Included with the
second book of Natural theology is also Wolff's first complete take
on worldviews that rivaled Christianity – one might
suppose that it was especially atheism controversy that generated his
interest in the topic. It is no wonder that Wolff rejects all these
theories, but what is interesting is how he groups these various
viewpoints into distinct sets.
The most important
of the wrong theories is obviously atheism, which Wolff thinks is so
important that it deserves a chapter of its own. We all know atheists
are of the opinion that God does not exist. What is more, a
consistent atheist must even deny the possibility of God, because by
Wolff's a priori proof, God would exist, if he just were possible.
Because God does not exist, there is no final explanation of the
world, but instead, the world must be an independent entity requiring
no explanation – a strange conclusion in Wolffian eyes, because
nothing extended could be really independent for Wolff. The worldly
events must either go on forever or form a loop in which things
repeat one another. In any case, they must follow an iron necessity,
since nothing outside the universe could come and change anything.
This doesn't mean that there would be no freedom, since human souls
might still have the freedom to do things – this freedom just
probably would have no consequences on the level of material world.
Still, it means that morality is difficult to combine with atheism,
because the necessity of the world makes it impossible to apply
values like good or bad to it.
After atheism, Wolff
groups together fatalism, deism and naturalism, probably because his
pietist opponents had often grouped these three together. Fatalism,
or the idea that everything in the world happens necessarily, is
evidently the one Wolff likes least. Wolff clearly states that
atheists must inevitably be fatalists, at least if they want to
accept the laws of physics. Still, all fatalists need not be
atheists, but they may well be deists, that is, they may believe that
God has just created the world, but does not afterwards interfere with
it in any manner. Wolff also points out that deist, like atheist,
cannot use the idea of divine providence as a way to booster people's
behaviour, yet, deist can be more consistent with morality, because he
can accept that God might have chosen another world, which might have
been better or worse.
Still, it is the
third idea or naturalism that is the most interesting of the three
theories. By naturalism Wolff does not mean belief in natural
sciences, but the idea of natural theology as the only true source
of religion. Wolff might have sympathised with the view, but he
clearly wanted to show also that natural theology and revealed
religion need not be rivals, but could in many cases meet one another.
It is not so strange
to see materialism and idealism in the same chapter, but
anthropomorphism seems a stranger bedfellow. Yet, Wolff obviously has
a point – if God is thought to be shaped like a human, he is obviously
material or at least has a material constituent. This also shows that
materialist need not necessarily be atheist, since she can just
assume that God is some material things (perhaps even the world
itself).
Wolff criticizes
both anthropomorphists and materialists, because they make God into
something very ungodlike – a material object that could be cut to
pieces. Interestingly Wolff is less critical of idealism and even
says that idealist need not deny physics, because she can just think
it concerns an apparent world. Still, Wolff finally denies idealism,
because it takes away from the glory of God, who then wouldn't have
created an independent world.
The final chapter of
the book gathers together various philosophical theories, but also
paganism or belief in the existence of several gods, which is perhaps
highlihted, because it shares similarities with Manicheanism: both
theories suggest that there are several principles guiding world and
thus they essentially lower the status of God. The final two systems,
Spinozism and Epicureanism, are quickly dealt with. Spinoza has the disadvantage, because it clearly confuses the notion of
independency and substance – God is the only independent thing and
others are God's creations, but these creations surely are not parts
of God. Epicureanism, on the other hand, falls from traditional
reasons – emphasising mere sensual pleasure destroys values in
themselves.
Finally a last page
on Wolff's natural theology. Next time I'll turn to a new philosopher.
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