Meier’s philosophical work has provided plenty of examples of something we’ve otherwise rarely seen in German philosophy in the first half of 18th century: applied philosophy, that is, application of philosophical concepts and theories to often very concrete questions of practical nature. His Gedancken von Ehre is no exception, being a discussion of honour or respect.
Although Meier’s final object lies then in practice, he begins his study with a theoretical part. Quite plausibly, we have to first know what honour is, before we can say, for instance, how much honour we should try to gain for ourselves. Furthermore, Meier adds, theoretical investigation of the notion of honour might awaken in us a desire to do honourable things.
Meier defines honour as the sum of all representations and judgements made by others of one’s perfections. More precisely, this sum, if it is unexpressed, can be called internal honour, while the expression of this internal honour through words and other signs is the corresponding external honour. An important detail is that the honour must be bestowed by others and so no one cannot honour oneself - not even God.
Meier notes that there is also another sense in which we can talk of external honour, that is, when we are speaking of compliments that people are forced to give because of some law. This law can be natural law - and then we are speaking of a good name of someone - or a civil law - for instance, when a person must be bestowed a title. Such external honours, Meier warns, are not really honours in his sense, which requires much more than mere following of a law.
The opposite of honour - dishonour or disrespect - and the corresponding internal and external dishonour can be defined by just replacing perfection with imperfection, Meier notes. From a lack of dishonour cannot be deduced the presence of honour, he adds, because between the two lies a state where other persons do not have any conception whatsoever of one’s perfections or imperfections. Indeed, most people are regarded in such an indifferent manner by persons not close to them
Because Meier defines honour through notions of representations and judgement, he can apply logic and psychology in his investigation. Thus, he notes that since judgements can be affirmative or negative, honour can be also given for a person not having certain imperfections. He immediately explains that in the latter case the lack of imperfection must imply the presence of perfection, since it is not yet an honour to be no murderer. Indeed, he adds, the concept of honour should be reserved to only those cases where the perfection of a person is exceptionally great, since otherwise every person would be honoured.
An important epistemological detail Meier points out is that honour should be based only on true representations and judgements. Thus, even if a person would compliment another, say, for being a great scholar, it would be no real honour if the person giving the compliment would have no idea what being a great scholar really means. All forms of flattery are then ruled out as not bestowing true honour. Then again, since an honour can remain unexpressed, lack of compliments does not either imply a lack of honour.
Honour is then clearly something else than mere fame, which means just people knowing someone, but not necessarily knowing them for a perfection - even murderers can be famous for being murderers. Even if the reason for one’s fame would be something good, that is, even if they would have a good reputation, this would still not guarantee that one is honoured, if the person in question would have no exceptional perfections.
Honour is also dependent on the context in which the person is evaluated, Meier emphasises. Thus, a soldier’s leadership skills can be honoured in the context of a small regiment, but not in the context of the whole army. Honour is also dependent on who does the honouring, and small-minded people can never really honour anyone, Meier insists, because they can never have a notion of what truly great perfection is.
What perfections can then be honoured? Meier thinks that practically anything. Some people think that e.g. beauty is not something that can be honoured, since one has no say on whether they are beautiful. Meier thinks that this argument fails, since even such perfections that seem to be up to us - say, our diligence - are ultimately decided by God. Thus, Meier sees no reason why things like beauty could not also be honoured.
Possible objects of honour are thus infinitely varied and similarly also possible objects of dishonour, Meier explains. Indeed, one person can have both perfections and imperfections and even most honoured people can have their dark side. In other words, if someone is respected, they can also be disrespected, just for different reasons.
Ei kommentteja:
Lähetä kommentti