Georg Friedrich Meier: Thoughts on the condition of the soul after death – Is there life after death?

This time we are considering the part of Meier’s treatise he himself considers the most important: he will show that the immortality of the soul is uncertain, making it thus even more uncertain what the life after death would be like. Meier begins from something he considers to be a proven fact, that is, the simplicity and immateriality of the soul. Like all simple beings, he continues, the soul has – or more likely, is – a force that supports its accidental features. This means that the soul exists as long as it retains its force, which is its nature.

This force or nature is the sufficient reason for the changes of the soul, Meier notes. Thus, as long as the soul exists, this nature acts, and this acting can be witnessed in the various ways its accidental features change. These changes are what the life of the soul consists of. As long as the soul exists, then, it lives, or the soul and its life are intrinsically entwined to one another. Meier adds the clarification that it is only the sensuous life he is speaking of and thus the only thing that needs to be proven is this sensuous life of the soul.

Meier follows the Wolffian tradition in stating that simple things like the soul cannot be taken apart, but they can only be destroyed through a complete annihilation, whereby nothing remains of the simple thing that does not exist anymore. Since the soul is a finite thing, it changes and can even fail to exist. Thus, Meier concludes, it is possible that it will be annihilated or that it dies after its death. Indeed, thinking the soul necessarily exists would be tantamount to equating it with God.

Now, Meier admits, this argument determines the mortality of the soul only in itself or in abstraction. To determine whether the soul will truly die or not requires determining whether there are any actual causes that would annihilate it. Meier notes that if the soul is annihilated, it must be annihilated by some substance and its force, which has to be one of three kinds: the soul itself, some other finite substance and its force or God with their infinite power.

Meier quickly concludes that the soul cannot annihilate itself: if the soul is to do something, it must exist, excluding the possibility of the soul being annihilated when it acts. For a somewhat similar reason, Meier insists, a soul cannot be annihilated by other finite things. This proposition Meier bases on the general fact that when a finite thing acts on another finite thing, the other thing acts also in the same measure back to the original thing. This means that if a finite thing would annihilate another, this other thing would at the same time have to exist and act on the first thing, making the annihilation impossible.

The only option left is then that God might annihilate the soul. Meier notes that God should be able to do everything that is in itself possible, which implies that God must also be able to kill the soul. Of course, he adds, God might not choose to do so. Still, he thinks, we cannot really know what God has chosen about this matter. Following the common assumptions of the Wolffian tradition, Meier thinks that God has chosen to actualise the best possible world. Since we haven’t died yet, we cannot know by experience whether our soul will continue to live after it. Then again, if we wanted to demonstrate this future life without relying on experience, we would have to show that it is a necessary ingredient of the best possible world. Such a demonstration, in Meier's opinion, would require going through all the events of the actual world, which clearly exceeds our capacities.

Meier has concluded the main task of this chapter: he has shown we cannot be certain that God won’t destroy us and thus our immortality cannot be demonstrated. Then again, he adds, we also cannot demonstrate that immortality would be contradictory. Meier goes even so far as to argue that materialism is not incompatible with the immortality of the soul. Of course, he immediately adds, if the soul were just another name for the body or some part of it, like the brain, it would die at the same time as the body dies. Then again, materialism is compatible with the position that the soul is something different from the body, just as long as it will be material, for instance, an atom or a combination of atoms. As an atom, the soul could very well be immortal, and even if the soul were a combination of atoms, it might be such that it cannot be broken apart like ordinary matter.

As a conclusion of this chapter, Meier goes through a list of supposed proofs for the immortality of soul, showing all to be lacking. I shall go through these proofs and Meier’s criticism of them very quickly:

• Simplicity justifies immortality; Meier notes that this assumption ignores the possibility of God annihilating the soul
• Our drive for eternal life justifies immortality; Meir insists that even if we had such an innate drive, this would by itself justify immortality just as poorly as our sexual drive would prove we will have sex at some point
• Shared conviction of all nations justifies immortality; Meier notes that before Copernicus we could have with similar grounds said that the Sun truly rotates the Earth
• Failure of arguments against immortality justifies immortality; Meier thinks that this argument is as convincing as if he would say that the Moon must have telepathetic denizens, because we cannot prove it wrong.

Georg Friedrich Meier: Thoughts on the condition of the soul after death – What is immortality?

After the preliminary considerations, Meier begins his investigation by elucidation of what is meant by the soul being immortal. He notes that many earlier philosophers, especially those of Cartesian school, had said that the soul's immortality means that it will not be decomposed. Because they also thought that the soul was simple and thus composed of nothing further, they imagined they had sufficiently proven the soul to be immortal.

Meier notes that this Cartesian notion of immortality is simply inadequate: even if the soul cannot be destroyed, it might still fail to be immortal. As an extreme case of an opposite kind, Meier introduces Ludvig Thümmig’s notion of immortality. Thümmig had said that to be immortal, the soul must not just be indestructible, but it also must exist eternally after death, live after death and finally recollect its previous life. Meier thinks Thümmig includes in his notion things that are not really about the immortality of the soul, but about the condition of the soul after death. The true notion should then lie somewhere between Cartesian and Thümmig’s notions.

Meier starts his own discussion of immortality with a discussion of life, which he defines, following Baumgarten, as something continuing its own nature. By nature Meier means sum of all such inner determinations that causes changes in accidences or makes them actual. Thus, he elucidates, nature of something does not include just its essence and capacities, but also forces. One could then prove that something lives by showing, firstly, that it continues to have its capacities or forces, or secondly, by showing that it continues to have actual accidences or changes in them that depend on its particular nature. Meier notes that the latter method is more common and easier, and indeed, the only way we can prove the life of something from experience, because we cannot directly perceive capacities and forces. For instance, we can know a tree has not died during winter, only if we see it grow leaves again in spring.

Death Meier then defines as the opposite of life, that is, interruption in the nature of something. Hence, something can be known to have died, firstly, if we know a priori that its forces have disappeared, or secondly, if we know a posteriori that it has no natural changes or accidences anymore. Note that the dead thing can still change in a manner that does not belong to its particular nature, just like a dead tree can still rot.

Meier continues by defining human being as a complex consisting of a reasoning soul and a human body, which are in a close relation of correspondence. Humans thus have three types of life: life of their body, life of their soul and life of the whole human being. Meier notes that the life of a human being requires the life of the body and the soul. Then again, he adds, if a human body lives, so must its soul and the whole human being also. The death of the human being implies then the death of the body and the ensuing separation of the body and the soul, but it need not imply the death of the soul.

In separation from the body, Meier says, the soul has two kinds of life, because it has two types of forces. In regard to its lower capacities, based on indistinct representations, it has sensuous or animal life, while in regard to its higher capacities, based on distinct representations, it has spiritual life. Now, he adds, spiritual life requires sensuous life, but not the other way around, as we can see in a sleeping person. Soul can then also die in two senses: by losing its sensuous life and thus all representation or by losing its spiritual life and only distinct representations.

Meier defines mortal to be something that can die, while immortal things cannot die. Because what is impossible cannot be actual, assuming the immortality of the soul means, he explains, assuming that the soul cannot die and that it will continue living after the death of the human being. Because what is possible need still not be actual, mortality of the soul might not mean that it would actually die, although usually people assume that the mortality of the soul implies its eventual death.

Following common definitions in the ontology of his times, Meier notes that possibility and impossibility could be absolute or hypothetical. This implies then two senses of mortality and immortality. If something is absolutely or in itself mortal, it can die, when we do not regard its relation to other things. Hypothetically mortal, on the other hand, is mortal when regarded in relation to other things or in some context. Meier notes that the human body is mortal both in itself and hypothetically. Absolutely immortal is then something, the death of which would imply in itself a contradiction: this sort of immortality Meier reserves only for the highest being. Hypothetically immortal, then, is something which cannot die in some context. Meier notes that a thing can be absolutely mortal without being hypothetically mortal in all contexts, while hypothetically mortal is always absolutely mortal. Absolutely immortal, on the other hand, cannot die in any context and is therefore hypothetically immortal.

Meier notes that for the sake of religion and morality it is not enough to prove that the soul is immortal or continues living after death, because it could just sleep or live like an animal. Instead, if one wants to defend religion and morality with such proofs, they should also show that the soul is at least occasionally conscious of itself and of other things in the future life, that it uses at least occasionally its higher forces, that is, freedom and understanding, and that in its future state it also remembers what it did while attached to the body and even recognises its identity with its former state. These latter properties, Meier elucidates, do not characterise the immortality of the soul, but something more, namely the condition of the soul after the death.

Georg Friedrich Meier: Thoughts on the condition of the soul after death (1746)

Meier’s Gedanken von dem Zustande der Seelen nach dem Tode is a rare book for its time, since although it studies the condition of the human soul after death, it does not try to demonstrate that this soul will continue to exist then. Indeed, he says, most of the demonstrations suggested for the immortality of our souls seem convincing just because the conclusion has already been accepted. We believe in the afterlife, because the idea agrees with our hopes, and indeed, we picture the afterlife to be as we would like it to be: Meier mentions a noble who was certain that in the afterlife souls of the nobility won’t have to mingle with souls from the lower classes.

Meier still makes sure to ascertain that he isn’t trying to disprove the immortality of the soul either. The reason for such an explanation is clear, since Meier speaks of the pressure of religious zealots, who censure everyone who even appears to go against such central religious dogmas. Meier assures the reader that he believes in the immortality of the soul and the final judgement of all humans, just because the Bible has taught him so. He even admits that we can be morally certain of this immortality and commends anyone who wants to go even further and demonstrate it with complete mathematical certainty.

Still, Meier says, the aim of his work is to show that such a demonstration is impossible for human beings, although, as he immediately adds, human reason is not inevitably led to doubt the immortality of the human soul. He will even analyse some suggested demonstrations and show where they fail to prove what they set out to prove. Finally, Meier concludes, his work will make it clear that nothing certain can be revealed about the condition of our soul after death.

Meier emphasises that his work has not been motivated by mere arrogance. Instead, he wants to raise the value of faith and scripture by lowering the worth of the human reason. Furthermore, Meier insists, the distinction of the faith and the reason also defends the faith: if one would think that belief in the immortality of the soul is based on nothing else than supposed demonstrations of reason, the weaknesses of these demonstrations would place the faith also in jeopardy.

Meier scorns all those who prefer leaving people with the incorrect opinion that demonstration of the immortality of the soul is possible in the name of religion and morality. On the contrary, he says, religion and morality do not need such weak defences. Immortality does motivate us for morality and religion, but motives need not have mathematical, but mere moral certainty.

Morality specifically, Meier thinks, has motives, even if we didn’t believe in immortality, because it has good consequences even in this life, and at least philosophers are equipped to understand these motives. Even if other people would not recognise these motives, Meier says, they still wouldn’t all become murderers and robbers, if they did not believe in the immortality of the human soul. His justification is that people generally do not act on the basis of some theories, but on the basis of their passions and inclinations. Furthermore, he insists, universal lack of morality could not occur, since, for instance, a universal disregard of property rights would soon collapse, since no one could make sure that they could keep on to what they had stolen from others.

Even religion could exist with the belief in human immortality, Meier says. True, he admits, most non-believers in immortality are atheists. Still, the demonstration of God’s existence is independent of the truth of our immortality, and when we accept the existence of God already, we always have to accept religion also.

Christian Wolff: Natural right 6 – What a scholar must do

Wolff ends this part of Jus naturae with a study of the duties of a scholar, that is, a person who knows of things. Wolff begins by noting that there are different kinds of scholars depending on what the person in question knows: e.g. there are scholars of law and scholars of languages. Furthermore, he continues, scholars come in different grades. Scholars of the lowest or vulgar order merely know facts. More experienced scholars, on the other hand, have philosophical or even mathematical understanding why something is true. The highest order of scholars, finally, are capable of finding new truths.

Wolff suggests that all scholars should aim for the proper place in this hierarchy, that is, the place where they can achieve something. Thus, if they can ascend to a higher order, they should not be content with remaining on a lower order. Indeed, scholars of all orders should continuously try to progress further, Wolff says, and not be satisfied with the knowledge of things they have already acquired.

Wolff is also a proponent of cooperation in scholarship: if some scholar can help others further, for instance, by providing advice in acquiring information or in finding new truths, they should do so. Particularly, scholars of superior grades should teach those of inferior grades things that are useful in promoting knowledge and understanding. On the other hand, a scholar who cannot decide something on their own should follow the guidance of other, preferably more experienced scholars.

The goal of a scholar, Wolff determines, should be to propagate knowledge and science and to develop them, unless this would be contrary to other important duties. This general goal has many subgoals, as it could imply perfecting one’s intellect, but also perfecting one’s will (if we are speaking of the science of morals) or even perfecting arts that serve humankind to reach necessities, commodities and pleasures of life.

Scholars can have different careers, depending on what they are good at (e.g. whether they are used to working with their hands or with mere intellect and how they apply what they know to other things). Whatever their career choice, Wolff explains, a person following a career should especially know the things they work with. If a scholar wants to pursue any career and they haven’t decided yet what it should be, they should choose it depending on their abilities.

An important task for every scholar, Wolff emphasises, is to have a cognitive faculty they can use readily. This implies that they should especially perfect their intellect. Furthermore, their intellect should enable them to discern true from apparent good and have enough understanding of the natural law for cultivating virtue. Because of this assumed expertise, scholars are expected to be more perfect in virtue than ordinary people and to show a good example to others.

Wolff thinks that all scholars should be given as much praise as they merit. Then again, no scholar has a right for praise, if they do not merit it. Thus, they have no right to complain, when they are not praised in this case. Wolff also insists that no scholar should envy another for being praised, even if the other person does not really merit it: we are allowed to praise anyone we want, provided this is not done contemptuously.

According to Wolff, scholars have the right to defend their own fame or fame of others against those who challenge it. Then again, they are not allowed to contend for their fame by showing contempt toward others. Similarly, scholars are not allowed to gain favour of their countrymen by deriding other nations, or vice versa, to gain favour of foreigners by deriding their own country.

Scholars of second and primary order, Wolff continues, have as their special duty to raise disciplines of science to such a grade of certainty that they can and to distinguish truth in these disciplines from falsehoods. Then again, they should not undertake judgement of such things, which they have not endeavoured to know so meticulously as things, in which they excel. Thus, they should not attempt to reach greater certitude in things, which they are not yet adequately acquainted with.

Who is able to correct or refute errors committed by others has the right to do this, Wolff thinks. Then again, scholars of lowest order are not able to do this and have therefore no right to refute others and even less to correct errors. Wolff notes there are two methods of refuting people. In direct refutation, one is to demonstrate propositions as true what the other thinks is false or to show the manner in which the other falls into error. In indirect refutation, one is to assume as true what the other asserts and then infer from it propositions that the other acknowledges as false. Refutation should also not contain any scorn or arguments conducted out of hate.

In Wolff’s opinion, freedom to philosophise belongs to scholarship. Indeed, he thinks that everyone is permitted to propose their opinion on philosophical matters and also are to be permitted to publicly say their opinion on them. Thus, no one should be forced to defend an opinion that they hold to be untrue. Hence, although scholars have a right to defend truth against assailants, this truth cannot and shouldn’t be defended with external force.

Christian Wolff: Natural right 6 – Not yet living

From dead Wolff turns to those not yet living. Just like with the former, Wolff notes first that future generations do not have any rights and hence cannot acquire any property. This lack of rights extends, according to him, even to foetuses that are still in the uterus. Thus, if I say that I transfer some right to an unborn foetus, this isn’t literally true. Even so, Wolff adds, my statement still creates an obligation that I will transfer the right to the baby when they have been born.

More generally, Wolff thinks that although the unborn cannot have any proper rights, they can have some sort of quasi rights in the sense that they will acquire rights when they are born. Thus, there can be an agreement that a certain right will be passed on to the descendants of the person who currently has that right, after this person died, even if these descendants do not yet live. In the case of a foetus in the uterus, this quasi right cannot be removed and it has an equal juridical status as a promise that is supposed to be fulfilled if some condition occurs. Thus, if a thing is given to an unborn child and then delivered in my possession, I am expected to hand the thing over to the child, once they have been born.

An interesting case occurs, when a person relinquishes a right that was supposed to pass on to some unborn people. Wolff insists that such a renunciation is impossible, if the unborn person in question is already a foetus, but possible, if they are not even that. Furthermore, Wolff notes, the renunciation could also be done in such a manner that the quasi expectation of receiving the right when born would remain with the unborn people.

Wolff thinks that we also have some duties toward future generations, and indeed, that we should love and care for the generations to come. Such duties include that we must make sure that scientific truths and arts discovered by us are received by future generations by spreading new knowledge. Moral virtue is also something Wolff thinks should be transferred to future generations, for instance, by writing down examples of virtuous behaviour and teaching them to young people. Finally, Wolff suggests also that the happiness of future generations should be taken care of by e.g. planting fruit trees.

Christian Wolff: Natural right 6 – Bury your dead

Next topic Wolff discusses concerns the rights of dead humans. His first verdict is that the dead have no rights: as soon as a person dies, they lose all their rights, and at the same time, all their obligations vanish. This means particularly that the dead cannot own or possess anything, so that all things they had cease to be theirs.

The obvious question now is what happens to the things the dead person owned, and more extensively, to all the rights they had. Wolff notes that if the right in question was personal – something only they could have, such as when their neighbour allowed them to borrow a horse occasionally – this right just vanished at the time of death. On the other hand, other kinds of rights and particularly all property can be transferred from one owner to another. Thus, a person can decree that at the time of their death these rights and things will be transferred to a certain person. Sometimes the transfer happens even automatically, for instance, when the dying person owed something to another, what was owed should after the death naturally pass to the other. Only in the case that the dying person did not own enough for covering this debt, is it at least partially annulled. Furthermore, Wolff clarifies, while the rights and the property can change owner at the event of death, debt does not, that is, if you inherit something from a person, you are not obligated to pay what the dead person owed to someone else.

Although the dead do not have rights in some sense, Wolff continues, they do have rights in the sense that people still have obligations concerning them. For instance, if the dead deserve some praise, they should be praised even after their death. More generally, any good things they have done should be returned in some manner, for example, by doing good to people they had loved. This duty, Wolff thinks, should be followed especially by those who benefited from the deeds of the dead person, including those who inherited something from them.

What then of the dead who have done things that go against all morals, such as murderers? Wolff thinks that it would be best that such acts would be simply forgotten, so that no one would be influenced by these examples. If the deeds are well known, then they could be discussed, but only with the intention of instructing people not to do such things. Thus, bad deeds of the dead should be excused, as much as possible.

In Wolff's opinion, every dead person deserves some respect just due to their humanity and should thus be treated with some respect, even if they were our enemies. This respect concerns even the dead body or the corpse, which should not be treated like dead animals, Wolff insists. All dead bodies should be removed from the sight of the living, since corpses transmit diseases, but they should not be thrown to dogs or left rotting. Wolff underlines that human corpses should especially not be eaten, except in extreme necessity.

Wolff admits that there’s a number of appropriate ways to dispose of a dead body, such as cremation. Still, he thinks that the most convenient and thus the preferred way to deal with the corpse is burial, where the dead body is covered in soil. Right of burial is thus a universal right of all humans, and to show our respect to the dead, we should attend the funeral ceremonies where the dead are buried.

Where the dead can be buried, then? Wolff notes that in the natural state, the dead could be buried anywhere, but after the introduction of ownership, it requires the permission of the owner of the land. Thus, there arises a need for cemeteries or places where people are customarily buried.

Memory of the good and illustrious deeds of the dead should remain alive, Wolff notes. For this reason he recommends raising monuments, not just at the place where the remains of the dead are buried, but even in other places (these are particularly called cenotaphs). Other means include making funeral orations and inscribing epitaphs at monuments.

Funerals are not just about the simple fact of burying the dead, Wolff adds, but they often include ceremonies and rituals that are not strictly necessary for the sake of the burial itself. One such ritual is that people are not buried in nude. Wolff explains that this should be a universal custom, since it helps us to further separate dead humans from dead animals. Then again, he adds, there is no general rule whether the corpse should be wrapped in linen or whether the dead person should just wear regular clothing, but this must be decided by the circumstances. In any case, if the clothing symbolises the love and gratefulness toward the dead person, Wolff considers it appropriate that the clothed body is exposed to the eyes of the people in the funeral, for instance, by opening the coffin before lowering it to the grave.

We usually feel sad, when people dear to us have died. Thus, Wolff says, it is just natural that we show some external signs of sadness, such as crying. Furthermore, he adds, it is quite appropriate that we voluntarily choose to show further signs of mourning, such as a certain style of dress we wear.

Wolff concludes the chapter with a question controversial for a long time: is it allowed to dissect human bodies in order to learn about anatomy? He notes that dissection is essential to understand what makes humans healthy and what causes sickness. Furthermore, he adds, knowing the structure of the human body lets us also glimpse to the mind of its creator or God. Hence, Wolff sees no reason why bodies could not be dissected, as long as it is not done to living humans and as long as the dissected bodies are given a decent burial.

Christian Wolff: Natural right 6 – Right of necessity

One of the major topics of Wolff’s earlier volumes of Jus naturae was the distinction between the primaeval community of things and the later introduction of private ownership. Wolff considered the move toward the latter a good thing, but now he reveals that the ownership is not an absolute thing: there is a tacit assumption that if a person is bereft of necessities of life, they can even use things owned by another to satisfy these necessities. This right he calls a residual right remaining from the primaeval community.

This residual right, Wolff continues, is but an example of the more extensive class of rights of necessity (jus necessitatis). By this he refers to any right to do something that is usually not allowed, for the sake of some indispensable obligation that could not be otherwise satisfied. In other words, a right of necessity occurs in cases where several laws collide with one another. Indeed, he adds, all natural laws have tacit exceptions that they need not be followed, if some inevitable necessity prevents this. For instance, although we are usually obligated to help people in danger, the case is different if we are also in danger and have to first and foremost save ourselves.

While duties toward others can be overridden by right of necessity, Wolff insists, duties toward God cannot. In other words, Wolff thinks God should be worshipped, no matter what the necessity. Immediately after saying this, Wolff notes some exceptions. We should worship God internally, but we cannot do this, if we happen to be out of our mind – still, even in this case, Wolff notes, the obligation to worship exists, but it has just been suspended until we come back to our senses. In case of external worship, such as going to church, on the other hand, there might be some other duty that requires immediate satisfaction and thus prevents us from going to church for the time being.

Wolff goes into more detail investigating various cases where a right of necessity holds. One very classical example is that of shipwreck, with people trying to save themselves by using a boat that cannot carry all the passengers. Wolff thinks that, in general, first come is first served, and if all enter the boat at the same time, the stronger ones can just throw away the weaker ones. The case is somewhat different, he thinks, if the owner of the boat is present, as they have the right to decide who is to board the boat.

An example particularly relevant to rights remaining from the primaeval community occurs when a person is starving, but cannot obtain food by purchase, work or even begging. In such a state, Wolff says, the person is allowed to just take what they need from others, if necessary, even by using violence, and this is not to be seen as theft or robbery. More generally, if a person necessarily requires the use of a thing they cannot otherwise obtain, they can use such a thing belonging to someone else: for example, we are allowed to use weapons of another person, if we are threatened by an assailant and have no means of our own to defend ourselves. Even so, Wolff adds, the thing in question should be returned to its original owner, if possible. If not, for instance, if the thing is consumed by its use, like a piece of food, similar thing or at least something of equal worth should be returned.

A case that intrigues Wolff very much is that of a common danger making it necessary to destroy the property of a person, say, when an impending shipwreck necessitates throwing some cargo in the sea or when preventing the spread of fire requires wrecking some building. The basic principle is simple – if the destruction is necessary, it can be done, but the damages are to be compensated – but the more intricate question is who is to contribute in each case. In the case of cargo thrown from the ship, Wolff suggests that the compensation should be the duty of the owner of the ship and of everyone who had cargo that was not thrown in the sea, and to determine how much each is to contribute, the value of the destroyed and the saved cargo and of the ship with all instruments is to be estimated. To make matters even more complicated, Wolff adds that passengers and the payment they have contributed should also be taken into account, as well as the weight of various pieces of cargo and even of the passengers (e.g. if someone has thrown away lighter, but more expensive cargo, they should be more responsible of the damages). And of course, if the ship sinks, even if cargo was thrown in sea, no contribution is required.

In the case of the house destroyed because of raging fire, Wolff explains, the owners of the buildings that the fire could have reached should first and foremost contribute to the compensation for the damages. Wolff makes two important exceptions: firstly, those whose buildings were not saved, but burned down, need undoubtedly not contribute, and secondly, if the destroyed building was already being burned to ground, no one has to compensate for anything. Finally, if there was a certain person who was responsible, either through deliberate choice or through negligence, of the fire, this person is solely responsible for the compensation.

Wolff argues that the rights remaining from the primaeval community also go further than mere jus necessitatis. This is the case with what Wolff calls res innoxia utilitas, that is, something that we can use to our advantage without harming anyone, not even the owner of the thing, An example Wolff provides is a river: its owner is not hurt in any way, if someone draws water from it. A perhaps more important case of innoxia utilitas is that of using other people's lands. Passage through those lands and their rivers, roads and bridges should be allowed for both people and their merchandise, unless there is reasonable fear for damages, Wolff insists, although the owners might ask for a fee to provide for the maintenance of the road network. Wolff even thinks one is allowed to remain for a time in the lands of others for just reasons, and homeless people should even have the right of perpetual habitation. People should even have a right to acquire things they need for living for a fair price, which requires the maintenance of inns for travelers.