Wolff is interested not just of truth
and probability, but of different methods for discovering true and
probable statements, that is, scientific and philosophical
methodology. Now, as we have seen, Wolff has made the bold statement
that logic is all that one requires for methodology, and at least
when it comes to truth, logic is essentially based on demonstrations.
This rather stringent description is easier to understand, once we
remember that Wolff would accept also empirical statements as
premisses of demonstration.
What I find remarkable is that Wolff
mentions two different methodologies: a posteriori and a priori. In
all external appearances, we are moving towards Kant, yet, there are still
crucial differences. While for Kant a posteriori would mean all
knowledge based on experience, Wolff limits the range of a posteriori
to mere experiences. Thus, when Kant says that a posteriori knowledge
cannot be universal, his statement is far stronger than Wolff's.
Indeed, Wolff would verbally accept Kant's statement, but it would
mean something less than with Kant – it would be just tautology
because individual experiences are always singular.
Now, if a posteriori has no other
meaning for Wolff, but individual experiences, a priori must then get
everything else, that is, the class of a priori contains all bits of
knowledge requiring demonstration. Now, demonstrations as meant by
Wolff here can be either direct or indirect, while a
priori can be either intuitive or discursive. Intuitive a priori has
a nice paradoxical feeling to it, somewhat reminiscent of later and
more famous synthetic a priori, yet, is not completely identical with
it. Intuitive apriority characterises all those truths that can be
directly intuited as true, just by carefully reflecting on the
elements of the supposed truth. The class of such truths contains
analytic axioms of logic, but also immediate truths about causes and
effects, which Kant would have classified as synthetic a priori.
The final class of knowledge statements
contains then discursive apriorities, that is, demonstrated truths.
As one should remember, these demonstrations could have reliable
experiences as premises. Furthermore, Wolff also included inductions
as just one modification of syllogistic reasoning. Wolff's class of
discursive apriorities contains then a lot that Kant would have
classified as a posteriori, and in fact is probably the largest of
the three classes.
Within this threefold classification
Wolff places his main methodological considerations: when is
experience to be relied upon, when can we say that something is a
cause, when can we use experiences to draw general conclusions etc. I
shall refrain from going into intricate details, and instead, I shall
next time look at how Wolff thinks scientific conclusions should be
presented.
Ei kommentteja:
Lähetä kommentti