obediently
and the master has to see that the servants are not overtasked. Wolff
even allows the possibility that servants (or slaves) would be owned
by the master, who could then also sell them to others. Wolff
restricts slavery only to persons whose happiness essentially
requires external governance. We immediately recognise a common
excuse for the enslavement of Africans: they just couldn't manage
themselves.
Wolff lived in an
age when social relations were for the most part hierarchic. Thus,
even in household there must be one person leading others. Children
are still not fully rational and so are to obey their parents, while
the servants are bound by the contract to obey their masters. When it
comes to mixing children and servants, Wolff expressly instructs to
avoid it. Children might disturb the work of the servants, but the true
reason for Wolff's command appears to be the fear of corrupting
influence that servants as persons of lower status might have on
children.
The case of husband
and wife is more interesting. The result is, of course, determined by
the gender roles of the time. Husband or the lord of the house is to be
the final master over the household, while the lady of the house is
relegated into the position of a trusted advisor, who knows the
affairs of the household best, and a representative of the lord, whom
the other occupants must obey. Yet, Wolff admits that in principle
men and women are not that different. Women are just more bound to
the children, and it is customarily the men who have to provide for
their families. Hence, the men know more about the ways of the world
and should therefore rule the household. Although Wolff's argument is
meant to uphold the status quo, it leaves open the option that under
different customs women might have the opportunity to educate
themselves and become as capable of taking care of the household as
men are.
Wolffian economics
shows then barely a hint of progression from the traditional
trappings. We shall see if things fare better with the actual
politics.
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