After cosmology, Wolff turns his
attention once again to human soul, and just like in his German
metaphysics, he divides the topic into two parts. The book I now
reading, or Psychologia empirica, concerns, as the title
says, empirical psychology, which is meant to provide us with the
experiential information that any theory of human soul or
consciousness should be able to explain. Second part, or rational
psychology, is then supposed to present the theory used for
explaining the propositions of empirical psychology.
Psychology is so for Wolff an empirical
science, and it is through experience that we must ascertain the
existence of the very topic of psychological investigations, that is,
the human soul. Wolff can finally apply the Cartesian strategy, with
which he had started the German metaphysics. He begins from the
rather indubitable fact that we are aware of things external to us.
Note that we need not confirm that there are things outside us, just
that there is this state of being conscious of them. Now, it is easy
to conclude that there must also be someone who is conscious, or the ”I”.
Wolff declares that the starting point
of the deduction or the state of consciousness of external things is
so indubitable that psychology has as certain beginning as
mathematics. Clearly, he once again does not want to say that the
existence of external things is certain, but only that our
consciousness of them is. Wolff thus suggests that the consciousness
of external things is dependent on the possibility of being conscious
of ourselves. Later on, Kant tried in his refutation of idealism, as
it were, to reverse this line of thought and show that our
self-consciousness is dependent on our consciousness of external
things.
Wolff then defines soul as that which
is conscious of itself and external things. One might wonder if Wolff
is here moving to the perilous area of Kantian paralogisms. Yet, one
must remember that at the stage of empirical psychology Wolff merely
describes what can be experienced without committing himself to any
theories explaining these experiences. Thus, Wolff can certainly
assume that there is both consciousness of things and consciousness
of this consciousness and that these two states of consciousness are
part of same stream of consciousness. He might even have the right to
call this stream soul, if he just refrains from saying that the soul
is e.g. immortal and independent substance – it would be just a
different name for human mind or consciousness.
A more difficult problem lies in the
question about the relationship of soul and body. Like a good
Cartesian, Wolff notes that soul is known before body, that is, while
we can be quite certain of the existence of our soul, the existence
of our body is more doubtful. One might think that this assumption
relies on Kant's fourth paralogism about the supposed relationship of
soul and body. Yet, when it comes to empirical psychology, Wolff even
here remains within the limits of what Kant could accept. Even Kant
doesn't deny that ”I am and I think I am” is far more certain
that the statement ”I am a bodily being”. It is only when from
these facts conclusions like ”I am not a bodily being” are drawn
that philosophers stray from a safe path.
Wolff's empirical psychology is then
not full of paralogisms – if these are anywhere to be found, it
will be in rational psychology, where Wolff will try to explain the
empirical facts of our mental life. Even so, we still have to ask
whether Wolff's methodology in empirical psychology is acceptable, as
even I have voiced some skepticism about it.
Now, the aim of empirical psychology,
according to Wolff, lies in cognition of our own soul: cognition is
here defined as nothing else but awareness or consciousness of
something. The cognition of ourselves, Wolff continues, we receive
through our capacity of apperception. The word ”apperception” was
introduced by Leibniz, because he wanted to separate consciousness of
external things (perception as such) from consciousness of oneself.
Wolff follows this lead in a rather unimaginative fashion.
Perception, he says, is simply representation of something, while
apperception is then perception of ourselves. All perceptions involve
the possibility of apperception, that is, when we observe, for
instance, an apple, we can also note that we are observing this
apple. Wolff just takes it for granted that this self-observation is
unproblematic, without considering in Kantian manner how this
self-observation takes place. Yet, despite these methodological
problems, we might still accept the results of such a
self-observation, just as long as we do not make any problematic
inferences from them – that is, just as long as we remain at the
level of empirical psychology and note, for instance, that we have
memories, without stepping to the field of rational psychology by
trying to explain why we can remember things.
Before
moving onward to a more substantial account of capacities of human
mind, I shall make a note of the structure of the book. Wolff uses
the trusted notion that human mind has a cognitive and volitional part,
basing even the division of the book on that presupposition. Within
each major part, Wolff then differentiates between less and more
clear faculties – sensory perceptions from understanding, sensuous
impulses from free will. Next time, we shall be looking at the book
in more detail, starting from sensation or perceptions.