After a theoretical study of will and basic drives affecting it, Crucius turns his interest toward practical philosophy or morals, that is, the study of how will should be used. Wolffian systems of philosophy often included a discipline of general practical philosophy, which was meant to serve as a basis for all practical philosophy. Crucius admits that such a discipline exists, in a sense, but because of its abstract nature it should be merely included within more concrete practical disciplines.
The basic topic of morals - how will should be used - comprises actually two different, although related questions, Crucius continues. Firstly, there is the question of how human being can make herself happy. This question is dealt with a discipline quite unique to Crucius’ system - a study of happiness. It goes beyond mere question of obligations, because although Crusius admits that we are in a sense obligated to become happy and perfect ourselves, the study of happiness is more about finding the most advantageous means for happiness.
Human happiness involves satisfaction of basic human desires. Now, Crucius says, since one of these basic drives is a drive for good conscience, happiness involves also trying to follow the demands of conscience. Indeed, he adds, one might say that these demands are designed to make humans happy. The demands underlie the second question of morals: what should human beings do, in other words, what duties humans have?
Crucius notes that the demands of conscience - duties or moral laws - assume the existence of a lawgiver, who has decreed these laws. Our obligation to follow these laws, Crucius says, is not caused by the lawgiver forcing us to do something. Instead, the obligation is generated by all the goods the lawgiver or God gives to us - indeed, even the duties themselves are such goods. If a human being subjects his own will to divine will and follows the divine laws, Crucius concludes, he will be virtuous, and because of that, happy.
The sum of these divine laws, or natural law, forms the second major part of morals for Crucius. It divides into further disciplines according to the object of the duties: natural theology deals with human duties toward God, natural law in a more limited sense deals with human duties toward one another and ethics duties toward oneself. Crucius adds that humans also have duties toward animals and even inanimate objects, but these ares so few that the don’t warrant their own discipline. He also adds that we should start from ethics, because we must first perfect our own capacities, before we are able to fulfill other duties.
The aim of ethics is then to perfect human beings, and in order to know how to do it, Crucius says that we must first know the goal God has given to humanity. Before going into that, Crucius notes that God, as the wisest and most perfect being, must have created the whole world for some reason, which is also evident, he continues, from the wise organisation of the parts and whole of the world. The goal that God has envisioned for the whole world, Crucius emphasises, must be that the world can be known and enjoyed rationally. Then again, human beings appear to be only such rational beings, while animals and plants exist only for the sake of human cultivation.
Why God then had to create the world at all, when he could just have thought about it? Crucius’ answer is that God’s goal in creation must involve free actions, which make the fate of the world unpredictable. Furthermore, since God appears to have made humans social, these actions are probably united efforts of many humans. God wants that these actions are virtuous, so that he could reward humans. Then again, it depends on the human choices whether all of them can be rewarded or whether some of them must be punished.
What then, finally, is the goal of humanity or the reward God is willing to give to virtuous people? Crucius notes that this goal cannot be just knowledge, because cognitive is in his system just means for volition. Then again, although Crucius admits that humans have right to use goods of the world, none of them can really satisfy humans. Indeed, because humans have unlimited desires, true reward could only be endless life in another world. Crucius notes that such a moral proof of human immortality is its only possible proof, because all theoretical proofs of immortality fall short of convincing everyone - for example, simplicity of human soul does not mean its immortality, because animals also have simple souls without being immortal.
What kind of behaviour is then required of humans or what it means to be virtuous? Crucius notes that, firstly, this world is not a prison for human beings. Especially body is something that soul truly requires for living in the current world. Thus, Crucius continues, we must keep this vessel in good shape for the duration of our life. Particularly we have no right to forfeit the body given to our use or commit a suicide. In addition to body, Crucius continues, we must also train our understanding. In practice, this means that we must acquire as many concepts as possible and use our understanding in diverse manners.
Since both body and understanding are mere tools for will, the perfection of will is an essential element of virtuous behaviour. Here, the important thing is to retain the freedom of human will - affections should remain mild and strong passions should be avoided, lest we become slave of our drives. Particularly, all goals should be subordinated to conscience and obedience of God, since these cannot be subordinated to anything else. Finally, Crucius points out that subordination here does not mean simply that humans would be constantly thinking about such a goal. Instead, it means, says Crucius, that we should, from time to time, check our behaviour and see whether there is something to fix.
perjantai 22. maaliskuuta 2019
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Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - Basic drives
Just like will can affect understanding, Crusius notes, drives of the will can be controlled through understanding. That is, the more lively the representations of objects of drives are, the livelier the respective drives are. What does this liveliness of both representations and drives mean? Like Baumgarten before him, Crusius explains that liveliness of representations is definitely not the same thing as their distinctness. Indeed, the more distinct our ideas of sensible things become, the less we often feel the need to strive for those things, Crusius argues. Instead of distinctness, liveliness, for Crusius, is characterised by the heightened grade of activity, by which we represent something.
From the standpoint of drives, the liveliness of the respective representations differs from both the strength and longevity of drives. In other words, no matter how lively our thoughts of the objects of our drives, these drives might not be able to withstand resistance nor might they be able to continue over a long period of time. Indeed, all these three characteristics - liveliness, strength and longevity - are for Crusius independent. In fact, he reduces the traditional four temperaments to different combinations of the three characteristics: drives of phlegmatic are lacking in all three characteristics, drives of sanguine are lively, drives of choleric are strong and drives of melancholic last long.
Crusius notes that drives and desires come in many different grades, starting from temporary affections and ending with extremely forceful passions. Crusius goes through a various species of such affections and passions, which was a common topic in current discussions of will. What is more interesting is Crusius’s statement that drives and desires can create new drives and desires. Thus, we might wind up desiring a subspecies of an old desire (like desire for truth might lead into a desire for curiosity) or an individual under that class (like love of philosophy might lead into a love for a particular school of philosophy), we could wind up desiring means for fulfilling other desires (such as when we desire gold), parts of certain desired objects (like when desire for general tidiness evolves into a desire for cleanliness), consequences and effects (like when we love children of our friends) and even mere signs (when we desire medals given for honourable services) and things sensed at the same time (when we desire to live in place with good memories).
Desires and drives can thus be based on other desires and drives, but Crusius insists that such series of desires must end with some first desires: then again, there might well be many different first desires. Now, Crusius notes that some of these first desires are contingent in the sense that they are based on our upbringing, while others are ingrained in the God-designed essence of humanity - the latter he calls basic desires. Indeed, he continues, all reasoning entities must have such basic desires or drives, so that they can become happy by fulfilling those desires. No basic desire can be inherently evil, Crusius believes, because otherwise God wouldn’t have given such to us. Because all desires correspond to some concepts, all reasoning entities must have some innate concepts, Crusius concludes, although they need not be immediately conscious of these concepts.
Crusius remarks that basic desires should not be confused with seemingly universal desires, objects of which could be derived through abstraction from any desires. Such abstract desires include a desire to avoid pain, desire for our own existence, a desire for applying one’s own capacities to the fullest extent and a desire to take advantage of suitable opportunities. A particularly important abstract desire is the sum of all desires that constitutes a desire for happiness, which Crusius defines as sum of all possible pleasures and a complete lack of pain. This desire is important, Crusius thinks, because it leads to a further desire for everlasting happiness, which has an infinite object and thus leads humans to accept the existence of God (note how Kant’s idea of God as a postulate for morality follows a similar path). Although all humans seem to share this desire, like all abstract desires, it is not truly a basic desire - indeed, happiness means different thing for different people, because it is a sum of their peculiar desires. Animals, Crusius adds, do not have this desire, since they do not have the requisite capacity for abstraction.
Of the true basic desires or drives, some are specific to humans. In fact, they are also such desires that have abstract objects and cannot thus belong to mere animals. Although these basic human desires should be common to all human beings, Crusius emphasises that they can exist in different force in different individuals. Furthermore, these drives can be hindered by one another or even some other drives, thus making it not obvious that everyone follows them.
Crusius counts three basic human desires, first of which is a desire to perfect oneself and one’s own capacities. This basic drive involves many other desires, such as desires to use and improve our cognitive abilities, to act according to best of reasons and to perfect our body. All these various desires require us to achieve a certain place in human society - freedom, power, riches, friendship and power. Finally, we also try to see and own perfect things, whether this perfection means real force inherent in these things or an ideal perfection, such as order and regularity.
The second basic human desire, Crusius says, is a drive for love. Love, in its moral sense, Crusius defines as a habit of regarding goals of another person as goals of oneself and of taking pleasure in well-being of others. When loving another person, Crusius continues, we do not aim at our own happiness, but at a mutual feeling of love, which would mean unification of the two persons involved. This love is not to be confused, Crusius warns, with such emotions like affection toward children or sexual desire. Particularly, it should be distinguished from so-called self-love, which is actually just satisfaction with one’s own perfections. This drive for love, Crusius admits, is universal, but sadly very weak and easily overpowered by other desires.
The final basic human drive Crusius admits in the drive to know the laws God has appointed for our behaviour. This drive could also be called drive for conscience, where conscience means judgement about the morality of one’s own actions. Crusius, thus, does not equate conscience with a consciousness of one’s faults, but more as a knowledge of one’s obligations and duties. Because we humans have this drive for knowing moral law, Crusius continues we must have an innate idea of this law. He does not mean that individual duties would be implanted in us, but only a general rule of action: do what is in accordance with the perfection of God, with one’s own relation to God and with the essential perfection of human nature and avoid the opposite. Since this drive for conscience is in our own nature, Crusius adds, we must have an innate idea of God and a natural respect for him. Just like our desire for love, the desire for conscience can be suppressed by stronger desires. Still, when these desires dissipate after we have done the objectionable deed, the conscience often reawakens and causes disagreeable pangs.
In addition to basic human desires, we share some basic desires with other animals. These animal desires concern only the goals of our animal nature, such as nourishment and reproduction. Crusius notes that we cannot really a priori determine what all these desires are, but we can only empirically search for their most general classes. Crusius counts two of these classes: drives to affect one’s body in a certain manner and drives to achieve a certain state of one’s body. The drives of the first class differ from one animal to another, depending on their specific capacities of e.g. movement. In any case, Crusius is certain that such drives presuppose soul having an innate idea of one’s own body and thus speak against the notion of soul moving from one body to another.
The second class might be further described as a drive for achieving pleasant bodily feelings. These feelings are attached to some bodily states - for instance, to certain smells and tastes - and are not necessarily connected with the perfection of body, just like pain is no signal of our body becoming more imperfect. Of specific drives, Crusius notes that a drive for nurturing children is clearly a drive of the first class, while sexual drives are caused by drives from both classes.
The relationship between human reason and animal drives is complicated. Animal drives are naturally strong and at least partially independent, which can be seen e.g. by the fierceness of bodily pains. Then again, Crusius admits that making our representations more distinct can dampen the animal drives. Furthermore, reason might add something to animal drives, such as when it combines sexuality with love.
From the standpoint of drives, the liveliness of the respective representations differs from both the strength and longevity of drives. In other words, no matter how lively our thoughts of the objects of our drives, these drives might not be able to withstand resistance nor might they be able to continue over a long period of time. Indeed, all these three characteristics - liveliness, strength and longevity - are for Crusius independent. In fact, he reduces the traditional four temperaments to different combinations of the three characteristics: drives of phlegmatic are lacking in all three characteristics, drives of sanguine are lively, drives of choleric are strong and drives of melancholic last long.
Crusius notes that drives and desires come in many different grades, starting from temporary affections and ending with extremely forceful passions. Crusius goes through a various species of such affections and passions, which was a common topic in current discussions of will. What is more interesting is Crusius’s statement that drives and desires can create new drives and desires. Thus, we might wind up desiring a subspecies of an old desire (like desire for truth might lead into a desire for curiosity) or an individual under that class (like love of philosophy might lead into a love for a particular school of philosophy), we could wind up desiring means for fulfilling other desires (such as when we desire gold), parts of certain desired objects (like when desire for general tidiness evolves into a desire for cleanliness), consequences and effects (like when we love children of our friends) and even mere signs (when we desire medals given for honourable services) and things sensed at the same time (when we desire to live in place with good memories).
Desires and drives can thus be based on other desires and drives, but Crusius insists that such series of desires must end with some first desires: then again, there might well be many different first desires. Now, Crusius notes that some of these first desires are contingent in the sense that they are based on our upbringing, while others are ingrained in the God-designed essence of humanity - the latter he calls basic desires. Indeed, he continues, all reasoning entities must have such basic desires or drives, so that they can become happy by fulfilling those desires. No basic desire can be inherently evil, Crusius believes, because otherwise God wouldn’t have given such to us. Because all desires correspond to some concepts, all reasoning entities must have some innate concepts, Crusius concludes, although they need not be immediately conscious of these concepts.
Crusius remarks that basic desires should not be confused with seemingly universal desires, objects of which could be derived through abstraction from any desires. Such abstract desires include a desire to avoid pain, desire for our own existence, a desire for applying one’s own capacities to the fullest extent and a desire to take advantage of suitable opportunities. A particularly important abstract desire is the sum of all desires that constitutes a desire for happiness, which Crusius defines as sum of all possible pleasures and a complete lack of pain. This desire is important, Crusius thinks, because it leads to a further desire for everlasting happiness, which has an infinite object and thus leads humans to accept the existence of God (note how Kant’s idea of God as a postulate for morality follows a similar path). Although all humans seem to share this desire, like all abstract desires, it is not truly a basic desire - indeed, happiness means different thing for different people, because it is a sum of their peculiar desires. Animals, Crusius adds, do not have this desire, since they do not have the requisite capacity for abstraction.
Of the true basic desires or drives, some are specific to humans. In fact, they are also such desires that have abstract objects and cannot thus belong to mere animals. Although these basic human desires should be common to all human beings, Crusius emphasises that they can exist in different force in different individuals. Furthermore, these drives can be hindered by one another or even some other drives, thus making it not obvious that everyone follows them.
Crusius counts three basic human desires, first of which is a desire to perfect oneself and one’s own capacities. This basic drive involves many other desires, such as desires to use and improve our cognitive abilities, to act according to best of reasons and to perfect our body. All these various desires require us to achieve a certain place in human society - freedom, power, riches, friendship and power. Finally, we also try to see and own perfect things, whether this perfection means real force inherent in these things or an ideal perfection, such as order and regularity.
The second basic human desire, Crusius says, is a drive for love. Love, in its moral sense, Crusius defines as a habit of regarding goals of another person as goals of oneself and of taking pleasure in well-being of others. When loving another person, Crusius continues, we do not aim at our own happiness, but at a mutual feeling of love, which would mean unification of the two persons involved. This love is not to be confused, Crusius warns, with such emotions like affection toward children or sexual desire. Particularly, it should be distinguished from so-called self-love, which is actually just satisfaction with one’s own perfections. This drive for love, Crusius admits, is universal, but sadly very weak and easily overpowered by other desires.
The final basic human drive Crusius admits in the drive to know the laws God has appointed for our behaviour. This drive could also be called drive for conscience, where conscience means judgement about the morality of one’s own actions. Crusius, thus, does not equate conscience with a consciousness of one’s faults, but more as a knowledge of one’s obligations and duties. Because we humans have this drive for knowing moral law, Crusius continues we must have an innate idea of this law. He does not mean that individual duties would be implanted in us, but only a general rule of action: do what is in accordance with the perfection of God, with one’s own relation to God and with the essential perfection of human nature and avoid the opposite. Since this drive for conscience is in our own nature, Crusius adds, we must have an innate idea of God and a natural respect for him. Just like our desire for love, the desire for conscience can be suppressed by stronger desires. Still, when these desires dissipate after we have done the objectionable deed, the conscience often reawakens and causes disagreeable pangs.
In addition to basic human desires, we share some basic desires with other animals. These animal desires concern only the goals of our animal nature, such as nourishment and reproduction. Crusius notes that we cannot really a priori determine what all these desires are, but we can only empirically search for their most general classes. Crusius counts two of these classes: drives to affect one’s body in a certain manner and drives to achieve a certain state of one’s body. The drives of the first class differ from one animal to another, depending on their specific capacities of e.g. movement. In any case, Crusius is certain that such drives presuppose soul having an innate idea of one’s own body and thus speak against the notion of soul moving from one body to another.
The second class might be further described as a drive for achieving pleasant bodily feelings. These feelings are attached to some bodily states - for instance, to certain smells and tastes - and are not necessarily connected with the perfection of body, just like pain is no signal of our body becoming more imperfect. Of specific drives, Crusius notes that a drive for nurturing children is clearly a drive of the first class, while sexual drives are caused by drives from both classes.
The relationship between human reason and animal drives is complicated. Animal drives are naturally strong and at least partially independent, which can be seen e.g. by the fierceness of bodily pains. Then again, Crusius admits that making our representations more distinct can dampen the animal drives. Furthermore, reason might add something to animal drives, such as when it combines sexuality with love.
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