Crusius moves from subordination – connection of concepts – to their distinction. Two concepts are distinct, he explains, when at least in one of the concepts is found something that cannot be said of the other. This means, Crusius adds, that some type of subordination cannot be found between them.
Distinction as such is not a very interesting notion, Crusius thinks, because types of distinction correspond simply with types of subordination, and furthermore, we can quite easily recognise distinct concepts through internal sense. A more important type of distinction, he says, is opposition, where the existence of one side of the opposition in a certain concept or subject prevents as such or in some measure the existence of the other side. Of opposition, Crusius adds, the most important kinds are the logical and the causal opposition.
The notion of logical opposition, Crusius begins, is based on the notion of logical subordination, where one concept comprehends all the individuals comprehended by another. On the basis of it, we can first define complete logical distinction or diversity, which means, he explains, that no individual comprehended in one concept is comprehended in the other, in other words, both concepts contain some positive or negative determination not contained in the other. If you are wondering, there is also partial logical distinction, which means that there are some individuals of one concept not comprehended under another, but this is not nearly as interesting a relation.
Complete logical diversity can be merely accidental, Crusius notes, if the diversity is caused only by the concepts being formed with different types of abstraction. Thus, he adds, concepts of human and understanding are completely logically diverse, but only because the concept of human is generated by logical abstraction, but the concept of understanding through metaphysical and qualitative abstraction. Then again, if we add the notion of subject to the latter – that is, if we think of something with understanding – we make the two concepts subordinated, because human is something with understanding. On the other hand, concepts of human and stone are completely logically diverse by themselves.
What is completely logically diverse, Crusius points out, might still not be opposed, which still requires that the concepts exclude one another in the same subject. Thus, understanding and will are completely logically diverse, but not opposed, because they can occur in the same subject.
Crusius divides oppositions into logical and real oppositions. Logical opposites exclude one another only in regard to a common concept or genus, so that an individual of this genus can belong only to one of the opposites, even if these opposites can occur at the same time in the same subject: thus, understanding and will can be called logical opposites, because the force that is understanding cannot be will, although a substance that has understanding can have also will. Real opposites, on the other hand, exclude one another from the same substance, like virtue and vice. An even stronger notion is what Crusius calls disparity, where the opposites cannot exist in the same subject even after one another: thus, eternal and contingent are disparate concepts, because what is at some point eterna can never be contingent.
Crusius states that oppositions can also be divided into those between contradictories and those between contraries. Contradictories come always in pairs, he explains, so that always one of them must hold, while the other is negated, like triangle and not-triangle. All other oppositions are those between contraries, Crusius continues, where the contrary opposite might be a partial or determined negation of a concept, like not-angled compared to triangle, or it might posit some substantial determination that excludes the concept in question, like circle compared to triangle. Contraries can thus be positive or negative and there can be more than two of them.
Crusius goes into more detail with the characteristics of contraries. He notes that they can be recognised as opposite either through senses, like sweet and sour, or from their abstract concepts, like virtue and vice. Furthermore, Crusius says, contraries can be merely comparative, where their distinction is based merely on different levels, such as fast and slow movement, but they can be also absolute contraries, so that their distinction is not just gradual, but a certain quality is cancelled through another, like with virtue and vice. Finally, Crusius divides contraries also in complete or perfect contraries, where one cancels all the properties of the other, like living and lifeless do, and into partial or imperfect contraries, which are opposed only in relation to certain properties, but have many other properties in common, like waking and dreaming.
Moving on to causal opposition, Crusius begins by noting that it could mean that it is impossible that a certain effect would be caused by a certain cause. Then again, he adds, it could also mean that we are speaking of two kinds of activities of certain causes and we know that one hinders the other and cancels it completely or partially or at least modifies it. In both cases, he continues, one can speak either of causes or grounds of physical existence, like warmth and cold oppose one another, or of grounds of moral existence, such as laws conflicting one another. When we are speaking of causal opposites that hinder or modify one another, this might happen through activity, like in case of a collision between two movements, or then they might just prevent some condition of the other, like when our body hinders the consciousness of our own soul.
Ei kommentteja:
Lähetä kommentti