All things make other things possible and are therefore causes, Crusius says. This possibility of another thing could be called a force. Problem with this definition, Crusius says, is that such forces seem to explain nothing: it does not really tell us anything to say that the stomach has a force to consume food. Indeed, such a force might be a combination of many causes or then it might be just an abstraction of some more substantial process.
For this reason, Crusius advocates looking for forces in a more substantial sense or fundamental forces (Grundkraft). These fundamental forces should be something special and distinct even outside our consideration and also something constant in the thing. When then can we say that something is a fundamental force? Well, Crusius notes, as long as we cannot causally explain the supposed effects through the force, this cannot be fundamental - or at least we do not understand the fundamental force distinctly. This means that at least the first or nearest effects of the fundamental force should be affected only by conditions within the subject. In fact, these nearest effects should be something in the subject itself, while further effects appearing in other things or objects are influenced also by fundamental forces in those objects.
Crusius continues determining fundamental forces. If a fundamental force is finite, it should have only one kind of nearest effect, while all further effects should be understood through these nearest effects - otherwise, causal chains would offer no explanation. Of course, the same finite subject can have several distinct fundamental forces and could thus be part of many kinds of causal chains with many types of nearest effects. Furthermore, the limitation affects even less an infinite force, Crusius says, because it should be capable of literally all kinds of effects. This implies that we can never really know what having an infinite force would feel like.
Fundamental force should be truly fundamental, Crusius emphasises. In other words, it should not be causally dependent on some other forces in the same subject nor be just a modification of some force. Then again, if one knows that some occurrence in a subject cannot be explained through one force, then this occurrence cannot be just a modification of this one force, but requires the influence of some other force. For instance, Crusius suggests against Wolff, human volition cannot be explained through mere force of representation.
Forces can cause something through their mere existence, Crusius says and gives as examples all mechanical causes that affect things through their mere position and shape. Then again, force can also be active in the sense that it affects things through an inner property directed to bring about certain effects. Such activities can form causal chains within a subject, Crusius notes, but these chains must end in some fundamental activities, which are immediate applications of some fundamental forces. These fundamental activities cannot be mechanical, thus, cannot depend on mere movement of the subjects. Furthermore, they cannot depend on anything external to the subject nor be generated merely by a previous activity of the subject, although previous activities can be conditions of a fundamental activity.
Crusius notes that some fundamental activities continue constantly, because of the essence of the underlying substance. In the case of divine activities, Crusius insists, the very underlying substance is necessary and thus the activities are also necessary. If the underlying substance is not necessary, like in case of elements, the fundamental activity is dependent on its existence.
Some fundamental activities do not occur constantly, Crusius says. Of these contingent fundamental activities, some happen always in a certain manner under certain conditions, like human sensations. Then again, other fundamental activities are just enabled by certain conditions, but not necessarily actualised: the primary example here is human will. Crusius insists that such free activities are not contradictory, and indeed, that their existence must be assumed, in order to justify the notion of moral accountability.
Free activities can be sufficient grounds, Crusius says, in the sense that they can make things actual. Then again, he continues, they are not determining grounds, that is, what they make actual could also be otherwise. In cases not involving free activities, Crusius endorses what he calls the principle of determining ground: what is not generated through free action must have a ground that not just makes it actual, but also determines it to be such and not otherwise.
The principle of determining ground concerns only real grounds, in other words, relations between real substances. Thus, Crusius explains, it should not be confused with an epistemic principle that nothing should be assumed without a good ground or reason or with a moral principle that nothing should be done without a good reason. Still, determining grounds do provide us also with ideal or epistemic grounds, he admits: if we know that something is a determining ground for some phenomenon, we know that this phenomenon cannot be otherwise.
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