As familiar as was his account of
complex entities, as familiar is also Wolff's description of simple
entities, which in many cases simply have characteristics opposite to
characteristics of complex substances. Previously I characterised
Wolffian simple things as units of forces, which is quite correct
still in light of Latin ontology, but one must not assume that
complex entities could not then be described in terms of forces.
Instead, the notion of force is something common to both simple and
complex entities.
To understand what Wolff means by a
force, one must begin with the notion of modes that we know to be
characteristics that can be changed without changing the essential
identity of a thing. Now, consistent collections of modes define a
certain state. Such states, if they happen to be instantiated, belong
to some thing, which can then be called the subject of these states,
which are then adjunct to the subject. Note that the notion of
subject, just like the notion of essence, is context dependent: in
geometry we might take certain figure as stable, while in physics
this figure could also be mutable.
In some cases, the change of states can
be explained through the subject of change – then the change can be
called an action of the subject, while in the opposite case it could
be called passion. Thus, while if I voluntarily jump from a plane,
the subsequent fall is my action, if on the other hand I am thrown
from a plane, the fall is my passion. A subject undergoing an action
can be called an agent, while a subject undergoing a passion can be
called patient.
Furthermore, corresponding to action
and passion, a thing has corresponding possibilities for action and
passion or active potentiality and passive potentiality, the former
of which Wolff also calls faculty. Without these potentialities
actions and passions could not occur, but as mere possibilities they
still require something in order to be activated.
In case of actions, this activating
element is finally called force. What a force is or how it will be
generated should not yet be apparent from this nominal definition.
Still, it is quite clear from the definition that it makes no sense
to speak of a force if there is no action that it activates, unless
there is some opposing force resisting this activation.
This is as far as conceptual analysis
takes us. From empirical considerations Wolff concludes that we could
describe force as consisting of conatus.
Conatus is a peculiar
notion, common to many early modern thinkers, such as Spinoza,
meaning a sort of life force of a thing that aimed at preventing the
destruction of the thing. In physical contexts, conatus
was often identified with impetus, the habit of bodies to remain in
the same state of movement – this tendency was thought to be due to
some internal yearning of bodies.
One obvious aim of
this talk of conatus or impetus is to introduce the possibility to
quantify forces – forces can be connected to the actions they
trigger, and we can thus present forces as vectors. Because of their
quantitative nature, forces can be combined (basic principle for this
possibility is easily seen in a so-called parallelogram of force).
Thus, we can regard forces of composite entities as combinations of
forces of simple entities.
Parallelogram of forces: when forces F1 and F2 are the only forces affecting a thing the resulting movement is described by their sum |
The mathematics of
forces is one step in Wolff's project of quantifying philosophy. A
final step is taken with the notion of grade, which Wolff defines as
a characteristic of qualities that can be used to distinguish
different (spatial or temporal) instances of same quality (thus, two
apples might have a different tinge of green). Now, Wolff notes that
it is possible to create at least a fictitious quantification for the
grades (just think of a temperature scale – if a temperature of air
rises two grades, this does not happen because of adding two
individual grades of warmth to air). Because qualities were
originally the only impediment of the quantification program, Wolff
thinks he has solved the problem suggested by his critics.
The final piece in
separating complex and simple entities is the notion of substance.
Here Wolff begins by distinguishing between what is mutable (that
which can be changed without it losing its essential identity) and what is only perdurable (that which can exist for a time without losing its
essential identity). Now, Wolff's interest lies in perdurable things:
cows, shadows, colours, you name it. Some of these perdurable entities are not
mutable, some of them are. According to Wolff, this distinction
among perdurables captures the traditional distinction between
accidences and substances. This might need some explanation. Consider
a traditional example of an accidence, such as certain shade of
colour. It can definitely exist for a while, say, on some surface,
but when you try to change it, it will change into a different shade.
Then again, a substance, like a cow, will not be destroyed, if you
paint it black – thus, it is not just perdurable, but also mutable.
Wolff's definition
clearly is not meant as a strict division, but more as a hierarchy of
substantiality – that is, we can speak of what is more accidental
or substantial. Thus, we can change e.g. shape of a certain blob of
colour, so that it will still remain a blob of this colour. Then
again certain modifications of cow, such as tearing it apart, will
undoubtedly destroy it. In addition, Wolff suggests we may define as
proper substances those perdurables that will endure through any
humanly conceivable change – these are essentially the simple
substances. Then again, complex substances are in comparison
accidental, because all their essential characteristics, such as
figure and magnitude, are mere accidents. Thus, they can be only
secondary substances.
Wolff ends his
account of simple substances with a consideration of infinities. The
characterisation of an infinite substance contains no surprises –
infinite substance is incomparable with finite substances, but we can
say that it has some analogical or eminent characteristics (eminence
appears to be just a roundabout way to say that we really do not understand
what it is). Then again, Wolff also makes some interesting remarks on
mathematical infinities and infinitesimals. To put short, he admits
that no mathematical infinities or infinitesimals actually exist, but
also suggests that such fictions are useful in e.g. differential
calculus.
So much for simple
substances, now it is only relations we have to speak of.
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