Crusius ends his discussion of concepts with a consideration of where we use them. He begins by noting that they form the building blocks for further concepts, and later on, propositions and deductions. Starting from the building of further concepts, Crusius notes that this can happen through distinguishing or combining or a combination of both. He points out that distinctions have already been dealt with and therefore turns his attention to combination of concepts.
Combination of concepts, Crusius notes, can happen without purposeful use of powers of understanding through imagination, for instance, while dreaming. The combination can also happen purposefully, he points out and adds that such a purposeful combination presupposes a previous distinguishing of a concept into more abstract concepts and a consciousness of a new combination of such abstractions. Such a recombination requires, according to Crusius, a shifting of attention to a direction where the abstractions seem united by some circumstance.
Parts forming the combined concept, Crusius notes, might then all be regarded as subordinated to the combination, for example, when we think of a straight line drawn toward the Sun. In other cases, he adds, the combined concepts are opposed to one another and connected to a third concept which forms the ground of the division, for instance, when I think of a line that is either curved or straight. In the latter case, Crusius explains, the concept of line is undetermined and we want to think it determinately, thus, we think it with more than one determination, both of which are opposed to one another, but subordinated to the concept of line. The opposition of curved and straight does not prevent representing this as one concept, he insists, because we are not thinking of a single line, but the essence of line in general.
The combination of concepts, Crusius points out, can be more or less arbitrary. Firstly, the parts can hang together by their nature and only their boundary might be arbitrary. Secondly, even the boundary might be derived from the nature of the parts, so that we combine them only insofar as we have regarded one part after another and finally regarded them altogether as a whole. Finally, the combination can be fully arbitrary.
Moving on to propositions and deductions, both of which Crusius will go on to handle in more detail later, he merely mentions the latter, while of the former he notes that they differ from combined concepts only by their purpose. Thus, with a combined concept one thinks both its parts and considers them only as a combined whole – like when thinking of an immortal God), while with propositions one thinks the compared concepts precisely for the purpose of representing their relation, like when one thinks that God is immortal.
All effects of understanding, whether concepts, propositions or deductions, Crusius thinks, represent certain possible or actual things, which are the object of our representations outside our thinking. Furthermore, he argues, when we think things, we must think them through certain properties, by which we designate them and distinguish them from one another. Crusius suggests calling these properties designating things as the object of thinking within thinking or understanding itself. Whether we are discussing the object outside or within thinking, he notes, the representations can change without the object changing. Thus, Crusius concludes, this changing activity in our representations must be distinguished from the objects of representation: he calls it the mode of representation.
Crusius divided the modes of representation into external or contingent mode and internal mode. Internal mode of representation, he explains, can be changed without changing the object outside thinking, that is, without meaning another object outside thinking. External or contingent mode of representation, on the other hand, can be changed without changing the object within the understanding, that is, it can be changed in such a manner that one still thinks about the previous properties of the object. In other words, if one changes the internal mode of representation, one still thinks about the previous object, but represents it through other properties: for example, when one thinks of God once as an eternal cause of the world and then as an entity that constantly thinks about all possible worlds.
Crusius makes the remark that in defining the same thing in different ways, we have different modes of representation. If the modes of representation are external or contingent, the change of definition retains even the same object within understanding. Thus the difference might consist only in that the parts of the concept are at one time thought in a different order after one another than at the other time, without ascribing to them a different relation to one another, for instance, when I say that soul is no body and then that bodies are not souls.
We use concepts to think and designate objects, Crusius continues, but we also need signs to designate concepts. These signs are used, he explains, to transmit our thoughts, since when we are used to signs, they suggest concepts to us by the rules of imagination. Then again, Crusius adds, signs are also used for our own convenience, since we cannot think of many concepts at the same time and with combined concepts we easily forget what they mean, but designating them with signs makes it easier to distinguish them from one another.
If signs should be fit to represent thoughts, from the standpoint of Crusius, there must potentially be many different signs that cannot easily be confused with one another, because there are many concepts and they have many relations. Furthermore, they should be easy to generate, manipulate and make note of. Crusius thinks that sounds that form words have all these properties, hence, regards it natural that words are used as signs for thoughts
Crusius defines language as a capacity to use words as signs for thoughts, although he adds immediately that this is true only of human language – other beings with reason can have language without words and instead some other signs for thoughts. Indeed, Crusius suggests, if we understand by language the sum of all such signs that express the internal state of spirits, even beasts can be said to have a language. Then again, he says, language is usually thought to consist of signs of abstract concepts.
If we want to use something as a sign for a thought, Crusius goes on, we must first have an idea of it. Crusius calls the idea of a word, whether spoken or written, the material meaning of this word. He then distinguishes the material meaning from the formal meaning of the word, which is the idea of a thing it should signify. Thus, when one cannot distinguish a word from other words, because it is spoken or written indistinctly, one does not understand its material meaning, but if the word is of unknown language, its formal meaning is unknown.
Experience shows, Crusius thinks, that words should be first connected to concrete concepts, because it would be inconvenient to try to define all of them. According to him, this is especially true when words are used for transmission of our thoughts, because the aim of such a transmission is usually to inform others about known truths. Furthermore, even if it would be possible, it would be of no use to give definitions of every word, because this would fix the meaning of the words only from the standpoint of the person defining them.
Using a sign, like a word, presupposes that the designated object appears sometimes with the sign. Thus, Crusius suggests, if we are accustomed that words and designated concepts occur together, it is said that we understand a language. In other words, hearing or reading the words of a language should bring to our mind the respective concepts, and furthermore, in thinking a concept, we should know the appropriate words designating them: both implications can appear without the other, but both are required, if we are to properly know a language.
Crusius divides understanding of language into immediate understanding, where the words make us instantly think the designated concepts, and mediate understanding, where the words of one language make us think of words of another language. He thinks this difference is remarkable, because the meaning of the translated words might not exactly convey the same meaning as the translation, because different languages have not named the exact same concepts. Furthermore, Crusius points out, the mediate understanding takes far more time, because it involves translation of the words to another language.
Understanding words becomes easier, Crusius holds, the more sensuous are the concepts designated by them, because we are very used to thinking sensuous concepts. On the contrary, if we designate abstract ideas with words, we must first carefully analyse concrete concepts designated by individual words and thus gradually build abstract concepts out of them. If someone cannot do this, Crusius points out, they are said to understand the words and still not know what to do with them.
Because words are just signs of concepts and change nothing in these concepts, Crusius clarifies the reader, it requires no particular type of knowledge to connect words with their concepts: if we wanted to do that, it would be like classifying a flower in a garden according to a sign filled with numbers, attached to that flower. Still, he adds, words are useful, because without them, the variety of concepts would lead us to inevitable confusion. They are external aids for knowledge, and our knowledge grows, when we learn more characteristics of the same concepts.
Crusius argues that words do not affect the mode of representation, because we can think the same things in different languages, and indeed, because we can forget the words and still know the things, not knowing how to express ourselves or choosing other words. Thus he concludes, we can have concepts without words, particularly with immediate sensations, but also with some abstract concepts. Crusius also warns the reader not to say that we think things through words, but at most that we combine a concept of thing with a concept of a word as a sign.
Words are signs of thoughts and thus should express the content and the differences of the thoughts conveniently. Sometimes, Crusius continues, we express complete, sometimes incomplete things, sometimes absolute things, sometimes relations. Of these various divisions he picks out especially the one between categorematic and syncategorematic words, where the former refers to situations, where the word could be used both as a subject and a predicate in the same proposition.
Words follow concepts, thus, Crusius notes, humans face difficulties in understanding one another, when concepts are not naturally determined, but based on arbitrary customs and purposes. In other words, when we want to communicate our thoughts to others, it is possible that some people due to their different concepts see things with different eyes and from another viewpoint that changes their external mode of representation and they might even ignore some circumstances we deem to be important. The result is that people do not understand each other completely: even the wisest sayings might be turned upside down by people who think they understand these perfectly.
Crusius turns next to speak of equivocity, where a word has more than one meaning. His general message is that equivocity or homonymy does not always imply obscurity of the meaning of the word or a confusion of concepts. Indeed, he points out, all languages have words that have more than one meaning without any confusion, because it is possible that in everyday use of the word the context provides the meaning. True, Crusius admits, sometimes there does arise obscurity of concept or even confusion, and therefore he separates mere grammatical equivocation from logical equivocation or ambiguity. In addition, he also mentions contingent or subjective equivocation where words are not actually equivocal, but their general concept just hasn’t been abstracted correctly from the examples.
Crusius starts to ponder the causes of equivocation. Sometimes, he says, it is based on a confusion of concepts, but often just giving a name of one thing to something else because of their greater or lesser similarity or connection. The reason for such a sharing of names might be that there are not enough words available and we still do not want to make up completely new and incomprehensible ones.
Crusius thinks that we should avoid ambiguity that is connected with obscurity and confusion. This means, he explains, that we should not use ambiguous words without adding determinations that highlight the uncertainty of their meanings in the context. Such determinations are either full nominal definitions of the words or mere auxiliary expressions, from which the meaning can be deduced. If it is nominal definitions that are used, we should pick a single distinct meaning of the ambiguous word or then distinguish all the common meanings of the word and retain the right to use all of them according to linguistic usage, but in such a manner that the obscurity is avoided through circumstances and additions.
In Crusius’s opinion, many philosophers are too strict when it comes to equivocity, demanding that a scholar should use a word constantly with the same meaning, although they cannot themselves apply this rule consistently. Indeed, Crusius emphasises that words are subservient to thoughts, thus, in common language we rarely meet a word, the meaning of which would not be a useful concept pointing to something real. Hence, in the determination of the meaning of words one should remain as much as possible with the common language and not deviate from it, if there is no danger of confusion and if there is no need to prevent inadequacies of knowledge. Otherwise other people wouldn’t understand what the scholar says, unless they took the arduous task of learning a new language. Still, Crusius concedes, because all concepts use words, it is allowed and required to give names for newly found concepts, but these novel names should be made as easy for the memory as possible, and concepts should be sufficiently significant, when making particular names for them.
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