A legal or valid contract can be broken only if persons involved mutually agree to it, Crusius remarks. Thus, if I am still willing to hold on to a contract, but other persons who made it are not, the others are still obligated to follow the contract, because otherwise the very culture of contracts would be in jeopardy. Of course, if the others fail to hold on to their end of the bargain, I am not obligated to hold on to my end. Crusius notes that these rules apply only to true contracts, which should not include such things as marriage and relation between governor and governed. In addition, although I would have a right to enforce a contract upon a person, it might still in some cases be advisable and in accordance with one’s conscience to not do it.
When a contract then is not valid or legal? Crusius notes that in some cases the persons in question cannot make contracts. No one can make contracts with God, since God’s omnipotence cannot be restricted - this rather peculiar idea is easier to understand once one remembers that in Crusius’ system all right is based on the might and will of God. Furthermore, a person cannot make contracts, if they can reason only inadequately, which is the case e.g. with children.
In addition to requirements concerning the persons making the contract, Crusius considers many other requirements of a valid contract. Firstly, contract must be made fairly, for instance, ambiguous wordings and especially deceptions are not allowed. This does not mean that a person making the contract cannot have any hidden intentions, and holding on to the literal meaning of the contract against the wishes of the persons involved is not to be taken as a lie or deception. Secondly, contract cannot obligate us to do anything that would be against natural or other law or contract determining the matter otherwise, for instance, we cannot be contracted to kill an innocent person or to steal something belonging to another person. Finally, contracts can be made only on matters that fall under our own control, that is, a contract cannot obligate us to do something we are not capable of.
An interesting case arises, when force is used to make a person enter a contract. Generally, Crusius says, although one can be enforced to hold onto a contract they have made, no one can be enforced to make a contract. Interestingly, Crusius notes that there are certain exceptions to this general rule. For instance, enforcing might be in some cases in accordance with natural law and would then make a contract based on it valid. A particular case arises in a situation where the persons making a contract have been in war with one another before making a contract and the contract enforces a peace upon them. Here, the previous condition - war between persons - is such a great threat to general security that any means avoiding it should be accepted.
Some previous treatises of natural law had considered in great length the relations between master and servant, and more precisely, in the context of family relations. Crusius takes as his stance that master/servant -relations have nothing to do with family relations and are thus merely special type of contracts. Hence, he emphasises that rights of a master cannot contain e.g. power of the life of a servant.
In addition to contracts of various kind, property was also a staple element in various treatises of natural law. Crusius’ work is no exception. He elucidates that something is a property of a person, if this thing that is property is not another person and the person in question - the owner of the property - has a right to possess it, while no other person has the same right. Property is thus something more than mere possession, which is just a physical capacity to control a thing. In addition, the relationship of owning differs from that of governing, which is explicitly a relation between persons.
Crusius contextualises the discussion of property issues in a state of nature. He admits that states do play a function in securing property rights, but adds immediately that the institution of property predates states, since property relations are found even in the most uncivilized conditions. Indeed, he says, a duty to respect other people’s property is implied by basic duties of natural law. It follows from a general duty of human love, since it demands us to respect what another person has worked for, and also from the duty to live in communities, since the existence of property enables the practices of buying services and goods and of making contracts. Finally, he notes, property rights are implied by the fallen state of human nature, since we must protect the fruits of our labour against vicious people.
What can then be owned and what not? The very definition of Crusius explicitly denies the possibility of slavery, unless one means by slavery a very intimate form of service, defined by explicit legal contracts. Furthermore, Crusius continues, in a state of nature what is owned must be a thing which can be used only through our own work and which can be created only through work or which is necessarily required when using things mentioned in the first clause. Thus, a piece of land cannot be considered anyone’s property in a state of nature, although this does not prevent that in some actual state the notion of property might be extended to a piece of land in order to encourage its use.
Owning something needs more than mere possessing, Crusius reminds us, thus, original acquiring of something ownerless as a property requires more than just taking it into one’s possession. More particularly, Crusius insists, original acquiring requires that the owner-to-be or their representative makes some effort to gain the thing. Derivative acquiring of property that someone else owns, on the other hand, can occur through many means. For instance, persons can make an explicit or implicit contract involving transfer of property, or a person can take into their possession something that another person has abandoned. Crusius considers inheritance a special case: a dead person cannot make a true contract stipulating the transference of their property, but for the sake of upholding tranquil society, testaments should be considered binding.
Violence is again an ambiguous element in Crusius’ account. He admits that in some situations violence can be used to acquire property belonging to another person, but makes it also clear that in most cases violent taking away of someone’s property is wrong, just like stealing and fraud cannot be used in acquiring property. If a person breaks another person’s property rights, the latter has a right for a compensation, provided that the first person still has enough means for providing their own sustenance. Still, Crusius reminds us, property rights are always just hypothetical, and for example, in case of extreme need, a person has a right to appropriate other person’s property, provided that this other person still owns enough for enjoyment of the fruits of their work.
Finally, Crusius notes that when property changes owner, the goods are usually compensated with something that is thought to have the same value. By value Crusius means magnitude of the goodness of a thing, in connection with needs of either particular individual or generally all human beings. Because needs change from time to time, in a state of nature it requires always a clear agreement what is a fair compensation of come goods. To ease transactions, Crusius notes, states provide universal signs for value (that is, money). Crusius does not consider in more detail what such monetary economy implies, but merely notes that such a sign must be made of a durable material and not be either too rare or too common, because the rarity of the material affects the inherent value of money - rarer means more expensive - and can in extreme cases make transactions more difficult.
In next post, we will round up Crusius discussion of natural law proper with his account of families.
