The primary
classification of things in metaphysical treatises has long been that
of substances and accidences and Baumgarten's Metaphysics makes no
exception. Substances are things that can exist without being
attached to something else, while accidences have to exist in
something else, namely, in substances. Furthermore, Baumgarten adds,
accidences are not just something externally connected to a
substance, but a substance must contain some reason why such
accidences exist within it. In other words, substance is a force that
in a sense causes its accidences – if completely, they are its
essentials and attributes, if partially, they are its modes.
Now, substances with
modes are variable or they have states, which can change into other
states.
Like all
things in Baumgarten's system, these changes also require grounding
in some forces. Changes effected by forces are then activities of
substances having these forces. Such activities might be connected
with changes in the active substance itself, but they might also link
to changes in other things: these other things then have a passion.
In latter case, the forces might act alone to produce a certain
effect and then we speak of real actions and passions, or then the
passive substance also has some activity at the same time as it has
passions, and then we speak of ideal actions and passions. The
division of real and ideal actions and passions is of importance in
relation to Baumgarten's thoughts about causality.
Because all
substances have forces, all of them have also activities – if
nothing else, then at least activities towards themselves.
Furthermore, activity does not define just the essence of substances,
but also their mutual presence – substances are present to one
another, Baumgarten says, when they happen to interact with one
another.
Baumgarten divides
substances, in quite a Wolffian manner, into complex and simple
substances (Baumgarten does admit that we can also have complexes of
accidences, but these are of secondary importance in comparison with
complexes of substances). Not so Wolffian is Baumgarten's endorsement
of Leibnizian term ”monad” as the name of the ultimate simple
substances. Rounding up the division of substances is the division of
simple substances into finite and infinite substances, in which
infinite substance has all the positive properties in highest grade
and thus exists necessarily and immutably – this is something we
will return to in Baumgarten's theology – while finite substances
change their states and have restrictions.
This concludes
Baumgarten's account of the substances or primary entities of the
world, and like with Wolff, we can already discern the outlines of
the three concrete metaphysical disciples. But before moving away
from ontology, we still have to discuss Baumgarten's account of basic
relations of entities.
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