I tried to argue
last time that Wolff's attempt to reduce faculties of soul to a
single force of representation is acceptable, when it comes to
cognitive faculties, which truly are nothing but modifications of
representation. The attempt seems more difficult in case of
appetetive faculties, like desire of will. In effect, Wolff appears
to be saying that representing something as both good and somehow
absent makes us motivated to reach for it. Yet, firstly, the causal
link between this representation and motivation seems sometimes quite
faint. Take, for instance, Kantian example of a person acquainted
with some beautiful object: the observer of such an object would be
disinterested and thus would not desire to possess it.
True, one could
argue that perhaps beauty just is completely distinct from goodness –
or perhaps one might suggest that we do desire to gaze upon beautiful
objects. Still, a more pressing question would still be left
unanswered: even if representing good and wanting it are inevitably
connected in human mind, wouldn't they still be different acts of
human consciousness, one mere passive cognition, other a beginning of
activity?
Now, one must
carefully note that Wolff wants to reduce all faculties of human soul
to force of representation.
Force means, for Wolff, already some activity – forces are in
constant state of activity, or they have a conatus for changing their
state. Thus, if soul is a
force of representation, it does not mean just that soul is
constantly looking at the world from some perspective, but it is also
constantly seeking to change that perspective. In other words, when
soul senses or perceives something, it also has an impulse for
changing what it senses or perceives. This impulse occurs with e.g.
an imagined phantasm of what the object sensed or perceived should be
like. This combination of perception of current state of affairs, a
phantasm of a different state of affairs and an impulse for replacing
one with the other constitutes the general structure of appetite in
Wolffian philosophy. Hence, even such appetites can be regarded as
modifications of a force of representation.
As
we now have solved the apparent problem of reducing appetite to
representation, we can just quickly note that like Wolff
distinguished between two levels of cognition (indistinct and
distinct), he also distinguishes between two levels of appetite,
depending on the level of distinctness of the corresponding
representation of the desired goal: indistinct representations are
connected with sensuous appetites and their stronger modifications of
affects, while distinct representations are connected with volitions.
Just
like indistinct representations (sensations and phantasms) were
connected with some bodily activities, Wolff also connects sensuous
appetites and affects e.g. with certain activities of heart (the
heart of an excited person beats faster etc.). Then again, distinct
representations of concepts and their combinations were only
mediately connected with brain through the aid of linguistic symbols.
This means, Wolff suggests, that volitions are not that tightly
connected with human body. True, volitions usually end with some
bodily movement and they are also conditioned by the state of body,
but this still leaves a possibility that human soul could freely
choose its actions. This is a topic I shall look into more carefully
next time, when I try to unravel Wolff's opinions about the
interaction between soul and body.
Ei kommentteja:
Lähetä kommentti