Christian Wolff: Natural right 4 (1744)

Christian Wolff continues his journey through natural right or law simply with a more detailed look on possible types of transactions. He begins from cases where transactions go only to one direction, that is, cases where a person gives some property or does some action to another person, without receiving anything in return, in other words, donations - a topic he also decides to concentrate on in the prologue of the book.

In a sense, this starting point is quite natural, since unidirectional transaction is simpler than a transaction in both directions. Yet, it also might imply a deeper principle in Wolff’s philosophy - we are obligated to create perfection around us, hence, we are obligated to help others by donations or beneficial actions. This obligation, Wolff says, is present even in a state where everything is shared with everyone and no private property exists - at this stage it is not things, but actions that are, in a sense, donated. Although donating is duty, Wolff clarifies, it is still only an imperfect duty, that is, we cannot say to whom we have to donate. Thus, no one can be forced to donate to a particular person. On the other hand, the recipient of donation is obligated to be grateful to the donor.

In another sense, donation is not just a one-sided deal, Wolff points out, because the recipient of the donation must still accept it. This is especially crucial when we remember that donation might be only conditional - for instance, someone might donate a sum of money to a person, on the condition that the recipient will train to be a doctor. Although one might see no reason for not accepting an unconditional donation, donations with such additional conditions are a completely different thing.

Wolff notes that donations can also happen through words and letters, and just like in the previous book, we find him speculating whether the donor can still cancel the donation, if the post hasn’t delivered the donation letter. Such verbal donations still, of course, obligate the donor to do what has been promised, whether it is a physical delivery of a thing or some other action.

Something Wolff has also noted in previous parts of natural law is that no contract or promise is valid, if the persons making them are not adults in their full senses. Thus, also in this case, no minors, people with mental conditions or intoxicated are allowed to donate. Wolff also notes that we are allowed to donate only with proper consideration and not rashly. Still, it is the duty of donor to notice when the donation has not been considered. If the donor does not do the necessary self-check, the recipient does not have the obligation to do it for them - although if a recipient notices that donor has acted rashly, Wolff admits, they should return the donation.

A peculiar case of donation Wolff singles out is the handing out of alms, by which Wolff means simply a donation meant for covering the bare necessities of life. Although everyone is obligated to give alms - even more so than to donate in general, because bare necessities are essential to all human beings - again, giving alms is just an imperfect duty and no one can be forced to it. On the other hand, beggars do have the right to argue to anyone, why they should be given alms.

Although Wolff then does accept the practice of begging, he does want to restrict who can do begging. According to Wolff, everyone should primarily take care of themselves with their own work. Hence, begging is allowed, he says, only if the would-be beggar cannot provide themselves with their own work, which can happen if they don’t have the capacity to do work, if they could and wanted to work, but no one would hire them, or if they did work, but the work would not pay enough for necessities of life.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - The law of the land

The purpose of state or republic, according to Crusius, is to guarantee common good of its citizens, and prudence in affairs of state means finding the best means for this common good. Crusius notes that no one constitution is the only possible means for common good - all three simple constitutions (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy) and their various combinations could work. Following tradition beginning from Aristotle, Crusius remarks that all of these constitutions could also be corrupted, if the regents of the state cared only for themselves and their own class (e.g. the three simple constitutions could be corrupted into tyrannies, oligarchies and ochlocracies). This corruption or illness of republic, Crusius clarifies, is not to be confused with mere irregularity of republic, where its constitution does not wholly serve the common good - irregularity does not yet give subjects right to overthrow their regents nor does it give other republics a right to meddle in its affairs.

In practice, Crusius advises that constitution of a republic should somehow restrict the power of regent. At least during the crucial time, when a new regent is required, either citizens should have a say in choosing the new government of the republic or this should be precisely determined by the constitution, so that the common good would not be too dependent on whims of an arbitrary individual. Indeed, the constitution should allow for strengthening and weakening the power of the regent, as the situation demanded.

In monarchy, Crusius specifies, regularity of the state demands that the power of the monarch is restricted by immutable laws, and even better, by an independent council or collegium, because individual rulers can easily become vicious. Still, Crusius adds, these restrictions shouldn’t get in the way of swift decisions, if common good required them. Furthermore, Crusius suggests that monarchies should be hereditary, because this would allow educating future monarchs to their position.

In addition, hereditary monarchies fall more rarely in civil wars, Crusius believes. In fact, he considers civil war so great a danger that he counsels making hereditary lines definite. Crusius advises particularly against monarchies with several monarchs, because at worst this encourages civil wars and at best it still weakens the republic.

Crusius has not as much to say about aristocracies and democracies. He notes that aristocracies should not be hereditary, because that could prevent best people becoming regents. Furthermore, Crusius thinks that rules stating how an aristocratic counsel comes to a decision should be clear, so that there would be no ambiguity about the decision making process. Of democracies Crusius really has nothing to say beyond noting that it requires a completely civilised nation.

In addition to choosing a constitution, Crusius continues, prudence in affairs of state concerns also the day-to-day decisions of a republic. Individual republics have their own particular circumstances requiring particular decisions, but Crusius notes that some general rules can be justified already by the general nature of republics.

Crusius begins by noting that good and prudent government has three goals, none of which should be ignored nor emphasised over others. First goal is to secure the position of regent and apply his powers most efficiently. Crucius remarks that writers like Machiavelli had focused on this goal, forgetting that the good of the regent was intricately connected with the good of the citizens, the second goal of prudent government. This second goal was overemphasised, Crusius says, by republican writers, who had forgotten that a republic still required an efficient regent. Finally, Crucius picks as the third goal the status of republic among other republic. Just like with other goals, he notes that some politicians focused too much on this particular goal, forgetting that external glory of state is based on its internal happiness.

Crusius states that prudence in affairs of state uses the very same capacities as prudence in private affairs, although it applies these capacities in different matters, which it then ought to be informed of. Specifically prudent governor should know the geographical characteristics of the land and the citizens, the political constitution of the whole republic and various communities within it, economic state of the republic, and finally, interests and goals of neighbouring republics.

Crusius emphasises the role of religion as the basis of security of republics. In addition to religion, sciences, arts and freedom of thinking should be protected, because they serve as means for securing all the goals of human life and make republics respected. Despite the lip service to freedom of thinking, Crusius is not willing to tolerate ideas working against the security of state, such as, he insists, atheism.

Crusius advises regents to be careful in choosing their officials and to prefer intelligent and virtuous people over those of high birth. Still, he also suggests that regents should not replace their own intelligence with the intelligence of their officials and that they should closely control the doings of those officials, because they work in the name of the regent. Crusius insists that officials should always follow direct commands of regent, to make the republic secure, while laws, according to Crucius, can be broken, if it is prudent to do so. Indeed, Crusius suggests, good example of regent guides subjects better than any laws.

Crusius speaks for strict regulation of state spendings - republic should always have some reserve finances, in case money is required for emergencies. Money shouldn’t particularly be given freely to subjects, Crusius argues, because they wouldn’t respect what they haven’t worked for, and they particularly shouldn’t have the right to press their own coinage. Instead, subjects should be taxed heavily, Crusius says, since no citizen should have means to live by oneself, but be in various ways dependent on other citizens. Indeed, a person providing sustenance to others should be congratulated, Crusius suggests, because they help to realise one goal of republic. To make taxation fair, Crusius notes, richer individuals should pay the most. Generally, he insists that money should be directed to move from owner to another from time to time, since in this manner it helps the state and the subjects more than if it remained stagnant. Thus, if some goods in land were still ownerless, they could be taken as regent’s property, so that they could be used for everyone’s benefit.

Crusius has not very much to say about legislation, beyond the general fact that laws should be applicable to different subjects. Furthermore, Crusius emphasises that laws should definite, so that there can be no room for misinterpretation, whether it is accidental or purposeful. Against another sort of fraud is directed Crusius’ advise that regents should be careful that religious communities won’t meddle into civil life of their members, since this is often a way to deceive lower classes.

When it comes to foreign relations, Crusius advocates for maintaining the army in good condition, because a strong army has an important role in preventing foreign conquest and in raising the prestige of the republic, which is important for achieving its goals. In commerce, Crusius holds onto essentially mercantilist ideals: foreign imports should be restricted, because losing gold weakens the state, and if something is to be imported, it should be raw materials that are then further developed into manufactures that could be sold to other countries for more money. Crusius still does not believe that republics are only competitors of one another. Indeed, he says that just like humans require friends, countries require alliances for their own security.