The word ”conscience”, derived from
Latin conscientia, has a long
history, beginning perhaps from Latin translations of Bible. The
German equivalent Gewissen
was fixed for the precise purpose by Luther's translation of the
Bible. Conscience began thus its course as an essentially religious
term – bad conscience was that nagging awareness within you that
you had sinned and thus deserved some punishment.
Conscience was thus
a type of knowledge, as the original Latin and the German translation
imply – namely, it was a knowledge of the morality of one's own
actions. In its original conception, conscience was a voice sent by
God, while in the post-Kantian German philosophy it became a a direct
certainty over all moral questions – an idea that Hegel was quick
to criticize.
Wolff
accepts the idea of conscience as the source of ethico-moral
knowledge from the tradition – Gewissen
is the capacity to estimate the worth of actions, which have either
already taken place or which have only been planned. Indeed, one and
the same action could be evalued even both when planned and after its
actual occurrence, and the judgement need not be same in the two
cases: we may regret our decisions later.
In Wolff conscience
is then identified with moral judgements and not with moral feelings.
True, he admits, conscience may cause a number of feelings – we
might, for instance, feel pangs for some evil action or be proud of
morally upright choices. Yet, these feelings are mere effects of
conscience, but not conscience itself – they are mere tools which
conscience uses in order to promote good actions.
Furthermore, Wolff
would deny that the source of the judgements of the conscience is
some mystical faculty for immediate moral knowledge. Instead, moral
judgements are properly based on knowledge of the characteristics of
things and their connections – that is, on reason, by which Wolff
refers to the faculty used in sciences in general. Wolff is thus
assimilating the account of conscience into the general account of
scientific reasoning, in opposition to many former and later theories
of conscience.
Undoubtedly Wolff
does not assume that people would go on making explicit mental
calculations over the worth of their possible and actual actions.
Instead, they will often just e.g. implicitly apply some ethical
principle to a particular case. Still, Wolff is convinced that
animals are incapable of even such implicit reasoning and are
therefore without conscience.
In addition, one
should remember that Wolffian reasoning is not the reasoning of the
caricature rationalists. True, Wolff would undoubtedly accept some of
his ethical principles as conceptual truths – his definition of
perfection would probably be a good example. Still, Wolff does accept
also reliable experiences as a basis of proper reasoning – in
philosophy in general, and also in ethics in particular.
Finally, Wolff does
accept also the possibility of faults in ethical reasoning. Sometimes
we don't know the proper information to decide the issue, at other
times we may be confused by sensuous information and in yet other
cases our conscience might be deceived by our desires. In other
words, erroneous conscience is a possibility.
Next time something
about how to find the highest possible good.
Ei kommentteja:
Lähetä kommentti