One of the most
perplexing parts of Wolff's ontology is his notion of determination –
something that can be affirmed of a thing. Are these determinations
subjective or objective? The definitions appear to support the former
reading, but the way Wolff actually uses these determinations to
define possible things seems to support the latter reading.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether these determinations should be
universals or abstract particulars, i.e. tropes. The most faithful
reading would perhaps be to deny that determinations are either,
since both universals and particulars are defined through the
determinations. Still, they seem more like universals, since unlike
with particulars, they could be joined with other determinations.
Whatever these
determinations are, Baumgarten accepts the notion, although he defines
it in a somewhat different manner. Something is determinate,
Baumgarten says, when it has been posited as A or not-A. The term
”posited” might seem rather strange, and indeed it is so – it
is not quite clear whether Baumgarten wants to say that something is
affirmed as A or not-A or whether it merely is
A or not-A or perhaps both. Still, what is posited in something
determinate is then a determination. If the posited determination is
positive, it is a reality, otherwise it is negation. Since it seems
objectively quite hard to say, which predicates should be called
positive and which negative, the division appears rather arbitrary –
yet, it should not be just subjective, since Baumgarten clearly
distinguishes cases, in which e.g. seemingly positive determinations
are actually negative.
Baumgarten's
manner of distinguishing various determinations appears familiar from
Wolffian ontology. Determinations can belong to a thing either as the
thing is in itself – then it a question of absolute or internal
determinations – or then as the thing is with respect to other
thing – then it is a question of relations or external
determinations. The internal determinations of a thing are either
ground for all other internal determinations – then they are
essentials, sum of which forms an essence – while other internal
determinations are affections. Affections are then either wholly
grounded in essentials – then they are attributes – or not –
then they are modes.
Now,
Baumgarten notes that a possible thing must be something that can be
regarded in itself or without any relations to other things – that
is, a possibility must be something with at least a minimal identity,
by which to regonise it. This is quite a remarkable suggestion that
is not included, at least explicitly,
in Wolff's ontology. The important consequence of this suggestion, on
the other hand, is something that we find from Wolff. If something is
possible, it must have some internal determinations, because without
them we could not speak about anything, and
since these determinations must be grounded on something, the
possible thing must have an essence. In other words, all possible
things should have an essence.
Clearly
a thing with some essence could also be merely possible, since e.g.
centaurs do have an essence without existing – this is something
Wolff agrees upon. A natural question then is what makes something
possible into something actual or existent. Wolff's answer is,
briefly put, that it ultimately has something to do with God's
decision to create just this particular world, but that it also lies
beyond complete understanding of human beings. In this matter,
Baumgarten deviates considerably from Wolffian example, although
almost no one has recognised it.
Baumgarten
almost equates the essence of a possible thing with its possibility.
What about the rest of the internal determinations of a thing,
especially its modes, which are not determined by mere essence?
Simple, they are part of existence. More determinately, it is the sum
of all the internal determinations that supposedly forms the
existence of a thing. In other words, while all actual things clearly
cannot have any more determinations and are in that sense complete,
all possible things should also be in some measure incomplete or
indeterminate.
Baumgarten's
theory is remarkably curious, although even more curious is that
Wolff has been considered to endorse this theory, at least
implicitly. True, Wolff says that actual things are completely
determinate, but he never affirms that all completely determinate
things would be actual. In fact, Wolff identifies complete
determination with another ontological notion, or individuality. As
Wolff, for instance, accepts the existence of haecceitas, which might
be described as an analogy of essence in individuals, it seems quite unreasonable to
suppose that Wolff would have thought all individuals are actual.
Baumgarten, on the
other hand, makes this bold move and declares all individuals to be
existent, thus denying the possibility of merely possible
individuals. One explanation might be that he has been led astray by
the notion of positing in his definition of determinations. True, we
human beings can posit some thing to be completely determinate, only
if we can experience it and thus know that it exists. Yet, this does
not mean that God with his infinite capacity of thinking –
something which Baumgarten himself should believe in – could not
think of a completely determinate individual, which still would not
exist. It is then Baumgarten who has fallen for the old trick of
confusing capacities of human understanding with the capacities of
divine understanding – something, of which Kant was to later accuse
his rationalist predecessors.
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