One of the most outrageous bits of
Wolff's metaphysics was his apparent attempt to deduce principle of
sufficient reason from the principle of non-contradiction. Some
readers have even declared that Wolff has thus Leibnizian distinction
between logical and empirical truths: Leibniz said that logical
truths were based on the principle of non-contradiction and empirical
truths on the principle of sufficient reason, so Wolff's deduction
apparently showed empirical truths to be logical. This is clearly a
mistaken reading, because Wolff still accepts the Leibnizian
distinction and use of the two principles as criteria. Indeed,
Leibniz had merely said that logical truths were necessarily true,
because their opposites were contradictory, while the empirical truths
require some previous explanation and were thus not necessary. Wolff
just added that the latter criterion was itself necessarily true and
in need of no further explanation.
Although Wolff's proof of the principle
of sufficient reason does not reduce all truths into logical truths,
the proof itself was rather unconvincing and based on a very
ontological reading of the principle of non-contradiction. Now, Wolff
apparently felt the need to justify the principle once again.
First of all, Wolff notes that actually
the principle as such requires no proof, because no philosopher and
indeed no human being would truly doubt it – or at least if someone
says he doubts, he is still bound to use the principle unconsciously,
when asking causes of events and motives of actions. I already noted
that Wolff had used in the original book a strategy where the
principle of sufficient reason was justified as a necessary
presupposition of us having coherent experience. Here Wolff is then
suggesting that the principle is somehow natural to human mind. Both
strategies have a Kantian feel, especially if one combined them: we
couldn't have experience without using the principle of sufficient
reason, thus, the principle must be ingrained in us.
Still, there is a difference. While
Kant apparently speaks determinedly of causality as a necessary
presupposition of experience, Wolffian ground is something in thing A
that explains something else in thing B, where A and B might be also
the same thing. Examples Wolff uses clearly show that in addition to
causal influences he is also thinking of motives as possible grounds.
Wolff is thus not saying that ”every event has a cause” would be
true of all experience, but instead the more general statement ”every
event either has a cause or is a motivated action”.
Wolff also explains his original proof
of the principle through the simile of scales: if two sides of the
scales are evenly balanced, the scales does not tip to either
direction, and if the scales do tip, something must have been added
or taken away to change the balance. In effect, this simile confirms
my interpretation of the proof: the different possibilities, as it
were, compete with one another for the chance of actualisation and
because of their opposition, they would remain eternally in a state
of null actuality, unless something came and changed the scales in
favour of one possibility. What appears different in Wolff's new
account is the admission that in case of human actions grounds or
motivations might not completely determine the action: human being
has still the opportunity to choose what motive he is going to
emphasize – we shall later see what effects this admission has on
Wolff's psychology.
Wolff also presents a completely new
line of defense for the principle. In essence, he outlines three
possibilities: firstly, the principle of sufficient reason might hold
always, it might hold never, or it might hold sometimes, but not
always. Somewhat hastily, Wolff concludes that the second option
cannot be true, because experience tells us that at least some events
have had a preceding ground (remember that Hume's criticism of
causality was still to come). How about then the third possibility?
Wolff suggests that if there were no possibility to actually say when
something has a ground and when not, then we would actually land back
to the second possibility. Thus, there must always be ground telling
whether there is a ground or not – and then we are actually in the
first option that the principle holds in all cases.
Wolff's argument is based on his fault
of not underlining yet another form of ”ground”. This ground is
more of an explanation based on ”form” or structure of events:
just like we can justify the proposition that a figure has angles
adding up to 180 degrees by its being triangle, similarly events
might have some structural features that either make the principle to
apply them or not. Indeed, Wolff has not managed to justify the
principle, but he has noted the possibility of a third ontological
position between full determinism and full indeterminism, which we
might call restricted or controlled indeterminism. That is, if we do
not want to admit that all events are deterministically caused, we do
not have to take everything to be indeterministic, if we suppose that
indeterminism applies only within some restricted area of events,
which does not hinder the determinism outside this area. This
possibility seems interesting, firstly, because it appears to fit in
with current state of physics (the area would have to be defined in
terms of e.g. size of entities involved). Secondly, it might even be
compatible with Kantian notion of deterministic causality as a
presupposition of experience, that is, indeterministic causality
might not hinder the possibility of experience, if it was restricted
to some area that was a) rarely seen in experience and b) controlled
in the sense that effects in that area would have no real effect
outside that area.
So much for the principle of sufficient
reason, next time I'll wrap up with Wolff's comments on the rest of
ontology.
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