Thus
far Wolff has mentioned a capacity of thinking oneself and a capacity
of thinking other things that happen to affect one's body – the
latter capacity we might call sensation or perception. These two
capacities concern things which are truly present, but human beings
have also the capacity of thinking something that is not present.
Wolff calls this capacity Einbildung
– word which is usually translated as imagination.
Whereas we would
nowadays think of creating something novel as an epitome of
imagination, for the early modern philosophy imagination was
particularly a capacity for representing something that had been
perceived or generally thought earlier. Thus, Spinoza explains
imagination through the example of Paul thinking his friend Peter,
although Peter is currently somewhere else. Later on, Kant and his
followers would call this capacity reproductive imagination and separate
it from productive imagination, which was required for constituting
experience itself.
It is
then no wonder that Wolff also connects Einbildung
with memory (Gedächtnis).
Memory is not then, according to Wolff, a capacity for thinking
things that once were thought – this is already covered by
imagination. Instead, the memory is left only with the task of
recognising that a certain thought is something that has been thought
before. Note that neither imagination nor memory need to concern just
earlier sensations, but they can also reproduce all sorts of thoughts
or conscious states.
Still,
Wolffian Einbildung
also includes the possibility of thinking something that has not been
thought before: if nowhere else, this happens at least in dreams.
This is still no Kantian productive imagination, because Wolff admits
that at least the materials of these imaginations must derive from
perceptions, that is, that the imaginations are mere recombinations
of previous thoughts. The imaginations in general are thus always
dependent on perceptions. Furthermore, the products of imagination
are also weaker than direct perceptions. Thus, the Wolffian
difference between perceptions and imaginations shares some
similarities with the Humean difference between impressions and
ideas.
Wolff distinguishes
two possibilities of imagining new thoughts. Firstly, the imagined
recombination of previous thoughts might be groundless, that is,
something that could not be generated. This is what Wolff calls an
empty imagination and it is exemplified by mythical notions like
centaur, but also by fantastic notions of different types of artists.
Wolff would probably include the utopian Lennon song mentioned in the
title among the products of an empty imagination.
Then
again, the combination might be based on the principle of sufficient
reason, or in other words, we might know how to produce it. In this
case, Wolff maintains, the combination has truth, and as we've seen
before, Wolff means by truth actually order: in other words, such a
combination is regulated. This is the highest point of beauty for
Wolff – creativity that is controlled by rules. It seems no wonder
that Wolff is especially presenting architecture as an example of
true beauty (I have examined Wolff's attitude towards architecture in
an earlier post).
Wolff is pleased of a roof protecting us from the weather, because it
is something we can truly make to happen, unlike dreams of love and
peace.
In
addition to architecture, Wolff assumes the controlled, but creative
imagination is used in mathematics: we might not have seen a
particular sort of curve, but we still know how to construct one,
because we know its equation. In Wolff's time all known curves were
undoubtedly such that could be constructed so easily. Yet, nowadays we are
familiar also with curves that cannot be completely constructed, but
which can only be approximated through a series of constructible
curves: the desired curve is then defined as the limit of such
series. If Wolff were consistent, he would probably have to consider
such curves results of an empty imagination.
In any
case, Wolff appears to think that if creative imagination is to be
fruitful, it requires external control. Although the control is not
assigned to any particular faculty, it is probably understanding
(Verstand) Wolff is thinking. I
shall consider this faculty next time.
Ei kommentteja:
Lähetä kommentti