Now, Crusius continues, it is interesting to ask what is the cause of this natural tendency. One possible suggestion could be that this cause lies somewhere outside humans, for instance, in the matter as such. Crusius notes that this explanation isn’t believable. True, matter might hinder our actions or then awaken some unpleasant sensations in us. Yet, neither of these need make us do anything evil - for instance, even if see horrific things, it is still down to us to decide how to react to them.
Similarly, the cause of evil cannot be any Satanic spiritual entity, Crusius notes. At most such a devilish figure could tempt human beings into evil actions. Still, even after being tempted, a person would have the choice whether to follow the suggestions of the tempter.
Crusius also denies that any divine entity could be behind human evil. It certainly couldn’t be God, Crusius says, because he has at most created the conditions, which allow the appearance of evil, but he still hasn’t caused this appearance. Furthermore, Crusius doesn’t believe that any Manichaean evil divinity could explain the problem of evil, because at most such a divinity could create a tendency to evil in humans. In addition, no other divinity beyond God can even exist, Crusius continues.
The reason for evil lies then in the human themselves, and the only question is whether it lies in their essential imperfection or in their arbitrary choices. The first of these was often dubbed metaphysical evil, but Crusius notes that due to its essentiality and necessity it is not true evil, but at most something that makes real evil possible. Indeed, he continues, trying to explain human evil through essential imperfection is just an attempt to confuse the difference between evil and good persons.
True evil, Crusius concludes, is thus caused by abuse of free will, when it has chosen a state that is contrary to what God has ordained. This abuse moves us away from our original state, which has been either indifferent to goodness and badness or then tends toward goodness. Crusius notes that this abuse or vice might be caused by two things: firstly, weakness of forces that should regulate us toward good decisions, and secondly, actively perverted direction of these regulating forces.
In addition to the division of vices by their cause, Crusius notes at least two ways to classify them. Firstly, vices can be divided according to the faculty it involves - understanding, will or both. Secondly, we can speak of simple or complex vices. Thus, there are simple vices of understanding, such as inattention or perverted curiosity for novelties, and simple vices of will, such as laziness and self-seeking. Of complex vices Crusius notes only three he considers most remarkable: avarice or perverted desire of wealth, lust or perverted desire for completely passive pleasures and ambition or perverted desire to be noticed by others.
Crusius notes that vicious behaviour is on the long run detrimental to a person. It involves always self-deception, since a vicious person has an improper notion of the worth of something. Furthermore, Crusius suggests, vicious person things wrongly that she can fulfil her desires, although they should be instead regulated. The result of this false idea is that the desire just grows and grows, when one gets used to pleasures and requires more stimulation to get to the same level of pleasure. If this continues, vices become habitual and enslave the person so that no free will can ever correct the situation.
Vicious person is then heading toward sickness of body and soul, Crusius notes. Furthermore, he continues, vicious people also hurt others, which alienates her from her fellow humans. But the worst consequence, according to Crusius, is that vicious person has lost her connection to God.
Vicious life is then painful, and this pain is sometimes good tool, by which a person can find an impetus for changing her life better. Generally, a person can cure her vicious behaviour by distancing oneself from all the things luring her to vicious actions and by strengthening both the motives pushing one toward good actions and forces necessary for doing those good actions.
Crusius notes that it is not clear how well repentance and struggle toward better life can heal the damage caused for oneself and for others by one’s own vicious behaviour. At least such corrective measures weaken the effects of vicious behaviour, but even a complete purification of one’s soul couldn’t really make damage undone. It is then unclear whether God will accept these measures or whether he has designed yet another form of punishment for the purpose of clearing one’s consciousness. Because this cannot be known from rational reasons, Crusius concludes, we must assume God has revealed his will on this matter, but this is more of a question of religion than of ethics.
