I noticed that in my investigation of
the theoretical part of Thümmig's work I left out a crucial element,
namely, the very structure of the science in question. A quick
schematic is here:
Few words of explanation. Logic forms
its own module in Wolffian philosophy. On the one hand, logic
precedes all other sciences, because it introduces the very method
used in all sciences. On the other hand, logic is clearly based on
psychological considerations: to know how human cognition should
work, we must know something about human cognitive powers. Because
psychology is partly an empirical science, Wolffian logic, as
described by Thümmig, must also have an empirical element.
The second module in the picture
consists of metaphysics. Here the foundation of the whole lies in
ontology, of which it is difficult to say whether it is empiricist of
rational – remember the controversy about the principle of
sufficient reason. On ontology are based both cosmology and
psychology, first of which deals with the sum of all complex objects
and second of which deals with one type of simple object or soul.
Both cosmology and psychology also have empirical foundations. In
addition to the ontological theory of complex objects, cosmology
contains also the highest generalizations from physical laws, clearly
based on observations. Even more clearly, psychology contains an
empirical part, which the so-called rational psychology then tries to
explain. Furthermore, rational psychology is also partially based on
cosmology, because psychology must explain the supposed interaction
of the soul with its body, a complex object. Finally, natural
theology is based on both cosmology and psychology – for instance,
the existence of God is deduced cosmologically from the existence of
the world and the soul.
The final module of theoretical
philosophy is then structured similarly as psychology. First, there
is the so-called experimental philosophy, which contains results of
the physical observations and experiments. The physics proper offers
then a rational explanation for the content of the experimental
philosophy , just as rational psychology was supposed to explanation
of the results of empirical philosophy. Physics is also grounded on
cosmology, which defines the most general laws governing the physical
things.
If we finally move to Thümmig's vision
of the practical philosophy of Wolffian school, we may firstly note how the practical philosophy is dependent on the theoretical
philosophy – logic is used to show how human being should use their
intellectual capacities, ontology to define the concept of goodness,
psychology to show what humans are capable of and theology to
determine how humans should take God into account.
In Wolff's writings practical
philosophy was detailed in two writings, the one dealing with ethics
and the other with civil philosophy, Thümmig's scheme makes it much
clearer that the two disciplines are actually just two parts of one
discipline. Indeed, the practical philosophy forms a more definite
unity with Thümmig than theoretical philosophy:
The practical philosophy has then a
general part, on which both of its major divisions are based. The aim
of this general part is to establish natural law as the guiding
principle of all good actions – all actions must aim towards
perfection. The natural law is then divided into two different
sublaws, depending on whether the actions involve only a single human
being or whether they involve also interpersonal relations. In the
former case, the natural law determines the obligation for an
individual to perfect one's intellect, volition, body and external
state, while in the second case natural law commands members of a
community to make other members as happy as possible and the
community in general as prosperous and tranquil as possible. The
former aspect of natural law is then the foundation of moral
philosophy or ethics, which is then nothing but a system of rules for
making oneself perfect. The latter aspect, on the other hand, is the
foundation of civil philosophy or politics, which is divided into two
parts. The first part or economics deals with the prosperity of
simple communities or households, while the second or politics
proper, which is also based on economics, deals with the prosperity
of communities consisting of households, that is, republics.
Thümmig has thus made two additions to
the Wolffian practical philosophy: firstly, he has introduced the
idea of a general practical philosophy, and secondly, he has divided
the ethics and the politics into two parts, first of which
investigates the primary goal of these disciplines and the second of
which determined the practical measures for obtaining those goals.
When it comes to details, Thümmig fails to make any substantial
additions to what Wolff himself had said in his works on ethics and
politics. This leads us naturally to the question of the role Thümmig
played in the development of German philosophy. I shall endeavor to
make similar concluding remarks on every philosopher, once I get to
the last text I read from them.
The texts of Thümmig
considered thus far have had little of lasting interest. In addition
to Institutions, he has edited one collection of Wolffian articles
and authored a book on scientific curiosities and an article
defending Wolff's German metaphysics. Even the Institutions, which
has been clearly the main publication of Thümmig, has been mostly a
mere summarized translation of Wolff's works. Of course, Institutions
still was important for the Wolffian school, because it presented the
doctrine of the school for the very first time in the international
language of the time.
Furthermore, it is clear
that Wolff and at least other Wolffians took Thümmig seriously and
referred to his writings various times. Indeed, it is just to be
expected that a promising young philosopher follows for a time the
writings of his mentor closely, before breaking into some truly new
territory. Thümmig never really had the chance to break away from
the shadow of Wolff, because he died rather young in 1728.
Still, in light of Thümmig's
writings it is difficult to say whether he could have really changed
the tone of Wolffian philosophy. He does introduce novelties, but
these novelties are not so much reformations of Wolff's doctrines,
but merely additions concerning issues Wolff had not discussed –
think, for instance, of Thümmig's fascination with animal
psychology. In contrast with later Wolffians, like Baumgarten,
Thümmig is more like a person who applies a theory to new fields of
investigation, while the later Wolffians sometimes even disputed the
theory and the axioms on which it was based – not to mention Kant,
who replaced even the methods and aims of philosophy.
So much for Thümmig, next
time we shall find out the purpose of the world.
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