Georg Friedrich Meier: Thoughts about jokes (1744)

 

(1718-1777)
By Skara kommun - Georgius Fridericus Meier; Uploaded by Magnus Manske, CC BY 2.0 

It seems almost a joke in itself to read an author from the Wolffian tradition of philosophy discussing the merits of jokes: how could such a system, with a penchant for droll rules, help us to understand imaginative and unruly world of jokes? Yet, this is exactly what Georg Friedeich Meier sets out to do in his Gedanken von Schertzen - to find rules by which to decide which jokes are effective and which are not. Just like an artist might not be able to explain why her works are beautiful, similarly a joker might not know why some joke is particularly funny.

To clarify a bit, Meier is not a pure Wolffian, but more precisely, hails from the tradition of Baumgarten. Now, while Baumgarten’s metaphysics was, on the whole, more intellectualist than Wolff’s, which still had some empiricist leanings, in one particular aspect Baumgarten’s philosophy was more receptive to the messiness of such topic as jokes. Baumgarten accepted that in addition to the clear and distinct perfection of conceptual thought, senses have their own kind of perfection, embodied in the new discipline of aesthetics. Baumgarten hadn’t at this point published his work on aesthetics, mentioning it only briefly in his psychology, but Meier as his student probably knew about Baumgarten’s more concrete ideas.

In addition to the obvious idea that jokes should induce laughter - at least when time and audience are right for them - Meier notes that jokes are dependent on two faculties, wit and sharpness. These two faculties are in a sense opposite: while a sharp mind provides distinct notion of separate entities, wit notices all correspondences between them, such as similarities of qualities and quantitative proportions. Mere wit is not enough for a joke, or otherwise allegories could be jokes, but neither is mere sharpness nor making people laugh - conceptual analysis is no joke and neither is any old prank.

Now, what makes a joke good or bad, Meier says, can depend either on the topic joked or on the very form of the joke. He at once concentrates his work on the latter kind of perfection. Still, he does note that topic can affect our overall enjoyment of joke: a blasphemous joke can make us uneasy, no matter how good it technically is.

Formal perfection of joke consists simply in showing wit and sharpness and making people laugh. Meier specifies this rather obvious remark by giving more definite criteria for the perfection of a joke. A good joke, Meier says, must be both complex and novel - or at least complex and novel jokes are better than simple and unoriginal ones. Complexity of a joke - or more precisely, joke impressing many ideas at once - entices imagination and causes pleasant emotions, when we have the ability to conceive many things at once. Novelty, on the other hand, shows that the joker has originality and not just good memory. An old joke might have seemed funny at first, but becoming too familiar it has lost its ability to make us laugh. Thus, a good joker doesn’t repeat her stories over and over again.

A good joke shouldn’t be just witty, Meier notes, but it should also be sharp. In other words, the connections uncovered in a good joke should not be too obvious, because mere similarity does not induce laughter. What this means in practice is, for instance, comparing very small and insignificant things with great and significant things and finding unexpected similarities. Especially funny, Meier says, is putting apparently contradictory matters on the same level, which he considers to be the essence of irony. The more points of contact uncovered for sharply distinguished things, the more perfect the joke is. All of these points of contact need not be made explicit, and indeed, it is better if many of them are left implicit. Furthermore, these points of contact should concern the essence of things, thus, Meier concludes, mere word plays are very imperfect jokes and a sign of bad taste (here Meier shows his own personal taste).

Meier also notes that good jokes should be unexpected. A joke told after a number of other, similar jokes has not much of an impact, because the ideas suggested by it are too distinct in our minds. Instead, a perfect joke should be preceded by ideas of a very different sort, being like a flash of sudden witticism. Thus, Meier notes, a joke told in the middle of very serious lectures requiring conceptual distinctness is a sign of great wittiness, and even more witty is when a person jokes at the time of her own death. Because a joke should be completely unexpected, audience should not have too much time to think about the matter beforehand, so it should not be preceded by any lengthy introductions. Particularly to be avoided is laughing before one’s own joke.

In addition, Meier notes, a good joke should have all the marks of beauty, that is, sensuous perfection. Firstly, a good joke should produce a clear idea of what it attempts to convey. That is, audience should not need any detailed explanations to understand it. Then again, a good joke should also be lively, which means that it shouldn’t be too conceptualised and analysed, just like geometrical explanation of a beautiful object is not beautiful. This means that jokes should not be too long. In order to combine clarity and brevity, jokes should be aimed at the specific audience listening to it. Finally, best jokes should concern true matters, although good jokes can also be told of things someone believed to be true, such as pagan gods.

Meier doesn’t have that much to say about what in a good joke makes someone laugh, because he admits that genesis of laughter is still not very clear. He does point out that laughter is primarily connected to positive ideas, although it can have mediate connection to negative ideas, such as when we laugh at our enemies. He also notes deformities and roguery as examples of things causing laughter, although too great a deformity causes empathy and too great a roguery anger. A general rule Meier concludes from these examples is that laughter happens when we observe incongruities in unimportant trifles. Then again, laughable as such is no true joke, if the aspects of witticism and sharpness are missing. Thus, funny anecdote is not yet a joke nor is a laughingstock a witty joker. Similarly, although a good performance can enhance the effect of a joke, performance as such does not make anything a joke.

Martin Knutzen: Philosophical study of immaterial nature of soul (1744)

While most of the philosophers of the Wolffian school were busy writing grandiose compendiums of philosophical disciplines, Knutzen, the teacher of Immanuel Kant, was satisfied with more succinct treatment of individual problems. For instance, Philosophische Abhandlung von der immateriellen Natur der Seele (a translation from Knutzen’s Latin original) treats the nature of human soul. In fact, it is a defense of the immateriality of latter, against materialists, who would state that soul is nothing else but a material thing.

Knutzen’s work divides into two parts, first of which positively argues that soul is immaterial, while the second criticises the materialistic arguments against the immateriality of the soul. While the first part of the treatise is not that original, it is at least a good summary of the usual Wolffian argument for the immateriality of the soul.

The starting point of Knutzen’s argument is the simple experience that we are conscious or aware of things. This what is conscious of things is then called soul, without first any indication whether soul is material or immaterial. Now, one thing soul can be conscious of is the soul itself. An important condition for this self-consciousness is the ability to distinguish oneself from other things - this ability is something we’ll see even Fichte emphasising as an important part of human self-consciousness.

Next question Knutzen makes concerns the conditions of the capacity to make distinctions. Firstly, he notes that the soul must have representations of several things, secondly, these various representations must belong to the same subject, and finally, the representations must be compared by this same subject. In other words, soul, as the subject of these various acts, must form an absolute unity - a sort of focus, from which all these “rays of action” start. In particular, the soul cannot be a mere unified complex of parts, Knutzen says, which wouldn’t really be an absolute, but only accidental unity.

Knutzen’s proof is then almost complete. What he still requires is to show that matter is no absolute unity. This he can do easily, because matter was defined to be a complex substance consisting of many parts, which were also substances. To make things even clearer, Knutzen asks us to consider, in a Condillacian manner, a statue that would think itself. Part of such a statue might represent one part of the statue and another part would represent another part. Yet, such a combination of representations would be no unified representation of the whole statue. At most, one or more indivisible parts of the statue might think of the whole statue and at the same time of themselves, but such an indivisible part - a monad - would then not be a complex substance nor material.

The second, bit more original part of Knutzen’s book is dedicated to showing faults in arguments purporting to show materiality of soul. Furthermore, Knutzen considers the question why people endorse materialism. He comes up with two answers. Firstly, he suggests that materialists are often unable to understand anything beyond what they sense and thus unable to fathom the existence of something that cannot be sensed, such as an immaterial soul. Secondly, he insinuates that many materialists just wish to discredit the idea of immortality, so they wouldn’t have to worry any retribution of their sins.

Knutzen considers seven different arguments for material nature of soul:

1) A clear reason for a materialist understanding of soul is that body appears to determine soul in many ways: for instance, bodily weaknesses and old age hinder thinking. Knutzen notes that these facts could also be explained by suggesting that soul uses body as an instrument when thinking something - when the instrument is somehow flawed, like when the body ages, thinking becomes difficult for soul. If an old person would suddenly get a new, young body, its ability to think would be increased.

2) Knutzen has rejected the first argument of materialists, because he thinks causal interaction between soul and a body is at least as good an explanation for certain facts that could be explained materialistically. Now, another argument for materialism starts particularly from this supposed interaction between soul and body - all causality requires substances touching each other, which makes sense only when these substances are material. Knutzen is able to quickly deal with this argument, because there is no clear reason why all causality would happen through direct contact, and indeed, Newtonian account of gravity appeared to show that even material substances could affect one another through long distances. In the end, Knutzen notes, there is no need to assume that an instrument would have the same essence as its user, just like a violin is very different from a violin player.

3) Yet another argument for materialism starts from similarities in the behaviour of parents and their children, which could be explained if souls were produced from the souls of their parents. Knutzen notes that just because soul of a particular parent and a particular child are similar, other children in the same family might bear no resemblance to their parents. In any case, the similarities in behaviour might be attributed to the similarities of instruments used by souls, that is, bodies.

4) Another materialistic argument begins from the natural assumption that soul appears to undergo changes - while we are conscious of this now, we will be conscious of another thing later. If we then assume that all changes are based on motion, then soul would have to be a movable thing and therefore material. Like with an earlier argument, Knutzen can simply deny that all changes require motion - indeed, it is quite conceivable that even some material changes, like when colour of an object changes, might not need motions.

5) Locke famously noted that while matter as such appears to have no capacity to think - as shown by material substances that do not think - God with his omnipotence would surely be capable of giving the matter a power to think, which would make the assumption of immaterial soul superfluous. Knutzen’s answer is that the idea of thinking matter is a complete contradiction, thus, even God could not make matter think, no matter how omnipotent he is.

6) It is a pity that most German philosophers of the time considered animals only in brief snippets, leaving their status in the world system quite unclear. Still, many philosophers had noted that animals did have souls, but their souls differed crucially from human souls - while humans could think, animals probably didn’t. Knutzen notes that materialists might insist that animal souls can think and that they are material, which would suggest that same things could be said about human souls. While it would be easy to deny that animals think, Knutzen does not do this, but admits that animals might have this capacity. Yet, he at once points out that animal souls cannot then be material.

7) The last straw of the materialists is to insist they can explain all phenomena of human consciousness materialistically, so that no supposition of immaterial substances is required. Knutzen goes very far in describing the current theories about nerve fluids etc. Yet, he finally notes, there seems to be no clear connection between thinking and movements of nerve fluids.

Christian Wolff: Natural right 4 - Forms of trade

Wolff continues his account of different types of contract with such where both sides of the contract give and receive something. Simplest form of such a contract is what he calls permutatio, where straightforwardly one person gives something to another person, who in turn gives something else to the first person. What is traded in permutatio might be physical things, but they might also be anything else, like rights to use a thing or certain amount of work.

Wolff notes that permutatio is valid only if certain rules are obeyed. Permutatio must, firstly, be consensually agreed upon. Furthermore, things traded in permutatio must be owned by the people giving them, that is, one cannot trade what belongs to someone else. Traded things need not be delivered at the same time nor immediately after agreeing to permutatio, but the agreement creates an obligation to deliver the agreed things.

A rather peculiar form of permutatio is what Wolff call permutatio res sua cum sua, that is, trading one’s thing with that same thing. What Wolff means is that in this type of permutatio one person gives a thing at a certain time and the other person returns that same thing later. The main difference to ordinary borrowing of a thing seems to be that unlike with borrowing, the ownership of the thing changes for a while to the second person. Despite this, the second person cannot give the traded thing away, before returning it to the original owner.

In all forms of permutatio, Wolff adds, the traded things should be equally priced. Wolff does admit that this is not an absolute obligation - a person can use permutatio to give more in exchange to the other, but then this extra can be interpreted as a donation. Wolff also notes that price can be defined in two ways, firstly, as what a thing is considered to be priced commonly or by experts, and secondly, what an individual considers the price to be according to her particular feeling toward the thing in question. Wolff notes that the first type of price is the true price, while prices based on individual feelings should be considered only if both sides of the permutatio accept the evaluation of things according to this price.

The most important form of permutatio is emtio venditio. The defining element of the emtio venditio is for Wolff that one person is thought to give a price of the thing given by the other person, or more particularly, sum of money corresponding to this price. The person giving he thing is called venditor (seller), while the other person in this contract is emtor (buyer).

Just like permutatio in general, emtio venditio is valid only if certain conditions apply, such as consensuality and the seller owning the thing sold. Wolff also adds such considerations that a person cannot sell something that does not exist - although she can make the conditional promise that she will sell a thing, if it does exist in the future - and that a person cannot buy something she already owns - although she can pay for the possession of this thing.

A peculiar characteristic of emtio venditio is that it involves an explicit or implicit negotiation for the price of the thing. This is especially important in case of people promising to buy or sell something, because such a promise has an implicit condition that both parties must agree upon the proper price of the thing. Even if a promise is in this case conditional, it creates obligations for the person who promised: for instance, a person promising to sell a thing cannot sell it to anyone else during the negotiations for the price.

Wolff notes that in addition to determining the price of the thing sold and bought, the buyer and the seller can agree upon conditions when the price will change. For instance, faults in the thing can lower its price, while delays in the payment can make it higher.

More generally, many details in different types of contract depend on what is agreed upon by the people signing the contract. A good example of this is what Wolff calls arrha - a separate payment that one side of the contract gives in order to confirm the validity of the contract. If no other conditions are stated, arrha changes the actual contract in no manner and specifically it need never be paid back. Then again, Wolff notes, arrha is often an additional ingredient in emtio venditio, so that it is counted as a partial payment of the actual purchase (what we would call a down payment), and the contract might state some further conditions, when the down payment has to be paid back by the seller.

Wolff goes through a number of other possible additions to an emtio venditio:

• Addictio in diem: This additional clause provides the seller an opportunity to accept during a certain period a better offer, even if the sale has otherwise been completed. The better offer need not be one with more money involved, but it can have otherwise better conditions, such as a more certain payment.
• Lex commissoria: This additional clause states that unless buyer pays during certain period of time, the sale becomes invalid. Seller is then free to trade the thing with someone else. Then again, if the seller accepts even a partial payment from the buyer, the lex commissoria becomes invalid.
• Pactum de retrahendo: An additional clause stating that if the traded thing is sold anew, it should be sold to a certain person, at least if this person is willing to pay the same price as other potential buyers. Thus, if the thing is sold to someone else, this person has the right to revoke the sale.
• Pactum de retrovendendo: This additional clause gives the seller a right to buy the sold thing back during a certain period. If nothing else is agreed upon, the price for this new sale should be same as the original. This clause means that the buyer cannot sell the thing to someone else during the time when the clause is valid.
• Pactum de redimendo: This additional clause is almost same as the previous, but here it is the right of the buyer to sell the traded thing back.

Whatever clauses are added to an emtio venditio, the ownership of traded thing should in general be transferred as soon as possible to the buyer. This means also that if the thing produces some further profits - or indeed, expenses - these belong to the buyer. Like many other details, Wolff notices, the buyer and seller can agree upon some other conditions, such that the profits should still belong the seller for a certain time.

One should only buy things from their owner. Yet, Wolff adds, the buyer cannot always know for sure whether the seller is the true owner and then she just has to assume the seller is. If then it is revealed afterwards that the owner knew nothing about this, she has a right to start eviction, that is, remove the thing from its possessor (i.e. the supposed buyer). In this case, the seller is obligated to pay for the buyer any expenses caused by eviction

A form of emtio venditio Wolff picks for a special consideration is what he calls locatio conductio, where what is sold is either work or use of a thing - in effect, concept of locatio conductio combines both work relations and rents. The seller in locatio conductio is called locator, while the buyer is called conductor. As soon as this type of contract has been agreed upon, the locator is obligated to provide the conductor with the work or the use of a thing. Similarly, conductor is obligated to pay for these, even if she later decided that she did not need the work or the use.

Just like with emtio venditio in general, there are certain rules governing what the locator and the conductor can do. For instance, no unlawful work (thefts, murders etc.) can be sold or bought. Furthermore, if the contract sets some restrictions on ways how the thing in question can be used, the conductor cannot break them. Then again, if if the conductor is not using a thing, locator cannot sell its use to another conductor without getting a permission from the first conductor.

Usually it is the owner who has the sole right of selling the use of a thing. An important exception is that the conductor or the buyer of this period of use can sell this use again. Similarly, if conductor has bought a period of work from locator, she can sell this work to a new conductor. This right of further locato conductio, or as Wolff calls it, sublocatio, is inherent in the notion of locatio conductio: if locator wants to forbid such a further sale of the use of thing or the work, conductor can then renounce the whole contract.

In case of locatio conductio involving use of a thing, locator is obligated to provide the conductor with a thing that is suited to the use it is contracted for. If locator is unable to do this, the contract becomes invalid: for instance, if locator has rented a house and because of repairs the conductor cannot live there, the contract falls apart. Conductor, on the other hand, is obligated to return the thing back to locator without any damages, except such as can be expected from normal wear and tear.

A rather peculiar form of locatio conductio is socida. In this case, the locatio conductio concerns use of cattle. Socida gives the conductor a right to use a herd of cattle with one prevision - if one of the herd dies, conductor should replace it. Thus, the herd, as it were, is indestructible, or as the colourful expression says it, made out of iron.

Wolff ends the book with discussion of two very special questions, societas and usuram. By societas he means a contract between two or more people that they will combine their capitals and work together for a common goal, dividing share in potential rewards and damages. The closest equivalent to modern terms would be company, except that Wolff’s societas is founded only for a definite project and for a limited period of time, although its existence can then be continued by mutual consent. Wolff goes into great detail discussing how profits or losses are to be divided fairly, what conditions regulate a person leaving societas and other similar things we cannot enter here.

The notion of usuram is closely connected to that of mutuum in that both involve a loan of a thing, which is consumed when used, such as money. The only difference is that in mutuum the person taking the loan needs just return what was loaned, but in case of usuram, she has to pay something additional for the use of the thing. In effect, then, usuram is simply a loan with usury or interest.

While we usually think of loans with compound interest, Wolff’s primary example of usuram is a loan where interest is paid just on the loaned sum. He does admit the possibility of interest paid on interest, and furthermore, interest paid on that interest etc., but this is something he considers only in passing.

Wolff’s general opinion is that asking for interest should generally be allowed. Indeed, in a sense he thinks that interest is the norm and loan without an interest is partially a donation. Then again, he wants very strict regulations on when interest can be asked for: this should be allowed, he says, only when the loan is used for a profitable business venture. Then again, if loan is used only for providing for the necessities of life, interest should not be demanded.

Christian Wolff: Natural right 4 - Loans, deposits and mandates

Although Wolff inserted the discussion of money on the pretext that money is required as a measure for trades, he continues with a discussion on contracts, in which, like in donations, a person gives or does something for someone else without receiving anything in return. The list of different types of contracts he considers is not Wolff’s personal invention, but hails from a long tradition of natural law. Indeed, this tradition continued even after Wolff, and we find even Hegel discussing briefly these various types of contract.Thus, going through these various types of contract has its reasons.

Commodatum

Wolff begins with a type of contract where a person concedes a use of an unconsumable thing she owns to another person for free. Thus, if I borrow a lawnmower to my neighbour, this is a case of commodatum, but if I borrow him some eggs, this usually isn’t, since eggs are in most cases used for culinary purposes. Then again, Wolff admits, if I would borrow eggs for my neighbour to show off in a parade, it would be commodatum, since the eggs are not consumed in the process.

Commodatum, like all these types of contracts, is based on the will of the person owning the thing borrowed. Thus, although the situation of the person asking to borrow things would be such that she should be borrowed, there’s no basis why a person not wanting to borrow would have to do this. Furthermore, commodatum remains the property of the owner, and the person to whom the thing is borrowed can only use it for temporary purposes. Specifically, that person cannot borrow the borrowed thing to someone else without a specific permission of the owner. After the use is over, borrowed thing should be returned to the owner. Indeed, if the owner needs the borrowed thing for her own purposes, it should be returned to her at once.

Naturally, if some damage happens to the borrowed thing, the person to whom the the thing was borrowed should cover the damages, if they are caused by her intentionally or through negligence. Then again, if the borrowed thing is already faulty and causes some damage to due to this fault, the owner of the borrowed thing should pay the damages.

A peculiar case of this type of contract is the so-called commodatum duntaxat causa - in effect, borrowing for the sake of the person owning the borrowed thing. The example above would be a case of this sort, if I had borrowed the lawnmower to my neighbour so that he could mow my lawn. This type of commodatum is somewhat different from the more general one, Wolff notices. For instance, if my neighbour is negligent when mowing my lawn and damages my lawnmower, it is actually my fault, since I should have been more careful in choosing a person to mow my lawn. Then again, if my neighbour would have intentionally damaged my lawnmower or if he happened to use it for some other purposes, while the damage happened, he would be obligated to pay the damages.

Mutuum

This type of contract is almost similar to commodatum, but now the borrowed thing is consumable, for instance, when I borrow eggs to my neighbour for him to use in baking. In this case, the very thing borrowed cannot be, of course, returned, but at least a thing of similar type and of same quantity should be returned.

One thing that is often borrowed in mutuum is money, for instance, if I pay my neighbour’s lunch, when he has forgotten his wallet, and he promises to return it the next day. For a loan of money to be a simple mutuum, there should be no interest paid for the loan. Since money comes in different currencies and a specific currency can be, according to Wolff, quantified in two different manners - either through its intrinsic characteristics, like the amount of gold it contains, or through its fluctuating valuation in the market - a mutuum must specify in what manner the loan is to be paid back: should be it of the very same currency and whether it must have the same amount of precious metal or have the same value in relation to other currencies.

Depositum

The name of this type of contract should be familiar from deposit boxes. In effect, in depositum some person agrees to take someone else’s thing into her custody and to guard it for free, for instance, when my neighbour leaves his car for me to watch, while he is on holiday. The ownership of the thing does not transfer to the custodian, who also has no right to use what is deposited. A use of the deposited thing would constitute a theft. Then again, the custodian of the deposited thing can deposit the thing further, that is, find another guardian for the thing she herself was supposed to guard already.

Although the custodian is obligated to guard the deposited thing, the owner has also responsibilities. Specifically, she should be careful in her choice of the custodian, and if she has happened to pick out a negligent person and she could have known this person to be negligent, Wolff insists, then the possible damage is to be blamed on her own negligent choice. Similarly, if the owner wants to end the depositum and asks for her thing back from the custodian, it is the responsibility of the owner to find reliable transportation from the custodian to herself for the thing.

Just like with commodatum, Wolff points out a possibility of depositum duntaxat causa. Here, the phrase means depositing a thing for the custodian, that is, providing her the opportunity to use the deposited thing - for instance, in the case above, my neighbour would have then allowed me to use his care he had entrusted to my care. Depositum duntaxat causa is then something close to commodatum, the difference being that the owner of the deposited thing still has more responsibility of the deposited thing.

Sequestrum

All the contract types dealt with thus far can involve more than one owner. Hence, we might have same thing owned by many persons, which they then decide to borrow to a friend of theirs or give it to this same friend to guard. Quite obviously, the eventual return of the thing is more difficult, because all must get their share, when thing is returned.

A very specific type of depositum with several owners for same thing is sequestrum. Here, the thing is deposited, because there is a lawsuit going on, determining who is the true and sole owner of the thing. Because of its close resemblance to depositum, there is not that much new to say about sequestrum. The most important difference between sequestrum and depositum concerns the time when the custodian must return the deposited thing to its owner. With sequestrum, the thing is to be returned when the controversy about its owner has been solved and the rightful owner has been decided.

Mandatum

While previous types of contracts involved things, mandatum involves actions. In a mandatum, one person asks another to do something in her name and this other person agrees to do it with no charge. Although the action in question could be nearly anything, Wolff clearly thinks mostly cases related to a business deal, for instance, if my neighbour asks me to participate in an auction in order to buy a specific object for him.

An important presupposition of mandatum is that the person mandated to do the deal should not get any profit for the deal arranged - not as a direct wage, of course, but also not through more indirect means, such as arranging a deal with a company one partially owns. In other words, the mandated person must be neutral in relation to the deal being made. Wolff does not deny that even a stakeholder could give council about and lobby for a deal - he just notes that such council doesn’t fulfil the definition of mandatum.

Wolff defines several types of mandatum. For instance, he notes that a mandatum could define very specific instructions, which the mandated person would have to follow to the letter, or it could outline only in broad details the outcome desired and leave the mandated person free to reach this goal by almost any means. In addition to this division, Wolff mentions also that mandatum could be either publicly known or a secret mandate. In the latter case, mandatum should also determine in what instances the mandated person has the right to reveal who the deal is being made for.

An important question in all the types of contract thus far has been who is to account for possible damages. In case of mandatum, it is usually the mandating party who has to be ready to pay something. The mandated person might lose opportunities to work, while doing the business deal, and they might even have to spend some money when contracting the deal, and the mandating party must be ready to account for such expenses. Then again, the mandated part must also account for damages caused by them, for instances, when overstepping the boundaries set by mandatum.

In addition to the basic case, where a person mandates another person, Wolff also considers cases where there are a lot of people mandating the same person for the same task or a lot of people mandated to do the same task by the same person. The important question about such a case is, undoubtedly, how the responsibilities are divided.

Honorarium

Peculiarly, Wolff leaves this type of contract unmentioned in the table of contents, probably because he deals it in the middle of the section about mandatum. The idea itself is rather simple - honorarium means donating money to a person as reward for their freely giving or doing something. In other words, honorarium could be given for such things like commodatum, mutuum, depositum and mandatum. The only restriction is that the person rewarded shouldn’t have done the act for the sake of receiving honorarium - in this case, Wolff says, the apparent honorarium is actually more like a wage paid for the actions.

Fidejussio

Fidejussio is a contract dependent on obligation of another person - a person entering into fidejussio guarantees that if this other person does not fulfil the obligation, the first person will do it. Although again, this obligation could be almost anything, in the most usual case fidejussio concerns a debt. Wolff notes that fidejussio is a contract that requires extreme vigilance in part of the guarantor, because it contains a clear risk of having to pay for mistakes of another. This means that valid fidejussio has strict preconditions - no one can be forced to make a guarantee and the guarantor must understand what is meant to be guaranteed and with what conditions. Furthermore, it is of utmost importance to commit fidejussio into a written form, although even an oral fidejussio is juridically valid.

Fidejussio is also dependent on the original obligation. If the obligation was not valid, then a fidejussio cannot either be. Furthermore, if the obligation is defined to start only at a certain date, fidejussio cannot begin before it. Finally, the guarantor can never be obligated to do more than the original debtor, although fidejussio can determine the guarantor e.g. to pay less of the debt.

Wolff notes that one debt can have many guarantors, and there are two main ways how this could happen. Firstly, all of them might be guarantors in conjunction. In that case, the fidejussio contract might determine who is to pay what - for example, if there is a certain ratio in which different guarantors want to pay the debt. If such a contract does not exist, Wolff says, then the person, to whom the debt should be paid (the creditor), can choose any guarantor. Secondly, guarantors can form ordered successions, that is, guarantors themselves can have their own guarantors. In such a case, naturally, the second guarantor will have to fulfill the obligation only if the original debtor and the first guarantor cannot do it.

Expromissio

Expromissio is a contract resembling fidejussio quite closely. The main difference is that while in fidejussio guarantor must fulfill the obligation only if the original debtor cannot do it, in expromissio the obligation is at once transferred to the new person. Indeed, expromissio releases the original debtor from the obligation completely.

Christian Wolff: Natural right 4 - Money, money, money

Although Wolff has just spoken in considerable detail about donations, he does note that usually we expect to receive something in return, when we give or do things to another person. Indeed, Wolff continues, if the other person can give or do something in turn, we are entitled to expect that they do. We can even expect that they will give or do something in the same ratio as we have given or done to them.

The phrase “same ratio” already presupposes that we can somehow quantify things we give or do. In other words, we expect them to have a specific value that we can determine. Now, Wolff notes that value of things is at least partially arbitrary - there is nothing in a piece of furniture to suggest that it should be tradable to so and so many bananas. Yet, Wolff at once concedes, we can at least insist that value is at least proportional to certain physical quantity. In other words, if a kilo of potatoes or an hour of work has a definite value, then two kilos of potatoes and two hours of work have double of that value.

In addition, Wolff also notes that the value of things should be determined by their place in economic processes. Thus, a price of land should reflect its possible produce, while the price of an industrial product is to be determined by the prices of the raw materials used for the thing, the price of work required in doing the product and other expenses. Wolff also notes that some ethical rules should govern the prices. For instance, we should take care that the most necessary things would have a smaller price than luxury items.

Determining the value of a thing in comparison to another thing is not an easy task. Hence, Wolff concludes, to simplify transactions we should choose a certain class of corporeal things as a common measure of value, that is, as money. This money, Wolff says should consist of some truly durable matter that will not be corrupted by rust nor won’t spoil. Then again, he also notes that money should consist of matter that is not needed for much else beyond its use as a measure of value. Finally, he concludes, money should consist of rare matter, so that its own value would be stable enough.These criteria suggest, Wolff concludes, that gold and silver are optimal raw materials for money.

Just like with all other countable things, Wolff continues, the price of money should be proportional to its quantity, or more precisely, its weight. To make it easier to know how much money weighs, gold or silver should be cut into small proportions or coins, with the weight of the coin stamped on it. This marking on a coin should be a reliable sign of its weight, thus, Wolff concludes, coins should not be forged e.g. by mixing baser metals with gold and silver.

Existence of money makes it possible to estimate how wealthy a person is - just turn all the property of a person into its monetary price, subtract possible debts and consider what kind of things the person could buy with that quantity of money. Wolff delineates several levels of things one could purchase with money. The lowest level is formed by necessities, which are essential for keeping a human being alive. A step further is the level of commodities, which are not as necessary, but still useful for everyday life. Above commodities is the level of jucundities, that is, things which make life pleasant, and above them, things required by decorum. Whatever remains beyond that level, Wolff concludes, is superfluous luxury.

Now, Wolff defines poverty as a state in which a person can afford at most only the necessities of life, if even those. On the contrary, a rich person is such that can afford even superfluities. Wolff gives some laughably obvious tricks for avoiding poverty, “spend less than you produce” being the most trivial. Still, he does not regard poverty as mere sign of laziness or reckless behaviour. Instead, he insists that poverty is just bad fortune, just like richness is also just good fortune. Wolff also suggests that it is decorate that rich people should try to equalise the gap between the rich and the poor by donating some of their money to the poor.

Christian Wolff: Natural right 4 (1744)

Christian Wolff continues his journey through natural right or law simply with a more detailed look on possible types of transactions. He begins from cases where transactions go only to one direction, that is, cases where a person gives some property or does some action to another person, without receiving anything in return, in other words, donations - a topic he also decides to concentrate on in the prologue of the book.

In a sense, this starting point is quite natural, since unidirectional transaction is simpler than a transaction in both directions. Yet, it also might imply a deeper principle in Wolff’s philosophy - we are obligated to create perfection around us, hence, we are obligated to help others by donations or beneficial actions. This obligation, Wolff says, is present even in a state where everything is shared with everyone and no private property exists - at this stage it is not things, but actions that are, in a sense, donated. Although donating is duty, Wolff clarifies, it is still only an imperfect duty, that is, we cannot say to whom we have to donate. Thus, no one can be forced to donate to a particular person. On the other hand, the recipient of donation is obligated to be grateful to the donor.

In another sense, donation is not just a one-sided deal, Wolff points out, because the recipient of the donation must still accept it. This is especially crucial when we remember that donation might be only conditional - for instance, someone might donate a sum of money to a person, on the condition that the recipient will train to be a doctor. Although one might see no reason for not accepting an unconditional donation, donations with such additional conditions are a completely different thing.

Wolff notes that donations can also happen through words and letters, and just like in the previous book, we find him speculating whether the donor can still cancel the donation, if the post hasn’t delivered the donation letter. Such verbal donations still, of course, obligate the donor to do what has been promised, whether it is a physical delivery of a thing or some other action.

Something Wolff has also noted in previous parts of natural law is that no contract or promise is valid, if the persons making them are not adults in their full senses. Thus, also in this case, no minors, people with mental conditions or intoxicated are allowed to donate. Wolff also notes that we are allowed to donate only with proper consideration and not rashly. Still, it is the duty of donor to notice when the donation has not been considered. If the donor does not do the necessary self-check, the recipient does not have the obligation to do it for them - although if a recipient notices that donor has acted rashly, Wolff admits, they should return the donation.

A peculiar case of donation Wolff singles out is the handing out of alms, by which Wolff means simply a donation meant for covering the bare necessities of life. Although everyone is obligated to give alms - even more so than to donate in general, because bare necessities are essential to all human beings - again, giving alms is just an imperfect duty and no one can be forced to it. On the other hand, beggars do have the right to argue to anyone, why they should be given alms.

Although Wolff then does accept the practice of begging, he does want to restrict who can do begging. According to Wolff, everyone should primarily take care of themselves with their own work. Hence, begging is allowed, he says, only if the would-be beggar cannot provide themselves with their own work, which can happen if they don’t have the capacity to do work, if they could and wanted to work, but no one would hire them, or if they did work, but the work would not pay enough for necessities of life.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - The law of the land

The purpose of state or republic, according to Crusius, is to guarantee common good of its citizens, and prudence in affairs of state means finding the best means for this common good. Crusius notes that no one constitution is the only possible means for common good - all three simple constitutions (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy) and their various combinations could work. Following tradition beginning from Aristotle, Crusius remarks that all of these constitutions could also be corrupted, if the regents of the state cared only for themselves and their own class (e.g. the three simple constitutions could be corrupted into tyrannies, oligarchies and ochlocracies). This corruption or illness of republic, Crusius clarifies, is not to be confused with mere irregularity of republic, where its constitution does not wholly serve the common good - irregularity does not yet give subjects right to overthrow their regents nor does it give other republics a right to meddle in its affairs.

In practice, Crusius advises that constitution of a republic should somehow restrict the power of regent. At least during the crucial time, when a new regent is required, either citizens should have a say in choosing the new government of the republic or this should be precisely determined by the constitution, so that the common good would not be too dependent on whims of an arbitrary individual. Indeed, the constitution should allow for strengthening and weakening the power of the regent, as the situation demanded.

In monarchy, Crusius specifies, regularity of the state demands that the power of the monarch is restricted by immutable laws, and even better, by an independent council or collegium, because individual rulers can easily become vicious. Still, Crusius adds, these restrictions shouldn’t get in the way of swift decisions, if common good required them. Furthermore, Crusius suggests that monarchies should be hereditary, because this would allow educating future monarchs to their position.

In addition, hereditary monarchies fall more rarely in civil wars, Crusius believes. In fact, he considers civil war so great a danger that he counsels making hereditary lines definite. Crusius advises particularly against monarchies with several monarchs, because at worst this encourages civil wars and at best it still weakens the republic.

Crusius has not as much to say about aristocracies and democracies. He notes that aristocracies should not be hereditary, because that could prevent best people becoming regents. Furthermore, Crusius thinks that rules stating how an aristocratic counsel comes to a decision should be clear, so that there would be no ambiguity about the decision making process. Of democracies Crusius really has nothing to say beyond noting that it requires a completely civilised nation.

In addition to choosing a constitution, Crusius continues, prudence in affairs of state concerns also the day-to-day decisions of a republic. Individual republics have their own particular circumstances requiring particular decisions, but Crusius notes that some general rules can be justified already by the general nature of republics.

Crusius begins by noting that good and prudent government has three goals, none of which should be ignored nor emphasised over others. First goal is to secure the position of regent and apply his powers most efficiently. Crucius remarks that writers like Machiavelli had focused on this goal, forgetting that the good of the regent was intricately connected with the good of the citizens, the second goal of prudent government. This second goal was overemphasised, Crusius says, by republican writers, who had forgotten that a republic still required an efficient regent. Finally, Crucius picks as the third goal the status of republic among other republic. Just like with other goals, he notes that some politicians focused too much on this particular goal, forgetting that external glory of state is based on its internal happiness.

Crusius states that prudence in affairs of state uses the very same capacities as prudence in private affairs, although it applies these capacities in different matters, which it then ought to be informed of. Specifically prudent governor should know the geographical characteristics of the land and the citizens, the political constitution of the whole republic and various communities within it, economic state of the republic, and finally, interests and goals of neighbouring republics.

Crusius emphasises the role of religion as the basis of security of republics. In addition to religion, sciences, arts and freedom of thinking should be protected, because they serve as means for securing all the goals of human life and make republics respected. Despite the lip service to freedom of thinking, Crusius is not willing to tolerate ideas working against the security of state, such as, he insists, atheism.

Crusius advises regents to be careful in choosing their officials and to prefer intelligent and virtuous people over those of high birth. Still, he also suggests that regents should not replace their own intelligence with the intelligence of their officials and that they should closely control the doings of those officials, because they work in the name of the regent. Crusius insists that officials should always follow direct commands of regent, to make the republic secure, while laws, according to Crucius, can be broken, if it is prudent to do so. Indeed, Crusius suggests, good example of regent guides subjects better than any laws.

Crusius speaks for strict regulation of state spendings - republic should always have some reserve finances, in case money is required for emergencies. Money shouldn’t particularly be given freely to subjects, Crusius argues, because they wouldn’t respect what they haven’t worked for, and they particularly shouldn’t have the right to press their own coinage. Instead, subjects should be taxed heavily, Crusius says, since no citizen should have means to live by oneself, but be in various ways dependent on other citizens. Indeed, a person providing sustenance to others should be congratulated, Crusius suggests, because they help to realise one goal of republic. To make taxation fair, Crusius notes, richer individuals should pay the most. Generally, he insists that money should be directed to move from owner to another from time to time, since in this manner it helps the state and the subjects more than if it remained stagnant. Thus, if some goods in land were still ownerless, they could be taken as regent’s property, so that they could be used for everyone’s benefit.

Crusius has not very much to say about legislation, beyond the general fact that laws should be applicable to different subjects. Furthermore, Crusius emphasises that laws should definite, so that there can be no room for misinterpretation, whether it is accidental or purposeful. Against another sort of fraud is directed Crusius’ advise that regents should be careful that religious communities won’t meddle into civil life of their members, since this is often a way to deceive lower classes.

When it comes to foreign relations, Crusius advocates for maintaining the army in good condition, because a strong army has an important role in preventing foreign conquest and in raising the prestige of the republic, which is important for achieving its goals. In commerce, Crusius holds onto essentially mercantilist ideals: foreign imports should be restricted, because losing gold weakens the state, and if something is to be imported, it should be raw materials that are then further developed into manufactures that could be sold to other countries for more money. Crusius still does not believe that republics are only competitors of one another. Indeed, he says that just like humans require friends, countries require alliances for their own security.

Christian August Crusius: Instruction to live reasonably - How to win friends and influence people

After dealing with the general rules of prudence, Crusius turns to its first area of application, that is, private affairs. He begins by noting that large parts of this study can be discarded, because they belong already to other sciences. Firstly, prudential care of one’s body and health belongs to medicine, secondly, prudential care of one’s understanding and intellect is the matter of logic, and finally, prudential care of one’s will and motivations has already been dealt in various parts of ethics and moral philosophy.

What is left for Crusius to consider is the prudential care of relationships with other people - in other words, how to get others to respect, honour and care for us. Unlike in case of proper moral philosophy, this is not so much a question of what one is deep down like and what an ideal, omniscient, God-like observer would say about one’s character, but more about how one appears to other people. Thus, although a person would be far from perfection in some field, she might still be respected, because she was viewed as perfect, at least when compared to other people.

Even so, Crusius is quick to warn his readers to avoid such a mere relative honour, because an honour based on being better than someone else will just create envy in others. In fact, he notes, lasting respect and honour must be based on true perfections. Furthermore, he continues, one should be careful in not bragging about one’s perfections and showing them only with good understanding, if one wants others to respect them.

A further, but related question Crusius considers is how to get people to love oneself. Love, Crusius defines, is awakened by perceiving perfections in someone and makes the lover attempt connecting with the beloved. Most often love is awakened, Crusius says, by perception of a perfection of will, because good will and good behaviour are signs of a person who is easy to connect with. Indeed, Crusius notes, a simple way to find love is to show love. Similarly, one should avoid things like mocking others and being ungrateful, if one does not want to be despised by others.

Crusius defines friendship as a type of love, more particularly, as connection of persons, in which both attempt to promote one another’s private ends. Because friendship is kind of love, Crusius advises, finding friends is a lot like making people love oneself. Indeed, he notes that best means for getting friends is to make oneself indispensable to others.

With this rather Dale Carnegian part of Crusius’ philosophy behind us, we have only one more part of the book to consider - that of prudential affairs of state.