In previous post, I
spoke of Wolff's general idea of the appetetive side of human mind
and particularly of appetites based on unanalyzed information from
perception, apperception and phantasms. Just like the move from lower to
higher faculties of cognition happens through analysis of perceptions
and phantasma, so does the move from lower to higher faculties of
appetite, that is, from sensuous appetite to will. What distinguishes
will from mere sensuous appetite or volitions from affects is that in
case of volitions we can in general tell why we want or avoid
something. In other words, volitions are based on conscious motives.
Although the
existence of motives does characterize volitions, this doesn't mean
that motives of our volitions would be completely transparent to us.
Just like in case of concepts, the analysis of our motives could well
be only partial and lead only to some gut feeling we couldn't really
base on anything. Indeed, lack of reliable information could well
lead us to volitions that we would discard at once, if we just knew
better – for instance, we might follow a diet that we thought to
make us healthy, even if more complete studies would reveal its
inefficiency.
Furthermore, even if
we knew well enough what was good for us, we might receive
contradictory information from our senses that might be difficult to
ignore due to its vividness, which might result in a mental conflict.
Thus, we might well know that eating certain foods is bad for our
condition, but the rich odours coming from grill might still seduce
us to savour the taste of such detrimental nutrients.
Indeed, in actual
decision making out motives are usually far from complete, and only
in hindsight can we rationalize our actions and explain why we did
them. This does not make us completely passive, because many impulses
besides willing guide our activities. These other impulses also help
Wolff solve the problem of Buridan's ass, that is, what to choose,
when none of the options has a stronger motive than others. Wolff is
of the opinion that we could choose in such cases, even if it would
come about with great difficult. This choice could then be helped by
other factors beyond motive. One of these is habit, which often takes
the place of a motivated, reasoned choice. Thus, Buridan's ass might
just prefer to pick out always a left hay stack, even if it had no
reason to do this.
Wolff's account of
Buridan's ass reveals that he doesn't think motives work in the same
way as causes do – if two forces equal in quantity, but working in
opposite directions would affect same object, no movement would
occur, but two opposed motives do not prevent actions. Indeed, Wolff
admits that motives do not so much determine actions, but give us a
chance to choose some activity. Thus, humans cannot act without any
motive at all, but they can still decide which motive to ignore and
which not. This does not mean that we could choose what volitions and
motives we do have, although Wolff admits that we could gradually
teach ourselves to gain or lose some volitions. True liberty, Wolff
concludes, lies actually in our ability to choose from given options
the one pleasing us most. Because volitions are then not determined
by the essence of the soul, this is enough to avoid Spinozistic
conclusions, Wolff says.
Freedom to act
is not restricted to choices within our own mind, Wolff argues
further, because our actions do appear to have some effect on our
bodies – if I decide to raise my hand, my hand is instantly raised.
The power of mind over body is still not absolute, because we cannot
just will our body to do physical impossibilities like flying. In
addition, changes in body are instantly followed by changes in our
mind, for instance, when light touches our eye. This is as much as
we can empirically determine from their relation, that is, that they
are dependent on one another. Real explanations of this
interdependence will be offered in Wolff's Rational psychology,
but now we are going to take a second look on Gottsched' philosophy.