Wolff's Latin series
of metaphysical works is finished by his Theologia naturalis.
While from the modern perspective this must be the least interesting
part of Wolff's system, it is, on the contrary, largest of all the
Latin metaphysical works, and indeed, was published in two volumes.
The first volume begins with
a brief explanation of what natural theology is all about, but
is especially characterised by an a posteriori method – that is,
Wolff attempts to use experience to determine the existence and
properties of God. The second
volume should then obviously use an a priori method – a novelty in
Wolffian system, and we shall see how it fits in with the more
established part of his theology.
Wolff's
primary route for God's existence has always been through what Kant
would later call a cosmologial proof.
Wolff begins by admitting the existence of reader's own soul – if
nothing else exists then I at least exist. Then Wolff notes that
there must be a complete grounding of the existence of this soul.
Complete ground or reason can then be only something which does not
require any further
explanation or anything
external for its own existence. It is clear this proof has a number
of weak points. What is this grounding supposed to mean? If it is
just a nickname for a mental demand of human consciousness that all
things must be fully grounded, then we clearly need not take it
seriously as an ontological principle – even if I'd have to insist
on God's existence, this would not necessitate God's actual
existence. Then again, it appears unreasonable to suppose that the
complete ground in an
ontological sense
couldn't be an infinite
series of past events,
especially if one believed that such a series would be necessary.
Whatever
the case, the rest of the book sets out to discover further
characteristics of this final explanation of everything. The
most straightforward feature is that while God, like all entities,
must have some force, it must be a force that requires nothing
external for activating it. In effect, if there is no inherent
contradiction in the structure of God, it will, as it were, actualise
itself, no matter what – we shall return to this idea, when we are
dealing with the second book on natural theology. Figuratively one
can say that God existed before anything else and God will exist
after anything else.
God's
necessity and self-sufficiency reveal at least what God cannot be.
God cannot have been generated in a literal sense of the term and he
definitely cannot be destroyed – thus, he cannot be material. Then
again, because human souls are essentially dependent on the world
they represent, God cannot be a human soul. Still, God has chosen to
create a particular world and so must have some mental activities or
be spirit. In fact, by thinking what sort of spiritual activities are
required in an act of creation, one can try to determine what God is
like.
Now,
in order that God can choose a world to create, he must have
first checked out all the possibilities from which to choose the
world to be created – in effect, God must have considered all the
possible worlds. This means
that God must have some cognitive activities, yet, they are of quite
different type than human cognition. For starters, God does not have
any passive faculties, because he is constantly acting or cognising
things. Furthermore, God does not need to move from one aspect of a
world to another, but he comprehends immediately everything that
would happen in one possible world. Because possible worlds contain
all that there might be, God is definitely omniscient.
If
God then knows all things perfectly well, can he also know what we
know, as we know it? Well, God cannot fail to have a perfect knowledge, thus, he
cannot force himself into a mode in which he would have only human
type of knowledge of world and cannot therefore have any firsthand experience on the condition of human consciousness. Still, God can know that some other
person has a more imperfect view of the world.
Because
God can at once see all the past, present and future events, he has
complete historical knowledge of all individual things. This does not
mean that God could not have universal or philosophical knowledge
also. Indeed, God can intuitively know whether certain feature of
things is universally connected to another feature, so making him the
greatest scientist of all times. Of
course, even in universal knowledge God is not restricted to any use
of symbols, although he does see that humans usually require such
aids for universal knowledge.
Before moving onto
more active side of divine attributes, it is good to note in passing
that Wolff also used considerable number of pages for determining
whether Bible got it right – that is, whether e.g. Bible is
correct, if it says that God sees something, or whether it must be
using symbolic language. It is a bold move, especially considering
accusations of atheism against Wolff and the recent schism with the Wertheimer Bible, that Wolff even considers such
questions, even if these questions feel rather dated nowadays. Next time more
about the divine will.
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