We might state Lange's main criticism
of Wolffian theology quite simply: God has very little to do in
Wolff's system. True, Wolff does admit that God exists and even
proves his existence, but Lange cannot even commend Wolff's proof,
which he deems to be faulty. Indeed, Lange hits on a crucial defect.
Wolff's principle of sufficient reason or ground states that all
things should have some ground, that is, all physical things should
derive from a previous cause and all conscious actions should be
somehow motivated. From this principle Wolff suddenly moves to a
stronger principle that all things should have a full ground, that
is, they should be based on an ultimate ground that requires no
further ground for its existence. Lange notes that Wolff's original
principle of sufficient ground is consistent with an infinite causal
series bringing about the current event, thus, making the leap to the stronger principle unjustified.
Even if Wolff does accept God, Lange
continues, Wolff's deterministic world system leaves almost no room
for divine push on events. Wolff does make a halfhearted attempt to
explain the possibility of miracles: God can supernaturally affect
world, if he then makes another miracle that corrects the world so
that it will once again return to its deterministic course. In
effect, miracles of Wolffian God can make nothing new happen, because
their results are erased by the second miracle of restitution.
Lange is especially opposed to Wolff's
notion of what God is like. Wolff defines God as an entity that can
think of all infinitely multiple possible worlds. God is then meant
to choose one of these possible worlds for actualization – thus, he
does not truly create the world, Lange says, meaning perhaps that God
does not design the world from scratch, but accepts the world from a
ready-made brochure of possible worlds. Even this choice is less of
an achievement than it seems, because God is essentially a passively
cognizing entity without any spontaneous volitions. God is like a
computer that has been programmed to choose the best possible
world – God as perfectly good cannot really choose any other
option. Hence, the supposed choice becomes a mere justification of
the goodness of the actual world – creation is as deterministic as
the world created.
An atheist would then have no
difficulties in accepting Wolffian philosophy, Lange concludes, for
the assumption of God is mere play of words. Indeed, Lange thinks,
Wolff even defends atheists by saying that atheism is compatible with
morality. We shall see next time in more detail what Lange has to say
about Wolffian ethics.
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