In the Wolffian
tradition, and generally also in German idealism, understanding
refers to a certain part of human cognition. Hoffmann, on the other
hand, follows another tradition and by understanding means generally
whole cognitive side of human mind. More particularly, Hoffmann
defines understanding as the power of spirit to determine itself in
such a manner that ideas can exist or be generated in it.
Hoffmann takes a
strikingly original stance and suggests that all animals are capable
of ideas and thus they must have understanding. Of course, there are
different grades of understanding. Some animals have only a passive
cognition or sensation, in which external objects decide what ideas
the animal will have. Then again, some animals have also an activity
– memory – that lets them retain their vividness for a while.
Yet, no non-human animal has the ability to know truth – this would
require what Hoffmann calls reason, which is peculiar only for
humans.
It is evident then
that human understanding has various powers or capacities. In a
sense, the most basic of these is sensation (Empfindung)
or the capacity to be passively determined by some external object in
such a manner that an idea is generated. Sensation is the basis of
cognition, because it is our only route to existence. Hoffmann states
quite strongly that humans do not have any pure understanding that
could know existence of something without any help from sensation.
Indeed, he even advises using
concrete examples for highly abstract rules, in order to ease
understanding them.
Yet,
sensation does have its limits, Hoffmann admits. We cannot sense any
simple objects, but everything we sense consists of smaller entities.
We can also sense only individual objects and no abstractions. Thus,
we can never directly sense essences of things, which would consist
of forces abstracted from individual things.
Just
like Wolffians, Hoffmann also thinks that sensation comes in two
kinds, as external and as internal sensation. What makes it more
interesting is that Hoffmann actually seems to have quite a developed
theory of inner sensation. While external sensation is caused by
objects completely external
to human soul, the ultimate causes of inner sensations lies within
the soul, namely, it is the very activities of human understanding or
at least their effects we view with inner sensation. There is
empirical evidence, Hoffmann thinks, that this activity does not
straightaway move to the inner sensation – there is a clear
temporal gap between a mental activity and awareness of such an
activity. Thus, the activities we see with inner sensation first
cause some changes in some part of our body – Hoffmann mentions the
notion of animal spirits – and it is the animal spirit which then
affects inner sensation.
In
addition to describing the various faculties of human understanding,
Hoffmann is also interested to describe various defects these
faculties might have and to suggest several cures for these defects –
perhaps this is influence of his mentor, Andreas Rüdiger, who did
study medicine. Thus, one could have too strong inner sensation so
that external events could pass by without one taking any notice –
someone might be too entwined in her own thoughts so that she
couldn't even witness an army marching by her. Then again, inner
sensation might also be too weak, because of an imbalance in the
relation of the activities of understanding and the animal spirits –
such weakness would then cause wavering in certainty, since, Hoffmann
says, one need to have a clear view of what one is thinking in order
to be convinced of it.
In
Wolffian scheme, sensation is then followed by imagination, which is
generally the capacity to represent something that is not present.
Hoffmann does not recognise such general capacity of imagination, but
instead distinguishes two subcapacities of Wolffian imagination into
independent capacities. First of these is memory or the capacity to
retain ideas of things no longer present still vividly in our mind.
Hoffmann doesn't have that much of interest to say about memory,
although he does speculate that the memorised ideas must be still
present somehow unconsciously in the soul, so that it can then view
them when needed. Memory is more important to Hoffmann as a
presupposition of making judgements – one has to keep subject still
in mind, when connecting it with predicate. Weak memory is then
obviously a hindrance to a philosopher, but so is also too good
memory – one dependent on book learning, instead of good judgement,
is prone to just believing in authorities.
Besides
memory, Hoffmann discusses also ingenuity, which he defines as the
capacity to move from an idea to another, to which the first one is
somehow connected. These two ideas are not distinguished in any
manner, so this movement involves no proper judgement, but is more
like an immediate association of one idea with another. Although not
yet a judgement, ingenuity might provide some material for more
philosophical thinking by highlighting on some interesting and deep
connection between things. Yet, ingenuity may obviously follow some
quite random or oratorical associations, which might thus be of
hindrance to good judgement.
The
fourth power of understanding, for Hoffmann, is then judgement – it
is also the most important power in logic, because only with
judgements it makes sense to speak of truth. Indeed, Hoffmann defines
judgement as the capacity to connect ideas formed out of material from the three other faculties in such a manner that an inner sensation
of these combinations produces a conviction of truth. As Hoffmann
already noted, judgement does not just connect ideas, but also
distinguishes them from one another – this power of abstraction is
then an essential ingredient in judgement (note how Hoffmann here
anticipates the idea of both Hegel and Hölderlin that judgement is
more a making of distinctions than combination of previously existing
concepts).
Hoffmann's
discussion of judgement requires then at first a discussion of
abstraction – we shall do that in more detail in later posts, but
some preliminaries can already be indicated. Abstraction begins
always from some sensed or remembered individual event or object and
then starts to divide the idea of this individual into pieces. In
case of processual events, the abstraction is causal – we separate
causes from effects and means from ends. In case of stable things,
the abstraction is existential. In that case we might, firstly, in
quantitative abstraction ignore the individuality of the original
idea – instead of this triangle, we might think of triangles in
general. Secondly, we might in metaphysical abstraction think of the
properties of the original individual, as separated from any subject
that might have it – instead of a human being, we might think of
humanity. Thirdly, we might in qualitative abstraction differentiate
the various properties of the original individual from one another.
Hoffmann
doesn't really go into great detail in how the abstraction works. He
does point out that often in case of causal abstraction we must be
thinking of events (distant or hidden causes) we have never actually
witnessed. Similarly, when thinking highly abstract and indeterminate
existential abstractions we must think of ideas that we cannot
literally see (the famous triangle that is no specific type of
triangle). Hoffmann merely notes that the judgement or abstraction
must be able to somehow supply what these ideas lack in themselves
and complete them.
While
in case of other faculties, too great use of them might hinder
judgement, in case of judgement itself this is obviously not
possible. Then again, Hoffmann notes that judgement might be too
weak. The weakness of judgement leads then to obvious defects: one
might have confused notions, be susceptible to unfounded
presuppositions and follow all types of paralogisms.
This
is then the general outline of Hoffmann's theory of mental faculties.
Next time I shall start speaking about their effects or ideas.
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