After showing his skill in metaphysics,
Wolff moved on to publish a book called Vernünftige Gedancken von
der Menschen Thun und Lassen.
Considering that the new work was of the same length as the previous,
I assume that Wolff must have worked with the two texts side by side.
The
topic of the new book is Menschen Thun und Lassen,
where Thun
straightforwardly means doing something. The word Lassen
is a bit more difficult to translate, but it is a counterpart of Thun
and refers probably to someone being an object of an action. The issue of the
book is then what human beings should do and what allow others to do
to them – that is, it is a work of ethics we are dealing with.
Nowadays no book on
ethics woud dare to ignore Hume's guillotine, but Wolff's work has
grown in a more primeval climate, where no one had had the audacity
to suppose that the is and the ought should be somehow separated.
Thus, Wolff is not afraid to base ethics straightforwardly on
metaphysics. Wolff had actually used normative notions like
perfection already in his ontology. That is, according to Wolff,
there are values which are independent of all actual inclinations of
any subject, even God.
Characteristically
Wolff adds that these values are not just embedded in the ontological
structure of all there is, but they also determine the action of
human beings – we all do what is good and avoid doing what is evil,
provided we know clearly what is good and what is evil. The statement
seems not so radical, if we remember that human beings are for Wolff
always impure knowers, who must base everything on confused
experiences.
Because true
goodness lies in Wolff's opinion in perfection, he suggests as the
primary principle of ethics ”make yourself and others more
perfect”. One might wonder how Wolff makes the leap from the
definition of goodness and the fact of human motivation to a
commandment. Yet, Wolff has actually made such leaps even in
mathematics – in postulates and problems Wolff has turned
statements of the sort ”if A is done, B is the result” into rules
of the sort ”if you want to make B happen, do A”.
True, Wolff's
primary ethical principle appears to lack the condition inherent in
the postulates and the problems. Yet, this condition is actually
implicit in the fact of human motivation for good: because all people
try to achieve goodness, they should perfect themselves and others.
Wolffian ethical principle is then what Kant would later call a
hypothetical imperative.
What appears more
perplexing is why the perfection of other peoples should matter –
surely desire for goodness would imply a motivation for only one's
own perfection? But we must remember that for Wolff pleasure arises
from mere inscpection of something perfect. Hence, the more the
perfection for the world in general is acheived, the more joyful and
merry will a rational person be.
This abstract
enjoyment of perfection is the only inherent reward for good actions.
But because God desires also good actions and the growth of
perfection, He will reward the good people with further happiness
(Glückseligkeit), Wolff states. Once again, Wolff does not
naively think that good people would have all the luck (Glück) in
the world – luck is something that varies very much from one
context to another. Instead, he means by happiness a more permanent
position – an unwavering state of serenity untouched by any
external influences.
The story of
Wolffian ethics will continue with a text on the capacity of grasping
ethical truths.