After the preliminary considerations, Meier begins his investigation by elucidation of what is meant by the soul being immortal. He notes that many earlier philosophers, especially those of Cartesian school, had said that the soul's immortality means that it will not be decomposed. Because they also thought that the soul was simple and thus composed of nothing further, they imagined they had sufficiently proven the soul to be immortal.
Meier notes that this Cartesian notion of immortality is simply inadequate: even if the soul cannot be destroyed, it might still fail to be immortal. As an extreme case of an opposite kind, Meier introduces Ludvig Thümmig’s notion of immortality. Thümmig had said that to be immortal, the soul must not just be indestructible, but it also must exist eternally after death, live after death and finally recollect its previous life. Meier thinks Thümmig includes in his notion things that are not really about the immortality of the soul, but about the condition of the soul after death. The true notion should then lie somewhere between Cartesian and Thümmig’s notions.
Meier starts his own discussion of immortality with a discussion of life, which he defines, following Baumgarten, as something continuing its own nature. By nature Meier means sum of all such inner determinations that causes changes in accidences or makes them actual. Thus, he elucidates, nature of something does not include just its essence and capacities, but also forces. One could then prove that something lives by showing, firstly, that it continues to have its capacities or forces, or secondly, by showing that it continues to have actual accidences or changes in them that depend on its particular nature. Meier notes that the latter method is more common and easier, and indeed, the only way we can prove the life of something from experience, because we cannot directly perceive capacities and forces. For instance, we can know a tree has not died during winter, only if we see it grow leaves again in spring.
Death Meier then defines as the opposite of life, that is, interruption in the nature of something. Hence, something can be known to have died, firstly, if we know a priori that its forces have disappeared, or secondly, if we know a posteriori that it has no natural changes or accidences anymore. Note that the dead thing can still change in a manner that does not belong to its particular nature, just like a dead tree can still rot.
Meier continues by defining human being as a complex consisting of a reasoning soul and a human body, which are in a close relation of correspondence. Humans thus have three types of life: life of their body, life of their soul and life of the whole human being. Meier notes that the life of a human being requires the life of the body and the soul. Then again, he adds, if a human body lives, so must its soul and the whole human being also. The death of the human being implies then the death of the body and the ensuing separation of the body and the soul, but it need not imply the death of the soul.
In separation from the body, Meier says, the soul has two kinds of life, because it has two types of forces. In regard to its lower capacities, based on indistinct representations, it has sensuous or animal life, while in regard to its higher capacities, based on distinct representations, it has spiritual life. Now, he adds, spiritual life requires sensuous life, but not the other way around, as we can see in a sleeping person. Soul can then also die in two senses: by losing its sensuous life and thus all representation or by losing its spiritual life and only distinct representations.
Meier defines mortal to be something that can die, while immortal things cannot die. Because what is impossible cannot be actual, assuming the immortality of the soul means, he explains, assuming that the soul cannot die and that it will continue living after the death of the human being. Because what is possible need still not be actual, mortality of the soul might not mean that it would actually die, although usually people assume that the mortality of the soul implies its eventual death.
Following common definitions in the ontology of his times, Meier notes that possibility and impossibility could be absolute or hypothetical. This implies then two senses of mortality and immortality. If something is absolutely or in itself mortal, it can die, when we do not regard its relation to other things. Hypothetically mortal, on the other hand, is mortal when regarded in relation to other things or in some context. Meier notes that the human body is mortal both in itself and hypothetically. Absolutely immortal is then something, the death of which would imply in itself a contradiction: this sort of immortality Meier reserves only for the highest being. Hypothetically immortal, then, is something which cannot die in some context. Meier notes that a thing can be absolutely mortal without being hypothetically mortal in all contexts, while hypothetically mortal is always absolutely mortal. Absolutely immortal, on the other hand, cannot die in any context and is therefore hypothetically immortal.
Meier notes that for the sake of religion and morality it is not enough to prove that the soul is immortal or continues living after death, because it could just sleep or live like an animal. Instead, if one wants to defend religion and morality with such proofs, they should also show that the soul is at least occasionally conscious of itself and of other things in the future life, that it uses at least occasionally its higher forces, that is, freedom and understanding, and that in its future state it also remembers what it did while attached to the body and even recognises its identity with its former state. These latter properties, Meier elucidates, do not characterise the immortality of the soul, but something more, namely the condition of the soul after the death.
sunnuntai 28. huhtikuuta 2024
keskiviikko 10. huhtikuuta 2024
Georg Friedrich Meier: Thoughts on the condition of the soul after death (1746)
Meier’s Gedanken von dem Zustande der Seelen nach dem Tode is a rare book for its time, since although it studies the condition of the human soul after death, it does not try to demonstrate that this soul will continue to exist then. Indeed, he says, most of the demonstrations suggested for the immortality of our souls seem convincing just because the conclusion has already been accepted. We believe in the afterlife, because the idea agrees with our hopes, and indeed, we picture the afterlife to be as we would like it to be: Meier mentions a noble who was certain that in the afterlife souls of the nobility won’t have to mingle with souls from the lower classes.
Meier still makes sure to ascertain that he isn’t trying to disprove the immortality of the soul either. The reason for such an explanation is clear, since Meier speaks of the pressure of religious zealots, who censure everyone who even appears to go against such central religious dogmas. Meier assures the reader that he believes in the immortality of the soul and the final judgement of all humans, just because the Bible has taught him so. He even admits that we can be morally certain of this immortality and commends anyone who wants to go even further and demonstrate it with complete mathematical certainty.
Still, Meier says, the aim of his work is to show that such a demonstration is impossible for human beings, although, as he immediately adds, human reason is not inevitably led to doubt the immortality of the human soul. He will even analyse some suggested demonstrations and show where they fail to prove what they set out to prove. Finally, Meier concludes, his work will make it clear that nothing certain can be revealed about the condition of our soul after death.
Meier emphasises that his work has not been motivated by mere arrogance. Instead, he wants to raise the value of faith and scripture by lowering the worth of the human reason. Furthermore, Meier insists, the distinction of the faith and the reason also defends the faith: if one would think that belief in the immortality of the soul is based on nothing else than supposed demonstrations of reason, the weaknesses of these demonstrations would place the faith also in jeopardy.
Meier scorns all those who prefer leaving people with the incorrect opinion that demonstration of the immortality of the soul is possible in the name of religion and morality. On the contrary, he says, religion and morality do not need such weak defences. Immortality does motivate us for morality and religion, but motives need not have mathematical, but mere moral certainty.
Morality specifically, Meier thinks, has motives, even if we didn’t believe in immortality, because it has good consequences even in this life, and at least philosophers are equipped to understand these motives. Even if other people would not recognise these motives, Meier says, they still wouldn’t all become murderers and robbers, if they did not believe in the immortality of the human soul. His justification is that people generally do not act on the basis of some theories, but on the basis of their passions and inclinations. Furthermore, he insists, universal lack of morality could not occur, since, for instance, a universal disregard of property rights would soon collapse, since no one could make sure that they could keep on to what they had stolen from others.
Even religion could exist with the belief in human immortality, Meier says. True, he admits, most non-believers in immortality are atheists. Still, the demonstration of God’s existence is independent of the truth of our immortality, and when we accept the existence of God already, we always have to accept religion also.
Meier still makes sure to ascertain that he isn’t trying to disprove the immortality of the soul either. The reason for such an explanation is clear, since Meier speaks of the pressure of religious zealots, who censure everyone who even appears to go against such central religious dogmas. Meier assures the reader that he believes in the immortality of the soul and the final judgement of all humans, just because the Bible has taught him so. He even admits that we can be morally certain of this immortality and commends anyone who wants to go even further and demonstrate it with complete mathematical certainty.
Still, Meier says, the aim of his work is to show that such a demonstration is impossible for human beings, although, as he immediately adds, human reason is not inevitably led to doubt the immortality of the human soul. He will even analyse some suggested demonstrations and show where they fail to prove what they set out to prove. Finally, Meier concludes, his work will make it clear that nothing certain can be revealed about the condition of our soul after death.
Meier emphasises that his work has not been motivated by mere arrogance. Instead, he wants to raise the value of faith and scripture by lowering the worth of the human reason. Furthermore, Meier insists, the distinction of the faith and the reason also defends the faith: if one would think that belief in the immortality of the soul is based on nothing else than supposed demonstrations of reason, the weaknesses of these demonstrations would place the faith also in jeopardy.
Meier scorns all those who prefer leaving people with the incorrect opinion that demonstration of the immortality of the soul is possible in the name of religion and morality. On the contrary, he says, religion and morality do not need such weak defences. Immortality does motivate us for morality and religion, but motives need not have mathematical, but mere moral certainty.
Morality specifically, Meier thinks, has motives, even if we didn’t believe in immortality, because it has good consequences even in this life, and at least philosophers are equipped to understand these motives. Even if other people would not recognise these motives, Meier says, they still wouldn’t all become murderers and robbers, if they did not believe in the immortality of the human soul. His justification is that people generally do not act on the basis of some theories, but on the basis of their passions and inclinations. Furthermore, he insists, universal lack of morality could not occur, since, for instance, a universal disregard of property rights would soon collapse, since no one could make sure that they could keep on to what they had stolen from others.
Even religion could exist with the belief in human immortality, Meier says. True, he admits, most non-believers in immortality are atheists. Still, the demonstration of God’s existence is independent of the truth of our immortality, and when we accept the existence of God already, we always have to accept religion also.
perjantai 5. huhtikuuta 2024
Christian Wolff: Natural right 6 – What a scholar must do
Wolff ends this part of Jus naturae with a study of the duties of a scholar, that is, a person who knows of things. Wolff begins by noting that there are different kinds of scholars depending on what the person in question knows: e.g. there are scholars of law and scholars of languages. Furthermore, he continues, scholars come in different grades. Scholars of the lowest or vulgar order merely know facts. More experienced scholars, on the other hand, have philosophical or even mathematical understanding why something is true. The highest order of scholars, finally, are capable of finding new truths.
Wolff suggests that all scholars should aim for the proper place in this hierarchy, that is, the place where they can achieve something. Thus, if they can ascend to a higher order, they should not be content with remaining on a lower order. Indeed, scholars of all orders should continuously try to progress further, Wolff says, and not be satisfied with the knowledge of things they have already acquired.
Wolff is also a proponent of cooperation in scholarship: if some scholar can help others further, for instance, by providing advice in acquiring information or in finding new truths, they should do so. Particularly, scholars of superior grades should teach those of inferior grades things that are useful in promoting knowledge and understanding. On the other hand, a scholar who cannot decide something on their own should follow the guidance of other, preferably more experienced scholars.
The goal of a scholar, Wolff determines, should be to propagate knowledge and science and to develop them, unless this would be contrary to other important duties. This general goal has many subgoals, as it could imply perfecting one’s intellect, but also perfecting one’s will (if we are speaking of the science of morals) or even perfecting arts that serve humankind to reach necessities, commodities and pleasures of life.
Scholars can have different careers, depending on what they are good at (e.g. whether they are used to working with their hands or with mere intellect and how they apply what they know to other things). Whatever their career choice, Wolff explains, a person following a career should especially know the things they work with. If a scholar wants to pursue any career and they haven’t decided yet what it should be, they should choose it depending on their abilities.
An important task for every scholar, Wolff emphasises, is to have a cognitive faculty they can use readily. This implies that they should especially perfect their intellect. Furthermore, their intellect should enable them to discern true from apparent good and have enough understanding of the natural law for cultivating virtue. Because of this assumed expertise, scholars are expected to be more perfect in virtue than ordinary people and to show a good example to others.
Wolff thinks that all scholars should be given as much praise as they merit. Then again, no scholar has a right for praise, if they do not merit it. Thus, they have no right to complain, when they are not praised in this case. Wolff also insists that no scholar should envy another for being praised, even if the other person does not really merit it: we are allowed to praise anyone we want, provided this is not done contemptuously.
According to Wolff, scholars have the right to defend their own fame or fame of others against those who challenge it. Then again, they are not allowed to contend for their fame by showing contempt toward others. Similarly, scholars are not allowed to gain favour of their countrymen by deriding other nations, or vice versa, to gain favour of foreigners by deriding their own country.
Scholars of second and primary order, Wolff continues, have as their special duty to raise disciplines of science to such a grade of certainty that they can and to distinguish truth in these disciplines from falsehoods. Then again, they should not undertake judgement of such things, which they have not endeavoured to know so meticulously as things, in which they excel. Thus, they should not attempt to reach greater certitude in things, which they are not yet adequately acquainted with.
Who is able to correct or refute errors committed by others has the right to do this, Wolff thinks. Then again, scholars of lowest order are not able to do this and have therefore no right to refute others and even less to correct errors. Wolff notes there are two methods of refuting people. In direct refutation, one is to demonstrate propositions as true what the other thinks is false or to show the manner in which the other falls into error. In indirect refutation, one is to assume as true what the other asserts and then infer from it propositions that the other acknowledges as false. Refutation should also not contain any scorn or arguments conducted out of hate.
In Wolff’s opinion, freedom to philosophise belongs to scholarship. Indeed, he thinks that everyone is permitted to propose their opinion on philosophical matters and also are to be permitted to publicly say their opinion on them. Thus, no one should be forced to defend an opinion that they hold to be untrue. Hence, although scholars have a right to defend truth against assailants, this truth cannot and shouldn’t be defended with external force.
Wolff suggests that all scholars should aim for the proper place in this hierarchy, that is, the place where they can achieve something. Thus, if they can ascend to a higher order, they should not be content with remaining on a lower order. Indeed, scholars of all orders should continuously try to progress further, Wolff says, and not be satisfied with the knowledge of things they have already acquired.
Wolff is also a proponent of cooperation in scholarship: if some scholar can help others further, for instance, by providing advice in acquiring information or in finding new truths, they should do so. Particularly, scholars of superior grades should teach those of inferior grades things that are useful in promoting knowledge and understanding. On the other hand, a scholar who cannot decide something on their own should follow the guidance of other, preferably more experienced scholars.
The goal of a scholar, Wolff determines, should be to propagate knowledge and science and to develop them, unless this would be contrary to other important duties. This general goal has many subgoals, as it could imply perfecting one’s intellect, but also perfecting one’s will (if we are speaking of the science of morals) or even perfecting arts that serve humankind to reach necessities, commodities and pleasures of life.
Scholars can have different careers, depending on what they are good at (e.g. whether they are used to working with their hands or with mere intellect and how they apply what they know to other things). Whatever their career choice, Wolff explains, a person following a career should especially know the things they work with. If a scholar wants to pursue any career and they haven’t decided yet what it should be, they should choose it depending on their abilities.
An important task for every scholar, Wolff emphasises, is to have a cognitive faculty they can use readily. This implies that they should especially perfect their intellect. Furthermore, their intellect should enable them to discern true from apparent good and have enough understanding of the natural law for cultivating virtue. Because of this assumed expertise, scholars are expected to be more perfect in virtue than ordinary people and to show a good example to others.
Wolff thinks that all scholars should be given as much praise as they merit. Then again, no scholar has a right for praise, if they do not merit it. Thus, they have no right to complain, when they are not praised in this case. Wolff also insists that no scholar should envy another for being praised, even if the other person does not really merit it: we are allowed to praise anyone we want, provided this is not done contemptuously.
According to Wolff, scholars have the right to defend their own fame or fame of others against those who challenge it. Then again, they are not allowed to contend for their fame by showing contempt toward others. Similarly, scholars are not allowed to gain favour of their countrymen by deriding other nations, or vice versa, to gain favour of foreigners by deriding their own country.
Scholars of second and primary order, Wolff continues, have as their special duty to raise disciplines of science to such a grade of certainty that they can and to distinguish truth in these disciplines from falsehoods. Then again, they should not undertake judgement of such things, which they have not endeavoured to know so meticulously as things, in which they excel. Thus, they should not attempt to reach greater certitude in things, which they are not yet adequately acquainted with.
Who is able to correct or refute errors committed by others has the right to do this, Wolff thinks. Then again, scholars of lowest order are not able to do this and have therefore no right to refute others and even less to correct errors. Wolff notes there are two methods of refuting people. In direct refutation, one is to demonstrate propositions as true what the other thinks is false or to show the manner in which the other falls into error. In indirect refutation, one is to assume as true what the other asserts and then infer from it propositions that the other acknowledges as false. Refutation should also not contain any scorn or arguments conducted out of hate.
In Wolff’s opinion, freedom to philosophise belongs to scholarship. Indeed, he thinks that everyone is permitted to propose their opinion on philosophical matters and also are to be permitted to publicly say their opinion on them. Thus, no one should be forced to defend an opinion that they hold to be untrue. Hence, although scholars have a right to defend truth against assailants, this truth cannot and shouldn’t be defended with external force.
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