Both Leibniz and Wolff divided
cognition into two kinds: intuitive and symbolic. I've had some
difficulties clarifying to myself how these two relate to the
progression from sensations through imagination and memory to
intellectual faculties of understanding and reason, so it feels a bit
helpful to see what Bilfinger has to say about the issue.
The basic definitions deriving from
Leibniz are pretty straightforward: intuitive cognition is caused by
attending the nature of things directly, while symbolic cognition is
connected to things only via mediation of signs. Leibniz then had
supposed that composite concepts are usually cognized symbolically:
after all, analysis of concepts into its constituents happens usually
through signs, e.g. if I define square as a rectangle with all sides
equal, the definition would be expressed verbally. Primitive
concepts, on the other hand, might be cognized either intuitively or
symbolically: e.g. point could be defined either by looking at points
or by saying what one means when speaking of a point.
Furthermore, all distinct concepts –
that is, concepts that can be analysed into clear concepts or into
concepts through which we can distinguish objects – must be based
on intuitive concepts. In other words, if we had an analysed concept,
in which we would know all the constituent concepts only through
further linguistic explications, somewhere along the line we would
have to use a circular explication, which clearly wouldn't help to
distinguish any objects. Thus, an analysis or explication that is
successful should at some point meet some cognitions which are
directly connected to things. Intuitive cognition is therefore a
necessary ingredient of good cognition: if our cognition is not
grounded on things, it might well deteriorate into a shamble of
contradictions and meaningless expressions.
From the perspective on what Leibniz
has to say, intuitive cognition is essential to well-founded science.
What good is symbolic cognition then? Bilfinger answers by turning
into Wolff's account. While symbolic cognition cannot by itself be a
source of true cognition, it can be used in inferring truths from
known truths. In particular, symbolic cognition is required whenever
we want to move to general truths about classes of objects: we cannot
literally be effected by any class of objects, because classes are
not real entities. Thus, symbolic cognition makes it also possible
that the Leibnizian ideal of an algebraic art of thinking could be
one day found. In addition, symbolic cognition is also useful in
transmitting cognition from one person to another: we cannot share
intuitions, but we can share signs and symbols.
Interesting here is how the division of
cognition into intuitive and symbolic kinds corresponds better with
Kantian division of sensibility/intuition vs.
spontaneity/understanding than Wolff's own division of sensations and
concepts. Indeed, Kant's famous statement that intuition without
understanding is blind, while understanding without intuition is
empty, could be easily translated into the Leibnizian-Wolffian
statement that intuitive understanding by itself is blind, because it cannot be generalized, while symbolic understanding by itself is empty, because it
fails to connect cognition with actual things. Of course, Kant
doesn't call his intuitions and concepts alone cognitions, but
reserves this name only for the result of the interplay of the two.
So much for Bilfinger's take on
Wolffian psychology, next time I'll discuss his notes on Wolffian
natural theology and especially the problem of evil.
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