Leibnizian philosophy was supposedly
based on two principles: the principle of contradiction which states
that contradictions cannot exist and which should be the
foundation of all logical truths and the principle of sufficient
reason which should be the principle of all non-logical truths
and which states that all non-logical facts must have an explanation.
Wolff continues the Leibnizian
tradition by placing these two principles at the beginning of his
ontology. Yet, while the two principles were apparently
indemonstrable for Leibniz, Wolff thought that he could deduce the
principle of sufficient reason. As the only other axiom from which
the principle of sufficient reason could be deduced is the principle
of contradiction, Wolff has often been accused of making ontology a
mere corollary of logic. I think it will be insightful to see whether
this accusation holds.
Although Leibniz's principle speaks of
reasons, Wolff's zureichende Grund
could as well or even better be translated as a sufficient ground.
Ground, then, is something in a thing A that explains why a thing B
exists. A and B could be the same thing, but if they happen to be
different, A can then be called the cause of B. Warmth of air
could thus be a ground for wilting of the plants, while the warm air
would be the cause of the same wilting. The principle of sufficient reason
in its Wolffian version states thus that all things must have a
sufficient ground, that is, something explaining completely how they
could exist.
Wolff has two proofs for the principle
of sufficent reason. Well, actually there is a third argument –
Wolff states that the principle must be assumed if one is to separate
a dream from a coherent experience – but this argument is clearly
based on the presupposition that we can differentiate the two.
Wolff's main argument is rather simple.
Suppose there is something without any ground explaining it. Then it
must have been generated out of nothing (Nichts). But
as nothing can come out of nothing, everything must have a sufficient
ground.
At first sightWolff
just appears to beg the question: the statement that something cannot
arise out of nothing says just that all things must arise from some
previous ground. Yet, we must be careful about how to interpret
Wolff's terminology. Nothing, which Wolff speaks of, does not mean a
mere state of there being no things. Indeed, Wolff admits that
something can come out of a state of there being nothing, as long as
it is a possibility that something could come out of this state.
Instead, Wolff's nothing refers to something that cannot be or an
impossibility: nothing can come out of nothing, because this
”nothing” is an impossibility that cannot ever be actualised.
We are
now in the midst of Wolff's use of modal terminology. I should
firstly clarify a possible misunderstanding. Nowadays, we are
accustomed to speak of possibility and impossibility in connection
with propositions: it is possible, for instance, that tomorrow it
will rain. For Wolff, on the contrary, possibility is a
characteristic of things. Indeed, thing (Ding)
means, according to Wolff, something possible. Thus, there are no
impossible things (like round squares), or at the most, they are only
imagined to be things, although in fact they are mere ”nothings”.
Wolff
also tells us that possbility is not by itself an actuality, but
requires something to fill itself. This filling of the possibility
appears then to be nothing else but the sufficient ground required
for the existence of something. We may then picture the Wolffian
structure of modalities through the following simile. The possible
things are like bubbles in a soup of possibility, all trying to float
upwards, to the free air of actuality: they are like forces striving
towards actualisation. The possibilities have various chances for reaching the surface, but at least they do have the potential to get there,
if a sufficient boost is given. Only the impossible residue at the
bottom can never rise towards the actuality, because it lacks the
necessary impetus even to strive towards actuality.
We may now return
to Wolff's second argument. Wolff asks us to assume two essentially similar things A and B, that is, things that differ only by quantity
and location. If the principle of sufficient ground would not hold, A
could be changed in some manner that would not occur, if A was
replaced with B. But this would contradict the assumption, because
similarity is defined by the characteristic that two things could
change their place without any essential difference.
Wolff's proof is
essentially based on his notion that all things have an essence, that
is, a kernel which determines all the other non-quantitative
characteristics that the thing has. It is only the essence and
characteristics based on it, through which the things can be
differentiated. In other words, two completely similar objects must have the
same essence.
Wolff's proof
suggests that the essence of a thing determines then all the possible
changes that can occur to this thing. If a thing would change in a
manner not based on the essence of the thing, such a change would
violate the essential identity of the thing.: this is the crux of
Wolff's second proof. Particularly the essence determines the
conditions in which a thing with such an essence can be actualised.
In other words, essences are the object of the real definitions of
Wolffian methodology.
The bubbles of
possibilities in the picture above are then just the Wolffian
essences. Note that at least at this point of his discourse Wolff
appears to accept the possibility that one essence might have several
actualisations distinguished only by their location or their quantity
(as I have not yet completed the book, the situation might still
change). Here Wolff seems to differ radically from Leibniz, who
insisted that two different entities must be differentiated by some
intrinsic properties.
Wolff also notes
that essences are eternal and necessary. This does not mean that the
essences themselves would necessarily have actualisation. He is
merely pointing out that if we take possibilities of things as new
things – essences – these things must exist. In effect, Wolff is
stating that the realm of possibilities is fixed: no new essence
could arise nor could any essence be destroyed, that is, neither any
impossibility could become possible nor any possibility could become
impossibility.
Wolff's framework
of modalities undoubtedly can justify the principle of sufficient
reason. Indeed, one might say that the principle is built into that
framework. But a more doubtful question is how Wolff can justify this
system of modalities. Even more confusing is that Wolff connects
possibility with non-contradiction. The system of modalities
expounded earlier is heavily ontological: possibility of a thing
involves some conditions by which it can be actualised. A definition
based on non-contradiction would appear to deontologicise the
modalities.
The most probable
explanation is that Wolff considered contradiction also to be an
ontological proposition. Thus, in the previous picture of modality,
we should think of all the essences as necessarily related to a
counterpart – or all the essences that are not necessary or cannot
by themselves be actualised. But the other essences form then pairs,
only only one of which can be actualised at the time: the
actualisation of one essence keeps its opposite unactualised. The
possibilities are then not just forces, but forces combating and
cancelling one another.
Even this explanation merely moves the
problem a step forward. If Wolff has an ontological notion of
contradiction, then the principle of contradiction becomes suddenly
quite problematic. Especially the negative possibilities seem quite
problematic: although there might be a force striving to generate
horses, it seems ridiciluous to suggest that there is an opposite
force acting to destroy horses.
As I mentioned previously, Wolff
attempts to use the Cartesian starting point as a justification of
the principle of contradiction. Wolff's idea is to show that even the
Cartesian cogito is based on
principle of contradiction: the principle is discovered through one
occasion of its use, although once discovered it is self-evident. But
it is far from clear that our knowledge of our own existence involves
any ontological non-contradiction: I do not believe that I am haunted by
a shadow of my non-existence trying to kill me which I would have to actively fight against.
Although
Wolff's attempt to prove the principle of sufficient reason is then
more complex than meets the eye, in the final reckoning it involves a
simple failure. By the way, complex and simple things in general will
be the issue next time.